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Abstract
This thesis examines foreign government loan issues on the London capital market in the 
period from 1870 to 1913, with special reference to Japan.
Chapter One provides an overview of foreign government loan issues in London. 
Chapter Two deals with a number of more specific topics: the development of the loan 
issue organisations on the market, and the role and involvement of various types of 
financial institutions in loan issue business.
Later Chapters mainly take up the detailed history of Japanese government loan 
issues, referring to domestic Japanese financial conditions. Chapters Three to Seven 
examine the development of Japanese government loan issues on the international capital 
markets. Throughout these operations Japan enhanced its creditworthiness by successfully 
spreading its loan issue operations from London to New York, Berlin and Paris. Chapter 
Eight discusses municipal and company loan issues, with a view to comparing them with 
the government’s. Chapter Nine discusses the role of the Japanese government’s deposits 
in London under the international gold standard system, and the effects of the Japanese 
government loan issues on Japan’s foreign trade. The Conclusion summarises the main 
arguments of the thesis.
3Content
Abstract 2
Content 3
List of tables and charts 6
List of abbreviations used 10
Rates of exchange (1913) 12
Definition 12
Acknowledgements 13
Introduction 15
Part I. Foreign government loan issues on the London capital market. 32
Chapter One. Foreign government loan issues
in London, 1870-1913. 33
1.1 Trends 33
1.2 Geographical distribution 54
1.3 Yields 57
1.4 Commissions 65
1.5 Market linkages 69
1.6 Conclusion 75
Chapter Two. Loan issue mechanism of the London capital market. 76
2.1 Development of the loan issue mechanism 77
2.1.1 Loan issues in the early nineteenth century 77
2.1.2 A new business practice - syndication 79
2.1.3 A new business practice - underwriting 81
2.2 Financial institutions and loan issues 87
2.2.1 Clearing banks 87
2.2.2 Overseas banks 93
2.2.3 Foreign banks 97
2.2.4 Merchant banks 100
2.2.5 The Bank of England 108
2.2.6 Stockbrokers 111
2.3 Conclusion 114
4Part II. Japanese government loan issues on the London capital market. 115
Chapter Three. Early loan issues. 119
3.1 9 percent loan issue in 1870 120
3.1.1 Railway construction and Lay 121
3.1.2 Lay’s negotiations in Japan 122
3.1.3 Lay’s activities in London 124
3.1.4 Divergence between Lay and the Japanese government 126
3.1.5 Performance 128
3.2 7 percent loan issue in 1873 129
3.2.1 Yoshida’s mission 131
3.2.2 Yoshida’s negotiations in London 132
3.2.3 Negotiations with the Oriental Bank 135
3.2.4 Performance 137
3.3 Conclusion 140
Chapter Four. Sino-Japanese war loan issues. 142
4.1 Re-sale of 5 percent domestic bonds in 1897...........................................143
4.1.1 Gold standard in Japan 143
4.1.2 Re-sale negotiations 144
4.1.3 Subscriptions 147
4.1.4 Performance 148
4.2 4 percent loan issue in 1899 153
4.2.1 Preliminary negotiations 153
4.2.2 Loan issue negotiations 156
4.2.3 Performance 160
4.2.4 Parr’s Bank and Japanese government loan business 162
4.3 Re-sale of 5 percent domestic bonds in 1902 172
4.3.1 Loan issue negotiations 173
4.3.2 Forming a syndicate 176
4.3.3 Performance 178
4.4 Conclusion 182
5Chapter Five. Russo-Japanese war loan issues (1). 184
5.1 Diplomatic negotiations 187
5.2 Baring Brothers and war loan issue 191
5.3 Takahashi’s mission 198
5.4 Loan issue in New York 206
5.5 Performance 211
5.6 Conclusion 215
Chapter Six. Russo-Japanese war loan issues (2). 219
6.1 6 percent loan issue in November 1904 220
6.2 4 1/2 percent loan issue in March 1905 230
6.3 4 1/2 percent loan issue in July 1905 238
6.4 4 percent loan issue in November 1905 247
6.5 Conclusion 263
Chapter Seven. Loan issues after the Russo-Japanese war. 265
7.1 5 percent loan issue in 1907 266
7.2 4 percent loan issue in 1910 283
7.3 Conclusion 292
Chapter Eight. Municipal and company loan issues. 293
8.1 Industrial Bank and foreign loan issues 295
8.2 Municipal loan issues 299
8.3 Company loan issues 313
8.3.1 Baring Brothers and railway investments 315
8.3.2 South Manchurian Railway Co. debenture issues 321
8.3.3 Industrial Bank debenture issue 324
8.4 Conclusion 331
Chapter Nine. Effects of Japanese government loan issues. 334
9.1 Japanese government’s foreign funds 334
9.2 Foreign loans and trade balances 343
9.3 Conclusion 347
Conclusion. 361
Bibliography. 371
6List of tables and charts
Table 1.1 Nominal value of securities quoted
on the London Stock Exchange, 1853-1913 36
1.2 Britain’s Colonial and foreign portfolio
investment, 1870-1914 37
1.3 Foreign government loan issues in London, 1870-1913 38
1.4 Foreign government loan issues in London, 1870-1913
(by country) 55
1.5 Realised yields of foreign government loans, 1870-1910
(by country) 61
1.6 Realised yields of selected foreign government bonds,
1880-1913 63
1.7 Japanese government loan issue terms (London),
1870-1910 65
1.8 Commissions of Japanese government loan issues (London),
1873-1910 68
1.9 Quotation prices of Russian and Japanese governments
bonds in London and Paris, 1906-1913 74
1.10 Bank rates and taux de l’escompte (discount rates)
(1907) 74
Table 2.1 Annual profits of Parr’s Bank and Japanese government
loan issues, 1904, 1905 and 1907 93
2.2 Main earning sources of the Yokohama Specie Bank,
1899 and 1901-1906.........................................................................  100
2.3 Foreign government loan issues in London, 1870-1913
(by financial institution) 105
2.4 Comparison of capital size of various financial
institutions, 1865-1910 106
2.5 J.S. Morgan & Co.’s earning sources, 1890-1906 107
2.6 Hambros’ earning sources, 1890-1906 108
Chart 2.1 Development of syndicates and underwriting 86
Table 3.1 Total amounts of Japanese government loan issues, 1870-1913 116
3.2 Japanese government loan issues, 1870-1913 117
3.3 Yields of foreign government loans issued during 1870 129
3.4 Commission of loan issue in 1873 139
3.5 Yields of foreign government loans issued during 1873 139
Table 4.1 Revenue and expenditure of the Japanese government
(general account), 1893-1903 150
4.2 Japan’s balance of trade, 1893-1903 150
4.3 Revenue of the special Sino-Japanese war account 151
4.4 Application and allocation of 5 percent
bond re-sale in 1897 151
4.5 Main applicants for 5 percent bond re-sale in 1897 152
4.6 Outstanding amount of Japanese government’s
borrowings, 1893-1903 165
4.7 Commission of 4 percent loan issue in 1899 166
4.8 Balance sheets of Parr’s Bank, 1890-1903 167
74.9 Advances plus discounts / deposits ratios
at main clearing banks, 1890-1903 168
4.10 Earning sources at Parr’s Bank, 1894-1901 169
4.11 Investments of Parr’s Bank, 1897-1901 170
4.12 Baring Brothers’ syndicate for 5 percent bond
re-sale in 1902 180
4.13 Subscriptions of 5 percent bond re-sale in 1902 181
4.14 Commission of 5 percent bond re-sale in 1902 181
Table 5.1 Proportion of loans to total military expenditure
for the Russo-Japanese war 186
5.2 Japanese government loan issues during
the Russo-Japanese war 186
5.3 British government’s guaranteed loans before 1914 190
5.4 London issue banks’ underwriting (May 1904, London) 217
5.5 Yields of foreign government loans
issued in London during 1904 217
5.6 Allotment of 6 percent loan issue (May 1904, London) 218
5.7 Commission of 6 percent loan issue (May 1904, London) 218
Chart 5.1 Prices of British, Russian and Japanese governments
bonds in London (January, February,
April and May 1904) 205
Table 6.1 Commission of 6 percent loan issue (November 1904, London) 229
6.2 London issue banks’ underwriting (November 1904, London) 229
6.3 Allotment of bonds (November 1904, London) 230
6.4 Japanese government’s sources of military expenditure
budget for the Russo-Japanese war 237
6.5 Commission of 4 1/2 percent loan issue
(March 1905, London) 237
6.6 London issue banks’ underwriting (March 1905, London) 238
6.7 Amounts of 4 1/2 percent loan issue (July 1905, Germany) 244
6.8 Commission of 4 1/2 percent loan issue
(July 1905, London) 245
6.9 London issue banks’ underwriting (July 1905, London) 245
6.10 Outstanding amount of Japanese government’s
borrowings, 1901-1913 246
6.11 Main position of first 6 percent bonds in 1907 259
6.12 Commission of 4 percent loan issue (November 1905, London) 259
6.13 London issue banks’ underwriting (November 1905, London) 260
6.14 Application and allotment (November 1905, London) 260
6.15 4 percent loan issue (November 1905, Paris) 261
6.16 Syndicate account of 4 percent loan issue
(November 1905, Paris) 262
6.17 Amounts of 4 percent loan issue (November 1905, Germany) 262
Chart 6.1 Highest prices of first 6 percent bonds in London 
and New York (August-November 1904, and 
March and June 1905) 263
8Table 7.1 Proportion of Japanese government’s debt expenditure
(general account), 1903-1913 279
7.2 Underwriting of 5 percent loan issue (1907, London) 279
7.3 Subscriptions of 5 percent loan issue (1907, London) 280
7.4 Commission of 5 percent loan issue (1907, London) 280
7.5 5 percent loan issue (1907, Paris) 281
7.6 4 percent loan issue (1910, Paris) 289
7.7 Syndicate account of 4 percent loan issue
(1910, Paris) 289
7.8 Subscriptions of 4 percent loan issue (1910, London) 290
7.9 Commission of 4 percent loan issue (1910, London) 290
7.10 Underwriting of 4 percent loan issue (1910, London) 290
7.11 Hongkong Bank’s broking list of 4 percent loan issue
(1910, London) 291
Chart 7.1 Quotation prices of 4 percent bonds of 1905 in London,
New York and Paris, 1906-1913 282
Table 8.1 Municipal foreign loan issues, 1899-1913 309
8.2 Interest rate differentials (Bank Rates and Official
Discount Rates), 1900-1910 311
8.3 Subscriptions of the City of Tokyo 5 percent
loan issue in 1906 311
8.4 Subscriptions of the City of Osaka 5 percent
loan issue in 1909 311
8.5 Subscriptions of the City of Yokohama 5 percent
loan issue in 1909 312
8.6 Subscriptions of the City of Tokyo 5 p e rc e n t.........................................
loan issue in 1912 312
8.7 Distribution of loan issue commissions in the City of
Kyoto 5 percent loan issue in 1909 312
8.8 Company foreign loan (debenture) issues, 1905-1913 326
8.9 Company debenture issues, 1902-1913 328
8.10 First South Manchurian Railway Co. debenture issue, 1907 329
8.11 Third South Manchurian Railway Co. debenture issue, 1908 329
8.12 Fourth South Manchurian Railway Co. debenture issue, 1911 329
8.13 Commissions of first and fourth South Manchurian
Railway Co. debenture issues 330
8.14 South Manchurian Railway Co. debenture issues, 1907-1911 330
Table 9.1 Japan’s specie holdings, 1900-1913 348
9.2 Investments of the Bank of Japan (specie holdings
abroad) (31 January 1908) 348
9.3 Investments of the Japanese government (specie holdings
abroad) (31 January 1908) 349
9.4 Japan’s balance of trade, 1890-1913 350
9.5 Changes of trade balances, specie and note issues
in Japan, 1903-1913 351
9.6 Japan’s balance of payments, 1904-1913 352
9.7 Japan’s exports and imports, 1900-1910 (by main country) 353
9.8 Britain’s trade balances, loan issues and
loan payments with Japan, 1903-1911 354
99.9 The United States’ trade balances, loan issues
and loan payments with Japan, 1903-1911 355
Chart 9.1 Distribution of Japanese loan proceeds 356
9.2 Specie holdings abroad and foreign exchange 356
9.3 Japanese government’s specie holdings, 1903-1913
received 357
paid 358
9.4 Bank of Japan’s specie holdings, 1903-1913
received 359
paid 360
List of abbreviations used
10
Archives
A.G.A.
A.J.A.A.
A.M.A.E.
A.M.F.
A.N.
A.S.A.B.A.
B.B.A.
B.C.A. 
B.E.A.
B.J.A.
B.L.P.E.S.A.
B.T.A.A.
B.T.L.A.
C.B.A. 
CI.B.A.
C.C.B.A. 
H.A.
H.S.B.A.
I.B.P.A. 
J.M.F.A. 
J.M.F.A.A. 
J.N.D.L. 
K.A.
L.A.
L.B.B.A.
L.J.S.B.A.
L.C.M.B.A.
L.S.E.A.
L.S.W.B.A.
M.A.
M.B.A.
M.G.A.
MT.B.A.
P.A.A.A. 
P.B.A. 
P.R.O. 
R.A.L.
S.A.
S.O.A.S.A.
U.B.L.A.
U.L.S.B.A.
W.B.A.
Antony Gibbs Archives (Guildhall Library)
American Jewish Association Archives (Cincinnati, Ohio)
Archives du Minisfere des Affaires Etrangfcres (Paris)
Archives du Ministbre des Finances (Paris)
Archives Nationales (Paris)
Anglo-South American Bank Archives (D.M.S. Watson Library, 
University College)
Baring Brothers & Co. Archives 
R. Benson & Co. Archives 
Bank of England Archives 
Bank of Japan Archives (Tokyo)
British Library of Political & Economic Science Archives
Bank of Tarapacd & Argentina Archives (D.M.S. Watson Library, 
University College)
Bank of Tarapaca & London Archives (D.M.S. Watson Library, 
University College)
Chartered Bank of India, Australia and China Archives
City Bank Archives
Capital and Counties Bank Archives
C.J. Hambro & Son Archives (Guildhall Library)
Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corporation Archives (Hongkong)
Imperial Bank of Persia Archives
Japanese Ministry of Finance Archives (Tokyo)
Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archives (Tokyo)
Japanese National Diet Library (Tokyo)
Kleinwort & Sons Co. Archives (Guildhall Library)
Lazard Brothers Co. Archives
London & Brazilian Bank Archives (D.M.S. Watson Library, 
University College)
London Joint Stock Bank Archives
London City & Midland Bank Archives
London Stock Exchange Archives (Guildhall Library)
London & South Western Bank Archives 
Mitsui Archives (Tokyo)
Midland Bank Archives
Morgan Grenfell & Co. Archives (to 1910 J.S. Morgan & Co. Archives) 
(Guildhall Library)
Mitsui Bank Archives (Tokyo)
Politische Archiv des Auswartigen Amts (Bonn)
Parr’s Bank Archives 
Public Record Office 
N.M. Rothschild & Sons Co. Archives 
J.Henry Schroder & Co. Archives
School of Oriental & African Studies Archives (University of London)
Union Bank of London Archives
Union of London & Smiths Bank Archives
Westminster Bank Archives
11
Others
Add. MS. Additional Manuscripts (British Library)
C. Chancery (Public Record Office)
F.O. Foreign Office (Public Record Office)
Ms. Manuscripts (Guildhall Library)
T. Treasury (Public Record Office)
Companv and banks
Banque de Paris Banque de Paris et des Pays-Bas
Banque frangaise Banque frangaise pour le Commerce et l’lndustrie
Baring Brothers Baring Brothers & Co.
Benson R. Benson & Co.
Brown Shipley Brown, Shipley & Co.
Chartered Bank Chartered Bank of India, Australia & China
Comptoir d’Escompte Comptoir National d’Escompte
Crddit Industriel et Societe Gdndrale de Credit Industriel et
Commercial Commercial
Erianger E. Erianger & Co.
Gibbs Antony Gibbs & Sons
Glyn,Mills & Co. Glyn Mills, Currie & Co. (from 1864)
Hambros C.J. Hambro & Son
Hongkong Bank Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corporation
Huth Frederick Huth & Co.
Industrial Bank Industrial Bank of Japan
Kleinworts Kleinwort, Sons & Co.
Lazard Brothers Lazard Brothers & Co.
Oriental Bank Oriental Bank Corporation
Panmure Gordon & Co. Panmure Gordon, Hills & Co. (1885-1902)
Schroder J.Henry Schroder & Co.
Standard Bank Standard Bank of South Africa
The London Rothschilds N.M. Rothschild & Sons
The Paris Rothschilds M.M. de Rothschild Freres
Warburg M.M. Warburg & Co.
Books and journals
B.P.P British Parliamentary Papers
C.S.S. Chugai Shogv5 Shinpo (Domestic and Abroad Commercial Newsl
D.D.F. Documents diplomatiques franpais
G.K.S. Gaisai Kankei Shirvo (Papers related to Foreign Loans')
G.T.R. Ginko Tsushin Roku (Japanese Bankers’ Magazine!
I.M.M. Investor’s Monthly Manual
J.I.B. Journal of the Institute of Bankers
J.R.S.S. Journal of the Royal Statistical Society
M.H.S.K.T. Meijiiko Honp5 Shuvo Keizai Tokei (Hundred-Year Statistics of the 
Japanese Economvl
M.T.Z. Meiji Taisho Zaiseishi (History of Japanese Finance in the Meiji and
Taisho Erasl
M.Z. Meiji Zaiseishi (History of Japanese Finance in the Meiji Eral
M.Z.K.S.S. Meijizenki Zaisei Keizai Shirvo Shusei (Collected Papers on the 
Financial and Economic Histories in the Early Period of the Meiji Era!
12
N.G.H.S. Nippon Gink5 Hvakunenshi (One Hundredth Anniversary History of the
Bank of Japan!
N.G.B. Nippon Gaiko Bunsho (Japanese Diplomatic Records')
N.K.G.G.S. Nippon Kogv5 Gink5 Gojunenshi (Fiftieth Anniversary History of the
Industrial Bank of Japanl 
S.E.O.I. Stock Exchange Official Intelligence
S.I.D. Seigai Inouekfi Den (Biography of Inoue Kaonri
T.K.J. Takahashi Korekiyo Jiden (Autobiography of Takahashi Korekivo')
T.K.Z. Tokyo Keizai Zasshi (Tokyo Econoiflic Journals
Y.S.G.Z.S. Yokohama Sh5kin Ginko Zen Shi (Complete History of the Yokohama
Specie Bank)
Rates of Exchange (19131 
(£1 sterling=20 shillings=240 pence)
Nation Currency Shillings Pence
France
Germany
Japan
U.S.A.
Hongkong
franc
mark
yen
dollar
Hongkong dollar
9
11
1
6
1/2
4/5
1/2
1/2
Source: S.E.O.I. for 1913, p. 1691;
F.H.H. King, The Hongkong Bank in the Period of Imperial China. 
1864-1902. vol.l (Cambridge, 1987), p.xxxviii.
Definition
In this thesis the term ‘foreign’ means countries outside the British Empire.
13
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
First of all, I should like to thank my supervisors at the London School of Economics, 
Professor T.C. Barker, Dr W.P. Kennedy and Dr G. Jones (former supervisor from 1983 
to 1985, now at the University of Reading), for their kind help, encouragement and 
patience with my study, although the responsibility for the content remains entirely mine.
I also wish to express my deep gratitude to the following people, banks and 
institutions for their kind help to my research: Dr J. Booker, Madame Brot, Dr K. Burk, 
Mr C. Cove-Smith, Dr S.J. Diaper, Mr H. Gillet, Dr S. Goto, Mr E. Green, Professor 
T. Kanegae, Professor F.H.H. King, Dr D. Kynaston, Mr G. Knight, Mrs M. Lee, Ms
S. Mace, Mr C. Monk, Professor I.H. Nish, Dr J. Orbell, Mr M. Purton, Mr R.M. 
Reed, Dr R.W. Roberts, Dr P. Thane, American Jewish Association Archives, Bank of 
Japan, Broadland Archives Trust, Europeenne de Banque, Hambros Bank Ltd., Lazard 
Brothers & Co., Mitsui Archives and Morgan Grenfell Group.
14
* * *
‘The diplomatic representative makes speeches in a language utterly unknown to his 
fellow-guests. The financier, not the better for his dinner, confides in English equally 
unintelligible to the Finance Minister’s relative that the loan, if successful, will be 
entirely owing to his - the financier’s - abilities; that if unsuccessful, failure will only be 
attributable to the rotten and bankrupt state of the borrowing country. The relative and 
the diplomatic representative retire home perfectly satisfied with their relations with 
British finance, and calculating how many loans the Finance Minister can bring out 
before the unhallowed cabals of his opponents have forced His Excellency into 
resignation or exile.’ (Sir Henry Drummond-Wolff, Rambling Recollections, vol.ii
[1908], pp.65-66).
* * *
‘ foreign loan issues are serious matters for a state. Unlike the projects that individual
people, unconcerned with the state, privately depended upon low rate foreign capital, the 
state’s direct borrowing abroad will cause the responsibility of paying it off at the 
sacrifice of the state. This is very different from the case that an individual goes into 
bankruptcy or fails in business. Nevertheless, if the state ventures to raise foreign loans, 
it should not only consolidate its [financial] foundation but also firmly ensure sources of
specie for the payment of principal and interest of the loans ’ (Meiji Zaiseishi
IHistorv of Japanese Finances in the Meiji Eral. vol.8 [Tokyo, 1903], pp. 169-70).
* * *
’It is not too much to say that the modem foreign policy of Great Britain has been 
primarily a struggle for profitable markets of investment. To a larger extent every year 
Great Britain has been becoming a nation living upon tribute from abroad, and the classes 
who enjoy this tribute have had an ever-increasing incentive to employ the public policy, 
the public purse, and the public force to extend the field of their private investments, and 
to safeguard and improve their existing investments. This is, perhaps, the most important 
fact in modem politics, and the obscurity in which it is wrapped has constituted the 
gravest danger to our State.’ (J.A. Hobson, Imperialism: A Study. 3rd ed. [1938], pp.53- 
54).
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INTRODUCTION
1
This thesis aims to analyse the character of foreign government loan issues on the London 
capital market before the First World War. It will address the following questions: firstly, 
how foreign governments were able to raise funds on the London capital market, and 
secondly, what the role of financial institutions involved in these operations was? These 
questions will be answered in relation to the history of Japanese government loan issues 
on the London capital market in the period from 1870 to 1913.
Consideration will be centred on the London capital market, but the significance 
of the Paris capital market1 will also be taken into consideration. Previous research has 
established that borrowers seeking to improve the terms of loan issues would sound out 
other main capital markets when London’s conditions seemed unfavourable. International 
market linkages in simultaneous loan issues will be looked into more seriously,2 although 
London became the centre for the Japanese government foreign loan issues.
Some scholars have neglected the role of Japan’s foreign borrowings at the early 
stage of its industrialisation,3 but the importance of Japan’s large capital imports after the 
turn of the century, which resulted mainly from increased military outlay, is generally 
admitted,4 comprising over 20 percent of the total foreign government loan issues in
Platt paid attention to the availability of new capital on the Paris capital market 
for foreign investment after the turn of the century (D.C.M. Platt, Britain’s Investment 
Overseas on the Eve of the First World War [1986], pp. 131-34).
2. Landes depicted this as ‘its [merchant banking’s] very nature of a team activity’ 
which included ‘a nucleus of two or three correspondents in different major markets’ 
(D.S. Landes, Bankers and Pashas [Cambridge[Mass.], 1958 [reprinted 1979]], p. 16).
3. W.J. Macpherson, The Economic Development of Japan c. 1868-1941 (1987), p.34;
E.P. Reubens, ‘Foreign Capital and Domestic Development in Japan’ in S. Kuznets, 
W.E. Moore & J.J. Spengler (eds.), Economic Growth (Durham[N.C.], 1955), p. 179.
4. G.C. Allen, A Short Economic History of Modem Japan. 1867-1937 (1972), p.50.
16
London in the period from 1900 to 1913. The scale of the Japanese government loan 
issues reached its apogee during the Russo-Japanese War period (1904-1905), and these 
financial operations on the international capital markets, especially London, New York, 
Berlin and Paris, attracted a great deal of attention from financiers and public investors.3
The activities of Japanese banks in the London capital market before the First 
World War are another subject of interest. Japan had been a mysterious and unknown 
country to Western investors in the 1870s, but by about the turn of the century its 
creditworthiness on the London capital market had improved remarkably. Japanese- 
owned banks, supported by the Japanese government, played a significant role in 
enhancing Japan’s borrowing position abroad. The banks, in collaboration with foreign 
financiers, arranged many Japanese government foreign loan issues on favourable terms.
Very little has been said about Japanese financial activities on foreign capital 
markets before 1914. There has been no serious study of Japanese government foreign 
loan issues. In fact, H. Feis, the author of the famous book Europe the World’s Banker. 
1870-1914. published in 1930, devoted only 8 out of his 469 pages to Japanese loans.6 
M. Takahashi, one of the leading Japanese financial historians, declared that the study 
of the activities of foreign financiers involved in Japanese government loan issues was 
impossible because of the unavailability of the relevant historical records.7 G.C. Allen 
mentioned Japan’s success in raising loans abroad after the Russo-Japanese War, but did 
not further elaborate on the reason for this success, or the means by which it was 
achieved.8
5. ‘Mr. Korekiyo Takahashi’, Bankers’ Magazine, vol.78 (1904), pp.355-56. He was 
the Japanese Government Special Loan Commissioner in 1904, 1905 and 1907.
6. H. Feis, Europe the World’s Banker. 1870-1914 (New Haven, 1930 [reprinted 
1964]), pp.422-29.
7. M. Takahashi, Meiji Zaiseishi Kenkvu fStudy on the Financial History in the Meiji 
Era) (Tokyo, 1964), p.200.
8. Allen, op. cit.. p.50; M.S. Gordon, ‘Japan’s Balance of International Payments, 
1904-1931’ in E.B. Schumpeter (ed.), The Industrialization of Japan and Manchukuo 
(New York, 1940), appendix (pp.863-925) and U. Kobayashi, War and Armament Loans 
of Japan (New York, 1922) did not refer to the loan issue process.
17
The neglected area of the Japanese government foreign loan issues also forms a 
part of the wider neglected area of the loan issue process on the London capital market, 
although, exceptionally, Hall9 and Gilbert10 have scrutinised the Australian governments 
loan issues. This neglect is curious in view of the long debate about British foreign 
investment.
The tendency of the British economy to invest capital abroad accelerated from 
around the middle of the nineteenth century, and by the period just before the First 
World War had become a very conspicuous phenomenon. The beginning of Britain’s 
relative economic decline in this era stimulated interest in the Victorian foreign 
investment as one possible explanation. The study of British foreign investment became 
a controversial topic because of the lack of accurate data. In the mid-1980s Platt raised 
doubts about the established estimates” of total British foreign investment before 1914, 
considering them an over-estimation.12 Feinstein, on the other hand, has recently defended 
the widely accepted figures of Paish.13 Further controversy has arisen from a re- 
evaluation of the composition of British foreign investment. While an older generation 
of economic historians regarded this investment as overwhelmingly portfolio in nature, 
a new generation of economists and business historians have joined forces to suggest that 
perhaps as much as 40 percent of British foreign investment before the First World War
9. A.R. Hall, The London Capital Market and Australia. 1870-1914 (Canberra, 
1963).
10. R.S. Gilbert, ‘London Financial Intermediaries and Australian Overseas 
Borrowing, 1900-29’, Australian Economic History Review, vol. 11 (1971).
11. It is said that G. Paish made the most accurate calculations of the amounts of 
foreign borrowings outstanding based on the Inland Revenue’s return of dividends (‘Great 
Britain’s Capital Investments in Other Lands’, J.R.S.S.. vol.lxxii (1909), pp.465-80; 
‘Great Britain’s Capital Investments in Individual Colonial and Foreign Countries’, ibid.. 
vol.lxxiv (1911), pp. 167-87; ‘The Export of Capital and the Cost of Living’, The Statist. 
14 February 1914, supplement.
12. Platt, op. cit..
13. C.H. Feinstein, ‘Britain’s Overseas Investments in 1913’, Economic History 
Review, second series, vol.xliii-no.2 (1990), pp.288-95.
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was direct, involving ownership and control of foreign assets.14 The recent argument on 
‘gentlemanly capitalism’ as a historical framework arises from Britain’s overseas 
expansion and its effect on its economy.15 This introduction will examine some of the 
most relevant literature on the debates surrounding British foreign investment and 
Japanese foreign loan issues, before turning more directly to the main topic of the thesis.
Firstly, there have been several estimates of the size of British capital exports, 
although there has been disagreement about the most appropriate method of estimation, 
‘direct’ or ‘indirect’. Hobson,16 Caimcross17 and Imlah18 calculated it for periods before 
1914 by the ‘indirect method’ - the residual of balance of payments deducting trade and 
some of non-trade items is equivalent to capital transfer.19 Feinstein detailed the United 
Kingdom’s foreign investment in the period from 1870 to 1965 using this method.20 
Clearly this produces a more correct figure for capital movements if the balance of 
payments data are accurately provided. Yet information on individual loan issues on the
14. P. Svedberg, ‘The Portfolio-Direct Composition of Private Foreign Investment in 
1914 Revisited’, Economic Journal, vol.88 (1978), pp.763-77; J.H. Dunning, ‘Changes 
in the Level and Structure of International Production: The Last One Hundred Years’ in 
M. Casson (ed.), The Growth of International Business (1983), chapter 5; P. Hertner &
G. Jones (eds.), Multinationals (Aldershot, 1986), pp. 1-18.
15. P.J. Cain & A.G. Hopkins, ‘The Political Economy of British Expansion 
Overseas, 1750-1914’, Economic History Review, second series, vol.xxxiii-no.4 (1980), 
pp.463-90; ‘Gentlemanly Capitalism and British Expansion Overseas, I. The Old Colonial 
System 1688-1850’ and ‘Gentlemanly Capitalism and British Expansion Overseas, II. 
New Imperialism, 1850-1945’, ibid.. vol.xxxix-no.4 (1986), pp.501-25 and vol.xl-no.l 
(1987), pp. 1-26; M.J. Daunton, ‘"Gentlemanly Capitalism" and British Industry 1820- 
1914’, Past and Present, no. 122 (1989), pp. 119-58.
16. C.K. Hobson, The Export of Capital (1914), p.204.
17. A.K. Caimcross, Home and Foreign Investment 1870-1913 (Cambridge, 1953),
p. 180.
18. A.H. Imlah, Economic Elements in the Pax Britannica (New York, 1969), 
pp.70-75.
19. P.L. Cottrell, British Overseas Investment in the Nineteenth Century (1975), pp. 
12-13.
2D. C.H. Feinstein, National Income. Expenditure and Output of the United Kingdom. 
1855-1965 (Cambridge, 1972), T37-T39. There is a revised series of foreign investment 
estimates for the United Kingdom 1870-1920 in C.H. Feinstein & S. Pollard (eds.), 
Studies in Capital Formation in the United Kingdom. 1750-1920 (Oxford, 1988), table 
xvii (pp.462-63).
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London capital market, not the exact amount of the total British capital exports, is needed 
in this thesis. Despite the importance of the previous works, they are largely silent on this 
matter.
The ‘direct method’ does give more details of individual loan issues. The Council 
of the Corporation of Foreign Bondholders21 and Jenks22 tabulated foreign government 
loan issues up to 1876 (1877). Hobson calculated Britain’s investment abroad (capital 
creations) from 1870 to 1912, from the Investor’s Monthly Manual.23 Segal and Simon,24 
and Simon,25 including other data, re-calculated new British portfolio ‘foreign’26 
investment (creations and calls) from 1865 to 1914. Davis and Huttenback revised these 
studies to show flows of industrial capital distributions.27 These valuable works have 
provided the annual aggregated amounts of investment, but do not give individual loan 
issue information directly. On the basis of this literature, this study will investigate the 
information on individual foreign government loan issues in London.
Secondly, extensive literature has been generated by debates about the influence 
of capital exports on the domestic British economy.28 It has been suggested that the British 
economy would have been more successful if some of the capital exported could have 
been invested in crucial domestic industries.29 This interpretation suggests that a shortage
21. Council of the Corporation of Foreign Bondholders, Fifth Annual General Report 
(1878).
L.H. Jenks, The Migration of British Capital to 1875 (1927 [reprinted 1971]), 
appendix c.
23. Hobson, op. cit.. p.219.
24. H.H. Segal & M. Simon, ‘British Foreign Capital Issues, 1865-1894’, Journal of 
Economic History, vol.xxi-no.4 (1961), pp.566-81.
M. Simon, ‘The Pattern of New British Portfolio Foreign Investment, 1865-1914’ 
in A.R. Hall (ed.), The Export of Capital from Britain. 1870-1914 (1968), p.25.
26. Included Colonies.
27. L.E. Davis & R.A. Huttenback, Mammon and the Pursuit of Empire (Cambridge, 
1986), especially chapter 2.
28. S. Pollard made an extensive survey on this issue (‘Capital Exports, 1870 - 1914: 
Harmful or Beneficial?’, Economic History Review, vol.xxxviii-no.4 [1985], 
pp.489-514).
29. W.P. Kennedy, Industrial Structure. Capital Markets and the Origins of British 
Economic Decline (Cambridge, 1987), pp. 158-63; ‘Foreign Investment, Trade, and
(continued...)
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of domestic industrial investment caused by the capital exports finally helped to push the 
domestic British economy into relative decline. Many have argued that the alleged 
excessive capital exports arose from defects in British financial organisation, which 
emphasised the divergence between the City and domestic industries.30 For this study, 
these arguments have provided useful background data on the involvement of financial 
institutions, such as the merchant banks, in foreign government loan issues, but 
surprisingly little detail on the mechanism through which foreign loans were issued. 
Additionally, the behaviour of Victorian investors has been seen as one of the 
components of the biased capital market, which accelerated capital exports in the British 
economy. The higher rate of realised returns on Colonial and foreign securities has been 
confirmed by Goschen,31 Nash,32 Lehfeldt,33 Caimcross34 and Edelstein.35 Their yields 
obviously corresponded to a ‘country risk’, that is to say, high risks and high returns. 
Edelstein has explained investors’ behaviour in lending abroad on the basis of ‘risk-
29(.. .continued)
Growth in the United Kingdom, 1870-1913’, Explorations in Economic History, vol. 11- 
no.4 (1974), pp.415-44; ‘Institutional Response to Economic Growth: Capital Markets 
in Britain to 1914’ in L. Hannah (ed.), Management Strategy and Business Development 
(1976), pp. 151-83. Also seeM.W. Kirby, The Decline of British Economic Power since 
1870 (1981), pp. 15-16 and M.H. Best & J. Humphries, ‘The City and Industrial Decline’ 
in B. Elbaum & W. Lazonick (eds.), The Decline of the British Economy (Oxford,
1986), pp.223-39.
30. This allegation was repeated in every generation. See the report of the Macmillan 
Committee - Committee on Finance and Industry, Report, B.P.P. 1930-31, xiii, [Cmd. 
3897], para 384 and 397.
31. Viscount Goschen, Essays and Addresses on Economic Questions. 1865-1893 
(1905), p.21.
32. R.L. Nash, A Short Inquiry into the Profitable Nature of Our Investments (1880), 
pp.31-32.
33. R.A. Lehfeldt, ‘The Rate of Interest on British and Foreign Investments’, 
J.R.S.S.. vol.lxxvi (1913), pp. 196-207 and 415-16; vol.lxxvii (1914), pp.432-35; 
vol.lxxviii (1915), pp.452-53.
34. Caimcross, op. cit.. chapter ix.
35. M. Edelstein, Overseas Investment in the Age of High Imperialism (1982), chapter
5.
21
adjusted’ returns.36 Kennedy has described the bias of the Victorian capital market as the 
safety - risk averse - preference of British investors acting on the basis of limited 
information, a limitation that was particularly acute in equity investments in areas of high 
technology.37 However, the relationship between risks and returns, based on the 
assumption that the contemporary investors were rational and well-informed, is a key 
issue of this argument.38 Furthermore, the more one accepts the arguments of economists 
and business historians that much British foreign investment was direct, the less plausible 
it is to suggest that all British investors were risk-averse.
Thirdly, historians of diplomacy have examined foreign loan matters in connection 
with government foreign policy. Feis’s pioneering work explored the political 
relationships between lending and borrowing countries. He emphasised that capital 
movements from one country to another were often determined by ‘political circumstance 
rather than by economic or financial calculation’.39 Feis and those following in his 
footsteps rightly stressed that diplomatic relations between lending and borrowing 
countries formed the most basic structure of loan issue negotiations, but neglected their 
economic aspect, which appeared particularly in the loan issue terms. This is a subject 
that this thesis will need to explore. Within this tradition, Platt,40 McLean41 and Edwards42 
have analysed the role of diplomacy in foreign government loan issues for Egypt, Persia,
36. Edelstein, op. cit.. pp. 130-40; ‘The Rate of Returns on U.K. Home and Foreign 
Investment, 1870-1913’, Unpublished Ph. D. Thesis, University of Pennsylvania, 1970, 
part ii; ‘Rigidity and Bias in the British Capital Market, 1870-1913’ in D.N. McCloskey 
(ed.), Essays on a Mature Economy (1971), pp.83-111; ‘Realised Rates of Return on 
U.K. Home and Overseas Portfolio Investment in the Age of High Imperialism’, 
Explorations in Economic History. vol.l3-no.3 (1976), pp.283-329.
37. Kennedy, op.cit.. chapter 5.
38. Pollard, op. cit., p.495. Also see, M. Collins, Banks and Industrial Finance in 
Britain 1800-1939 (1990), pp.42-48.
39. Feis, op. cit..
40. D.C.M. Platt, Finance. Trade, and Politics in British Foreign Policy 1815-1914 
(Oxford, 1968), especially part iii.
41. D. McLean, Britain and Her Buffer States (1979).
42. E.W. Edwards, British Diplomacy and Finance in China. 1895-1914 (Oxford,
1987).
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and China respectively before 1914, but their analyses have not represented the loan issue 
processes of these countries on the London capital market.
Fourthly, business historians have shown how important foreign government loan 
issues were to particular banking concerns. There are several detailed histories of 
merchant banks, such as J.S. Morgan & Co. (Morgan Grenfell & Co.) (Burk),43 J.P. 
Morgan & Co. and J.S. Morgan & Co. (Morgan Grenfell & Co.) (Carosso),44 Baring 
Brothers & Co. (Orbell45 and Ziegler46) and Kleinwort, Sons & Co. (Diaper).47 From a 
wider perspective, Chapman has explained the involvement of merchant banks as a whole 
in the foreign loan issue business.48 They all bring out the role of merchant banks in this 
field. In addition, two recent studies of British overseas banks, the Imperial Bank of 
Persia (Jones)49 and the Hongkong Bank (King),50 have shed light upon the loan issue 
business of those institutions. These histories have provided useful information based on 
confidential archives, but naturally had the limitation of only examining the loan issues 
with which these particular banks were concerned.
However, in Britain Japanese government loan issues have not yet been considered 
in the detailed historical studies. King tabulated the Japanese government loan issues 
before 1914 which the Hongkong Bank took up.51 Orbell and Ziegler have given a very
43. K. Burk, Morgan Grenfell 1838-1988 (Oxford, 1989).
44. V.P. Carosso, The Morgans (Cambridge[Mass.], 1987).
45. J. Orbell, Baring Brothers & Co.. Ltd. (1985).
46. P. Ziegler, The Sixth Great Power (1988).
47. S.J. Diaper, ‘The History of Kleinwort, Sons & Co. in Merchant Banking, 
1855-1961’, Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, University of Nottingham, 1983.
48. S. Chapman, The Rise of Merchant Banking (1984), especially chapter 6.
49. G. Jones, Banking and Empire in Iran (Cambridge, 1986).
*. F.H.H. King, The Hongkong Bank in Late Imperial China. 1864-1902. vol.l 
(Cambridge, 1987), chapter 14; The Hongkong Bank in the Period of Imperialism and 
War. 1895-1918. vol.2 (Cambridge, 1988), part ii.
31. King, op. cit.. vol.2, pp. 143-46, ‘Appendix A, Summary of Japanese Public 
Loans with Hongkong Bank’. Yet his table is incomplete: for instance, S. Samuel & 
Co. was not an issuer of the bond re-sale in 1897 (p. 143); N.M. Rothschild & Sons Co. 
were one of the loan issuers of the 4 percent loan in 1905 (p. 144); there were two 
Japanese government short-term loan issues in 1912 which the Hongkong Bank 
undertook.
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brief explanation of Baring Brothers & Co.’s involvement in the Japanese government 
loan issues in London during the Russo-Japanese War.52 They have by no means revealed 
the whole of Japanese government loan issues on the London capital market before 1914.
It is clear from this survey that, while the previous literature on British foreign 
investment in the English language has provided an enormous amount of valuable 
background data, discussion of the foreign government loan issue process on the London 
capital market in general, and about Japanese government foreign loan issues in 
particular, has been limited.
In Japan, there has been no prominent and original study on British foreign 
investment, and only a small number of researches which have looked at Japanese 
government foreign loan issues, primarily because of the dearth of sources.53 Both official 
histories of the Japanese government and loan issue banks, and the diaries and 
autobiographies of government loan commissioners who negotiated on loan issues directly 
with foreign financiers, have provided useful information about Japanese government 
foreign loan issues. However, it is right to say generally that the study of Japanese 
government foreign loan issues in Japan is still at the level of fact-finding. The relevant 
literature on government foreign loan issues is categorised as follows.
Firstly, there are two official histories of the Japanese Ministry of Finance which 
have discussed the foreign loan issue process from the viewpoint of the Japanese 
government. These have provided important information for this study. The Meiji 
Zaiseishi (History of Japanese Finance in the Meiji Era)54 included the government 
foreign loan issues up to 1902; the Meiji Taisho Zaiseishi (History of Japanese Finance
52. Orbell, op. cit.. pp.68-69; Ziegler, op.cit.. pp.312-13.
53. The general perspective of capital imports to Japan has been given by M. 
Takahashi, op. cit. and Y. Horie, Gaishi Yunvu no Kaiko to Tenb5 (Recollection and 
Prospect of Capital Imports to Japan) (Tokyo, 1950).
54. Japanese Ministry of Finance, Meiji Zaiseishi (History of Japanese Finance in 
the Meiji EraL vol. 8 (Tokyo, 1904).
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in the Meiji and Taisho Eras)55 covered the government foreign loan issues fully from 
1870 to 1913. In addition, the Komura Gaikoshi (History of the Diplomat Komura 
Jutaro),56 written by the Japanese Ministry of Foreign-Affairs, has described the Japanese 
government foreign loan issues during the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905) as one of his 
diplomatic activities.
Histories of Japanese banks engaged in loan issues have often referred to 
government (including municipal and company) foreign loan issues. The Nippon Gink5 
Hvakunenshi (One Hundredth Anniversary History of the Bank of Japan!57 has examined 
the government foreign loan issues in 1897, 1899, 1904 and 1905 with which the Bank 
was officially concerned. The Yokohama Shokin Ginkozenshi (Complete History of the 
Yokohama Specie Bank)58 has discussed that institution’s involvement in the government 
foreign loan issues in 1899, 1904, 1905, 1907 and 1910, when the Bank acted as one of 
the loan issue banks on the London capital market. The Nippon K5gv5 Gink5 Goiunenshi 
(Fiftieth Anniversary History of the Industrial Bank of Japan!59 has been extremely useful 
for the research of the government foreign loan issue in 1902 and many municipal and 
company foreign loan issues. However, as has been shown in the survey for the literature 
in the English language, the restricted perspective of an individual bank history is 
unavoidable for them.
Secondly, Japanese government loan commissioners of the period have published
55. Japanese Ministry of Finance, Meiji Taish5 Zaiseishi (History of Japanese Finance 
in the Meiji and Taish5 Era), vol. 12 (Tokyo, 1937).
5<5. Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Komura Gaikoshi (History of the Diplomat 
Komura Jutaro! (Tokyo, reprinted 1966).
57Nippon Ginko Hvakunenshi (One Hundredth Anniversary History of the Bank of 
Japan! vol.l and 2 (Tokyo, 1983).
58. The Bank of Tokyo, Yokohama Shokin Ginkozenshi (Complete History of the 
Yokohama Specie Bank!, vol.2 (Tokyo, 1981).
59. The Industrial Bank of Japan, Nippon Kogvo Ginko Goiunenshi (Fiftieth 
Anniversary History of the Industrial Bank of Japan! (Tokyo, 1957).
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their diaries and autobiographies. K. Yoshida,60 the commissioner of the foreign loan 
issue in 1873, and K. Takahashi,61 the commissioner of the foreign loan issues in 1904, 
1905 and 1907, have written about their loan issue negotiations with foreign financiers. 
Most of the studies of Japanese government foreign loan issues in the Japanese language 
have rested on these sources. Yet it must be emphasised that these records observed the 
loan issue negotiations only from the viewpoint of the Japanese government (the 
borrower). It is also necessary to throw light upon the other side on the basis of foreign 
financiers’ (the lenders’) records.
Thirdly, there are several general studies of Japanese government foreign loan 
issues before 1914, although these have largely concentrated on the activities of the 
Japanese government and Japanese loan issue banks. T. Tanaka has explained the 
Japanese loan issue in 1870 in relation to railway construction. His descriptions have 
been based partly on British Foreign Office records.62 M. Senda has revealed the Japanese 
government’s loan issue activities in the United States and Europe in the period from 
1872 to 1873, drawing mainly upon Yoshida’s diary.63 N. Tamaki, using the Bank’s 
official history, has examined the involvement of the Yokohama Specie Bank in the
60. T. Tsuchiya & H. Ouchi, Meiii Zenki Zaisei Keizai Shirvo Shusei (Collected 
Papers on the Financial and Economic Histories in the Early Period of the Meiji Era), 
vol. 10 (Tokyo, 1935).
61. K. Takahashi (T. Uetsuka [ed.]), Takahashi Korekiyo Jiden (Autobiography of 
Takahashi Korekivol. vol.2 (Tokyo, 1976).
62. T. Tanaka, Meiji Ishin no Seikvoku to Tetsudo Kensetsu (Political Implications 
of the Meiji Restoration and Railway Construction in Japanl (Tokyo, 1963). Some 
remarks should be addressed to the fact that the British Foreign Office records which he 
used were supplied by a British researcher (J.J. Gerson - the author of ‘Horatio Nelson 
Lay: His Role in British Relations with China, 1849-65’, Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, 
University of London, 1967) (the appendix of Tanaka’s book, p.359). For Gerson’s 
study, see chapter 3 of this thesis.
63. M. Senda, ‘Meiji Rokunen Nanabu Ritsuki Gaisai no Boshukatei (Seven Percent
Foreign Loan Issue in 1873)’, Shakai Keizai Shigaku (Japanese Socio-Economic Journal!. 
vol.49-no.5 (1983), pp. 1-26 and ‘Meiji Rokunen Nanabu Ritsuki Gaisai no Boshukatei
(Seven Percent Foreign Loan Issue in 1873)’, (Faculty of Economics, Nippon University) 
Keizai ShOshi (Journal of Economics!, vol.54-no. 1 (1984), pp.60-104.
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Japanese government foreign loan issues in the period from 1899 to 1905.64 T. Kamaike 
has discussed the Japanese government loan issues during the Russo-Japanese War;65 M. 
Kajima has also mentioned them from the diplomatic viewpoint.66 Both have been 
dependent overwhelmingly upon Takahashi’s autobiography for mentioning the loan issue 
negotiations with foreign financiers.
It is fair to conclude, therefore, that the studies in the Japanese language are 
fragmentary. The Meiji Taisho Zaiseishi (History of Japanese Finance in the Meiji and 
Taisho Era).67 it is true, was based only on Japanese records but they are those of the 
Ministry of Finance. No one has studied Japanese government foreign loan issues using 
the archives of the British banks acting as loan issuers.
2
The ‘backwardness’ of research on the mechanism of loan issues in Britain can 
be ascribed mainly to the problem of sources. Restrictions on access to loan issue banks’ 
papers made the research almost impossible in the past. In addition, the transitory 
character of loan issue organisations complicated the study.68 Loan issue terms published 
in a prospectus or journal told nothing of the negotiations, which can only be revealed 
by the loan issue banks’ records.
Jacob Viner observed in 1929 that ‘no documented and detailed study of this phase
w. N. Tamaki, ‘The Yokohama Specie Bank: A Multinational in the Japanese Interest 
1879-1931’ in G. Jones (ed.), Banks as Multinationals (1990), pp. 191-216. This article 
was written in English, but all its primary sources were Japanese printed records.
K. Kamaike, ‘Nichiro Senso o meguru Gaisai Mondai (The Problem of Foreign 
Loans during the Russo-Japanese War)’ in S. Shinobu (ed.), Nichiro Sensoshi no Kenkvu 
(Study on the History of the Russo-Japanese War! (Tokyo, 1959), pp. 330-53.
M. Kajima, Nippon Gaik5shi (Diplomatic History of Japan), vol.7 (Tokyo, 1970).
67. It has not given detailed explanations of loan issue negotiations with loan issue 
banks because its sources were limited to Japanese records. For instance, the 
government’s loan proceeds of the second 6 percent loan issue in 1904 have not been 
disclosed (p.92).
68. Cottrell, op. cit.. p.33.
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of European diplomacy has ever been published by any historian or economist. It has 
been necessary, therefore, to piece together the miscellaneous bits of information which 
could be gathered from contemporaneous literature and from the flood of diplomatic 
documents and memoirs published since 1914. But the secrecy which ordinarily surrounds 
transactions such as are here dealt with when they occur, the reticence of diplomats even 
in their memoirs, and the rarity of informative memoirs or biographies of the financiers 
who participated in the transactions, make[s] it impossible to hope for anything like a 
complete account, even if all published sources of information had been found and used, 
of the relations between haute finance and haute politique. ,69
Recently in Britain, ‘the secrecy’ of the foreign loan issues before the First World 
War has lifted partially because loan issue banks have permitted access to most of their 
records. This thesis is based primarily on the research at the archives of Baring Brothers, 
the London Rothschilds, the Paris Rothschilds, Parr’s Bank and the Hongkong Bank, 
which were involved most deeply in Japanese government loan issues in the period from 
1897 to 1910. However, the situation in Japan is different. The banks concerned with the 
foreign loan issues are still unwilling to admit access to their archives.70 Nevertheless, this 
research could be based on several Japanese banks’ archives.71
The official histories of the Japanese Ministry of Finance are another major 
problem. These histories are important and useful sources for the study of Japanese 
government foreign loan issues, but have referred to them without any footnotes or
69. Jacob Viner, ‘International Finance and Balance of Power Diplomacy, 1880- 
1914’, Southwestern Political and Social Science Quarterly, vol.ix-no.4 (1929), pp.407- 
8 .
70. No academic researcher has yet had access to the archives of the Yokohama Specie 
Bank and the Industrial Bank, however the Yokohama Specie Bank’s official histories: 
Yokohama Specie Bank, Yokohama Shokin Ginkoshi (History of the Yokohama Specie 
Bank), vol. 1-5 and vol. 1-8 (data) (Yokohama, 1920-1936 [reprinted 1976]) and Bank of 
Tokyo, Yokohama Shokin Ginkozenshi (Complete History of the Yokohama Specie 
Bank), vol. 1-6 (Tokyo, 1980-1983), to a considerable degree, provide its business affairs.
71. 1 should like to express my sincere thanks to the favour granted to me by the Bank 
of Japan and the Mitsui Bank.
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references.72 Therefore, this study is founded on records at the Ministry of Finance 
Archives, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archives, the National Diet Library and the 
loan issue banks’ archives. Both Japanese government’s (borrower’s) and loan issue 
banks’ (lenders’) records will be used in this thesis.
This study is firmly based on business history methodology. As mentioned, 
published loan issue terms told nothing of loan issue negotiations, and only archival 
research in surviving records can reveal the details of loan issue negotiations. Each of the 
Japanese government loan issues will be examined as a case study. Such a close study of 
the development of these loan issues on the market can provide the basis for 
generalisations about the whole loan issue process. It is hoped that this thesis will make 
a substantial contribution to the knowledge about Japanese government foreign loan issues 
in the period from 1870 to 1913, and also provide new insights into the loan issue 
mechanism on the London capital market before the First World War.
.................................................................3
This thesis consists of two parts: a delineation of foreign government loan issues on the 
London capital market in the period from 1870 to 1913 (Part I), and a case study of 
Japanese government loan issues before the First World War (Part II).
Part I has no intention of chronicling a specific country’s loan issues. As it is 
impossible to follow in one study all foreign government loan issues on an archival level, 
only their general nature and character will be outlined. The focus is general. Its purpose 
is to provide a yardstick for understanding the Japanese government loan issues that will 
be discussed in Part II. In contrast, Part II provides a detailed case study of Japanese 
government loan issues in the period from 1870 to 1913, based on archival material in 
both Britain and Japan. The following is a brief, chapter by chapter, synopsis.
" M .Z.. vol.8 and M.T.Z.. vol. 12.
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Chapter 1 will give a historical perspective of foreign government loan issues on 
the London capital market in the period from 1870 to 1913, mainly based on the Stock 
Exchange Official Intelligence and the Investor’s Monthly Manual. The main table gives 
the components of individual foreign government loan issues. The geographical 
distribution of foreign government loan issues, the levels of yields, loan issue 
commissions and the linkages of loan issue markets will also be examined.
Chapter 2 will discuss the development of loan issue methods, such as syndication 
and underwriting, on the London capital markets before the First World War. The role 
and the involvement of the various types of financial institutions acting in the City 
(clearing banks, overseas banks, foreign banks, merchant banks, the Bank of England and 
stockbrokers) in Colonial and foreign government loan issues will also be scrutinised.
Chapters 3 to 9 are devoted to a detailed history of the Japanese government 
foreign loan issues in the period from 1870 to 1913. Japan’s success story, from being 
a dubious foreign borrower in the early 1870s to a respected one after the Russo-Japanese 
War, suggests the importance of efficient access to foreign markets, and of the 
borrowers’ initiative in loan issue negotiations with foreign financiers.
After the Meiji Restoration (1868), the Japanese government immediately required 
a great deal of capital to build social institutions and infrastructure for the country’s rapid 
industrialisation. The idea of public loans was totally unfamiliar in the Japan of the time. 
In Chapter 3 two early Japanese government loan issues will be examined. In 1870 and 
1873, the Japanese government raised public loans in London, the purposes of which 
were to construct a railway and to redeem pensions for the old feudal knight class 
(samurai). In the 1870s the reputation of Japanese government bonds had not yet been 
established, and they were regarded almost on the same footing as that of the notorious 
foreign governments bonds.
In the period from 1874 to 1895, Japanese government’s finances relied upon 
domestic borrowing and tax increases. The government’s annual income and expenditure 
were well-balanced; the financing of the industrialisation in the early Meiji period was
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done entirely from domestic savings. Yet the Sino-Japanese War (1895) imposed the 
burden of military expenditure on Japan’s national finances. In order to meet the 
increased outlay, the Japanese government forged new financial links with the London 
capital market in the late-1890s. Mainly because of the silver standard in Japan and the 
character of unlisted bonds on the London Stock Exchange, however, the standing of the 
Japanese government domestic bonds was not high in the City. The quotation of 5 percent 
domestic bonds on the London Stock Exchange was finally achieved in 1896, and in the 
following year the gold standard was also adopted in Japan.
From the end of the 1890s Japan entered the age of international foreign 
borrowing. Chapter 4 will discuss the three Japanese government foreign loan issues: the 
re-sale of the 5 percent domestic bonds in 1897, the new 4 percent loan issue in 1899 
and the re-sale of the 5 percent domestic bonds in 1902. Now the Japanese government, 
on a fully-fledged scale, began to organise foreign loan issues for huge armament 
expenditures, and this reached its peak during the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905). The 
Japanese government successfully created a channel to eminent financiers in the City, and 
gained high creditworthiness among public investors. Not only in London but also in 
New York, Berlin and Paris, large numbers of Japanese government war loans were 
floated simultaneously. Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 will show this rapid expansion of the 
loan issue markets.
Following the Russo-Japanese War the Japanese government raised several 
conversion loans on the Paris capital market in coalition with London. At this stage, on 
a competitive footing, Japan came to establish itself as a respected borrower on the 
international capital markets, as shown in Chapter 7. Chapter 8 will discuss municipal 
and company foreign loan issues in contrast with the Japanese government loan issues.
Chapter 9 will deal with another facet of these loan issues, that is to say, the role 
of the Japanese government’s specie holdings abroad (zaigai seikal and the repercussions 
of foreign loan issues on Japan’s trade balances with Britain. After 1903 the Japanese 
government no longer transferred the loan proceeds to Japan, but kept them in deposits
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at the Bank of England and London clearing banks. From this source the Japanese 
government settled the trade deficits in London. These loan proceeds were able to play 
a significant role in regulating the London money market. These funds, as an unintended 
consequence, helped the working of the contemporary international gold standard. Given 
the multilateral trade settlement structure, Britain acted as the largest exporter of both 
capital and goods to Japan. Britain’s large lendings to Japan increased its trade surpluses 
and minimised losses of gold and foreign exchange.
PART I
FOREIGN GOVERNMENT LOAN ISSUES 
ON THE LONDON CAPITAL MARKET
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CHAPTER 1 
FOREIGN GOVERNMENT LOAN ISSUES 
IN LONDON, 1870-1913
The London capital market was deeply involved in Japanese government loan issues in 
the period from 1870 to 1913. In order to help to understand these financial operations, 
this chapter presents a general overview of foreign government loan issues on the London 
capital market before the First World War, giving consideration to trends, geographical 
distribution, yields, commissions and market linkages. The discussion is not intended to 
be comprehensive, but it is hoped that this chapter will be sufficient to place the Japanese 
government loan issues in a proper perspective.
1.1 Trends
Although during the era of ‘Railway Mania’ between the 1830s and the 1850s British 
investors poured their funds into domestic railways, Consols remained the primary object 
for investment for many throughout the nineteenth century because of their safety. As 
shown in Table 1.1, however, Consols’ large share in transactions diminished rapidly 
after 1863, and many investors sought a prudent way to invest money abroad to return 
a higher rate of interest than at home. There was now a search for higher anticipated 
returns from overseas lending. An increased number of foreign government loans were 
issued in London in the 1860s and the 1870s, and foreign government bonds became the 
centre of the market. The British economy had by this time entered into the high age of 
capital exports. After the Franco-Prussian War (1870-1871), Paris lost its foremost 
position, and conversely London became established in its place as the world’s centre for 
foreign lending.1 ‘Now London has a manifest monopoly of every new issue of any
\  C.P. Kindleberger, A Financial History of Western Europe (1984), pp.265-67.
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importance’, The Economist observed, ‘the names of other foreign markets are mentioned 
in the prospectuses, but they obviously play a second part’.2
It was also during the 1860s and the 1870s that London merchant banks briskly 
expanded their loan issue business. Newcomers, such as Kleinworts, E. Erlanger, 
Morton, Rose & Co., Speyer Brothers, Seligman Brothers, J.S. Morgan & Co. and 
Lazard Brothers, emerged in London as cosmopolitan family banking firms.3 Some of 
them were German-born Jews who came across from the United States. These 
Anglo-American houses opened London branches and began to issue foreign loans on a 
liberal scale. Their new business strategy was to take advantage of organising 
simultaneous loan issues in London and New York.
From about 1880, instead of the foreign government bonds common in the 1870s, 
Colonial government bonds, and Indian, Colonial and American railway debentures were 
highlighted on the market, although Britain’s foreign portfolio investment always 
exceeded Colonial portfolio investment except for the period between 1875 and 1879 
(Table 1.2). Corporation bonds, domestic and Colonial, were also newly introduced into 
the market from the late-1870s. Colonial government bonds, Indian and Colonial railway 
guaranteed debentures and corporation bonds gradually expanded the gilt-edged market.
The volume of new foreign government loan issues had cyclical fluctuations. 
There was another boom in them in the late-1880s ending in the Baring Crisis of 1890. 
By 1913, however, foreign government bonds had earned a reputation as a safe form of 
investment.4 Although their volume increased, foreign government bonds were no longer 
a promising market leader, but rather stable investment objects. Industrial securities now 
registered more rapid growth.
2. The Economist. 27 December 1873, p. 1561.
3. L.H. Jenks, Migration of British Capital to 1875 (1927 [reprinted 1971]), 
pp.267-71; S. Chapman, The Rise of Merchant Banking (1984), p.55; V.P. Carosso, 
Investment Banking in America (Cambridge[Mass.], 1970), pp.91-92.
\  Kennedy labelled the foreign government bonds of 1870 ‘moderate risk’ but they 
came to be ‘safest’ in 1913 (W.P. Kennedy, Industrial Structure. Capital Markets and the 
Origin of British Economic Decline [Cambridge, 1987], pp. 128-29).
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This section will give a general view of foreign government loan issues on the 
London capital market. Simon’s calculation, the most precise one,5 is too aggregated for 
this purpose, as information on individual, not overall, foreign government loan issues 
is needed. Table 1.3 shows the individual foreign government loan issues made wholly 
or partially through the London capital market in the period from 1870 to 1913. As 
mentioned in the notes, this contains several inevitable defects resulting from the dearth 
of data which is only available from the financial press.6 Table 1.3 must be treated most 
carefully, because it includes many conversion loans and ‘partials’, amounts placed 
outside London simultaneously. This table, therefore, is not able to support a calculation 
of the amount of British foreign exports or of capital transfers from the London capital 
market. Its validity is strictly limited to a general overview of foreign government loan 
issues on the international capital markets, especially London. Despite these short­
comings, however, it should be possible to gain an idea of the nature and character of 
foreign government loan issues coming before the London capital market in the years 
from 1870 to 1913.
5. M. Simon, ‘The Pattern of New British Portfolio Foreign Investment, 1865-1914’ 
in A.R. Hall (ed.), The Export of Capital from Britain. 1870-1914 (1968), pp.38-39.
6. Chapman complained ‘none of these published sources is complete’ (op. cit.. p. 191 
[note 23]).
Table 1.1 Nominal Value of Securities quoted on the London Stock Exchange.
Securities 1853
1853-1913 
1863 1873 1883 1893 1903 1913
British government 853.6 901.9 858.9 871.6 810.2 936.2 1013.0
stocks (100) (106) (101) (102) (95) (HO) (119)
[70] [56] [38] [24] [12] [11] [9]
Corporation stocks - - - 50.0 91.4 166.0 277.1
(Domestic) (100) (183) (332) (554)
[1] [2] [2] [3]
Corporation stocks - - 35.3 13.0 43.9 48.1 156.5
(Colonial & Foreign) (100) (37) (124) (136) (443)
[2] [0] [1] [0] [1]
Colonial government - 24.7 47.3 130.6 264.9 334.6 455.7
securities (100) (191) (529) (1072) (1355) (1845)
[2] [2] [4] [4] [4] [4]
Foreign stocks 69.7 146.7 403.9 831.5 2384.6 2884.3 3133.9
(100) (210) (579) (1193) (3421) (4139) (4496)
[6] [9] [18] [23] [36] [33] [28]
Railways
Domestic 193.7 245.2 374.0 658.1 854.8 1104.6 1217.3
(100) (127) (193) (340) (441) (570) (628)
[16] [15] [16] [18] [13] [12] [11]
Indian * 68.7 102.0 80.0 105.5 134.0 151.4
ii ii (100) (132) (168) (189)ii ii [2] [2] [1] [1]
Colonial * ii ii 51.6 119.0 154.5 313.4ii ii (100) (231) (299) (607)
[4] [4] [2] [2] [2] [3]
American - - 82.7 307.6 743.7 1107.5 1729.6
(100) (372) (899) (1339) (2091)
[4] [9] [11] [12] [15]
Foreign 31.3 132.0 168.8 378.0 596.1 581.9 736.1
(100) (422) (539) (1208) (1904) (1859) (2352)
[3] [8] [7] [10] [9] [7] [7]
Industries 66.8 85.2 197.1 269.4 547.0 1382.1 2078.5
(100) (128) (295) (403) (819) (2069) (3112)
[5] [6] [9] [7] [8] [16] [18]
Total 1215.1 1604.4 2270.0 3641.4 6561.1 8833.811262.5
(100) (132) (187) (300) (540) (727) (927)
[100] [100] [100] [100] [100] [100] [100]
Notes: £ million;
* included foreign;
( ) annual index of amounts; 
[ ] shares of securities;
- implies nil.
Source: E.V. Morgan & W.A. Thomas, The Stock Exchange (1962), table v
(pp.280-81).
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Table 1.2 Britain’s Colonial and Foreign Portfolio Investment. 1870-1914
(£000)
(percent)
Period Domestic
issues
(%)
Colonial
issues
(%)
Foreign
issues
(%>
Total
issues
(%)
1870-74 113,634 46,257 131,288 291,179
(39) (16) (45) (100)
1875-79 106,328 88,813 61,967 257,108
(41) (35) (24) (100)
1880-84 135,537 122,532 224,020 482,089
(28) (25) (47) (100)
1885-89 171,554 148,458 290,443 610,455
(28) (24) (48) (100)
1890-94 151,089 113,002 219,323 483,414
(31) (24) (45) (100)
1895-99 231,638 113,103 184,895 539,636*
(44) (21) (35) (100)
1900-04 396,715 179,031 216,181 791,927
(50) (23) (27) (100)
1905-09 173,902 270,991 483,503 928,396
(19) (29) (52) (100)
1910-14 218,547 352,494 558,670 1,129,711
(19) (31) (50) (100)
Notes: * 529,636 is the right figure;
New portfolio investment (capital called up);
Intermediate estimate (‘entirely taken up in the United Kingdom 
issues, but, in addition to those enumerated in the minimum series, 
includes adjustments for calls whose presence can be inferred from 
existing reports’).
Sources: L.E. Davis & R.A. Huttenback, Mammon and the Pursuit of
Empire (Cambridge, 1986), pp.35-36 and 40-41.
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Table 1.3 Foreign Government Loan Issues in London. 1870-1913
Year Country Interest
rate
(nominal)
(%)
Issue
price
(* )
Issue
amount
(nominal)
(£0 0 0 )
Market
relations
Issue
patterns
Loan
issuers
1870 Argentina1 6 8 8 10342 M C. de Murrieta
1870 Austria 5 - 975483 P M London Rothschilds
1870 Austria 5 - 10571l 4 P M London Rothschilds
1870 Chile 5 83 1 0 1 2 s M J.S. Morgan
1870 Egypt 7 78 1/2 71426 P M Bischoffsheim & Goldschmidt
1870 France 6 85 1 0 0 0 0 7 M J.S. Morgan
1870 Honduras 1 0 80 25008 M Bischoffsheim & Goldschmidt
1870 Japan 9 98 1 0 0 0 9 M Schroder
1870 North
Germany 5 96 1/21 0 750011 Cl London Joint Stock Bank
1870 Peru 6 81 1/41 2 1192013 C M Schroder
1870 Romania 7 8 6 4341 4 M C. Devaux
1870 Romania 7 1/2 72 60015 C F Anglo-Austrian Bank
1870 Russia 5 80 1 2 0 0 0 1 6 P M London Rothschilds
1870 Spain 5 80 231817 P M London Rothschilds
1870 Spain 3 29 1/2 3430018 Gn Spanish Financial Commission
1870 Turkey 6 60 1 / 2 2 2 0 0 0 1 9 c M L. Cohen
1871 Argentina 6 8 8  1 / 2 612230 p M C. de Murrieta
1871 Brazil 5 89 345921 M London Rothschilds
1871 Costa Rica 6 72 50022 M Bischoffsheim & Goldschmidt
1871 Costa Rica 6 74 50023 M Bischoffsheim & Goldschmidt
1871 France 5 82 1 / 2 11111924 M Baring Bros; London Rothschilds
1871 Holland 5 90 1/2 18925 M S. Montagu
1871 Hungary 5 81 300026 c M Raphael
*. Originally the City o f Buenos Aires loan.
2. I.M .M ..
3. Consolidation of public debt; no London issue amount; the unredeemable amount was £175,000,000 (I.M.M. [Quotations]).
4. Consolidation o f public debt; no London issue amount; the unredeemable amount was £348,000,000 (l.M .M . [Quotations]).
5. £1,220,000 (I.M .M .).
6. L.C .P..
1. I.M .M .; L .C.P.; the paid-up amount in London was £4,000,000 (Ec, 11 March 1871, p.35).
8. I.M .M ..
9. I.M .M ..
,0. L.J.S.B .A ., Q.70.
" .  I.M .M ..
12. The issue price was at 82 1/2 percent (S.E.Y. [80]).
,3. I.M .M ..
14. I.M .M ..
15. Conversion; I.M .M .; no S.E .O .I..
16. Consolidation; I.M .M ..
17. L .C.P..
18 . Conversion; no London issue amount.
19. the issue amount was £22,222,220 (S.E.O.I.).
20. Confederation; I.M .M ..
21. £3,370,000 (I.M .M .): the issue amount was £3,000,000 (L.A.).
22. I.M .M ..
23. I.M .M ..
24. £100,000,000 (I.M .M .): the issue amount was £97,500,000 (R.H.); the paid-up amount in London was £26,960,000 (Ec. 
16 March 1872, p .48).
25. No S .E .O .I..
26. I.M .M ..
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Table 1.3 Foreign Government Loan Issues in London. 1870-1913 (cont.)
Year Country Interest
rate
(nominal)
(%)
Issue
price
(%)
Issue
amount
(nominal)
(£0 0 0 )
Market
relations
Issue
patterns
Loan
issuers
1871 Liberia 7 85 1 0 0 2 7 M Holdemess, Nott
1871 North
Germany 5 96s8 750029 Cl London Joint Stock Bank
1871 Paraguay 8 80 lOOO3 0 M Robinson & Fleming
1871 Russia 5 81 1 / 2 1 2 0 0 0 31 P M London Rothschilds
1871 Spain 6 80 262232 M Stem Bros
1871 Spain 3 31 637533 PC Gn Spanish Financial Commission
1871 Turkey 6 73 570034 M Dent Palmer
1871 USA 5 102 3/8 4000035 P M Baring Bros; London Rothschilds
1871 Uruguay 6 72 350036 M I. Thomson, T. Bonar
1872 Argentina 6 76 122537 M Stem Bros
1872 Bolivia 6 6 8 170038 M Lumb. Wanklyn
1872 Costa Rica 7 82 149639 M Knowles & Foster
1872 France 5 84 1/2 16562240 C M Baring Bros; London Rothschilds
1872 Paraguay 8 85 56241 M Robinson & Fleming
1872 Peru 5 77 1/2 1500042 P M Schroder; Stem Bros
1872 Russia 5 89 1500043 C M London Rothschilds
1872 Spain 3 28 3/4 900044 PC Gn Spanish Financial Commission
1873 Argentina4 5 6 89 1/2 204046 M Baring Bros
1873 Chile 5 94 227647 O Oriental Bank Corp
1873 Colombia 4 1/2 - 2 0 0 0 4 8 Cl London & County Bank
1873 Egypt 7 84 1/4 3200049 PC FM Imperial Ottoman Bank; Bischoffsheim & Goldschmidt
1873 Hungary 5 80 540050 C M Raphael
1873 Japan 7 92 1/2 240051 O Oriental Bank Corp
27. I.M .M ..
28. L.J.S.B .A ., Q70.
I.M .M ..
30. I.M .M ..
31. Consolidation; I.M .M ..
32. I.M .M .: the issue amount was £2,622,781 (L.A. and L.C.P.).
33. I.M .M .: L .C.P.; the issue amount was £20,907,000 (Fn [89]).
34. I.M .M ..
35. Funded loan; no London issue amount; £41,000,000 (in exchange) (I.M.M.); the issue amount was £41,00,000 at 92 % 
(R.H.): £45,000,000 and £16,875,000 at 91 % (Ec).
36. I.M .M ..
37. Confederation; I.M .M ..
38. I.M .M ..
39. £2,400,000 (I.M .M .): the issue amount was £2,400,000 (S.E.Y. [80] and Fn [89]).
40. No London issue amount; £120,000,000 (I.M .M .): the issue amount was £141,500,000 (R.H.): the paid-up amount in London 
£45,600,000 (Ec).
41. £2,000,000 (I.M .M .): the issue amount was £2,000,000 (S.E.Y. [80], Fn [89] and L.A.).
42. Consolidation; I.M .M ..
43. Consolidation; I.M .M ..
44. £10,625,000 (I.M.M. and C .L.P.); the issue amount was £10,625,000 (Ec); £35,029,000 (Fn [89]).
45. Originally the City o f Buenos Aires loan.
46. I.M .M ..
47. I.M .M ..
48. Conversion; I.M .M ..
49 . Conversion; no London issue amount; I.M .M .; L.C.P..
50. I.M .M .: the issue amount was £3,000,000 (Fn [80]); £5,400,000 (L.A.).
51. I.M .M ..
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Table 1.3 Foreign Government Loan Issues in London. 1870-1913 (cont.)
Year Country Interest
rate
(nominal)
(%)
Issue
price
(%)
Issue
amount
(nominal)
(£0 0 0 )
Market
relations
Issue
patterns
Loan
issuers
1873 Russia 5 93 1500052 P M London Rothschilds
1873 Spain 3 - 148253 Gn Spanish Financial Commission
1873 Turkey 6 58 1/2 800054 P F Imperial Ottoman Bank
1873 USA 5 102 3/8 6000055 P M Baring Bros; London Rothschilds
1874 Argentina 6 80 357s 6 M Stem Bros
1874 Belgium 3 75 1/2 144057 C M Baring Bros
1874 Turkey 5 43 1/2 1590058 P F Imperial Ottoman Bank
1875 Brazil 5 96 1/2 530159 M London Rothschilds
1875 Chile 5 8 8  1/4 1 1 0 0 ® O Oriental Bank Corp
1875 China 8 95 32761 O Hongkong Bank
1875 France 3 - 238062 C I -
1875 Russia 4 1/2 92 15000® P M London Rothschilds
1875 Spain 3 - 1330264 Gn Spanish Financial Commission
1875 Sweden 4 1/2 98 3/4 982® c M Erlanger
1876 China 8 1 0 0 274® c O Hongkong Bank
1876 Norway 4 1/2 96 1/2 132067 p M Hambros
1876 Portugal 5 83 1/2 306 p F Soci£te de Depdts et de Comptes Courants
1876 Sweden 4 1/2 96 1/2 1500® M Hambros
1876 USA 4 1/2 103 1/2 6000069 p M London Rothschilds; J.S. Morgan; Seligmans
1877 China 8 98 160470 O Hongkong Bank
1877 Egypt 5 - 1080071 p F Comptoir National d’Escompte
1877 Egypt 6 - 2070072 p F Comptoir National d ’Escompte
1877 Hungary 6 83 1/2 450073 PGC M London Rothschilds
1877 Portugal 3 50 400074 P M Baring Bros
1877 Spain 2 par 1321375 P Gn Spanish Financial Commission
52. Consolidation; I.M .M .: the issue amount was £8,000,000 (Fn [89]).
53. Conversion; no London issue amount.
54. I.M .M .; the issue amount was £27,777,780 (S.E.Y. [80]); £27,197,000 (Fn [89]).
55. Funded loan; no London issue amount; the issue amount was £61,682,500 at £102 16s. 2d. per $500 (about 99 7/10 %)
(R .H .).
. Confederation; I.M .M ..
57. I.M .M ..
58. I.M .M ..
59. £5,250,000 (I.M .M .); the issue amount was £5,000,000 (Fn [89] and L.A.).
®. £1,000,000 (I.M .M .): the issue amount was £1,143,000 (S.E.Y. [80]); £1,900,000 (Fn [80] and L.A.).
61. No F.B .H .: the issue amount was £627,675 at 98 8 s. l id .  (about 98 9/20 %) (S.E.Y. [80]).
62. I.M .M .: no S.E.O.I.
®. Consolidation; £8,000,000 (I.M .M .): the issue amount was £8,000,000 (Fn [89]).
64. No London issue amount.
65. £1,000,000 (I.M .M .): the issue amount was DM20,250,000 (£995,625) (S.E.Y. [80]).
®. I.M .M .: no S.E .O .I..
67. I.M .M ..
®. I.M .M .; the issue amount was £2,000,000 (S.E.Y. [80], Fn [89] and L.A.).
Funded loan; no London issue amount; the issue amount was £62,100,000 at £103 1/2 per $500 (about 100 9/25 %) (R.H.).
7D. I.M .M ..
71 . Conversion.
72. Unification; L.C .P..
73. Redemption; £3,500,000 (I.M .M .): the issue amount was £8,000,000 (R.H. and L.C.P.); £40,000,000 (S.E .O .I.).
74. Consolidation; £6,500,000 (I.M .M .): L .C.P..
75. No London issue amount; the issue amount was £13,397,700 (S.E.Y. [80]).
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Table 1.3 Foreign Government Loan Issues in London. 1870-1913 (cont.)
Year Country Interest
rate
(nominal)
(%)
Issue
price
(%)
Issue
amount
(nominal)
(£0 0 0 )
Market
relations
Issue
patterns
Loan
issuers
1877 Turkey 5 50 500076 Cl Glyn Mills, Currie
1877 USA 4 102 3/4 14000077 P M London Rothschilds; J.S. Morgan; Seligmans; 
Morton Rose
1878 Egypt 5 73 850078 P M London Rothschilds
1878 Holland 4 98 3/8 358379 C I B.W. Blydenstein; Exchange & Investment Ban! 
Jordaan & Co.
1878 Norway 4 1/2 95 170080 P M Hambros
1878 Portugal 3 50 250081 C M Stem Bros
1878 Sweden 4 8 8 1 0 0 0 8 2 P M Hambros
1879 Austria 4 - 400083 c I -
1879 Greece 5 - 9998 4 O Ionian Bank
1880 Denmark 4 - 1648 M Hambros
1880 Norway 4 97 1/2
0000 p M Hambros
1880 Portugal 3 50 1/2 2 2 0 0 8 6 PC M Stem Bros
1880 Prussia 4 - 2950087 Cl London Joint Stock Bank
1880 Russia 4 75 2400088 c F Russian Bank for Foreign Trade
188089 Sweden 4 97 1/2 2 2 0 0 9 0 PC M Hambros
1881 Argentina 6 91 245091 p M C. de Murrieta
1881 Greece 5 74 125092 p M Hambros
1881 Hungary 4 75 1/2 1600093 PG M London Rothschilds
1881 Italy 5 90 1460094 C M Hambros; Baring Bros
1881
(1880)
Sweden 4 98 1/2 70095 C M Hambros
1881 Turkey 5 83 5000 P F Imperial Ottoman Bank
1881 Venezuela 3 - 270296 M Robarts, Lubbock
1882 Argentina 6 92 1/2 00 C M Morton, Rose
1882 Italy 5 8 8 1458998 C M Hambros; Baring Bros
76. I.M .M ..
77. Funded loan; no London issue amount; the issue amount was £143,850,000 at £102 3/4 per $500 (about 99 16/25 %) (R .H .).
78. Redemption; I.M .M .; L.C.P..
79. I.M .M .: L .C.P..
80. I.M .M .; the figure includes the issue amount in Germany (H.A., M s.19,131).
81. I.M .M .: L .C.P..
82. I.M .M .: the issue amount was £1,000,000 including Paris (H.A., Ms. 19,167).
83. I.M .M ..
84. Conversion; the issue amount was £1,200,000 (S.E.Y. [90]); £724,000 (Fn [89]).
85. Part o f conversion; £1,156,000 (I.M .M .): the issue amount was £881,000 (H.A., M s.19,132/1).
86. Conversion; £2,610,000 (I.M .M /).
87. Consolidation; L.J.S.B.A., Q70.
88. I.M .M ..
89. See 1881 and 1883.
90. Redemption; H.A., M s.19,168/3.
91. I.M .M ..
92. £3,800,000 (I.M .M .): the issue amount was £1,250,000 (Fn [981 and L.A.).
w . Conversion; R.H.; the issue amount was £68,400,000 (1881-1888) (S.E.O.I.): £16,000,000 (L.A.).
I.M .M ..
95. I.M .M .: H .A ., M s.19,168/3.
96. Conversion; the issue amount was £2,750,000 (Fn [98]).
97. I.M .M ..
98. I.M .M .: H .A ., M s.19,119.
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Table 1.3 Foreign Government Loan Issues in London. 1870-1913 (cont.)
Year Country Interest Issue Issue Market Issue Loan
rate price amount relations patterns issuers
(nominal) (nominal)
(%) (%) (£0 0 0 )
1882
(1880) Portugal 5 92 1/4 2460 Gn Portuguese Government Financial Commission
1882 Russia 3 55 890499 PGC M Baring Bros
1882 Spain 4 - 1 2 0 0 0 1 0 0 Gn Spanish Government Financial Commission
1882 Turkey 5 83 3000101 P F Imperial Ottoman Bank
1883 Brazil 4 1/2 89 45991 0 2 P M London Rothschilds
1883 Hungary 4 - 5096103 PGC M London Rothschilds
1883
(1880) Sweden 4 98 1/2 1 1 0 0 1 0 4 P M Hambros
1883 Uruguay 5 72 11127105 M I. Thomson, T. Bonar
1884 Argentina 5 84 1/2 1673J06 P M Baring Bros
1884 Argentina 4 84 5952107 M J.S. Morgan
1884 Greece 5 6 8  1 / 2 4400108 P M Hambros
1884
(1881) Hungary 4 77 3/8 16000109 M London Rothschilds
1884 Hungary 4 - lOOOO1 1 0 PGC M London Rothschilds
1884 Orange
Free
State 6 par 1 0 0 1M O Standard Bank
1884
(1880) Portugal 3 50 1/2 2095112 PC Gn Portuguese Government Financial Commission
1884
(1881) Turkey 5 - 7427113 PC F Imperial Ottoman Bank
1885 Chile 4 1/2 89 00 o °L Cl City Bank
1885 China 7 98 150511S O Hongkong Bank
1885 China 6 98 750116 O Hongkong Bank
1885 China 6 98 1500117 M Baring Bros; Matheson
1885
(1880) Egypt 3 95 1/2 9424118 PG M London Rothschilds1 1 9
I.M .M .: the issue amount included the Paris issue (H.A., M s.19,160).
10°. Conversion (L.C.P.).
101. I.M .M ..
102. £4,500,000 (I.M .M .).
103. Conversion; L .C.P..
104. H .A., M s.19,168/2.
105. Unification; the issue amount was £11,113,000 (Fn [89]).
106. I.M .M .: the issue amount was £1,714,200 (Fn [98] and F.B.H. [81]); £1,683,100 (L.A.).
107. I.M .M ..
108. £3,014,000 (I.M.M. - net); the issue amount was £6,800,000 (L.A.); £4.238,600 (S.E.O.I.).
109. Conversion.
no. Conversion; the issue amount was £12,473,960 at 77 3/8 (in cash) (L.C.P.). 
i n . I.M .M ..
112. I.M .M .: the issue amount was £2,095,000 (L.A.).
113. Conversion; L.C .P.; no S.E .O .I..
114. £719,921 (I.M.M. - net).
115. I.M .M ..
116. I.M .M ..
u7. I.M .M ..
n8. £9,000,000 (I.M.M. - net).
119. Guaranteed by Britain, France, Germany, Russia, Italy and Austria-Hungary.
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Table 1.3 Foreign Government Loan Issues in London. 1870-1913 (cont.)
Year Country Interest Issue Issue Market Issue Loan
rate price amount relations patterns issuers
(nominal) (nominal)
(%) (%) (£0 0 0 )
1886120 Argentina 5 80 4000121 P M Baring Bros; J.S. Morgan
1886 Brazil 5 95 6431122 M London Rothschilds
1886 Chile 4 1/2 98 1/2 6010123 M London Rothschilds
1886 Costa
Rica 4(5 ) 92 1/2 
96 1/2 655124 T River Plate Trust
1886 Cuba 6 87 24800125 M Baring Bros
1886 Hawaii 6 98 2 0 0 M Matheson
1886 Mexico 3 60 4650126 Cl Glyn Mills, Currie
1886 Nicaragua 6 92 1/2 285127 Cl City Bank
1886 Norway 3 1/2 98 1700128 P M Hambros
1886 Paraguay 2,3 and 4 - 839129 M Robarts, Lubbock
1887
(1886) Argentina 5 85 1/2 4290130 P M Baring Bros; J.S. Morgan
1887131 Argentina 5 91 1/2 1300132 M C. de Murrieta
1887 Chile 4 1/2 97 1/2 1160133 M London Rothschilds
1887 Greece 4 78 1/2 1780134 PC M Hambros
1888 Argentina 4 1/2 87 39331 3 5 G M Baring Bros
1888 Argentina 5 94 1500136 M C. de Murrieta
(1887)
1888 Brazil 4 1/2 97 6297137 PGC M London Rothschilds
1888
(1887) Egypt 4 1/2 95 1/2 2330138 G M London Rothschilds
1888139 Greece 6 81 1 / 2 673 C M Antony Gibbs
1888 Guatemala 4 - 922140 M Hambros; I. Thomson, T . Bonar
1888 Mexico 6 78 1/2 3700141 GC M Antony Gibbs
and
20. See 1887.
21. £3,200,000 (I.M.M. - net).
£5.700.000 (I.M .M .).
Conversion; £315,000 (in cash) (I.M .M .); the issue amount was £6,050,000 (L.A.).
Consolidation; the issue amount was £525,000; £1,475,000 (S.E.O.I. and L.A.).
Conversion; the issue amount was £35,000,000 (S.E.O.I.).
26. Consolidation.
27. £263,625 (I.M.M. - net).
28. Conversion; £1,666,000 (I.M.M. - net).
29. Conversion; the issue amount was £843,500 and £160,100 (S.E.I.O.).
30. £3,668,035 (I.M.M. - net); the issue amount was £4,333,000 (S.E.Y. [12]); £4,290,000 (L.A.); £8,333,000 in total in 1886 
1887 (F.B.H. [91]).
31. See 1888 and 1889.
32. £1,188,500 (I.M .M .).
33. £1,085,937 (I.M .M .).
34. £4,239,000 (I.M .M .): the issue amount was £5,400,000 (S.E.Y. [12]); £1,900,000 (S.E .O .I.. Fn [98] and L.A.).
35. £3,422,217 (I.M .M .): the issue amount was £1,900,000 (Fn [98]); £3,973,700 (F.B.H. [91]); £3,933,580 (L.A.).
36. £1,410,000 (I.M.M. - net).
37. £5,820,000 (I.M .M .).
38. £2,225,100 (I.M.M. - net).
39. See 1889; no I.M .M ..
40. Conversion; the issue amount was £815,000 (Fn [89]); £922,700 (L.A.).
41. Part o f conversion; £2,904,500 (I.M.M. - net); the issue amount was £3,700,000 (L.A.); £10,500,000 in total (S.E.Y. [90]).
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Table 1.3 Foreign Government Loan Issues in London. 1870-1913 (cont.)
Year Country Interest
rate
(nominal)
(%)
Issue
price
(%)
Issue
amount
(nominal)
(£0 0 0 )
Market
relations
Issue
patterns
Loan
issuers
1888 Norway 3 8 8  1 / 2 3560142 P M Hambros
1888 Portugal 3 - 7761143 M Baring Bros
1888 Russia 4 8 6  2/5 19775144 PGC M Baring Bros; Hambros
1888 Santo
Domingo 6 - 76145 M Peter, Lawson
1888 Santo
Domingo 6 83 1/2 4751 4 6 Cl Capital & Counties Bank
1888 Sweden 3 - 1470147 P M London Rothschilds
1888 Turkey 5 77 7827148 PG F Deutsche Bank
1888 Uruguay 6 82 1 / 2 4255149 PC M Baring Bros
1889
(1887) Argentina 5 97 1168150 M C. de Murrieta
1889 Argentina 4 1/2 90 5263151 PG M Baring Bros; C. de Murrieta
1889 Argentina 3 1/2 par 2659152 M Stem Bros
1889 Brazil 4 90 2 0 0 0 0 1 5 3 P M London Rothschilds
1889 Bulgaria 6 - 1746154 M Robart, Lubbock
1889 Chile 4 1/2 101 3/4 1546155 G F Deutsche Bank
1889
(1888) Greece 6 96 1/4 277 M Antony Gibbs
1889 Greece 4 72 1 2 0 0 1* 5 M Hambros
1889 Greece 4 77 1/2 5000157 G M Antony Gibbs
1889 Hungary 4 1/2 - 5200158 P M London Rothschilds
1889 Mexico 5 77 1/2 1300159 G M Seligmans
1889 Portugal 4 1/2 - 6812160 P M Baring Bros
1889 Russia 4 - 27685161 PGC M London Rothschilds
1889 Russia 4 - 49120162 P M London Rothschilds
1889 Salvador 6 95 1/2 300 Cl London & South Western Bank
142. Conversion.
143. Conversion; the issue amount was £85,532,634 (S.E.O.I.).
144. Conversion.
145. Conversion.
14<s. Conversion.
147. Conversion; no R .H ..
148. The issue amount was £1,500,000 (S.E.O.I.).
149. £3,610,423 (I.M .M .).
15°. £1,133,154 (I.M .M .).
151. Conversion; the issue amount was £5.290.000 (S.E.Y. 1121 and F.B.H. f911): £5.263.560 (L.A.).
152 _. Conversion.
153. Conversion; the issue amount was £19,837,000 (S.E.O.I. and R.H.); £20,000,000 (L.A.).
154. Conversion; the issue amount was £1,871,100 (L.A.); £1,847,580 (S.E.O.I.): £1,816,326 (S.E.Y. [90]).
155. £1,573,452 (I.M.M. - net).
156. Conversion.
157. Conversion.
158 . Conversion.
,59. I.M .M ..
16°. Conversion; the issue amount was £7,761,000 (S.E.O.I.): £8,358,199 (S.E.Y. [90]).
161. Conversion; I.M .M ..
162. Conversion.
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Table 1.3 Foreign Government Loan Issues in London. 1870-1913 (cont.)
Year Country Interest
rate
(nominal)
(%)
Issue
price
(%)
Issue
amount
(nominal)
(£0 0 0 )
Market
relations
Issue
patterns
Loan
issuers
1889
(1888) Santo
Domingo 6 70 42163 Cl Capital & Counties Bank
1890
(1889) Bulgaria 6 92 1/2 1 2 0 0 F Imperial Ottoman Bank
1890 Egypt 3 1/2 91 29400164 PGC M London Rothschilds
1890 Egypt 4 99 1/4 7299165 P M Stem Bros
1890 Greece 5 93 2400166 GC M Hambros
1890 Mexico 6 65 325167 I Home & Colonial Assets & Debenture Corp
1890 Mexico 6 93 1/2 6000168 M Antony Gibbs
1890 Russia 4 93 14238169 PGC M Baring Bros; Hambros
1890 Russia 4 79 1/4 11865170 P M London Rothschilds
1890
(1868) Russia 4 98 7/8 1651171 P M Schroder; London Rothschilds
1890 Santo
Domingo 6 77 5751 7 2 C I Westendorp
1890 Sweden 3 1/2 - I960173 P M London Rothschilds
1890 Turkey 4 78 1/2 1372174 PGC F Imperial Ottoman Bank
1890 Turkey 4 81 3/4 7827175 P F Imperial Ottoman Bank
1891 Argentina 6 - 2 0 0 0 1 7 6 P M J.S. Morgan
1891 Russia 3 79 7/10 19775177 PC M Hambros
1891 Russia 4 - 12656178 M London Rothschilds
1891 Turkey 4 93 1/2 6316179 P M London Rothschilds
1892 Argentina 5 - 1361180 O London & River Plate Bank
1892 Argentina 5 - 6324 M Baring Bros
1892 Chile 5 95 1800181 M London Rothschilds
1892 Holland 3 1/2 1 0 0  1 / 2 4492182 C I Agency of Financial Ministry
1892 Persia 6 95 500183 O Imperial Bank o f Persia
63. Conversion.
64. Part o f conversion and redemption; £26,754,000 (I.M.M. - net).
65. Conversion; I.M .M ..
66. £3,343,350 (I.M.M. and S.E.Y. [12]).
67. I.M .M .; the issue amount was $2,500,000 (£515,625) (L.A.).
®. £5,610,000 (I.M.M. - net).
69. Conversion; £13,244,000 (I.M .M .).
70. Conversion; I.M .M . did not include this amount in the creation amount.
71. Conversion; I.M .M . did not include this amount in the creation amount.
72. The loan was issued in Amsterdam.
73. Redemption; no R .H ..
74. Part o f conversion; £1,077,412 (I.M.M. - net); the issue amount was £4,545,000 (S.E.O .I.).
75. Conversion; I.M .M ..
76. Funding; the issue amount was £7,630,680 (S.E.Y. [01]); £2,000,000 (L.A.); £14,880,000 in total (S .E .O .I.).
77. I.M .M ..
78. Conversion; I.M .M ..
79. Conversion and redemption.
80. The issue amount was £2,000,000 (S.E.O.I., S.E.Y. [01] and L.A.).
81. £1,710,000 (I.M.M. - net); the issue amount was £149,000 and the balance was withdrawn (S.E.O.I.): £1,800,000 (L.A.).
82. I.M .M ..
83. £475,000 (I.M.M. - net).
46
Table 1.3 Foreign Government Loan Issues in London. 1870-1913 (cont.-)
Year Country Interest Issue Issue Market Issue Loan
rate price amount relations patterns issuers
(nominal) (nominal)
(%) (%) (£0 0 0 )
1892 South
Africa 5 90 2500 M London Rothschilds
1892 Uruguay 3 1/2 - 19300184 P Cl Glyn Mills, Currie
1893 Brazil 5 80 2650 M London Rothschilds
1893 Chile 4 1/2 - 630 Cl City Bank
1893 Egypt 4 1/4 - 8500185 P M London Rothschilds
1893 Greece 5 - 389186 M Hambros
1893 Santo
Domingo 4 - 2035187 Gn Dominion Financial Agency
1894
(1893) Brazil 5 79 1060 M London Rothschilds
1894 China 7 98 1635188 GC O Hongkong Bank
1894 Denmark 3 96 3/8 1388189 P M Hambros
1894 Mexico 6 6 8 2594190 C Cl Glyn Mills, Currie
1894 Norway 3 1/2 99 2188191 P M Hambros
1894 Russia 3 1/2 94 4/6 1 9 2 15820193 P M London Rothschilds
1894 Sweden 3 - 990194 P FM Credit Lyonnais;Hambros; London Rothschilds
1894 Turkey 3 1/2 94 1/4 8212195 P M London Rothschilds
1895 Brazil 5 85 7442196 P M London Rothschilds
1895 Chile 4 1/2 93 1/2 2 0 0 0 1 9 7 M London Rothschilds
1895 China 6 96 1/2 3000198 O Hongkong Bank
1895 China 6 106 1 0 0 0 1 9 9 O Chartered Bank
1895 China 4 98 4/5 15820 PC F Credit Lyonnais; Comptoir National d ’Escompte 
Russian Bank for Foreign Trade
1895 Guatemala 4 - 1545200 G F Deutsche Bank
1895 Hungary 3 87 1/8 1875201 P Cl Lloyds Bank
1895 USA 4 1 1 0 12463202 M London Rothschilds; J.S. Morgan
1896 Chile 5 95 1/2 4000203 GC M London Rothschilds
184. Consolidation; the issue amount was £19,300,000 (L.A.).
185. Conversion.
186. Funding; the issue amount was £4.000,000 (S.E.O.I.); £365,507 (L.A.).
187. Conversion.
188. I.M .M ..
189. £760,290 (I.M .M .): the figure includes the issue amount in Paris (H.A., M s.19,082).
19°. £1,764,410 (I.M.M. - net); the issue amount was £2,594,720 (F.B.H. [95]); £2,335,200 (L.A.).
191. Part o f  conversion; £2,166,120 (I.M.M. - net).
192. The issue price was 94 4/6 percent per £98 17s. 6 d. (95 3/4 %) (R.H.).
,93. £15.100.000 (I.M .M .).
194. Conversion; £1,265,890 (I.M .M .): the issue amount was £990,000 (L.A.).
195. Redemption; I.M .M ..
,96. £5,100,000 (I.M .M .).
197. £1,870,000 (I.M.M. - net).
198. £2,895,000 (I.M.M. - net).
199. £1,060,000 (I.M.M. - net).
20°. Part o f conversion; the issue amount was £1,534,090 (S.E.O.I.); £1,494,700 (L.A.).
201. £1,633,594 (I.M.M. - net).
202. The issue amount was $62,317,500 (£12,852,984) at £227 per $1,000 (about 109 19/20 %) (R.H .): $31,157,700 
(£6,426,275) was offered in London (Fn [98]).
203. £3,982,000 (I.M .M .).
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Table 1.3 Foreign Government Loan Issues in London, 1870-1913 (cont.-)
Year Country Interest Issue Issue Market Issue Loan
rate price amount relations patterns issuers
(nominal) (nominal)
(%) (%) (£0 0 0 )
1896 China 5 98 3/4 16000204 G O Hongkong Bank
1896 Haiti 6 90 2 0 0 0 2 0 5 P F Societe Generale
1896 Tonking 2  1 / 2 87 3200206 P F Banque de l’Indo-Chine
1896 Uruguay 5 71 1/2 1667 Cl Glyn Mills, Currie
1896207 USA 4 1 1 0 2 0 0 0 0 M London Rothschilds; J.S. Morgan
1897 Argentina 4 - 6385208 PG M Baring Bros
1897 Colombia 1  1 / 2
3 - 2700 Cl London & County Bank
1897 Denmark 3 99 1/16 3992209 P FM Credit Lyonnais; Hambros
1897 Japan 5 1 0 1  1 / 2 4385210 C1FO Capital & Counties Bank; Yokohama Specie Bank; 
Hongkong Bank; Chartered Bank
1897 Santo
Domingo 4 6 6 1150211 M Brown Jansen
1897
(1895) Serbia 4 6 8 1 0 0 0 2 1 2 P Cl Parr’s Bank
1898 Argentina 4 - 1527213 M Baring Bros
1898 Argentina 4 - 6746214 M Baring Bros
1898 Argentina 4 - 4057215 M Baring Bros
1898 Brazil 5 - 8613216 M London Rothschilds
1898 China 4 1/2 90 16000217 G O Hongkong Bank
1898 Greece 2  1 / 2 1 0 1  1 / 2 6023218 PC I Bank o f England
1898 Holland 3 92 4817219 C C1M Union Bank o f London; Speyer Bros
1899 China 5 97 2300220 P IO British Chinese Corp; Hongkong Bank
1899 Denmark 4 - 3 5  2 2 1 I -
1899 Germany 3 92 3787 C1FM London Joint Stock Bank; Deutsche Bank; Stem Bros
1899 Japan 4 90 1 0 0 0 0 2 2 2 C1FO Parr’s Bank; Yokohama Specie Bank; Hongkong Bank
1899 Mexico 5 - 378720 PGCN M J.S. Morgan
1900 Argentina 6 - 2 0 0 0 M Baring Bros
1900 Argentina 4 - 282S224 P M Baring Bros
204. £9,875,000 and £5,940.000 (I.M.M.): the figure includes the issue amount in Berlin issue.
TQC
. Issued in Paris.
206. This loan was issued in Paris.
207. This loan was issued in 1895.
208. The issue amount was £11,607,100 (F.B.H. [00-1]); £11,514,500 (S.E.O.I.): £404,000 (L.A.).
209. Conversion; £3,889,905 (I.M .M .).
210. £4,455,426 (I.M .M .).
2 n . Unification; the issue amount was £1,500,000 (S.E.O.I.): £1,017,200 (L.A.).
212. Unification: £680.000 (I.M.M. - net); the issue amount was £14.211,680 (S.E.O.I.); £1,000.000 (L.A.).
213 . Conversion.
214. Conversion.
215 . Conversion.
216. R .H .: funded; the issue amount was £8,613,392 (L.A.).
217. £14,400,000 (I.M.M. - net); the figure includes the issue amount in Berlin issue.
218. £5,029,925 (I.M .M .).
219. £4,673,363 (I.M .M .).
22°. £2,231,000 (I.M.M. - net).
221. I.M .M .: no S.E.I.O.
222. £9,000,000 (I.M.M. - net).
223. Consolidation; the issue amount was £22,700,000 (S.E.O.I.); £3,787,960 (L.A.).
224. Conversion.
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Year Country Interest
rate
(nominal)
(%)
Issue
price
(%)
Issue
amount
(nominal)
(£0 0 0 )
Market
relations
Issue
patterns
Loan
issuers
1900 Argentina 4 - 1028225 M Baring Bros
1900 Chile 4 1/2 - 260226 M London Rothschilds
1900 Denmark 3 1/2 94 3/4 665 P F Credit Lyonnais
1900 Sweden 4 227 98 9472 2 8 P Cl Lloyds Bank
1901 Brazil 4 - 14605229 M London Rothschilds
1902 Bulgaria 5 89 1/2 4197230 PC FM Imperial Ottoman Bank; Stern Bros
1902231 Greece 4 83 1/2 880232 PG M Hambros
1902 Japan 5 par 5104233 FMO Yokohama Specie Bank; 
Baring Bros; Hongkong Bank
1902 Turkey 4 8 6 7818234 P F Imperial Ottoman Bank
1903
1903
Argentina 5 89 1430235 MO Baring Bros; London & River Plate Bank
(1890) Argentina 5 87 2770236 O London & River Plate Bank
1903237 Brazil 5 90 5500238 PGC M London Rothschilds
1903 Serbia 5 90 2400 P Cl Parr’s Bank
1903 Turkey 4 - S8432239 F Imperial Ottoman Bank
1904240 China 5 97 1/2 2250241 O Hongkong Bank
1904 Cuba 5 97 7201242 PGCN M Speyer Bros
1904
1904
Ecuador 4 6 8 77 243 Cl Glyn Mills, Currie
(1902) Greece 4 84 870244 C M Hambros
1904
(1902)
Greece 4 84 230 PG M Hambros
1904 Japan 6 93 1/2 5000245 N C1FO Parr’s Bank; Yokohama Specie Bank; Hongkong Ba
1904 Japan 6 90 1/2 6000246 NG C1FO Parr’s Bank; Yokohama Specie Bank; Hongkong Ba
1904 Mexico 4 94 8230247 PCN M Speyer Bros
225. Conversion.
226. No R.H.
227. From 1910 the interest was 3 1/2 percent.
228. £1,960,000 (I.M .M /): the issue amount was £2,000,000 (S.E.O.I/): £947,000 (L.A.).
229. R .H .: the issue amount was £8,800,920 (L.A.). The purpose of this loan was the purchase o f railway companies.
23°. £3,796,820 (I.M .M /).
231. See 1904 and 1906.
232. £734,800 (I.M.M. - net); the total issue amount was £2,250,000; £880,000 (L.A.).
233. I.M .M ..
234. Conversion; £2,046,692 (I.M .M .).
235. £1,273,323 (I.M.M. - net); the issue amount was £2,000,000 (S.E.O.I.): £1,430,700 (L.A.).
236. £2,410,526 (I.M.M. - net); the issue amount was £2,976,000 and the issuer was J.S. Morgan & Co. (S.E.O .I.): £2,770,000 
(L.A.).
237. See 1905.
238. £4,950,000 (I.M.M. - net).
239. Unification (S.E.Y. [12]).
24°. See 1907.
241. £2,193,750 (I.M.M. - net).
242. The amount o f the English scrip was $7,624,000 (£1,576,162) (L.A.).
243. The issue amount was £77,990 (L.A.).
244. £730,800 (I.M.M. - net).
245. £4,675,000 (I.M.M. - net).
246. £5,430,000 (I.M.M. - net).
247. Conversion.
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Year Country Interest Issue Issue Market Issue Loan
rate price amount relations patterns issuers
(nominal) (nominal)
(%) (%) (£0 0 0 )
1905
(1903) Brazil 5 96 1/2 3000248 M London Rothschilds
1905 Chile 5 95 1/2 1350249 M London Rothschilds
1905 China 5 97 lOOO2 5 0 PG O Hongkong Bank
1905 Japan 4 1/2 90 15000251 N C1FO Parr’s Bank; Yokohama Specie Bank; Hongkong Ba
1905 Japan 4 1/2 90 1 0 0 0 0 2 5 2 GN C1FO Parr’s Bank; Yokohama Specie Bank; Hongkong Ba
1905 Japan 4 90 6500253 PGN C1FMO Parr’s Bank; Yokohama Specie Bank; 
London Rothschilds; Hongkong Bank
1905 Siam 4 1/2 95 1/2 500254 P FO Banque de l’lndo-Chine; 
Hongkong Bank; Chartered Bank
1905 Venezuela 3 - S229755 P I Council of Foreign Bondholders
1906 Brazil 5 96 1 1 0 0 M London Rothschilds
1906 Chile 4 1/2 par 3700256 PGC FM Deutsche Bank; Speyer Bros
1906
(1902) Greece 4 83 1/2 270257 G M Hambros
1906 Russia 5 89 13101258 P M Baring Bros
1906 Switzer­
land 3 1/2 99 2 2 0 0 2 5 9 P C1F Glyn Mills, Currie; Swiss Bankverein
1906 Uruguay 5 96 1/4 no260 P Cl Glyn Mills, Currie
1907 Argentina 5 97 1/2 2580261 PG M Baring Bros; J.S. Morgan
1907 Brazil 5 95 3000 M London Rothschilds
1907
(1904) China 5 94 650 O Hongkong Bank
1907 China 5 par 1500 o Hongkong Bank
1907 Japan 5 99 1/2 11500262 P C1FMO Parr’s Bank; Yokohama Specie Bank; 
London Rothschilds; Hongkong Bank
1907 Siam 4 1/2 98 1 1 25263 PG O Hongkong Bank
1907 Switzer­
land 3 1/2 99 1/2 6 6 6 ™ PG C1F Glyn Mills, Currie; Swiss Bankverein
1908 Argentina 4 818265 M Baring Bros
248. £2,910,000 (LM .M .l.
249. £1,239,250 fl.M .M .).
25°. £970,000 (l.M .M. - net).
251. £13,500,000 (l.M.M. - net).
252. £9,000,000 (l.M.M. - net).
253. £5,850,000 (l.M.M. - net).
254. £500,000 was issued in Paris (S.E.Y. [12]).
255. Conversion.
736. £3,496,500 fl.M .M .).
257. The issue amount was £270,000 (L.A.).
258. £11,659,890 fl.M .M. - net); the issue amount was £13,101,000 (L.A.).
259. £2,178,000 fl.M .M. - net); the issue amount was Fr50,000,000 (£1,979,166) (L.A.).
2eo. Conversion; the issue amount was £2,911,169 (S.E.Y. [12]); £170,003 (L.A.).
261. £2,515,500 fl.M.M. - net); the issue amount was £2,580,000 (S.E.O.I. and L.A.).
262. Conversion; £11,442,500 fl.M.M. - net).
263. £2,940,000 fl.M .M .).
264. The issue amount was Fr50,000,000 (£1,979,166) (L.A.); total issue amount from 1899 to 1902 was Fr500,000,000 
(£19,791,665) (S.E.O.I.').
265. The issue amount was £517,760 (S.E.Y. [12]).
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Year Country Interest Issue Issue Market Issue Loan
rate price amount relations patterns issuers
(nominal) (nominal)
(%) (%) (£0 0 0 )
1908 Brazil 5 96 4000 P M London Rothschilds
1908266 China 5 98 3/4 1 1 1 0 2 6 7 G O Hongkong Bank
1908 China 5 99 1500268 O Hongkong Bank
1908 China 5-4 1/2 98 2500269 P o Hongkong Bank
1908 Greece 5 97 2 0 0 2 7 0 PGC M Hambros
1908 Liberia 6 1 0 1 1 0 0 2 7 1 M Erlanger
1908 Salvador 6 8 6 1 0 0 0 MO Chalmers, Guthrie & Co.
London Bank o f Mexico & South America
1908 Sweden 4 98 3000272 M Hambros
1909 Argentina 5 98 2960273 PGN M Baring Bros; J.S. Morgan
1909 Chile 5 96 1/2 3000274 M London Rothschilds
1909
(1908) China 5 par 740275 G O Hongkong Bank
1909276 Cuba 4 1/2 96 1131 N M Speyer Bros
1909 Finland 4 1/2 92 1/2 1800 C C1M Union of London & Smiths Bank; Hambros
1909 Monte­
negro 5 97 250 M Boulton Brothers
1909 Nicaragua 92 500277 C O Anglo-South American Bank
1909 Russia 4 1/2 8 8  3/4 59S52 7 8 PG M Baring Bros
1909
(1908) Turkey 4 89 1/2 1094279 PG FM Imperial Ottoman Bank; Stem Bros
1909 Turkey 4 89 2 0 0 0 2 8 0 P FM Imperial Ottoman Bank; Morgan Grenfell
1910 Argentina 5 1 0 1 1209 M Baring Bros; Morgan Grenfell
1910 Argentina 4 - 411 M Baring Bros
1910 Brazil 4 90 1 0 0 0 M London Rothschilds
1910 Brazil 4 87 1/2 1 0 0 0 0 281 P M London Rothschilds
1910 Bulgaria 4 1/2 91 3960 GC M Schroder
1910 Chile 5 99 2600282 M London Rothschilds
1910 China 7 108 450 T London City & Midland Executor Trustee Co.
1910 China 5 1 0 0  1 / 2 1 1 1 0 2 8 3 G O Hongkong Bank
266. See 1909.
267. £1,096,125 (l.M .M. - net); the issue amount was £1,110,000 (L.A.).
2<58. £1,485,000 (l.M .M. - net).
269. Redemption.
270. £194,000 (l.M.M. - net); the issue amount was £400,000 (L.A.).
271. Conversion.
272. £2,940,000 (l.M.M. - net).
273. £2,900,800 (l.M.M. - net); the issue amount was £10,000,000 (L.A.).
274. Conversion; £2,895,500 (l.M.M. - net).
275. l.M .M ..
276. See 1910 and 1911.
277. Conversion or redemption.
278. £5,285,061 (l.M .M. - net); the London issue amount was £5,955,000 (L.A.).
m . £979,398 (l.M .M. - net).
28°. £1,780,000 (l.M .M. - net).
281. Conversion.
282. £2,574,000 (l.M.M. - net).
283. £1,115,550 (l.M.M. - net); the issue amount was £3,000,000 (S.E.O.I.): £1,100,000 (L.A.).
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Year Country Interest Issue Issue Market Issue Loan
rate price amount relations patterns issuers
(nominal) (nominal)
(%) (%) (£0 0 0 )
1910
(1909) Cuba 4 1/2 98 1131 N M Speyer Bros
1910 Greece 5 99 1588284 PC M Hambros; Erlanger
1910 Japan 4 95 1 1 0 0 0 2 8 5 C1FO Parr’s Bank; Yokohama Specie Bank; Hongkong Bank
1911 Brazil 4 92 4500 C M London Rothschilds
1911 Brazil 4 83 1/2 2400 P I South American Railway Construction
1911 Chile 5 98 1/2 2452 PG M London Rothschilds
1911 Chile 5 98 1/2 5000286 PG M London Rothschilds
1911 Chile 4 1/2 - 275 M London Rothschilds
1911 China 5 1 0 0  1 / 2 1500287 PGN O Hongkong Bank
1911 Costa
Rica 4 - 2 0 0 0 2 8 8 P I M.C. Keith
1911
(1909-10) Cuba 4 1/2 98 3/4 1131 N M Speyer Bros
1911 Greece 4 8 6  1 / 2 5732 8 9 C M Hambros; Erlanger
1911 Norway 4 100 3/4 2 2 0 0 C1M Union o f London & Smiths Bank; Hambros
1911 Persia 5 96 1/2 1250290 O Imperial Bank of Persia
1911 Peru 5 1/2 98 1/2 1172291 G M Schroder
1912 Brazil 4 83 1/2 2400 I South American Railway Construction Co. 
(Lloyds Bank)
1912 Chile 3 95 1099292 GC M Schroder
1912 China 5 95 5000293 OT British Bank for Foreign Trade; 
British International Investment Trust
1912 Denmark 4 97 2500294 P M Hambros
1913 Argentina 5 99 1 0 0 0 2 9 5 M Baring Bros
1913 Argentina 5 98 341296 M Baring Bros
1913 Brazil 5 97 1 1 0 0 0 2 9 7 M London Rothschilds
1913 Chile 5 96 1118298 P M Schroder
1913 China 5 90 7416299 PGC O Hongkong Bank
1913 Romania 4 1/2 91 198Q300 GC M Schroder
2M. £1,572,120 fl.M .M . - net).
285. Conversion.
286. £4,925,000 fl.M .M. - net); the total issue amount of the two loans was £9,905,000 fS.E.Y. [16]); £5,000,000 (L.A.).
287. The issue amount was £1,500,000 (L.A.).
288 . Conversion.
289. Conversion; the London issue amount was £573,764 (L.A.).
790. £1,206,250 fl.M .M . - net).
291. £1,154,814 fl.M .M. - net); the issue amount was £1,172,000 (L.A.).
292. The issue amount was £1,099,000 (L.A.).
293. £4,750,000 fl.M .M. - net).
294. £2,425,000 fl.M .M. - net); the issue amount was £2,500,000 (L.A.).
295. £990,000 fl.M .M. - net); the issue amount was £1,425,200 fS.E.O.I/): £1,000,000 (L.A.).
796. £341,300 (L.A.).
297. Conversion.
298. £1,074,144 fl.M .M. - net).
2" .  Reorganisation; £6,674,940 fl.M.M. - net); the issue amount was £7,416,680 (L.A.).
30°. Conversion; the London issue amount was £1,980,000 (L.A.).
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Table 1.3 Foreign Government Loan Issues in London. 1870-1913 (cont.)
Abbreviations:
C Continent
Cl Clearing banks
Ec The Economist
F Foreign banks
F.B.H. Annual Report o f the Council of the Corporation of Foreign Bondholders
Fn Fenn’s Compendium
G Germany
Gn Government
H.A. Hambros Archives
I Indefinite
I.M .M . Investor’s Monthly Manual (British Capital Created)
L.A. London Stock Exchange Archives
L .C.P. Loan and Company Prospectuses (London Stock Exchange [Guildhall Library])
L.J.S.B.A. London Joint Stock Bank Archives
M Merchant banks
N New York
O Overseas banks
P Paris
R.A. London Rothschilds Archives
R.H. The London House of Rothschild [J.Ayer], A Century of Finance
S.E.O.I. Stock Exchange Official Intelligence
S.E.Y. Stock Exchange Year-Book
T Trust companies
Sources:
Primary sources of the table were as follows:
1870-78 5th Annual General Report o f the Council of the Corporation of Foreign bondholders:
1878-84 Stock Exchange Year-Book and Burdett’s Official Intelligence (Quotations);
1885-1913 Burdett’s Official Intelligence and Stock Exchange Official Intelligence (re-titled from the 1899 edition) 
(British, Foreign and Colonial Loans issued in London);
1870-1913 Investor’s Monthly Manual (British Capital Created).
These data were modified on the basis of the following journals, books and archival records:
Fenn’s Compendium of the English and Foreign Funds, Debts and Revenues o f all Nations. 14th ed. (by R.L. Nash) 
(1889) and 16th ed. (by S.F. Van Oss) (1898);
The London House of Rothschild [J. Ayer], A Century of Finance 1804 to 1904 (1905), pp.52-81;
The Economist (‘Commercial History and Review’);
Burdett’s Official Intelligence and Stock Exchange Official Intelligence (re-titled from the 1899 edition)
(main part) (1885-1914)
Thomas Skinner, Stock Exchange Year-Book (for the years of 1880, 1890, 1901, 1912 and 1916);
Annual Report o f the Council of the Corporation o f Foreign Bondholders. 1877-1913;
Hambros Archives, Loan Issue Papers;
Loan and Company Prospectuses (London Stock Exchange [Guildhall Library]);
London Joint Stock Bank Archives, Loan Issue Papers;
London Stock Exchange Archives, Ms. 18,001 (Index of Quotation Applications);
London Rothschilds Archives, Loan Issue Papers.
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Table 1.3 Foreign Government Loan Issues in London, 1870-1913 (cont.)
Notes: - implies no information;
( ) Original issue year;
‘Issue amount (nominal)’ means the London issue amount (nominal);
‘Market relations’ shows the linkages o f loan markets;
‘Issue patterns’ shows the combination of financiers in issue;
Loan issue prices were not fixed in most of the conversion loan issues because the payments were made by the exchange 
o f old bonds for new ones.
Table 1.3 has the following inevitable defects because its primary sources are based on the financial press: (i) not all the 
loan issues on the London capital market were found in the table and there were missing ones, especially privately placed 
loans; (ii) loans (loan issue amounts) issued on the London capital market are listed in this table whenever possible but 
this distinction was not always possible even from prospectuses, and loans issued outside the London capital market and 
partials are inevitably included; (iii) loans (loan issue amounts) issued outside the London capital market are listed in the 
table when the primary sources regarded them as London’s tranches; (iv) the tracing o f loan issue purposes (conversion, 
redemption and so on), loan issuers and market relations are incomplete; (v) only central government loans are collected 
because it is difficult to follow Treasury bill and provincial government loan issues from the financial press; (vi) some 
government guaranteed loan issues are included in the table as government loan issues; (vii) re-sales o f  domestic loans 
(loans which had been issued internally and afterwards re-sold abroad) are included in the table; (viii) differences of 
information, especially on loan issue amounts, among the financial press are referred to in footnotes unless there are 
decisive grounds to be selected; (ix) careful treatment is needed with respect to as above such as Argentina, Egypt, 
Greece, Mexico, Portugal, Russia, Spain and Turkey; their repeated conversion operations often obscured the real extent 
o f  their loan issues.
Some remarks should be made about loan issue information collected from the financial press, (i) l.M .M . covers the full 
period (1870-1913) but includes only loans quoted on the London Stock Exchange. The tables o f ‘British Capital Created’ 
and of ‘British Capital Called up’ give accurate loan issue amounts in London mostly, but their coverage is limited and 
there are large omissions, (ii) Stock Exchange Official Intelligence. Stock Exchange Year-Book and Fenn’s Compendium 
provide most extensive information on loan issues by country, but do not always separate London’s issue amounts from 
total amounts (issued or created) and often include loan issue amounts outside the London capital market (partials). (iii) 
The London Rothschilds’ official history (A Century of Finance 1804 to 1904) provides the most precise information of 
their loan issues, but loan issue amounts includes other Rothschilds’ tranches and coverage ended in 1903. (iv) The 
Economist no longer gave individual loan issue information after the year of 1881 because l.M .M . played this role. After 
1903 it published British capital created and called up - the same figure as l.M .M .. (v) The London Stock Exchange 
Archives (Ms. 18,001 [quotation applications] and Loan and Company Prospectuses) were concerned only with loans 
quoted on the London Stock Exchange but provided the most accurate loan issue terms, (vi) Annual Report o f the Council 
o f the Corporation o f Foreign Bondholders gave useful information on countries with heavy borrowing.
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1.2 Geographical Distribution
Table 1.4 shows the geographical distribution of foreign government loan issues on the 
London capital market by country. After 1896 major developed European countries and 
the United States were no longer large borrowers in London and raised necessary funds 
on their own domestic markets. Paris, rather than London, became the prime source of 
loans for Southern Europe, the Scandinavian countries, Romania, Switzerland and 
Russia.7 Russia conducted large-scale financial operations in both London and Paris, but 
following the Franco-Russian Entente of 1894 patronised the Paris capital market far 
more. Russia did return to London in 1906 for a simultaneous loan issue.
The London capital market became receptive especially to South American and 
Far Eastern countries from the late-1890s. Their proportion of the total issue amount 
increased remarkably, although South American government bonds had already become 
market leaders in the 1870s and the late-1880s. London was of paramount importance for 
Chinese government loan issues from the outset, but in 1895 China, as a result of 
Russia’s diplomatic influence, tapped the Paris capital market to raise the Sino-Japanese 
War indemnity. China floated many simultaneous loans in London and on the Continent. 
Japan depended upon the London capital market for its first foreign loan issue in 1870. 
After a long interval, in the 1890s, it began to organise large loan issues in London. 
Japan briskly expanded a loan issue market from London to New York and Berlin during 
the Russo-Japanese War, and later reached the Paris capital market. The total Japanese 
government loan issues on the London capital market in the period from 1870 to 1913 
amounted to £82,106,335 (net amount), 3.8 percent of the total foreign government 
issues, but their proportion increased remarkably to 20.8 percent in the period from 1900 
to 1913 when transactions of foreign governments bonds on the market were at a low 
ebb.
\  M. Levy-Leboyer (ed.), La position intemationale de la France (Paris, 1973), 
p.25.
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Table 1.4 Foreign Government Loan Issues in London. 1870-1913 (By Country')
(£0 0 0 ; net proceeds)
Country 1870-74 1875-79 1880-84 1885-89 1890-94 1895-99 1900-04 1905-09 1910-13 Total
Argentina 9370 9399 21418 9685 18715 9539 6297 2956 87379
Austria 203259* 4000 207259
Belgium 1087 1087
Bolivia 1156 1156
Brazil 3079 5115 4093 30218 2957 14939 19555 10641 28468 119065
Bulgaria 1746 1 1 1 0 3756 3604 10216
Chile 2979 971 9343 2340 5690 260 7884 12307 41774
China 2157 3680 1602 52016 2194 8852 14533 85034
Colombia 2 0 0 0 2700 4700
Costa
Rica 1957 619 2 0 0 0 4576
Cuba 21576 6985 1086 2225 31872
Denmark 1648 1365 3989 630 2425 10057
Ecuador 52 52
Egypt 32317 37705 11225 42498 123745
Finland 1665 1665
France 240124* 2380 242504
Germany 14438 29500 3484 47422
Greece 999 3939 6951 2621 6113 1659 419 2068 24769
Guatemala 922 1545 2467
Haiti 1800 1800
Hawaii 196 196
Holland 171 3525 4514 4432 12642
Honduras 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 0
Hungary 6750 3758 39556 5200 1634 56898
Italy 25978 25978
Japan 3200 13451 15209 39793 10450 82103
Liberia 85 1 0 1 186
Mexico 6702 7585 3787 7736 25810
Montenegro 243 243
Nicaragua 264 460 724
Norway 2889 859 4817 2166 2217 12948
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Table 1.4 Foreign Government Loan Issues in London, 1870-1913 (By Country) (cont.)
(£0 0 0 ; net proceeds)
Country 1870-74 1875-79 1880-84 1885-89 1890-94 1895-99 1900-04 1905-09 1910-13 Total
Paraguay 1278 839 2117
Persia 475 1206 1681
Peru 21310 1154 22464
Portugal 3506 4438 14573 22517
Romania 805 1802 2607
Russia 46680 13800 22897 93891 54175 16945 248388*
Santo
Domingo 502 2478 759 3739
Salvador 287 860 1147
Serbia 680 2160 2840
Siam 1580 1580
South
Africa 1 0 0 2250 2350
Spain 20116 26515 1 2 0 0 0 58631
Sweden 3297 3918 1470 2950 928 2940 15503
Switzerland 2841 2841
Tonking 2784 2784
Turkey 29068 2500 14067 6027 2 1 1 2 1 45155 2759 120697*
USA 102375 205950 35709 344034*
Uruguay 2520 8011 3510 19300 1192 164 34697
Venezuela 2702 5229 7931
Total 748124 319067 183105 245976 181192 175419 115818 110759 87415 2166875
(index) ( 1 0 0 ) ( 1 0 0 ) ( 1 0 0 ) ( 1 0 0 ) ( 1 0 0 ) ( 1 0 0 ) ( 1 0 0 ) ( 1 0 0 ) ( 1 0 0 ) ( 1 0 0 )
Feinstein 385000 142000 271000 402000 338000 217000 155000 666000 818000 3394000
(index) (51) (45) (148) (163) (187) (124) (134) (601) (936) (157)
Simon 352600 158100 307600 451500 294400 379400 359700 653300 785300 3741900
(index) (47) (50) (168) (184) (162) (216) (311) (590) (898) (173)
Notes: Germany included North Germany and Prussia; South Africa included Orange Free State;
* Only a fraction o f these particularly large sums were raised in London;
Net proceeds were calculated as follows:
(net proceeds) =  (total loan issue amounts) X (London issue prices, otherwise 100)/100;
These amounts do not mean actual capital transfers from the London capital market, and the data for the period before 
1885, not based on S.E.O .I.. are perhaps insignificant because they included large partials.
Feinstein calculated U.K. investment abroad (net) on the indirect method and Simon British portfolio foreign investment 
(net) on the direct method.
Sources: Table 1.3;
C.H. Feinstein & S. Pollard (eds.), Studies in Capital Formation in the United Kingdom. 1750-1920 (Oxford, 1988), 
table xvii (pp.462-63);
M. Simon, ‘The Pattern of New British Portfolio Foreign Investment, 1865-1914’ in A.R. Hall (ed.), The Export of 
Capital from Britain 1870-1914 (1968), pp.38-39.
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1.3 Yields
Anticipated returns and risks are the fundamental determinants of investors’ demand. The 
promised yields of Colonial and foreign government bonds were typically much higher 
than those of Consols,8 but British investors did not always prefer these higher interest 
bonds because of perceived ‘country risks’. In 1865 Viscount Goschen, in saying 
‘thousands of men, who, under the old system [the principle of unlimited liability], would 
rather have invested their money at 3 per cent, at home than risk it abroad for 50’ ,9 noted 
that not only high yields but also risks swayed the decision of British investors. Dickson, 
who gives full treatment to eighteenth century national debt problems, has paid attention 
to the aspect of safety in investment.10 Kennedy has discussed British investors’ 
preferences for safety, and explained the reasons for the apparent bias of the Victorian 
capital market towards foreign securities, as resulting mainly from a limited ability to 
achieve informed diversification of dangerous domestic ventures and the highly 
segmented, informationally inefficient structure of the various financial institutions of 
the London capital market.11 Edelstein, taking risks in investment into consideration, 
calculated ‘risk-adjusted returns’ and confirmed a tendency for overseas ‘risk-adjusted 
returns’ to exceed those at home.12 It is worth considering the behaviour of Victorian
8. R.L. Nash, A Short History into the Profitable Nature of Our Investments (1881), 
pp.31-32; R.A. Lehfeldt, ‘The Rate of Interest on British and Foreign Investments’, 
J.R.S.S.. vol.lxxvi (1913), pp. 196-207 and 415-16; vol.lxxvii (1914), pp.432-35; vol. 
lxxviii (1915), pp.452-53; A.K. Caimcross, Home and Foreign Investment 1870-1913 
(Cambridge, 1953), chapter ix; M. Edelstein, Overseas Investment in the Age of High 
Imperialism (1982), chapter 5.
9. Viscount Goschen, Essays and Addresses on Economic Questions. 1865-1893 
(1905), p.26.
10. P.G.M. Dickson, The Financial Revolution in England (1967), p.301.
11. Kennedy, op. cit.. chapter 5.
12. M. Edelstein, ‘Realised Rates of Return U.K. Home and Overseas Portfolio 
Investment in the Age of High Imperialism’, Explorations in Economic History, vol. 13- 
no. 3 (1976), pp. 302-6; Overseas Investment in the Age of High Imperialism (1982), 
pp. 130-40. Edelstein’s analysis of ‘risk-adjusted returns’ was similar to that of J.D. 
Bailey’s analysis of Australian governments’ bondholders (M. Edelstein, ‘The Rate of
(continued...)
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investors, but it is now almost impossible to trace bondholders because the loan issue 
banks held no subscription lists of their issued securities.13 ‘It has, in fact, proved to be 
extremely difficult to generalize about Victorian investors’.14
Table 1.5 shows the average yields of the foreign government bonds quoted on 
the London Stock Exchange at 5 year intervals from 1870 to 1910. The figures of these 
yields were made by dividing the annual nominal dividends by the January quotation 
prices of the bonds in the Investor’s Monthly Manual15 and averaged by country. The 
contemporary market rate of interest and investors’ assessment of the risk factors 
involved in the investment could affect the quotation prices. Obviously higher yields 
coincided with higher dividends and lower prices.
In particular, South American countries’ high-yield bonds deserved attention at 
the time. There were several notorious South American government loan issues which
,2(... continued)
Return on U.K. Home and Foreign Investment, 1870-1913’, Unpublished Ph. D. Thesis, 
University of Pennsylvania, 1970, pp.73-76). Bailey emphasised that the importance of 
‘safe’ investors or rentiers as Colonial government bond investors by saying that ‘they 
constituted between 40 and 50% of the number of subscribers, and invested between 30 
and 40% of the capital [amounts]’ (‘Australian Company Borrowings 1870-1913: A 
Study in British Overseas Investment’, Unpublished D. Phil. Thesis, Oxford University, 
1958, p. 63). But note that in order to obtain a good statistical fit for his calculations of 
risk adjusted yields, Edelstein must introduce for preference and debenture issues a 
dummy variable that takes on a significant negative coefficient (Edelstein, Overseas 
Investment, op. cit.. pp. 131-135). This means that British wealth-holders systematically 
paid too much for preference and debenture issues relative to their realised patterns of 
risk and return. Without this adjustment, the risk adjusted returns on foreign investment, 
shown in Edelstein’s Table 5.7, would have been markedly lower, rather than only 
slightly lower (ibid.. pp. 138-39), than the returns in domestic investment. However, the 
differential between risk adjusted returns on overseas and domestic equity remains.
13. It is possible to derive the subscribers’ names, addresses, occupations and amounts 
of the colonial government loans from the Bank of England Archives. Bailey analysed 
the subscribers of the Queensland government loans of 1883, 1884, 1888 and 1891 
(Bailey, op. cit., pp.55-63 and appendix ii [pp.iii-xiii]).
14. S. Pollard, ‘Capital Exports, 1870-1914: Harmful or Beneficial?’, Economic 
History Review, second series, vol.xxxviii-no.4 (1985), p.498.
15. The dividends were nominal (not realised dividends) because the item of ‘yield to 
investors at latest price’ in the Investor’s Monthly Manual is not available before June 
1879.
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defaulted immediately after flotation. Without doubt, the fabulous promised yields enticed 
investors into perilous ventures and many disappointments.
South European countries and Turkey manifested low creditworthiness on the 
market. Greece and Turkey had crucial debt problems from the late nineteenth century. 
Italy, after unification in 1870, steadily improved its borrowing position on the European 
financial markets and by the 1880s achieved first-rate standing.
The yields of the bonds issued by East European and Far Eastern countries were 
not as high as those of the South American countries. Their creditworthiness was still 
middling even in 1910.
Throughout the nineteenth century the more developed West European countries 
received a favourable assessment from investors. Just before the First World War the 
Scandinavian countries, where central governments relied on much foreign capital for 
their industrialisation, attained similar levels of credit rating on the London capital 
market.
The chronological yields of several foreign government loans are indicated in 
Table 1.6. Silver loans were assessed at a discount under the gold standard mainly 
because of the depreciation of silver from the 1870s.16 The establishment of the gold 
standard improved borrowing countries’ creditworthiness on the foreign capital markets. 
In fact, after the adoption of the gold standard in 1897, the yields of Russian and 
Japanese governments bonds plummeted as bonds prices rose.17
Table 1.7 sets out the Japanese government loan issue terms in the period from
16. Viscount Goschen, op. cit.. p. 133. The price of silver fell 20 percent in the 1870s. 
In August 1897, Japanese government 5 percent bonds, based on silver standard, were 
quoted at 46 1/2 percent (yielding 10.75 percent at market) on the London Stock 
Exchange, but 5 percent bonds, endorsed to pay the principal and interest in gold, at 101 
1/2 (yielding 4.93 percent at market) (l.M.M.. August 1897).
17. The establishment of the gold standard in Russia attracted more foreign capital 
because of reductions in exchange risks (P.R. Gregory, ‘The Russian Balance of 
Payments, the Gold Standard, and Monetary Policy’, Journal of Economic History, 
vol.39-no.2 [1979], p.393).
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1870 to 1910. The rates of nominal interest reflected Japan’s creditworthiness of the time, 
and the level of the yields at issue indicates the market’s assessment of these loan issues. 
The risk factors were calculated roughly from the difference between them and the yields 
on Consols, one of the relatively risk free investments. The two early loans held large 
perceived risks for public investors since Japan was still an unknown country. However, 
Japan’s borrowing position in London improved remarkably as a result of both the 
adoption of the gold standard and the conclusion of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance in 1902. 
Japan built closer relations with the London capital market. This obviously reflected the 
level of the yields at issue in 1899 and 1902. The two loan issues of 1904 involved the 
uncertainties and dangers of the Russo-Japanese War. The yields of the Japanese 
government loans thus closely corresponded with the risks that the contemporary loan 
issue market perceived and the dividends paid.
61
Table 1.5 Realised Yields of Foreign Government Loans. 1870-1910 (Bv Country")
(percent)
Country 1870 1875 1880 1885 1890 1895 1900 1905 1910
Argentina 7.0 7.2 7.4 7.0 5.5 10.7 6.9 5.9 5.2
Austria 10.1 7.6 6.8 6.5 5.9 5.4 5.4 4.0 4.1
Belgium 4.1 4.2 3.9 3.7 3.2 2.9 - - -
Bolivia - 24.0 16.0 - - - - - -
Brazil 5.7 5.0 5.0 5.1 5.1 5.6 7.2 5.0 4.8
Bulgaria - - - - - 6.0 6.8 6.0 5.1
Chile 5.6 4.7 6.9 5.5 5.2 4.8 5.6 5.0 4.9
China - - 7.4 7.7 6.1 6.4 7.8 5.5 5.7
Colombia 7.1 7.9 11.2 23.8 11.3 28.8 9.4 5.0 6.7
Costa Rica - 31.0 42.6 50.0 5.6 15.8 10.4 13.6 7.7
Cuba 8.7 8.8 - - - - - 4.7 4.8
Denmark 4.1 4.5 4.3 4.0 - - 3.5 3.3 3.5
Ecuador 10.5 12.5 11.1 12.5 4.2 18.5 18.8 - -
Egypt 8.3 8.1 8.2 5.9 4.7 3.7 3.8 3.8 3.8
Finland - - - - - - - - 4.7
France 4.1 5.2 3.9 4.0 3.7 3.1 3.2 3.1 3.1
Germany - - - 3.9 3.8 3.4 3.5 3.4 3.6
Greece 47.6 35.7 25.0 6.6 5.4 16.7 11.4 9.1 8.9
Guatemala 7.7 12.0 31.7 14.3 5.8 18.4 20.0 15.2 10.1
Hawaii - - - - - 5.8 - - -
Holland 4.6 4.0 3.9 3.9 3.2 3.1 3.2 3.1 3.3
Honduras 12.3 142.9 153.8 250.0 60.6 160.0 210.5 111.1 80.0
Hungary - 6.7 6.4 5.3 4.5 4.0 3.9 3.9 4.1
Italy 7.7 6.6 5.7 5.2 5.3 5.6 5.4 4.9 5.1
Japan - 7.7 7.3 6.7 6.5 6.6 6.6 6.5 5.3
Liberia - 35.0 140.0 - - - - 9.5 -
Mexico 31.4 20.5 34.0 24.1 6.3 10.4 6.7 6.9 6.2
Nicaragua - - - - 6.0 10.1 7.9 5.6 5.5
Norway - - 4.3 4.2 3.6 3.3 3.5 3.4 3.5
Orange Free State - - - - 5.8 5.8 - - -
Paraguay - 45.8 57.1 94.1 4.5 25.0 17.6 7.4 5.6
Peru 5.5 8.9 31.6 52.1 29.1 - - - -
Portugal 9.1 6.3 5.7 6.7 4.7 12.1 13.2 4.5 4.6
Russia 5.7 4.9 5.6 5.4 4.6 3.7 3.8 4.4 4.4
Salvador - - - - - 8.6 - - 6.9
Santo Domingo - 66.7 - 50.0 - - - - -
Serbia - - - - - - 6.8 5.2 4.8
Siam - - - - - - - - 4.5
Spain 11.1 9.2 9.2 5.3 4.9 5.1 5.4 4.4 4.2
Sweden 5.0 4.8 4.4 4.1 3.7 3.5 3.4 3.5 3.8
Switzerland - - - - - - - 3.5 3.6
Turkey 8.5 8.8 30.6 24.3 4.6 3.8 5.6 4.1 4.1
United States 6.2 5.6 4.6 3.6 3.8 - 3.3 3.4 3.3
Uruguay - 10.1 21.0 9.9 6.9 6.7 7.8 5.4 4.9
Venezuela 28.0 37.6 35.2 10.0 5.7 6.5 12.2 6.8 5.4
Colonial
governments 4.8 4.4 4.1 4.0 3.7 3.3 3.5 3.8 4.0
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Table 1.5
Notes:
Source:
Realised Yields of Foreign Government Loans. 1870-1910 (By Countryl (cont.)
End of January;
- implies no transactions;
These yields were made by dividing the dividends of individual loans by 
the January quotation prices and averaged by country;
Excluding Treasury bills and provincial governments loan issues; 
Germany included Prussia;
Colonial governments’ yields were calculated from 51 bonds.
1870, 1875, 1880, 1885, 1890, 1895, 1900, 1905 and 1910; 
British Colonial governments - Edelstein, ‘The Rate of Return, op. cit.*, 
pp.295-96.
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Table 1.6 Realised Yields of Selected Foreign Government Bonds. 1880-1913
(percent)
Argentina Brazil Chile China Greece Italy
5 % 4 1/2 % 4 1/2 % 6 % 5 % 5 %
(1884) (1883) (1886) (1895) (1881) (1862)
Yield
(at issue) 5.9 5.0 4.5 6.2 6.7 6.8
1880 5.1
1881 4.9
1882 7.8 5.1
1883 7.7 5.0
1884 5.2 8.0 4.7
1885 - 5.5 8.0 4.3
1886 6.1 5.3 10.0 4.5
1887 5.8 4.9 9.4 4.5
1888 5.4 4.6 4.6 7.9 4.7
1889 5.2 4.6 4.3 6.0 4.6
1890 5.4 5.6 4.4 5.6 4.8
1891 8.0 6.1 4.7 5.6 4.7
1892 - 6.9 4.9 7.4 4.9
1893 - 6.3 5.1 7.9 4.8
1894 7.2 7.4 5.5 - 5.8
1895 7.0 5.7 4.7 5.1 4.7
1896 6.8 6.1 4.8 5.6 5.1 4.7
1897 5.0 6.3 5.0 5.6 5.1 4.4
1898 6.8 7.3 5.4 5.6 4.0 4.2
1899 6.8 - 6.0 5.6 3.4 4.3
1900 7.9 - 5.4 5.6 4.3 4.3
1901 6.4 - 5.4 5.9 4.7 4.2
1902 6.7 - 6.0 5.6 4.3 4.0
1903 5.5 5.4 5.2 5.7 4.3 3.9
1904 5.3 5.5 5.4 5.8 4.0 3.9
1905 5.0 5.2 4.8 5.7 3.8 3.9
1906 4.9 4.8 4.6 5.7 3.6 4.0
1907 5.0 5.1 4.8 5.8 3.9 4.0
1908 5.0 5.1 5.2 5.7 - 4.0
1909 4.9 5.3 4.9 5.7 - 4.0
1910 4.7 4.6 4.7 5.7 - 4.0
1911 4.7 4.6 4.7 5.7 - 4.0
1912 4.8 4.6 4.7 5.9 - 4.0
1913 4.8 4.6 4.8 5.8 - 4.2
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Table 1.6 Realised Yields of Selected Foreign Government Bonds. 1880-1913
(cont.)
(percent)
Japan 
7 % 
(1873)
Japan 
4 % 
(1899)
Prussia 
4 %* 
(1880)
Russia 
5 % 
(1822)
Sweden 
4 %** 
(1880)
Consol 
3 %***
Yield
(at issue) 7.5 4.4 - 6.1 4.1 -
1880 6.6 5.8 3.0
1881 6.5 4.0 5.6 4.1 3.0
1882 5.5 4.1 5.9 4.0 3.0
1883 6.0 4.0 6.1 4.0 2.9
1884 6.5 3.9 5.9 4.0 2.9
1885 6.1 3.9 5.3 4.0 3.0
1886 6.0 3.8 - 3.8 3.0
1887 4.9 3.8 5.2 3.8 2.9
1888 4.7 3.8 5.6 3.8 2.9
1889 6.0 3.7 5.1 3.7 3.0
1890 5.8 3.8 4.5 3.8 2.7
1891 5.8 3.8 4.2 3.8 2.7
1892 5.3 3.8 4.5 3.9 2.7
1893 5.8 3.8 4.3 3.9 2.6
1894 5.8 3.9 4.1 3.8 2.5
1895 4.6 3.8 3.8 3.9 2.4
1896 4.3 3.8 3.8 3.4 2.4
1897 6.1 3.9 3.4 3.4 2.2
1898 3.9 3.3 3.4 2.2
1899 3.5 3.4 3.4 2.0
1900 4.8 3.6 3.8 3.6 2.5
1901 5.0 3.6 3.8 3.6 2.7
1902 5.0 3.5 3.9 3.5 2.6
1903 4.6 3.0 3.7 3.5 2.6
1904 5.3 3.5 4.0 3.5 2.8
1905 5.0 3.5 4.6 3.5 2.8
1906 4.4 3.5 5.0 3.5 2.7
1907 4.5 3.6 5.3 3.5 2.9
1908 4.8 3.8 5.1 3.6 2.8
1909 4.7 3.7 4.8 3.7 3.0
1910 4.3 3.7 4.4 3.6 3.0
1911 4.3 3.8 4.1 3.7 3.1
1912 4.6 3.8 4.1 3.7 3.1
1913 5.1 4.1 4.1 3.8 3.2
Notes: End of January;
Source:
- implies no transaction;
These yields were derived from ‘yield to investors at latest price; 
redemption included’ in 
* from 1899 3 1/2 percent;
** from 1896 3 1/2 percent;
*** from 1890 2 3/4 percent and from 1903 2 1/2 percent.
l.M .M .. annually.
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Table 1.7 Japanese Government Loan Issue Terms (London). 1870-1910
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Year Nominal Issue Nominal Borrowing Yield Yield on Yield
interest price issue period at issue Consols difference
rate amount
(%) (%) (£000) (year) (%) (%) (%)
1870 9 98 1,000 13 9.2 3.2 6.0
1873 7 92 1/2 2,400 25 7.6 3.2 4.4
1897 5 101 1/2 4,385 53 4.9 2.5 2.4
1899 4 90 10,000 55 4.4 2.6 1.8
1902 5 100 5,104 55 5.0 2.9 2.1
1904 6 93 1/2 5,000 7 6.4 2.8 3.6
1904 6 90 1/2 6,000 7 6.6 2.8 3.8
1905 4 1/2 90 15,000 25 5.0 2.8 2.2
1905 4 1/2 90 10,000 25 5.0 2.8 2.2
1905 4 90 6,500 25 4.4 2.8 1.6
1907 5 99 1/2 11,500 60 5.0 3.0 2.0
1910 4 95 11,000 60 4.2 3.1 1.1
Notes: (5)=(l)/(2)xl00;
(7)=(5)-(6).
Sources: (l)-(5) Part II;
(6) B.R. Mitchell, British Historical Statistics (Cambridge, 1988), 
p.678.
1.4 Commissions
The level of loan issue commissions18 depended upon the risks which loan issuers 
undertook. The commissions on Colonial government loan issues19 were much lower than
18. Normally loan issue charges comprise the following commissions: loan issue bank 
commissions, underwriting commissions, brokerage commissions (placing underwriting), 
brokerage commissions (application), intermediary commissions and miscellaneous 
commissions.
19. Usually Colonial governments paid a 1-1/4 percent loan issue bank commission 
and a 1/4 percent broking commission (Schilling, op. cit.. p.52). The Bank of England 
charged a very low issue bank commission, 1/8 percent (at a fixed price) and 1/16 
percent (at tender) (Committee of Enquiry into the Organization of the Crown Agents’ 
Office, Minutes of Evidence & Appendices, B.P.P. 1909, xvi, [Cd.4474], Q.4179 [E. 
Blake -Senior Crown Agent]). Hall’s figures of the costs in New South Wales
(continued...)
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those of foreign governments, because the former were raised by the tender method.20 In 
this case, the loan issue banks did not undertake loan issues at their own risk. On the 
other hand, foreign governments faced high loan issue commissions. Since most of their 
loan issues were implemented on the condition that the loan issuers should guarantee to 
take some or all of the issue amounts,21 the loan issuers demanded sufficient commissions 
to compensate for their risks in the loan issues.
Some of the South American government loan issues in the 1860s and the 1870s, 
fully investigated by a Parliamentary Committee, revealed high loan issue commissions: 
the Honduras government 10 percent loan issue of 1867 paid about an 8.4 percent 
commission22 and the Costa Rica government 7 percent loan of 1872 a 7.6 percent 
commission.23 The Japanese government too paid a 7 percent commission in the 9 percent 
loan issue of 1870.24 These loan issue commissions were very high in comparison with 
contemporary standards.
It was of importance to borrowing countries to free themselves from foreign 
financiers’ high commissions. In fact, after the assiduous efforts by local financial 
institutions to use the most advantageous foreign capital markets, some of the borrowing 
countries successfully improved their subordinate position and became independent 
borrowers. For instance, Sweden carefully avoided over-dependence upon particular 
financiers and markets, and pursued the most favourable loan issue terms on the
I9(.. .continued)
government loan issues were higher (A.R. Hall, The London Capital Market and 
Australia. 1870-1914 [Canberra, 1963], p. 107). It seems likely that his calculation would 
include all the costs for the loan issues, such as the British stamp duty, printing and 
others.
20. For the tender method, see chapter 2.
21. See chapter 2.
22. Report of the Select Committee on Loans to Foreign States, B.P.P. 1875, xi, 
appendix, no.6.
23. Ibid., no.28. Burk pointed out J.S. Morgan & Co.’s large commission in the 
Chilean government loan issues of 1867 (K. Burk, Morgan Grenfell 1838-1988 [Oxford, 
1989], p.33).
24. See chapter 3.
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international capital markets. Throughout these operations, pre-eminent local banks 
always took the lead in loan issue negotiations with foreign financiers. The competitive 
background considerably lowered the level of commissions in Swedish government loan 
issues.25
However, financiers issued the loans of favoured foreign governments at 
remarkably low commissions especially when the loans were placed by the tender 
method. The London Joint Stock Bank tendered for the North German Confederation 
Treasury bonds issue in 1870 at a 1/2 percent commission;26 in 1880 the Bank also 
negotiated the re-sale of the Prussian government 4 percent domestic loan issue at a 1/3 
percent commission.27 In the Italian government 5 percent loan issues from 1880 to 1882, 
Hambros and Baring Brothers obtained only about a 2 3/10 percent profit with all charges 
included.28 Hambros carried out the Swedish government 4 percent loan issue in 1880 at 
about a 2 3/5 percent profit.29
There was a tendency for loan issue commissions to diminish. Because of both 
the diffusion of underwriting30 and keen competition on the loan issue market, financiers 
were forced to lower their loan issue commissions. In 1911 the London Rothschilds came 
to charge a 1 or a 1 1/4 percent underwriting commission and a 1 percent loan issue bank 
commission for foreign government loan issues. This level was less expensive than 
contemporary standards, namely 2 or 1 1/2 percent of an underwriting commission and 
11/2 percent of a loan issue bank commission. The London Rothschilds, therefore, felt 
proud that ‘the underwriting commission we charged is less than all other governments
O. Gasslander, History of the Stockholms Enskilda Bank to 1914 (Stockholm,
1962), passim.
26. L.J.S.B.A., Q 70, Special German Correspondence and others, no date.
27. Ibid., London Joint Stock Bank to the General Direction of the Seehandlung 
Society, 10 November 1879.
28. H.A., Ms. 19,119, Italian Government Loan Syndicate Account (1880-1882).
29. Ibid., Ms. 19,168, Swedish Government 4 percent Loan of 1880.
30. For underwriting, see chapter 2.
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had paid for their issues’.31
The Japanese government loan issue terms in the period from 1873 to 1913 are 
shown in Table 1.8. Except for the re-sales of domestic bonds in 1902 and the four loan 
issues during the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905), the commissions charged by 
financiers were about 4 percent. The four war loan issues needed much higher 
commissions charged to compensate for the risks of hazardous war loans.
Table 1.8 Commissions of Japanese Government Loan Issues (London!.
1873-1910
(percent)
Year 1873 1897 1899 1902 1904
(6%)
1904
(6%)
Underwriting 2 I
L/2
2 iiiii
2 2
Brokerage
(placing underwriting)
1/2 1/2
i
1/2
iii
1/2 1/2
Brokerage
(application)
1/4 1/4
iiiiii
1/4 1/4
Advertisement 1/4 1/4
iiii
1/4 1/4
Loan issue bank 1 1
iii 3
1/2
3
3/4
Total 4 4 4** 4
3/4
6
1/2*
6
3/4*
31. R.A.L., XI/111/50, Chilean Government 5 percent Loan (1911).
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Table 1.8 Commissions of Japanese Government Loan Issues (London).
1873-1910 (cont.)
(percent)
Year 1905 1905 1905 1907 1910
(4 1/2%) (4 1/2%) (4%)
Underwriting 2 2 1
1/2
1
1/2
1
1/2
Brokerage
(placing underwriting)
1/2 1/2 1/2 1/2 1/2
Brokerage
(application)
1/4 1/4 1/4 1/4 1/4
Advertisement 1/4 1/4 1/4 1/4 1/4
Loan issue bank 2 2 1 1 1
1/2 1/2 1/2 1/2 1/2
Total 5 5 4 4 4
1/2* 1/2*
Notes: Excluding the British stamp duty and intermediary commissions in Japan;
* Russo-Japanese war loan issues;
** the commission to the actual issue amount on the market was 5 percent. 
Source: These sources will be mentioned in Part II.
1.5 Market Linkages
In order to obtain more favourable loan issue terms, borrowers often sought to avoid 
over-dependence upon one market and turned more of their attention to other capital 
markets. From the 1890s the markets for foreign government loan issues included not 
only London but also Paris and other main Continental cities. After the turn of the 
century the New York capital market also came to deal with foreign loan issues. 
Simultaneous loan issues were a possibility and international market linkages were more 
important to borrowing countries. This section will view relationships between 
international capital markets, especially London and Paris, the largest markets of the
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time, in simultaneous loan issues. In order to look into their linkages, let us contrast 
several economic factors, which produced the difference in quotation prices, such as 
interest rate differentials, governments’ control and costs of loan issues between the two 
markets.
There were an increased number of security issues in France in the 1900s and the 
proportion of the foreign security issues (‘valeurs Strangere’) to the total rose to 66 
percent in 1904.32 The Paris capital market was regarded as having ‘completely regained 
its position as an international financial market, second only to London in its ability to 
absorb foreign loans’.33
In the 1900s, however, there was a partial isolation of the Paris capital market 
from London. Comparing the prices of bonds quoted on the Paris Stock Exchange with 
those on the London Stock Exchange, L’economiste franqais commented in 1910: 
‘France is not the sole lender to the world but the one with the most favourable 
conditions. There is a difference of 2 or 3 points (that is to say, 2 percent or 3 percent), 
often of 5 or 6 and of from 7 to 8 in the capitalisation of the same government loans 
between France and London’.34 The Russian government 5 percent bonds (1906) and the 
Japanese government 4 percent bonds (1905), issued simultaneously in Paris and London, 
showed such a tendency. As indicated in Table 1.9, there was a conspicuous and 
continuing difference in their quotation prices between Paris and London in the period 
from 1906 to 1909.35
32. Minist&re de l’Economie et des Finances, Annuaire statistique de la France 1966 
(Paris, 1967), p.532. The figures included French colonial security issues.
33. M. de Cecco, Money and Empire (Oxford, 1974), p. 106; also see D.C.M. Platt, 
Britain’s Investment Overseas on the Eve of the First World War (1986), p. 134. 
However, the Berlin capital market did not transact a large number of foreign securities, 
but was concerned mainly with domestic industrial finance (R.G. Levy, ‘Les grands 
marches financiers’, Revue economique intemationale. 1905, pp.479 and 493).
34. P. Leroy-Beaulieu, ‘Les emprunts des Etats Strangers et le gouvemement 
frangais’, L’economiste francais. 1 October 1910, p.487.
35. As will be seen in chapter 7, this gap often frustrated simultaneous loan issues on 
the international capital markets when loan issue banks fixed loan issue prices.
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The discount rates at the Bank of France (‘le taux d’escompte k la Banque de 
France’) were lower than the Bank Rates in London during most of the period from 1890 
to 1913.36 Table 1.10 confirms their difference in 1907. Low interest rates in Paris might 
have caused a high capitalisation of securities on the Paris capital market.
There was another, more important, reason for the higher quotation prices in 
Paris. It was the strict control by both the French government and great financiers of 
the Paris Stock Exchange that brought about the differences. The French government did 
not readily admit the quotation of bonds issued outside France on the Paris Stock 
Exchange, a practice referred to as the ‘Frenchman’s watertight system’.37 The restricted 
supply of securities for the market necessarily led to the higher capitalisation on the Paris 
Stock Exchange. In fact, the differences between the quotation prices of the Japanese 
government 4 percent bonds of 1905 in London and Paris rapidly decreased after 1910, 
when the French government admitted the quotation of London’s tranche on the Paris 
Stock Exchange (Table 1.9). Labordbre, therefore, regarded high quotation prices in 
Paris as ‘very inflated values’ which whenever possible attracted foreign borrowers and 
companies to the Paris capital market.38
It is true that there was only slight official intervention in loan issue negotiations 
in Britain but, by contrast, in France foreign governments were not able to effect any 
loan issue without the authorisation of the Ministry of Finance.39 The French government 
invariably regarded foreign loans as a diplomatic implement directly reflecting its
Ministbre de l’Economie et des Finances, op. cit.. p.520; D.K. Sheppard, The 
Growth and Role of U. K. Financial Institutions. 1880-1962 (1971), pp. 190-91. Yet S. 
Homer drew the opposite conclusion (A History of Interest Rates [New Brunswick,
1963], pp.504 and 515).
37. M.A., Bank 13-6, T. Toyama, ‘Mitsui Ginko Obei Shucchoin Hokokusho (Report 
of an officer dispatched by the Mitsui Bank to Europe and America)’ (Tokyo, 1909), 
p.29; M .T.Z.. vol. 12, pp.240-41.
38. M. Labordere, ‘Mechanism of Foreign Investment in France’, Economic Journal, 
vol.xxiv (1914), p.532.
39. H. Gans, ‘L’intervention gouvemementaleet l’accfcs du marche financier’, Revue 
politique et parlementaire. vol.lix (1909), p.249.
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interests.40 The French government put the power of authorising a security quotation into 
the hands of the Chambre Syndicate at the Paris Stock Exchange on the condition that the 
government made the final decision, taking into consideration diplomatic relations with 
a borrowing country.41 On the other hand, it was the British government’s established 
policy neither to control quotations on the London Stock Exchange nor to intervene in 
financiers’ private transactions except for diplomatically important cases.42 The General 
Purpose Committee of the London Stock Exchange assessed new quotation applications 
according to its own criteria.43
One factor in the selection of a loan issue market for borrowers lay in the 
difference of loan issue costs or commissions.44 It was pointed out in 1905 that loan issues 
in Paris required additional charges for the manipulation of the press and a higher rate 
of stamp duty.45 Lysis, without giving a precise definition of the profit, pointed out the 
high profits earned by French financiers in foreign government loan issues.46 Yet the level
40. H. Feis, Europe the World’s Banker. 1870-1914 (New Haven, 1930 [reprinted
1964]), p. 133; R. Wakatsuki, Kofuan Kaikoroku (Mv Recollection] (Tokyo, 1950), 
pp. 111-13.
41. E. Becque, L’intemationalisation des capitaux (Montpellier, 1912), pp. 113-14.
42. For instance, the British government guaranteed the Turkish government 4 percent 
loan issue in 1855 during the Crimean War (The London House of Rothschild [J. Ayer], 
op. cit.. p.46). However, Feis noticed the accord between the British government’s 
diplomatic policy and Russian government’s financial operations in London (op. cit.. 
p. 89).
43. For instance, in the 1890s the British Foreign Office was much concerned with 
Persia but the London Stock Exchange Committee did not readily admit the quotation of 
the 1892 loan (L.S.E.A., Ms. 14,600, vol.64, Stock Exchange General Purpose 
Committee Minutes, 22 June 1896, Application of the Persian Government 6 Percent 
Loan of 1892 - Refused).
44. There was much argument about the costs of loan issues on the international 
capital markets. The lower brokerage rates in London, in comparison with New York, 
were pointed out in the 1920s (Burk, op. cit.. pp.88 and 300 [note 78]).
45. J.N.D.L., Inoue Papers, 686-8, K. Takahashi to T. Katsura and K. Sone, 21 
September 1905. In 1909 the officer dispatched by the Mitsui Bank noted the significant 
difference between the British stamp duty (1/2 percent) and the French one (2 percent) 
(M.A., Bank 13-6, Toyama, op. cit., pp.25-26).
46. Lysis (pseudonym- E. Le Tailleur), Contre 1’oligarchic financiere en France 
(Paris, 1908), pp.26-28.
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of the ‘bdnefice syndic et commission (syndicate profit and commission)’ in the Turkish 
government loan issues in Paris for the years from 1894 to 1914, calculated by Thobie, 
was less than 5 percent after 190247 and the Japanese government 4 percent loan issues 
in 1905 and in 1910 were implemented at almost the same commission in London and 
Paris (4 percent).48 Kaufmann correctly estimated a net profit to a member of a syndicate, 
deducting various issue charges, at about 2 percent.49 It is difficult to generalise about the 
loan issue commissions in the Paris capital market on the basis of an insufficient number 
of the loan issues, but one wonders if Lysis’ figures might not be overestimated. As far 
as loan issue commissions were concerned, there was very little difference for borrowers 
between the London and Paris capital markets.
It is right to say, therefore, that it was mainly because of the French government’s 
policy that the isolation of the Paris capital market from the London capital market 
occurred in some of the simultaneous loan issues.
The linkages of the world’s main capital markets of the time was imperfect and 
differences in the quotation prices of securities occurred. These differences often hindered 
simultaneous loan issues on the international capital markets. However, as the result of 
the development of market linkages in later periods, the patterns of loan issues became 
diversified for borrowers. This made it possible for borrowers to select the most 
favourable loan issue on the international capital markets, either on one market or on 
multiple markets.50
47. J. Thobie, ‘Placements et investissements frangais dans l’empire ottoman, 1881- 
1914’ in Levy-Leboyer (ed.), op. cit.. p.293. He did not give the source for his 
calculations.
48. See chapter 6 and chapter 7.
49. E. Kaufmann (translated by A.S. Sacker), La banque en France (Paris, 1914),
p. 122.
50. See chapter 7.
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Table 1.9 Quotation Prices of Russian and Japanese 
Governments Bonds in London and Paris. 1906-1913
(percent)
Year Japanese Government Russian Government
4 percent Bond (1905) 5 percent Bond (1906)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Year Paris London Difference Paris London Different
1906 92.0 88.25 3.75 _ - _
1907 88.0 82.0 6.0 94.75 90.25 4.50
1908 92.75 85.75 7.0 100.0 97.25 2.75
1909 99.50 93.25 6.25 103.50 101.50 2.00
1910 97.30 96.0 1.30 104.80 104.75 0.05
1911 94.85 92.0 2.85 104.65 104.0 0.65
1912 90.60 87.50 3.10 103.25 103.75 -0.50
1913 - - - 103.10 102.50 0.60
Notes: Percent of the quotation prices;
End of December;
- implies no data;
(3)=(l)-(2); (6)=(4)-(5).
Sources: (1) & (4) from Marchd financier, vol. 1906-7, p.204, vol. 1907-
8, p.351, vol. 1908-9, p.333, vol.1909-10, p.254, vol.1910-11, 
p.247; vol. 1911-12, p.261, vol.1912-13, p.283, vol.1913-14,
P-416;
(2) & (5) from monthly.
Table 1.10 Bank Rates and Taux de l’Escompte (Discount Rates") (1907")
Date Month Bank Rates Taux de l’Escompte
(London) (Paris)
1 January 6 3
17 January 5 3
21 March 5 3 1/2
11 April 4 1/2 3 1/2
25 April 4 3 1/2
15 August 4 1/2 3 1/2
31 October 5 1/2 3 1/2
4 November 6 3 1/2
7 November 7 4
Source: Marche financier, vol. 1907-8, p.345.
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1.4 Conclusion
This chapter has given a general overview of the London capital market before 1914. It 
is no more than an overview, but several useful points have emerged.
The volume of foreign government loan issues on the London capital market had 
cyclical fluctuations and one of their peaks occurred in the 1870s. There was another 
boom at the end of the 1880s. The foreign government loan issues showed a definite 
pattern in geographical distribution. After the late-1890s, the London capital market was 
open wide mainly to South American and Far Eastern countries including Japan, because 
the major developed European countries and the United States were no longer large 
borrowers on foreign capital markets.
The promised yields of the foreign government bonds were much higher than 
those of Consols. Yet British investors who preferred safety in investment took into 
consideration not only high yields but also low risks. Loan issue commissions were 
determined ultimately by the concomitant risks which loan issuers incurred. Therefore, 
less creditworthy foreign governments had to pay higher commissions because their loan 
issues involved greater risks. The establishment of the gold standard improved borrowing 
countries’ creditworthiness on the foreign capital markets.
Market linkages were of considerable importance to simultaneous loan issues but 
these linkages were often imperfect. Even in the 1900s there was a partial isolation of 
Paris from London, and some of the simultaneous loans were transacted at much higher 
quotation prices on the Paris capital market than on the London capital market. The 
French government’s policy of restricting the quotation of securities issued outside France 
was mainly responsible for the difference. The French government always regarded 
foreign loan issues as one of its diplomatic weapons. However, the development of 
market linkages enabled borrowers to select the most favourable loan issue on the 
international capital markets.
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CHAPTER 2 
LOAN ISSUE MECHANISM 
OF THE LONDON CAPITAL MARKET
It is important to understand the general character of loan issues on the London capital 
market before a particular country’s loan matters are discussed. This chapter presents 
the development of the loan issue mechanism of the London capital market. The role, and 
the extent of the involvement, of a variety of financial institutions of the City in loan 
issue business for Colonial and foreign governments will be examined.
It is useful to give an outline of the various stages by which an ultimate borrower 
(government), ultimate lenders (investors) and financial intermediaries were connected 
through the loan issue market, because the intervention of the financial intermediaries, 
which helped the borrower to find the lenders efficiently, often veiled the relationship 
between the ultimate borrower and the ultimate lenders. The capital market played a role 
‘to select the sources of highest yield, to capitalize these in the form of stocks and shares 
and to sell these securities to the public’.1
A government which intended to raise a loan, first nominated a commissioner 
or an agent. He became the negotiator of the loan issue with the banks in the country 
where the government proposed to issue the loan. The commissioner or agent, at the next 
stage, looked for banks which would undertake the issue. The loan issue banks, in 
collaboration with stockbrokers, began to organise the loan issue for the market. They 
issued the prospectuses and informed the financial press of the loan issue; the 
stockbrokers also advertised to potential customers. Then the subscriptions took place. 
The relationship between the ultimate borrower (government) and the ultimate lenders 
(investors) was formed in this way. However, in most cases, before the offering of 
subscriptions, other financial intermediaries, namely the loan issue bank syndicate and
'. F. Lavington, The English Capital Market. 3rd. ed. (1934), p. 190.
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the underwriters, temporarily intervened in the relationship between the ultimate 
borrower, the ultimate lenders and the loan issue banks.
The loan issue bank syndicate, the loan issue banks acting in union, undertook 
the loan issue for the ultimate borrower. The underwriters guaranteed to take the 
unsubscribed portion. Obviously these organisations helped to float the loan more 
efficiently on the loan issue market. It was through these intermediaries that the issued 
bonds were finally delivered to the ultimate lenders. All these interrelated operations 
between the ultimate borrower and the ultimate lenders together comprised the market 
loan issue mechanism.
2.1 Development of the Loan Issue Mechanism
Market methods were developed to free loan issuers from the limitation of individuals’ 
resources. The creation of loan issue organisations, such as issue syndicates and 
underwriters, forms a part of this development. This section will examine the 
development of these loan issue organisations in the nineteenth century.
2.1.1 Loan issues in the early nineteenth century
The first peak of foreign government loan issues on the London capital market occurred 
in the early-1820s.2 The independence of South American countries from Spain caused 
a large export boom in the British economy, and this excitement enticed many British 
investors to purchase South American governments bonds.3 These became market leaders 
but most of them quickly fell into default after 1825.
2. The latest explanation of this speculation is given by F.G. Dawson, The First 
American Debt Crisis (1990).
3. J.W. Gilbart, The History. Principles and Practice of Banking, vol.l (1922), 
pp. 65-66.
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Jenks illustrated the foreign loan issue methods in the 1820s, and pointed out the 
co-operation among issue houses.4 There is a reference to this in The Times in 1826 
when J. & S. Ricardo< a London merchant bank, was defending its high commission in
Cicb .
the Greek government 5 percent loan issue of 1825.5 Ricardo’s letter, addressed to the 
editor of The Times, revealed the co-operation among financiers in this loan contract.6 
In the Colombian government loan issue of 1824, there was also the co-operation of the 
financiers involved; B.A. Goldschmidt & Co., the issuer of this loan, prepared the list 
filled with merchants and men of great capital who were ready to take the bonds to share 
the risks and profits.7
The need for co-operation among financiers obviously stemmed from the increased 
size of the loan issues which were now too great for individual resources to bear the risks 
involved. Compared with the practice of the late nineteenth century, the loan issue 
organisation of the 1820s simply meant participants’ co-operation in taking a certain 
issue amount and sharing risks and profits. The terminology of a syndicate had not yet 
been used.
The sale organisation for subscriptions in the 1820s was primitive. The success 
of loan issues depended almost entirely upon the loan issuers’ narrow circle of friends 
and families. The most crucial matter was how loan issuers could ensure the solid support 
of purchasers. It must be emphasised that family and personal connections played a 
principal role. The Rothschilds frequently raised huge loan issues in London, Paris, 
Frankfurt-on-Main and Vienna simultaneously through their kin who acted as satellites.8
4. L.H. Jenks, The Migration of British Capital to 1875 (1927 [reprinted 1971]), 
p.47.
5. The Times. 24 October 1826.
6. Ibid.. 28 October 1826.
7. A Statement of Some Circumstances connected with the Mode of Contracting the 
Colombian Loan (probably 1825), pp. 8-15.
8. The following phrase typically illustrates their way of business : ‘a family that 
works together is invincible’ (Count Corti [translated from the German by Brian & 
Beatrix Lunn], The Reign of the House of Rothschild. [1928], p.465). The London 
Rothschilds’ official history (The London House of Rothschild [J. Ayer], A Century of
(continued...)
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Baring Brothers, one of the long-standing merchant banks in the City, also secured many 
correspondents for their transactions covering most of the main cities on the Continent 
and in the United States.
Loan issuers were often forced to take the remnant of the issue amount unless they 
could find sufficient purchasers. It was because of this uncertainty that loan issuers in the 
early nineteenth century received a large commission. In 1825 J. & S. Ricardo & Co. 
obtained a £60,000 commission (6 percent) at least from the Greek government 5 percent 
loan issue.9
2.1.2 A new business practice - syndication
At the end of the 1860s a loan flotation technique, syndication, was used for many of 
the new foreign government loan issues. A borrower made a contract for the loan issue 
with an agent who usually formed a syndicate. The syndicate purchased all or some of 
the unsubscribed bonds according to the contract, although there were possible variations 
in contracts of syndication. The forming of a syndicate to purchase unsubscribed bonds 
was in most cases applicable to foreign government loan issues because of their less 
creditworthy and more speculative nature.
So far little has been known about how foreign government loan issues were 
arranged on the London capital market. Lavington10 and Hall11 explained the mechanism 
of Colonial government loan issues, depending upon Schilling.12 It is true that Schilling
8(.. .continued)
Finance. 1804 to 1904 [1905]) often details their co-operation in security issues (pp. 13- 
81).
9. The Times. 24 October 1826. Jacob and Samson were younger brothers of the 
famous David Ricardo (D. Weatherall, David Ricardo [Hague, 1976], p. 132).
10. Lavington, op. cit.. pp. 196-99.
". A.R. Hall, The London Capital Market and Australia. 1870-1914 (Canberra,
1963), pp.73-81 and 99-107.
12. Ibid.. p. 196 (note 59).
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has analysed the mechanism of Colonial government loan issues, yet he neither disclosed 
his sources nor analysed them in the course of the development of the loan issue methods 
on the London capital market.13 Furthermore, the techniques of syndication and capital 
underwriting14 were developed largely in the field of foreign government loan issues,15 
since, as will be discussed later, Colonial governments usually drew financial assistance 
from the British government, the Bank of England and other specific financial institutions 
in London.
It is possible to look at how particular foreign government loans of the 1860s 
and the 1870s were floated on the market, from published sources such as British 
Parliamentary Papers and contemporary financial journals. Yet there have been no serious 
studies which fully made use of them, although Jenks regarded the evidence taken before 
the Parliamentary Committee of 187516 as ‘a storehouse of material upon the loan 
business’.17
With the marked increase of foreign government loan issues in the late nineteenth 
century, many financial journals referred to the loan issue mechanism. In 1873 the 
Bondholder’s Register emphasised ‘a considerable change during the last eight or ten 
years’ in foreign government loan issues,18 but the practice of syndication prevailing in 
the 1860s was not, in the sense of undertaking a loan issue in union at their own risk, 
very different from that of the 1820s. Syndication was not a new invention of the 1860s 
but had ‘only recently come to the knowledge of the public’.19 Large systematic 
operations among financiers on the stock exchange made people misunderstand it.
13. T. Schilling, London als Anleihemarkt der englischen Kolonien (Stuttgart, 1911), 
p.52.
14. Hereafter used as underwriting.
15. D. Finnie, Capital Underwriting (1934), pp.6-7.
16. Report from the Select Committee on Loans to Foreign States; together with the 
Proceedings of the Committee, Minutes of Evidence, and Index, B.P.P. 1875, xi 
(hereafter cited as Committee on Loans).
17. Jenks, op. cit.. p.400.
18. Bondholder’s Register. 8 July 1873.
19. Bankers’ Magazine, vol.33 (1873), p. 1000.
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The primary role of a syndicate was to ensure a firm placement of the loan on 
the market. In other words, members of a syndicate jointly incurred risks in the loan 
issue by taking all or some of the issue amount on their own responsibility:
the nature and object of a syndicate as I understand it is this: that any operation 
that is too large, either from the amount involved, or the risk involved for any one 
firm, rather than not be taken at all, should be subdivided by other firms in 
certain proportions, according to their means and importance. That is the primary 
object, to divide the risks of the operation, or to furnish guarantees to a 
Government for a certain portion of the loan being taken firm, as it is called, 
where any one individual firm would not be satisfactory to the Government, or 
not willing to take so large a risk themselves; therefore, they call in their friends 
and associates to join them in that operation.20
The contract of the Chilean government 5 percent loan issue syndicate in 1870 
guaranteed to purchase unsubscribed bonds;21 the syndicate of the Iquique & La Noria 
Pizaqua and Sal De Obispo and Junction Railways (Peru), formed in 1872, guaranteed 
to place half an issue amount of the 7 percent debentures.22 The following quotation from 
the Bankers* Magazine of 1876 well describes how a syndicate secured a loan issue:
when the preliminary arrangements had been completed between the borrowing 
government, or its authorised representatives in this country, and the firm who 
were to undertake the introduction of the loan to the public, the latter 
communicated to numerous capitalists, bankers, merchants, stockbrokers, private 
individuals and others, the terms on which they could enter the syndicate. An 
agreement was drawn up between the original agents, or contractors, and the 
members of the syndicate. The syndicate guaranteed the placing or disposal of a 
certain portion of the whole loan, perhaps one-third or even one-half; and the part 
so guaranteed was the first portion that might be placed among the public.23
2.1.3 A new business practice - underwriting
The role of underwriting in ensuring firm purchasers of loan issues was of extreme
20. Evidence taken before Committee on Loans, Q.5014 (A. Grant, Grant Brothers 
& Co.).
21. M.G.A., Ms.21,760, HC 4.3.4, Memorandum of Agreement, 28 January 1870.
22. Huth, Frederick & Co. Archives, Ms. 10.700, box 1, no. 1983.
23. Bankers’ Magazine, vol.36 (1876), p.518.
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importance, but so far historians have not explained its origin and development to a 
satisfactory degree.24 The contracts of syndication in foreign government loan issues 
during the 1860s and the 1870s often included the de facto role of ‘underwriting’. Since 
the syndicate guaranteed to purchase some of the loan issue amount at a certain price 
from the borrowers, members of the syndicate had to take unsalable bonds at their own 
risk.25
The terminology of underwriting had not yet been used in the 1860s and the 
1870s, but underwriting was thus recognised as one of the roles of a syndicate. The 
development of underwriting was rather mysterious. Finnie believed that the practice of 
underwriting was introduced to capital issues from marine insurance.26 When was 
underwriting institutionally split from the roles of a syndicate? In other words, when did 
a syndicate divide into an issue syndicate and an underwriting syndicate?27 Unfortunately 
the origin of the underwriting in foreign government loan issues could not be found in 
contemporary journals. Chart 2.1 shows the course of the development of syndicates and 
underwriting in the nineteenth century. At first, the separation of loan issue bank 
commissions from syndicate profits took place and the main role of syndicates became 
the guarantee of loan issues (‘underwriting’). Subsequently, loan issue banks (loan issue 
bank syndicate) came to arrange the subscriptions alone and did not undertake loan issues
24. For academic research on the role of underwriting in loan issues, see D.C.M. 
Platt, Britain’s Investment Overseas on the Eve of the First World War (1986), 
pp. 141-45; S. Chapman, The Rise of Merchant Banking (1984), pp. 88-89 and 100-01. 
Neither referred to the development of underwriting.
Bankers’ Magazine, vol.36 (1876), p.518; Evidence taken before Committee on 
Loans, Q. 3543 (R. Foster, Knowles & Foster Co.).
26. Finnie, op. cit.. pp.2-4. It was true that O’Hagan considered why insurance could 
not be extended to capital issues (H.O. O’Hagan, Leaves from My Life, vol.l [1929], 
p. 150).
27. For this division of the functions, the American practice of ‘Syndicate N o .l’ and 
‘Syndicate No.2’ is of interest here. ‘Syndicate No. 1 [a loan issue bank syndicate] simply 
buys the securities and then proceeds to form another syndicate [‘Syndicate No.2 - an 
underwriting syndicate] for the purpose of selling them, and when formed they sell the 
securities to the second syndicate at an advance in price’ (L.B. Franklin, ‘Syndicates’, 
fAmericanl Bankers Magazine, vol.87 [1913], p.665).
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at their own risk, although they organised underwriting syndicates; underwriters 
(underwriting syndicates), who were not involved directly in the subscriptions, guaranteed 
to purchase unsubscribed bonds in exchange for their commissions.
According to O’Hagan, he was the first person who followed the practice of 
underwriting in share and debenture issues. He wrote that:
I began by approaching some of the larger trust and investment companies, and 
when I found them inclined to take shares or debentures in an undertaking I 
offered them, I persuaded them to risk having to take three or four times the 
amount they were contemplating if the capital was not fully subscribed, I paying
them a commission for so doing I determined to put the business of
underwriting or guaranteeing the subscription of the capital of limited liability 
companies on a legal and proper footing, and endeavoured to popularize the 
system to the extent that I should get the whole of my issues of capital 
underwritten or guaranteed.28
O’Hagan, an individual stockbroker, introduced underwriting into share and debenture 
issues and attempted to disseminate this practice to financial institutions. The practice of 
underwriting gradually came to be recognised as distinct from that of a syndicate. It 
seems certain that this separation necessarily drew smaller capitals, compared with shares 
of a loan issue syndicate, into underwriting business. The risks involved in issue could 
thus be dispersed to many underwriters.
At the outset, large financiers were not in favour of underwriting but soon found 
it lucrative in well-organised projects.29 Many financial institutions now regarded 
underwriting as a safe investment business, because they no longer needed to run great 
risks.
O’Hagan does not clearly mention when he carried out the first underwriting, but 
perhaps it was in the 1880s. In 1897 The Statist stated that ‘underwriting has, with the 
more speculative concerns, almost taken the place of original subscriptions’.30 It was after
28. O’Hagan, op. cit.. p. 150.
* Ibid.. pp. 151-52.
The Statist. 2 January 1897, p. 17.
84
the guarantee of Baring Brothers’ debts in 1890 that the Clydesdale Bank came to 
participate in Baring Brothers’ underwriting.31
However, the introduction of underwriting into Colonial government loan issues 
in the 1890s was extensively discussed by the financial press. The Bank of England and 
a stockbroker, usually Mullens Marshall & Co., could always provide definite assistance 
by making advances to or selling unallotted balances at a reduced price32 for Colonial 
governments when the loan issues failed to secure the necessary issues by the tender 
method.33 Yet the Bank of England replaced the tender method with the underwriting 
method because the Bank came to consider that it could not support Colonial government 
loan issues to an unlimited extent.34 In 1893 the Queensland government became the first 
Colonial government to adopt underwriting in loan issues.35 It is obvious that the 
underwriting method had the advantage of securing issue amounts on the market. By the 
turn of the century, a terminology of underwriting took firm root in textbooks on 
investment,36 and Lord Nathaniel Meyer Rothschild complained that ‘the trouble was 
largely due to the excessive growth of the practice of underwriting, which made it fatally 
easy to bring out almost any loan’.37
The banks which made a contract for the loan issue nominated stockbrokers who
31. C.W. Munn, Clydesdale Bank (1988), pp. 145-46.
32. B.E.A., G23/69, W. Lidderdale to J.F. Garrick, 6 October 1891.
33. On the announcement of loan issue terms, a borrower and loan issue bank received 
tenders for the loan. The loan issue bank simply lent its reputation and influence on the 
market, but did not undertake the loan issue at its own risk when the applications of the 
tenders did not reach the full issue amount. The applicants were required to offer at a 
certain price a certain number of the bonds which they would take. Borrowers came to 
set a minimum issue price on the basis of the current quotation prices of similar 
securities. The whole issue was usually allotted among the applicants at an average price 
above the minimum issue price (Bondholders’ Register. 26 January 1875; A.K. 
Caimcross, Home and Foreign Investment 1870-1913 [Cambridge, 1953], pp.91-92).
34. B.E.A., G23/69, Lidderdale to Garrick, 25 January 1892.
35. R.S. Gilbert, ‘London Financial Intermediaries and Australian Overseas 
Borrowing, 1900-29’, Australian Economic History Review, vol. 11 (1971), p.42; The 
Statist. 28 January 1893, p.98.
36. H. Lowenfeld, All About Investment. 2nd ed. (1909), p. 172.
37. His Obituary (The Times. 1 April 1915).
85
organised underwriters and allotted the bonds. The stockbrokers informally called on 
various financial institutions in the City and invited them to underwrite at a certain 
commission. After this preliminary interview, the loan issue banks officially sent the 
underwriting letter stating the terms of the underwriting: i.e. the names of issuers, the 
issue amount, the underwriting commission and the responsibilities of the underwriters. 
The underwriters, in return, informed the loan issue banks of their underwriting amounts 
with deposits. Sometimes they had their secured amounts sub-underwritten.38 Usually 
clearing banks, merchant banks, overseas banks, stockbrokers, discount companies, 
insurance companies, investment trust companies, merchants and interested individuals 
(correspondents, partners, staff and large clients) were nominated as underwriters.39 The 
scale of underwriting depended upon the strength and range of stockbrokers* market 
connections.
As shown in chapter 1, less creditworthy governments’ loan issues, such as those 
of South American countries, usually demanded much higher underwriting commissions 
because of the greater concomitant risks in investment. A normal underwriting 
commission was between 11/2 and 2 1/2 percent but declined to a 1 percent level after 
the First World War. Even so, underwriters still seem to have secured ample profits with 
comparatively small risks.40
38. Finnie, op. cit.. pp. 106-15.
39. Chapter 4 includes Baring Brothers’ underwriters’ list in the Japanese government 
5 percent bond re-sale of 1902.
40. The Economist. 6 December 1913, p. 1236.
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Chart 2.1 Development of Syndicates and Underwriting
1820s Co-operation in loan issues to share the risks and profits.
v
1860s - Syndicate 
1870s
A syndicate, a more formed organisation, undertook 
a loan issue and shared the risks and profits among 
the members, according to a well defined agreement.
1880s
i
i
i
i
v
iiii
V
Loan issue bank syndicate
Loan issues bank undertook a 
loan issue from a borrower 
and organised the subscriptions 
but did not take the loan issue 
at their own risk.
Underwriting syndicate
Underwriters took the risks of 
the loan issue in exchange for 
the underwriting commission.
The underwriting commission 
was decided before the 
subscriptions.
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2.2 Financial Institutions and Loan Issues
This section will examine how a variety of financial institutions: clearing banks, overseas 
banks, foreign banks, merchant banks, the Bank of England and stockbrokers, became 
involved in Colonial and foreign government loan issue operations.
2.2.1 Clearing banks
Before the Overend Gurney Crisis (1866), English clearing banks had developed and 
expanded on the basis of domestic transactions: discounting inland bills and short-term 
advances. By contrast, the business connected with Colonies and foreign countries was 
mainly dealt with by merchant banks whose extensive correspondent networks played a 
prime part in their ability to conduct world-wide business. Yet merchant banks did not 
retain this exclusive position for long. In the latter part of the nineteenth century the 
London clearing banks, as well as overseas banks and foreign banks, began to encroach 
on this field.
It was the growth of acceptance business41 which caused the first major change in 
the attitude of the London clearing banks towards overseas business.42 As well as 
acceptance business, the London clearing banks regarded Colonial and foreign loan issue 
business as another suitable area of activity, but loan issue business tended to lock up 
their deposits in illiquid investments, unsalable bonds (mainly foreign ones). C. Gow, the 
General Manager of the London Joint Stock Bank, emphasised that his Bank’s choice of
41. Acceptance business was that banks ‘would add their names to bills of exchange 
either for their own customers or for those of their correspondents. The effect was to 
guarantee payment of the bills and to ensure that they could be discounted at the best 
rates’ (Munn, op. cit.. pp. 143-44).
42. A steady decline in domestic transactions in the 1880s induced the London & 
Westminster Bank to exploit such business as a new earning source (T.E. Gregory, The 
Westminster Bank through a Century, vol.i [1936], pp.269-71).
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portfolio investments depended entirely upon ‘the essence of negotiability’.43 It is true that 
in the 1870s the London Joint Stock Bank had been prohibited, by its byelaws, from 
investing funds in foreign bonds.44 W. McKewan, of the London & County Bank, 
apologised to the Committee on Foreign Loans of 1875 that his bank’s role in the 
Honduras government loan of 1867 had by no means been that of a loan contractor but 
that of a subscription agent.45 When the Capital & Counties Bank was involved in the re­
sale of the Japanese government 5 percent domestic bonds in 1897, The Statist raised the 
question of whether clearing banks, which received deposits from the public and paid 
them back on demand, should undertake foreign loan issue business.46
Traditional English banking practice hindered clearing banks from entering into 
loan issue business even as underwriters. Yet Goodhart revised this negative picture of 
the London clearing banks and in part threw new light upon their security issue business 
before the First World War, quoting that:
they [clearing banks] were not only active as dealers in the market, but they had 
also come to play a major role in the new issue market, as underwriters, and in 
many cases taking on the main responsibility for the flotation of a new issue. 
Some of the banks’ activity in the market came as a concomitant to their role as 
underwriters, selling off securities from their portfolios with which they had been 
stuck at the time of issue. The process of arranging and underwriting new issues 
was a lucrative one; banks were continually trying to keep up influential 
connections.47
So far very little has been mentioned about how the London clearing banks became 
involved in Colonial and foreign government loan issue business.
43. U.S. National Monetary Commission, Interviews on the Banking and Currency 
Systems of England. Scotland. France. Germany. Switzerland, and Italy (Senate, 61st 
Congress, 2nd Session, no.405) (Washington, 1910), p.69.
44. L.J.S.B.A., Q70, London Joint Stock Bank to the General Direction of the 
Seehandlung Society, 10 November 1879.
45. Evidence taken before the Committee on Loans, Q.801 (W. McKewan, the Joint 
General Manager of the London & County Bank).
* The Statist. 15 May 1897, p.789.
47. C.A.E. Goodhart, The Business of Banking 1891-1914 (1972), p. 136.
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The decline of the Crown Agents in Colonial government loan business gave a 
great impetus to other financial institutions in the City. The Crown Agents were heavily 
involved in financial transactions with Colonies, particularly in raising Colonial 
government loans in the 1860s and the 1870s. The efficiency of their office attracted loan 
issue business even from Colonies which possessed responsible governments and agents 
of their own.48 But in 1880 the Treasury considered that ‘the transaction by the Crown 
Agents of the business of responsible Government Colonies is an arrangement which 
cannot be permitted to continue’.49 Thereafter, opportunities for loan issue business for 
Colonies with responsible governments were open wide to clearing banks and the Bank 
of England, because they had already established transactions in loan issues with these 
Colonies.50
From the early nineteenth century, Glyn, Mills & Co.51 aggressively raised loans
to such an extent that Feis misleadingly grouped it among merchant banks.52 It issued
many Canadian government loans as one of the London agents of the Bank of Upper
Canada from the 1830s.53 After the 1880s the London & Westminster Bank undertook
many Colonial government loan issues for Australia (except for South Australia), Natal 
*
and the Cape of Good Hope. In 1876 the London Joint Stock Bank issued the Quebec
48. A.W. Abbott, A Short History of the Crown Agents and their Office (1959), 
pp.23-24; No.5, (Extract) Memorandum on the Origin and Functions of the Department 
of the Crown Agents for the Colonies, by Sir Penrose G. Julyan, September 1878 
(Crown Agents for the Colonies, Papers Explanatory of the Functions of the Crown 
Agents for the Colonies [August 1881], B.P.P. 1881, lxiv, [C.-3075]).
49. No.6, Colonial Office to Treasury, 26 November 1880 (ibid.).
50. In the 1860s and the 1870s, the Bank of England co-operated with the Crown 
Agents in some of the New Zealand government loan issues; the Consolidated Bank 
issued several Tasmanian government loans; the London & Westminster Bank became 
one of the loan issuers in many Victorian government loans (London Stock Exchange 
[Guildhall Library], Loan and Company Prospectuses).
51. From 1864 Glyn, Mills, Currie & Co..
52. H. Feis, Europe the World’s Banker 1870-1914 (New Haven, 1930 [reprinted 
1964]), p .8.
53. R. Fulford, Glyn’s. 1753-1953 (1953), chapter 8.
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government 5 percent loan54 and, together with the London & Westminster Bank, became 
involved in Victorian government loan issues in the 1860s and the 1870s.55 Following the 
turn of the century the London Joint Stock Bank began to arrange the underwriting of 
Colonial government loan issues on a large scale.56 The Consolidated Bank, a London 
clearing bank, took up many Tasmanian government loan issues during the 1870s and the 
1880s, but from 1889 the London & Westminster Bank supplanted it.57 In 1893 the Union 
Bank of London tendered for the Mauritius government 3 percent loan and underwrote 
the New Zealand government 3 1/2 percent loan.58 By degrees the Bank broadened its 
portfolio investments from domestic and Colonial securities to foreign ones.59
The London clearing banks were also concerned with foreign government loan 
issues. They did not need to run great risks in foreign government loan issues if loan 
issues were underwritten fully. Yet foreign government loan issue business seemed to 
them in general a dangerous area, and the London clearing banks agreed to become loan 
issuers only when there were particular links, personal or commercial, with the 
borrowers.60 As will be seen in Chapter 4, there were particularly close personal
54. L.J.S.B.A., Q8, Board Minutes, 3 August 1876. The Bank was an agent for the 
Merchant Bank of Canada.
55. London Stock Exchange (Guildhall Library), Loan and Company Prospectuses. 
The Bank was an agent for the Colonial Bank of Australia.
56. L.J.S.B.A., Q ll, 9 May, 19 September, 17 October and 5 December 1901.
57. The reason is not clear, but the Consolidated Bank experienced difficulties after 
the 1866 crisis and towards the end of the 1880s, the Bank adopted a policy of branch 
expansion in the Manchester area rather than in London (Gregory, op. cit.. vol.ii, pp.51- 
68).
58. U.B.L.A., B11488, Board Minutes, 25 January 1893.
59. C.A.E. Goodhart, The Business of Banking 1891-1914 (1972) pp.491-517 
(appendix iv-i).
60. There was a marked difference between the London clearing banks and French 
banques de depots (public deposit banks) vis-k-vis loan issue business in general, as J. 
Bouvier has pointed out (J. Bouvier, Le Credit Lyonnais de 1863 k 1882. vol.ii [Paris, 
1961], pp.779-80). G. Manchez also noted this difference fSoci6t6s de depots!-:! banques 
d’affaires [Paris, 1918], pp. 113-14). Banques de depots welcomed such business, making 
it their main line. If the issue amount was underwritten fully, the risks were limited, as 
mentioned. Besides, banques de depdts could, to a certain extent, internalise the loan 
issue market to their own customers: the direct placement method made a good channel
(continued...)
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connections between the Japanese government and Parr’s Bank.
It is known that Glyn, Mills & Co. issued Portuguese government loans in the 
1820s and the 1830s.61 In 1871 the London Joint Stock Bank undertook the North German 
Confederation 5 percent Treasury bonds issue for £6,000,000, in conjunction with the 
Royal Seehandlung Society of Berlin (Preuflische Seehandlung), as a standard 
transaction.62 In the 1880s the City Bank launched a number of Chilean government loan 
issues as the London agent of the Banco Nacional de Chile.63 In 1885 the Bank agreed to 
purchase the Chilean government 4 1/2 percent loan, which had already been 
underwritten by a syndicate,64 and underwrote the Nicaraguan government 6 percent loan 
issue in 1886.65 From 1909 the London City & Midland Bank made large-scale Russian 
railway investments.66 In 1889 the London & South Western Bank dealt with the Salvador 
government 6 percent loan, underwritten by Panmure Gordon, Hill & Co.’s syndicate.67
% . .continued)
for selling the bonds to their customers. This method became popular among banques de 
depots (A. Thdry, Les grands dtablissements de credit franyais avant. pendant et aprks 
la guerre [Paris, 1921], pp.45-46) and ensured firm demand for the loans they issued, 
not through public subscriptions (J. Dagneau, Les agences regionales du Credit 
Lvonnais. annees 1870-1914 [originally presented as These de Doctorat en histoire [3e 
Cycle] to the University de Paris VIII [1975] [New York, 1977], p.248). Customers, on 
the other hand, generally put full trust in their banks as investment advisers (H.D. White, 
The French International Accounts 1880-1913 rCambridgerMass.l. 1933], p.279). Direct 
placement, which was not an institution built into the British financial counterparts (R. 
Michie, ‘Different in Name Only?: The London Stock Exchange and Foreign Bourses, 
c. 1850-1914’, Business History, vol.xxx-no.l [1988], p.63), made a major channel
between financiers and investors in France, and could effectively disperse loan issue
banks’ risks to customers (E. Kaufmann [translated by A.S. Sacker], La banque en 
France [Paris, 1914], p. 306). The reason for banques de depots entering into loan issue 
business on a large scale lay in this structure of the French loan issue market.
61. Fulford, op. cit.. chapter 8.
62. L.J.S.B.A., Board Minutes, Q8, 2 March 1871; W.F. Crick & J.E. Wadsworth, 
A Hundred Years of Joint Stock Banking (1958), p.308.
®. CI.B.A., ACC293/1, Arrangement Book, vol.l, f.465.
Ibid., E8, Board Minutes, 8 September 1885.
65. Ibid., 14 December 1886.
“ . A.R. Holmes and E. Green, Midland (1986), pp. 135-36.
67. L.S.W.B.A., Board Minutes, 25 July 1889.
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In 1895 the Bank underwrote the Chinese government 4 percent war indemnity loan.68
Parr’s Bank was particularly inclined towards foreign government loan issues. 
The Bank was set up as a country bank at Warrington, and became a London clearing 
bank in 1891. Absorbing the Alliance Bank in 1892 and the Consolidated Bank in 1896, 
Parr’s Bank paid much attention to foreign government loan issue business as well as 
acceptance business in Liverpool. In 1897 and 1903 the Bank played a major role in 
effecting the Serbian government’s 4 percent and 5 percent loan issues.69 After 1899 
Parr’s Bank was intimately connected with many of the Japanese government loan issues, 
as will be discussed in Part II.
It is difficult to trace fully the exact amount of loan issue commissions in clearing 
banks’ accounts.70 Table 2.1 sets out Parr’s Bank’s commissions of 1904, 1905 and 1907 
earned from the Japanese government loan issues and their proportion to the total annual 
gross profits, a fairly high ones during 1904 and 1905.
The main reason for the London clearing banks increasing Colonial and foreign 
government loan issue business in the 1890s was probably a desire to seek new businesses 
to compensate for a decline in their formerly lucrative activities of discounting inland 
bills and making advances to domestic industries.71 Despite the fact that this new strategy 
jeopardised the liquidity of their resources, the extent of the risks which the London 
clearing banks ran in foreign loan issue business was not great because they always, in 
conjunction with stockbrokers, organised underwriting syndicates for the loan issues 
which they undertook.
68. Ibid., 27 June 1895.
P.B.A., B11416, Board Minutes, 24 June 1897.
70. F. Capie & A. Weber, ‘Truth and Fiction’ in Institute of Commonwealth Studies 
(University of London), Collected Seminar Papers, no.36 (The City and the Empire) 
(1987), p.28.
71. Nishimura confirmed the decline of advances plus discounts/ deposits ratios of 
banks in England and Wales in the late nineteenth century (S. Nishimura, The Decline 
of Inland Bills of Exchange in the London Money Market 1855-1913 fCambridge. 1971], 
table 26 [pp. 107-9]).
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Table 2.1 Annual Profits of Parr’s Bank and Japanese Government 
Loan Issues. 1904. 1905 and 1907
(1) (2) (3)
Year Parr’s Bank’s Total annual (l)/(2)
commissions earned gross profits 
from Japanese 
government loan issues 
(£000) (£000) (%)
1904 92 741 12.4
1905 210 770 27.3
1907 49 819 6.0
Note: (3)=(l)/(2)xl00.
Sources: (1) W.B.A., D2469;
(2) Gregory, op. cit.. vol.ii, pp.322-23.
2.2.2 Overseas banks
Before the Second World War there was an overall category of overseas banks which 
meant banks based in the British Empire, and contemporary writers did not make any 
distinction between those which raised equity and had their boards in a particular part 
of the British Empire (outside Britain), and those in Britain.72 In this study the term 
‘overseas banks’ means the overall category.
The names of overseas banks indicated their geographical relations, such as the 
Hongkong Bank with the Far East, the Bank of Montreal with Canada and the National 
Bank of Australasia with Australia. Their roles covered ordinary banking business 
(issuing bank notes, advancing and discounting bills), providing credit to international 
trade (acceptance and foreign exchange) and issuing securities.73 Their loan issue business 
deserves more serious attention. Loan issue business was of significant importance in the
72. R.J. Truptil, British Banks and the London Money Market (1936), p. 166.
73. D. Joslin, A Century of Banking in Latin America (1963), p.20; J.A. Henry ( 
ed. by H.A. Siepmann), The First Hundred Years of the Standard Bank (1963), p.44.
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areas with which some of the overseas banks were concerned. There was a regional 
distribution in the foreign government loan issues which the overseas banks undertook. 
They arranged loan issues mainly for the Far East, Persia and South America.
The Oriental Bank played a leading role in Chinese and Japanese governments 
loan issue business in the 1860s and the 1870s, but went bankrupt in 1884.74 The 
Hongkong Bank and the Chartered Bank were also active in making many loan issues for 
China, Japan and Siam as regular business. Because of some reluctance towards foreign 
loan issues on the part of the Chartered Bank,75 after the turn of the century the 
Hongkong Bank carried out most of the Chinese government loan issues, facing no 
formidable competitor. It was more from a political viewpoint that the Hongkong Bank 
handled many Chinese government loan issues, its aim being to ensure the success of 
Britain’s commercial interests in China.76 As a consequence of the diplomatic conflict 
with other European powers in China, strong ties formed between the Hongkong Bank 
and the British Foreign Office. In 1898 the British Treasury, despite the Hongkong 
Bank’s application,77 refused to guarantee the Chinese government war indemnity loan,78 
but directed the Bank of England to accept an inscription of the bonds.79 The Hongkong 
Bank’s brilliant success in many foreign government loan issues for Far Eastern countries
74. The direct causes of the Oriental Bank’s suspension in 1884 were as follows: a 
failure of the Ceylon coffee crop; a loss in Mauritius through frauds and cyclones; failure 
of Chilean government loan flotations; a cumulative fall in the rupee. Most of the Bank’s 
assets were locked up in illiquid investments such as railway shares and advances to 
planters in Ceylon when the Bank was in difficulties (A.S.J. Baster, The Imperial Banks 
[1929], pp.258-59; Banker’s Magazine, vol.44 [1884], pp.664-70).
75. C. Mackenzie, Realms of Silver (1954), p.206.
76. The Hongkong Bank’s diplomatic role appeared especially in the Sino-Japanese 
War indemnity loan issue negotiations in the period from 1895 to 1898 (S.F. Wright, 
Hart and the Chinese Customs. [Belfast, 1950], chapter xx; D. McLean, ‘The Foreign 
Office and the Chinese Indemnity Loan, 1895’, Historical Journal, vol.xvi-no.2 [1973], 
pp. 303-21).
77F.0.17/1330, E. Cameron to F. Bertie, 23 December 1897.
78. F.0.17/1356, E.W. Hamilton to Bertie, 7 February 1898.
79. B.E.A., G23/70, G.F. Glennie to Hamilton, 21 March 1898. The same 
arrangement had been made in 1896 (ibid., G23/69, Glennie to Cameron, 26 March 
1896).
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was ascribed partly to its close liaison with both the British Foreign Office and the 
foreign governments of those countries where the Bank operated, and partly to the co­
operation with the powerful stockbroker Panmure Gordon & Co. in loan issues.80 Their 
co-operation in many Japanese government loan issues will be seen in Part II.
In Persia the Imperial Bank of Persia was invariably regarded as a guardian of 
Britain’s commercial interests. In 1892 and 1911, it arranged the two Persian government 
loans in London.81 The Bank clung to these operations and drew unusual assistance from 
the British government. After the Russian loan of 1901 to Persia, the British government 
came to give direct support to the Imperial Bank. The Bank acted as ‘the medium through 
which loans were passed’ to the Persian government in 1903: an agreement that the 
Indian government was to lend up to £500,000 to the Bank and that the Bank was to lend 
this money to the Persian government, was concluded between the British government 
and the Imperial Bank of Persia.82 From the loan issue negotiations in 1911 there is the 
more telling evidence of an officer at the British Foreign Office, showing favour to the 
Bank: ‘H.M. Government are bound to support [the] Imperial Bank [of Persia] in 
preference to other houses’.83
For South American countries, especially Argentina, Chile and Brazil, the eminent 
London merchant banks initially raised most of the loans, although the Oriental Bank was 
concerned with several Chilean government loan issues in the early-1870s. The London 
& River Plate Bank handled two Argentinian government loan issues in 1892 and 1903. 
In 1908 the London Bank of Mexico & South America issued the Salvador government 
6 percent loan. In 1909 the Anglo-South American Bank undertook the Nicaraguan
F.H.H. King, The Hongkong Bank in Late Imperial China. 1864-1902. vol.l 
(Cambridge, 1987), p.545; B.H.D. MacDermot, Panmure Gordon & Co.. 1876-1976 
(1976), pp. 13-14, 42 and 53. The name of the company was Panmure Gordon, Hill & 
Co. from 1885 to 1902.
81. For these loan issues, see G. Jones, Banking and Empire in Iran (Cambridge, 
1986), pp.51-54 and 120-24.
82. Ibid., pp.87-89.
83. F .0.371/965. G.H. Barclay to Lord Grey, 27 October 1910.
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government 6 percent loan issue. But the activities of the overseas banks in this field 
were quite small in proportion to those of the merchant banks.
Keen competition with influential merchant banks, however, often forced overseas 
banks to switch their main business objectives to smaller operations, that is to say, 
Treasury bill and provincial government loan issues. The Bank of Tarapacd & London 
floated the Chilean government Treasury bills in 189884 and 1902.85 The London & 
Brazilian Bank issued a Pard government loan in 190186 and in 1904 raised a loan for the 
Sao Paulo government. The Bank also arranged the Bahia government loan issues in 1905 
and 1910.87
In the 1860s and the 1870s, the Bank of New South Wales, the National Bank of 
Australia and the Union Bank of Australia were involved in Australian governments loan 
issues in London,88 although most of them (except for South Australia) came to be dealt 
with by the Bank of England and the London & Westminster Bank after the 1880s. The 
Bank of Adelaide undertook many South Australian government loan issues. The Bank 
of Montreal acted as a loan issuer for the Canadian government.
Besides the income derived from foreign exchange business, loan issue 
commissions were one of the main earning sources for overseas banks. In an extreme 
case, the Hongkong Bank’s profit from the Chinese government war indemnity loan 
issues of 1896 and 1898 reached around £130,00089 and £220,97190 respectively, which 
accounted for 22.0 percent and 15.3 percent respectively of its annual net earnings 
(deducting various expenses).91 However, loan issue commissions were not always so
84. B.T.L.A., C2/1, London to Santiago, no. 75, 1 July 1898.
85. Ibid., C2/3, no. 178 and no. 180, London to Santiago, 5 and 19 September 1902. 
The name of the Bank was now the Bank of Tarapaca & Argentina.
96. L.B.B.A., G3/5, Supplement 39/53, 19 December 1901.
87. Ibid., G3/10, Head Office to Rio de Janeiro, 24 February 1910.
88. London Stock Exchange (Guildhall Library), Loan & Company Prospectuses.
89. H.S.B.A., Board Minutes, 1 October 1896.
90. Ibid., Board Minutes, 12 November 1898.
91. Bankers’ Magazine, vol.62 (1896), p.536; vol.63 (1897), p.617; vol.66 (1898), 
p.507; vol.67 (1899), p.774.
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remunerative to overseas banks as the Hongkong Bank’s war indemnity loan issues. The 
Bank of New South Wales complained of ‘the miserable commission’ (1/4 percent) when 
it was involved in the Victorian government 4 percent loan issue in 1876;92 in 1902 the 
Bank of Tarapaca & Argentina placed the Chilean government Treasury bills only with 
the £2,500 net profit (1/2 percent of the issue amount).93
Overseas banks had wide branch networks spread over the world, but their loan 
issue activities for Colonies (except for South Australia and Canada) and South America 
were limited. In these areas, well defined financial channels had been formed between 
governments and particular financiers before the overseas banks embarked upon loan 
issue business. Merchant banks and banks with specific connections, such as the Bank of 
England and the London & Westminster Bank, had taken a firm grip on the business. On 
the other hand, in the Far East and Persia there was no formidable competitor to overseas 
banks.
2.2.3 Foreign banks
Contemporaries defined foreign banks as the banks based outside the British Empire. In 
order to distinguish these banks from those based in the British Empire, this classification 
is adopted in this study. There were an increased number of foreign banks’ branches in 
London between 1890 and 1895; accordingly they accepted large deposits and exerted 
more influence on the market.94 In the 1890s the internationalisation of the money market 
proceeded rapidly and London became the largest financial centre for the settlement of
R.F. Holder, Bank of New South Wales, vol.l (Sydney, 1970), p.341. The role 
of the Bank in this loan issue was one of the agents for receiving the tenders (London 
Stock Exchange [Guildhall Library], Loan and Company Prospectuses).
B.T.A.A., C2/3, London to Santiago, no. 174 (11 July 1902) and no. 178 (5 
September 1902).
W.F. Spalding, ‘The Establishment and Growth of Foreign Branch Banks in 
London, and the Effect, Immediate and Ultimate, upon the Banking and Commercial 
Development of this Country’, J.I.B.. vol.xxxii (1911), p.438.
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trade bills and foreign borrowings.95
Foreign banks provided material assistance to their home countries’ financial 
operations in London. There was ‘so large a share of this [foreign securities] investment 
business done by the foreign branch banks’.96 Keen competition between foreign banks 
and British banks (including clearing banks, overseas banks and merchant banks) occurred 
in loan issue business. In the Danish government 3 percent loan issue of 1894, Hambros, 
a London merchant bank and the loan issuer in London, did not authorise the Crddit 
Lyonnais’s London Branch as a loan issuer, even though the loan issue was arranged by 
the Credit Lyonnais’s Head Office.97 On another occasion, however, foreign banks 
harmoniously collaborated with British banks as did the Yokohama Specie Bank and the 
Industrial Bank in Japanese loan issues in London.
Reputable French banks repeatedly made simultaneous loan issues in London and 
Paris. They were the earliest arrivals among foreign banks on the London money market. 
First, large banques de depots opened London branches: in 1865 Comptoir National 
d’Escompte; in 1872 Socidtd Gdn6rale; in 1873 Crddit Lyonnais,98 and began to run 
their business in London. Subsequently, banques d’affaires99 and banques coloniales came 
to issue foreign government loans on the London capital market.
German credit banks also exercised great financial power in the London capital 
market. This obviously coincided with Germany’s aggressive expansionist policy. The 
Deutsche Bank was founded in March 1870 and defined its business object as ‘....in
95. F. Schuster, ‘Foreign Trade and the Money Market’, J.I.B.. vol.xxv (1904), 
pp.58-62. Low transaction costs and a low discount rate for sterling bills on the London 
money market were attractive to foreign banks (P. Hertner, ‘German Banks abroad before 
1914’ in G. Jones [ed.], Banks as Multinationals [1990], p. 101).
96. Spalding, op. cit.. p.451.
". H.A., Ms. 19,082, Hambros to C.F. Tietgen, 15 November 1894.
*. Truptil, op. cit.. p. 179.
". Banques d’affaires - public banks for investment business. The French ‘banque 
d’affaires’ meant ‘investment bank’ in English (D. Landes, ‘The Old Banks and the New’ 
in F. Crouzet, W.H. Chaloner & W.M. Stem [eds.], Essavs in European Economic 
History. 1789-1914 [Alva, 1969], p. 113 [note 2]).
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particular to promote and facilitate trade relations between Germany, other European 
countries and overseas markets’.100 The Bank opened its London Branch in 1873.101 This 
branch, often simultaneously in Germany, arranged many loan issues to Germany and its 
dependencies. Other German banks also opened London branches: the Dresdner Bank in 
1895 and the Disconto-Gesellschaft in 1899.102
A combination of British and French capital produced the Imperial Ottoman Bank 
in 1863.103 Although the head office was registered in Constantinople, the Bank’s 
character was obviously an Anglo-French bank as its administration was governed by the 
two committees in London and Paris. The Imperial Ottoman Bank was authorised by the 
Turkish government (the Ottoman Empire) as the state bank, whose affairs were 
supervised by the government’s commission.104 Because of these relations, the Imperial 
Ottoman Bank was deeply involved in the Turkish government’s finance, especially the 
reorganisation of the national debt. Paris, since the loan issue in 1863, became a prime 
lender to Turkey but the Imperial Ottoman Bank introduced many Turkish government 
loan issues to London simultaneously.
The Russian Bank for Foreign Trade, the Swiss Bankverein and the Yokohama 
Specie Bank always played a very significant part in loan issues in London for their 
home countries. The Russian Bank for Foreign Trade opened a London branch in 1885.105 
The Yokohama Specie Bank was established in 1879 and opened the London branch as 
early as 1881.106 In most of the Japanese government foreign loan issues after 1899, the 
Yokohama Specie Bank, without exception, co-operated with two major British banks,
10°. M. Pohl, ‘Deutsche Bank London Agency Founded 100 Years Ago’ in Deutsche 
Bank (ed.), Studies on Economic and Monetary Problems and on Banking History 
(Mainz, 1988), p.233.
101. Ibid., p.236.
102. Ibid., p.237.
103. A. Biliotti, La Banque ImpSriale Ottomane (Paris, 1909), pp. 18-21; A. 
Autheman, History of the Ottoman Bank (Istanbul, 1988), pp. 1-4.
104. Ibid.. p.4.
105. Banker’s Magazine, vol.lxxix (1905), p.362.
106. Y.S.G.Z.S.. vol.2, p.38.
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Parr’s Bank and the Hongkong Bank. This combination of the loan issue banks including 
Panmure Gordon & Co., a stockbroker, became the backbone of Japanese government 
financial operations in London. Table 2.2 calculates the earning sources of the Yokohama 
Specie Bank. The proportion of the loan issue commission compared to total earnings was 
not significant but was higher in the years when the Bank undertook the Japanese 
government loan issues (1899, 1902, 1904 and 1905), although with a time lag.
Table 2.2 Main Earning Sources of the Yokohama Specie Bank. 1899 and 1901-1906
Earning 1899 1901 1902 1903 1904 1905 1906
exchange 6,852 4,960 5,349 6,270 6,260 7,352 9,772
(%) (50) (44) (43) (49) (47) (41) (44)
From
commission 433 148 237 231 1,041 1,923 1,323
(%) (3) (1) (2) (2) (8) (ID (6)
Total
earning 13,660 11,248 12,518 12,779 13,450 17,732 22,125
(%) (100) (100) (100) (100) (100) (100) (100)
Notes: ¥000(¥l=2s. l/2d.);
No data for 1900.
Source: Yokohama Specie Bank, Yokohama Shokin Ginkoshi (History of
the Yokohama Specie Bank), vol.4 (Yokohama, 1920 [reprinted 
1976]).
2.2.4 Merchant banks
Merchant banks acted principally as acceptance and issue houses. Their power and 
influence eventually raised London to being the world’s largest financial centre in the 
nineteenth century. The relationship between merchant banks’ loan issue business and 
their earning sources has never received a satisfactory explanation and will be considered 
here.
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It is difficult to divide the amount of any loan issue among different types of co­
issuers. Several scholars107 have relied upon W. A. Brown’s statistics on Britain’s overseas 
new issues,108 although he mentioned nothing about how to aggregate the amounts of the 
different types of co-issuers. Neither did Simon provide alternative statistics on foreign 
loan issues classified by financial institution.109 Brown emphasised the drop in the 
merchant banks’ proportion of the new overseas issues, from 43.7 percent in the period 
1885-1889 to 32.7 percent in 1905-1909; by contrast with this, both the ‘joint-stock 
banks’ (clearing banks) and overseas banks’, especially after the late-1890s, gained the 
share lost by the merchant banks. De Cecco consistently heralded ‘the swan song of the 
power of the Bank of England and of the merchant banks’110 after the Baring Crisis, by 
pointing to the rapid growth of clearing banks backed by large amounts of public 
deposits.111
Table 2.3 classifies foreign government loan issues by financial institution, 
showing the combination of co-issuers. According to this table, the share of merchant 
banks in the total foreign government loan issues dropped sharply after 1895: from 94 
percent in 1885-1889 to 39 percent in 1905-1909. However, including the other types of 
loan issues in which merchant banks were concerned as one of the co-issuers, the share 
of merchant banks slightly recovered. It is true that after 1890 overseas banks, foreign 
banks and the London clearing banks began to issue many foreign government loans, and 
as a result merchant banks lost their shares on the loan issue market. Yet the merchant 
banks’ key position on the loan issue market, especially in underwriting and linking one 
market with others in simultaneous loan issues, was firmly retained. Their roles in loan 
issue operations became more specialised. Merchant banks’ experience and good sources
107. T. Balogh, Studies in Financial Organization (Cambridge, 1947), p.233; Hall, 
op. cit.. p.72.
108. ‘British Capital Abroad’, The Economist. 20 November 1937, p .362.
109. M. Simon, ‘The Pattern of New British Portfolio Foreign Investment, 1865- 
1914’ in A.R. Hall (ed.), The Export of Capital from Britain (1968), pp. 15-44.
110. M. de Cecco, Money and Empire (Oxford, 1974), p.95.
111. Ibid., pp.96-97.
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of business information still made them significantly attractive to many foreign 
borrowers.112
Unlike clearing banks and overseas banks (public deposit banks), capital sources 
for merchant banks organised in a partnership were circumscribed by partners’ capital and 
borrowing. This limitation often undermined their financial position. Partners’ capital 
was the most reliable source of funding for merchant banks. It goes without saying that 
substantial capital would help to ensure the merchant banks’ financial stability in 
business. In the 1880s Antony Gibbs, for example, suffered greatly from a lack of 
partners’ capital resulting from both an excess of Australian investments and several 
eminent partners’ withdrawal from the business.113 Brown Shipley’s business was also 
frequently upset by the retired partners’ withdrawal of capital.114 Merchant banks, in 
consequence, were subject to capital fluctuations effected by partners’ withdrawal. This 
capital uncertainty often caused serious management problems. In an extreme case, the 
precariousness of the capital structure actually threatened a firm’s existence, and retiring 
partners were often asked to stagger their capital withdrawal over several years.115
Table 2.4 compares the capital size of the various financial institutions: merchant 
banks; clearing banks; overseas banks; French banques de depots; French banques 
d’affaires; German Kreditbanken. With the exception of the merchant banks, the others 
were all joint stock deposit banks. Many of the London clearing banks started from small 
country banks, whose capital size was much smaller than that of the eminent 
contemporary merchant banks, but, in the course of amalgamation, rapidly increased. 
On the other hand, most of the merchant banks carried out business with small capital,
112. P. Einzig, The Fight for Financial Supremacy (1931), p.29.
113. Chapman, op. cit.. pp. 166-67.
114. S.J. Diaper, ‘The History of Kleinwort, Sons & Co. in Merchant Banking, 
1855-1961’, Unpublished Ph. D., University of Nottingham, 1983, pp.62-63.
115. S.J. Diaper, ‘Merchant Banking Growth in the Second Half of the Nineteenth 
Century: The experience of Kleinwort, Son & Co.’ in the Institute of Commonwealth 
Studies (University of London), Collected Seminar Papers, no.35 (The City & the 
Empire) (1985), p.95.
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especially compared with the banks on the Continent which would take up security issue 
business, because merchant banks were organised as partnerships. So far as capital size 
was concerned, merchant banks were in a vulnerable financial position, their most 
important assets being their reputations and connections.116 These well complemented lack 
of their capital size. However, merchant banks like Kleinworts and Brown Shipley 
specialised in acceptance business and enlarged their capital size. After 1910 they reached 
a capital figure almost equivalent to that of the London clearing banks and the banques 
d’affaires.
Merchant banks specialised in the businesses which stemmed mainly from their 
own historical backgrounds. For instance, from the late nineteenth century Kleinworts 
were seldom involved in security issues and concentrated on acceptance business.117 R. 
Benson III, after his father’s bankruptcy in 1875, rebuilt the firm (R. Benson & Co.) 
with small capital for carrying out retailing bonds and shares.118 M. Samuel & Co. was 
engaged largely in merchant activities for Far Eastern countries.
Not all the merchant banks, therefore, were able to undertake foreign loan issues 
and the risks involved. Before the advent of underwriting in the City, only those 
merchant banks with sufficient resources could run security issue business by purchasing 
all or some of the issue at their own risk. It is a well-known fact that the larger and 
long-standing merchant banks such as, Baring Brothers, the London Rothschilds and 
Hambros, frequently arranged many foreign government loan issues.
However, it is difficult to argue generally to what extent loan issues contributed 
to merchant banks’ earnings, for they covered a wide range of business and every 
merchant bank had its own character. In addition, their accounting figures cannot be 
formulated and standardised. It is merely apparent that loan issue commissions were one 
of the important earning sources for some of them. Fortunately the earning sources of
,16. Chapman, op. cit.. p.62.
117. Diaper, ‘The History of Kleinwort, op. cit.’, pp.264-65.
118. Chapman, op. cit.. p. 129.
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several merchant banks can be deduced. In the case of J.S. Morgan Co. (Table 2.5), the 
gross earnings from security issues were rather irregular. The security transactions 
occupied a much larger proportion in the annual gross earnings but frequently caused 
heavy losses. It seems that their security issues and stock dealings were not stable earning 
sources. Table 2.6 indicates Hambros’ earning sources. It is obvious that the rate of 
increase in the ‘Discount Account’ became much greater than in the ‘Commission 
Account’.
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Table 2.3 Foreign Government Loan Issues in London. 1870-1913 (By Financial Institution)
(£000; net proceeds)
(percent)
Combination o f 
financial 
institutions 1870-74 1875-79 1880-84 1885-89 1890-94 1895-99 1900-04 1905-09 1910-13
Merchant bank 672173
(90)
244264
(77)
106112
(58)
231060
(94)
139282
(77)
79599
(45)
42051
(36)
42856
(39)
53001
(61)
Merchant bank 
Clearing bank
4432
(3)
1665
(2)
2217
(2)
Merchant bank 
Foreign bank
26960
(4)
990
(0)
3954
(2)
3756
(3)
6459
(6)
Merchant bank 
Overseas bank
1273
(1)
860
(1)
Merchant bank 
Clearing bank 
Foreign bank
3484
(2)
Merchant bank 
Foreign bank 
Overseas bank
5104
(4)
Merchant bank 
Clearing bank 
Foreign bank 
Overseas bank
17293
(15)
Sub-total (94) (77) (58) (94) (77) (52) (44) (63) (63)
Clearing bank 16438 2500
(1)
29500
(16)
4485
(2)
21694
(12)
6205
(4)
3140
(3)
164
(0)
0
(0)
Clearing bank 
Foreign bank
2841
(3)
Clearing bank 
Foreign bank 
Overseas bank
13451
(8)
10105
(9)
22500
(20)
10450
(12)
Foreign bank 12029
(1)
31756
(10)
32067
(18)
7600
(3)
8586
(5)
21759
(12)
45786
(40)
Foreign bank 
Overseas bank
478
(0)
Overseas bank 4359
(1)
4126
(1)
100
(0)
2210
(1)
3438
(2)
34155
(19)
4604
(4)
10415
(9)
10504
(12)
Overseas bank 
Trust company
4750
(5)
Overseas bank 
Indefinite
2231
(1)
Trust company 619
(0)
486
(1)
Government 16164
(2)
26515
(8)
15327
(8)
2035
(1)
Indefinite 9905
(3)
5168
(3)
6148
(4)
5229
(5)
6008
(7)
Total 748123 319066 183106 245974 181193 175418 115819 110760 87416
(100) (100) (100) (100) (100) (100) (100) (100) (100)
Notes: Net proceeds were calculated as follows:
(net proceeds) =  (total loan issue amounts) x (London issue prices, otherwise 100)/100; 
These amounts do not mean actual capital transfers from the London capital market.
Source: Table 1.3.
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Table 2.4 Comparison of Capital Size of Various Financial Institutions. 1865-1910
(£000)
1865 1870 1875 1880 1885 1890 1895 1900 1905 1910
Merchant Bank
*1891
Baring Bros . . . .  - 1,000 1,025 1,025 1,025 1,025
Benson - - - - - 265 60 117 192 198
Brown
Shipley - - 1,270 1,196 1,106 1,399 1,276
Gibbs - - - - 419 1,060 543 420 716 919
Hambros 542 647 634 720 959 1,036 962 1,154 1,292
Kleinworts 654 914 845 759 822 892 1,174 1,718 2,330 3,419
*1868
J.S. Morgan 471 655 1,461 2,331 2,903 1,773 2,188 2,261 1,722 1,020
*1901
Schroder _ _ _ _ _ _ _  1,500 - 2,500
Clearing Bank
Parr’s Bank 100 150 392 492 560 600 1,000 1,464 1,709 2,205
Westminster
Bank 1,000 2,000 2,000 2,399 2,800 2,800 2,800 2,800 2,800 3,500
Overseas Bank 
Hongkong
Bank 560 900 1,130 1,130 1,390 1,590 1,600 1,600 1,600 1,360
Banque de Depots
Crddit *1874
Lyonnais 792 - 1,979 3,958 7,917 7,917 7,917 9,896 9,896 9,896
Societe
Generate 4,750 4,750 4,750 4,750 4,750 4,750 4,750 6,333 9,89615,883
Banque d’Affaires 
Banques de
Paris 2,454 2,454 2,454 2,454 2,454 2,454 2,454 2,454 2,454 2,969
Union
Parisienne _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _  2,375 2,375
Kreditbank
Deutsche *1871
Bank - 738 2,213 2,213 2,950 3,688 4,425 7,375 8,850 9,833
Disconto-
Gesellschaft 1,672 1,672 2,950 2,950 2,950 3,688 5,654 6,392 8,358 8,358
Notes: - implies no information; * the nearest year;
Rates of exchange (Frl=9 l/2d.; DM1 = 11 4/5d.).
Sources: The Economist, annually; E. Baldy, Les banques d’affaires en France
depuis 1900 (Paris, 1922), annexes 1; Kaufmann, op. cit.. tableaux; A. 
Bosenick, Neudeutsche gemischte Bankwirtschaft (Munich & Berlin, 
1912), AnlageXVI-Tabelle 1; Burk, op. cit.. appendix ii and iii; B.C.A., 
Balance Sheets; A.G.A., Ms. 11,042/1 and Ms. 11,064/1; H.A., 
Ms. 19.033/17-29.
Table 2.5 J.S. Morgan & Co.’s Earning Sources. 1890-1906
Year Commission Profit Interest Other Gross
& loss earning earnings
(stock
dealing)
(£) (£) (£) (£) (£)
(* ) (%) (%) (%) (%)
1890 26,842 *5,559 6,724 _ 43,641
(62) (15) (100)
1891 52,262 22,580 10,275 - 125,268
(42) (18) (8) - (100)
1892 67,712 99,102 8,316 - 211,047
(32) (47) (4) - (100)
1893 57,607 *57,444 4,927 - 97,763
(59) (5) - (100)
1894 42,441 39,194 8,854 - 108,264
(39) (36) (8) - (100)
1895 90,081 220,766 15,969 16,263 363,683
(25) (61) (4) (4) (100)
1896 78,758 146.229 19,997 - 264,762
(30) (55) (8) - (100)
1897 96,754 225,913 17,656 - 362,581
(27) (62) (5) - (100)
1898 60,699 170,723 13,790 - 261,216
(23) (65) (5) - (100)
1899 87,729 115,785 21,003 - 243,336
(36) (48) (9) - (100)
1900 48,606 130,021 11,570 - 208,745
(23) (62) (6) - (100)
1901 135,902 307,737 33,794 - 488,831
(28) (63) (7) - (100)
1902 54,996 275,253 43,670 - 388,849
(14) (71) (11) - (100)
1903 70,419 *240,779 23,147 - -
(-) (-) (-) (-)
1904 51,320 119,977 22,104 50,000 203,839
(25) (59) (11) (25) (100)
1905 56,594 *220,859 30,923 50,000 143,107
(40) (22) (35) (100)
1906 97,407 40,349 39,174 - 181,631
(54) (22) (22) - (100)
Notes: * indicates loss;
- implies nil;
‘Other’ was mainly concerned with issues; 
Not all the earning sources were disclosed.
Source: Burk, op. cit.. appendix ii and iii.
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Table 2.6 Hambros’ Earning Sources. 1890-1906
Year
(1)
Discount
account
(£) (%)
(2)
Commission 
account 
(£) (%)
(3)
Gross
earnings
(£) (%)
1890 64,676 55 53,171 45 117,847 100
1891 31,651 50 31,029 50 62,680 100
1892 29,585 55 24,220 45 53,805 100
1893 29,422 58 21,209 42 50,631 100
1894 26,268 50 25,873 50 52,141 100
1895 41,555 56 32,686 44 74,241 100
1896 35,974 61 22,748 39 58,722 100
1897 35,777 57 26,833 43 62,610 100
1898 - - - - - -
1899 - - - - - -
1900 58,455 59 41,290 41 99,745 100
1901 - - - - - -
1902 73,797 69 33,185 31 106,982 100
1903 74,487 76 23,792 24 98,279 100
1904 - - - - - -
1905 75,979 70 32,368 30 108,347 100
1906 83,997 70 36,037 30 120,034 100
Notes: - implies no information;
(3)=(l)+(2).
Source: H.A., Ms. 19.033/13-29.
2.2.5 The Bank of England
It was clear that Colonial governments could, from time to time, draw direct financial 
assistance from the British government. Parliament, given the recommendation of the 
Treasury, agreed to provide financial aid to Colonies. The total of government funds 
disbursed in direct support of dependent Colonies amounted to £99,411 in 1879, but by 
1900 became ten times as much as that sum.119
In comparison with foreign governments, Colonial governments could float loans 
on the London capital market more easily. Certain financial institutions in the City,
l19. L.E. Davis & R. A. Huttenback cover the general activities of the Crown Agents 
but give little discussion of loan issues (Mammon and Pursuit of Empire [Cambridge, 
1986], pp. 180-82).
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notably the Crown Agents, the Bank of England, and specific banks and stockbrokers 
with Colonial connections, invariably looked after loan issues for Colonial 
governments,120 as previously stated.
In the late-1860s, the Bank of England regarded Colonial government loan 
business as safe and well-qualified. It was in 1866 that the Bank of England agreed to 
take the New Zealand government 6 percent bonds.121 In 1876 the Bank made 
arrangements for the management of the public debts for the Queensland government122 
and in 1878 for the first time undertook the New Zealand government 5 percent loan 
issue for £3,500,000.123 Thereafter, at the Bank of England ‘the era of colonial 
management has fairly opened’.124 The Bank of England undertook Colonial loan issues 
for the Indian, the New Zealand, the Queensland, the New South Wales (before 1902) 
and the Transvaal governments. Colonial governments, for their parts, could obviously 
derive an advantage from counting upon the Bank of England for their loan issue
• 11Coperations.
The Bank of England, in collaboration with Mullens Marshall & Co., a 
stockbroker, nicknamed ‘Bank’s Brother’, implemented most of the Colonial government 
loan issues by the tender method.126 It was an established practice for the Bank that a
12°. Schilling, op. cit.. p.40; Evidence taken before the Committee of Enquiry into 
the Organization of the Crown Agents’ Office (hereafter cited as Committee of Crown 
Agents’ Office), B.P.P. 1909, xvi, [Cd.4474], Q.3730 (J.A. Mullens, a partner of 
Mullens, Marshall & Co.); London Stock Exchange (Guildhall Library), Loans and 
Company Prospectuses.
121. J. Clapham, The Bank of England, vol.ii (Cambridge, 1944), pp.301-2.
122. B.E.A., G4/97, Courts Minutes, 24 February 1876.
123. Ibid., G8/43, Treasury Committee Minutes, 29 May 1878; London Stock 
Exchange (Guildhall Library), Loan and Company Prospectuses.
124. Clapham, op. cit.. p.302.
125. Evidence taken before the Committee of Crown Agents’ Office, Q.3732 
(Mullens).
126. J.& A. Scrimgeour & Co., a stockbroker, co-operated with Mullens, Marshall & 
Co. when the Bank took up New Zealand government loan issues; R. Nivison & Co., a 
stockbroker, also worked with Mullens, Marshall & Co. for Indian government loan 
issues (London Stock Exchange [Guildhall Library], Loans and Company Prospectuses).
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stockbroker actually made the necessary arrangements for loan issues on the market.
There were direct loan issue negotiations between the Bank of England and 
Colonial governments. At first, an Agent General for a Colonial government sounded out 
market conditions at the Bank when it wished to issue a new loan; the Bank of England, 
in conjunction with stockbrokers, reported to the Agent General the assessment of the 
proposed loan issue and suggested a possible way. In the negotiations of the New South 
Wales government loan of 1891, W. Lidderdale, the Governor of the Bank of England, 
informed S. Samuel, the Agent General, that the intended loan could be placed privately 
among financial houses, but only at a much lower issue price than the current quotation 
prices of existing New South Wales government bonds because of the unfavourable 
market conditions for new loan issues.127
In 1892 the Bank was deeply concerned with the Queensland government 3 1/2 
percent loan issue. Originally this loan for £2,500,000 (the first issue) had been offered 
by a tender on the market at the minimum price of 94 percent in 1891, but subsequently 
the unsubscribed balance was taken up again at 92 1/4 percent.128 Although Lidderdale 
was of the firm opinion that the Bank of England should not support Colonial government 
loan issues to an unlimited extent nor even give any assistance unless the public accepted 
the loan,129 Mullens Marshall & Co., on the terms of the agreement, urged the Bank 
through the Agent General to take some of the unsubscribed portion when the loan had 
been tendered on the market and only a small portion had been subscribed by the 
public.130 By the end of the nineteenth century, however, the Bank of England had 
established the rules according to which it handled these government loan issues.131
127. B.E.A., G23/69, W. Lidderdale to S. Samuel, 13 August 1891.
128. S.E.O.I. for 1895, pp. 160-61.
129. B.E.A., G23/69, Lidderdale to Garrick, 25 January 1892.
13°. Ibid., H. Cubb to J.F. Garrick, 16 January 1892.
131. Ibid., G8/51, Treasury Committee Minutes, 12 August 1908.
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2.2.6 Stockbrokers
The important role of stockbrokers in loan issue operations has not been sufficiently 
discussed and is often underrated. Charles Duguid’s famous textbook on the stock 
exchange mentioned the two important activities of stockbrokers related to loan issues: 
underwriting and broking.132 Firstly, their activities were concerned with the broking of 
issued bonds. In order to encourage investors’ demand for the bonds, stockbrokers 
supplied investment information to customers by circulars and information sheets.133 More 
directly, stockbrokers sent the prospectuses with the stamped application forms and 
induced customers to purchase the issued bonds; they said we ‘have pleasure in 
endeavouring to secure an allotment’.134 Secondly, stockbrokers underwrote loan issues. 
The extent of their involvement in underwriting was varied, according to their position 
in loan issue operations. When stockbrokers, in collaboration with loan issue banks, 
arranged the loan issue, they played a positive role in organising the underwriting and 
invited financial institutions to it.135 Otherwise, they participated as commission-takers.
Large and pre-eminent stockbrokers often acted as de facto loan issuers, 
especially when the Bank of England, the Crown Agents and banks with little experience 
of loan issue business undertook loan issues. Although the fragmented structure of the 
London capital market often symbolised its ‘deficiencies’, compared with the German 
universal banking system,136 stockbrokers inside the London capital market played a co­
132. Charles Duguid, The Stock Exchange, fifth ed. (1926), pp.31-32. Lavington 
simply described ‘the brokers who lend their names to the prospectuses, assign the 
underwriting on payment of an "overriding1’ commission, carry through many of the 
technical formalities and open up a market among their clients’ (op. cit.. p. 184).
133. N. Grieser, ‘The British Investor and his Sources of Information’, Unpublished 
M.Sc.(Econ.) Thesis, University of London, 1940, pp.76-77.
134. W.J. Reader, A House in the City (1979), p.93. This was Foster & Braithwaite’s 
case.
135. O’Hagan, op. cit.. vol.l, pp. 150-51.
136. Y. Cassis, ‘British Finance: Success and Controversy’ in J.J. van Helten & Y. 
Cassis [eds.], Capitalism in a Mature Economy (1990), pp.8-9.
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ordinated and integrated role in some of the loan issues. Schilling was the first to pay 
necessary attention to this aspect of stockbrokers’ activities in Colonial government loan 
issues.137 Specific stockbrokers established direct and close relations with Colonial 
governments’ loan issues in London.138 In these cases, the stockbrokers, rather than the 
loan issue banks, made preparations for loan issues on the market (underwriting and 
broking), and the loan issue banks acted simply as subscription agents because the loan 
issue banks were not experts in that business.139
Three eminent stockbrokers: R. Nivison & Co., J.& A. Scrimgeour & Co. and 
Mullens Marshall & Co., undertook Colonial government loan issues almost as the sole 
operators. There were definite business boundaries among them: for Colonies with 
responsible governments R. Nivison & Co. arranged loan issues; for the Crown Colonies 
J. & A. Scrimgeour & Co. and Mullens Marshall & Co. acted as the stockbrokers; 
Mullens Marshall & Co. usually organised loan issues which the Bank of England 
undertook.140 In these loan issues, the loan issue banks including the Crown Agents put 
all the necessary arrangements of the loan issues into the hands of these stockbrokers.
J.A. Mullens, a partner of Mullens Marshall & Co., explained their roles in loan 
issues with the Crown Agents. J. & A. Scrimgeour & Co., the main stockbrokers of the
137. Schilling, op. cit.. p.46.
138. Such a practice was also confirmed in Indian government guaranteed railway loan 
issues. Railway companies had their own stockbrokers (Evidence taken before the 
Committee of the Crown Agents’ Office, Q.715 [H.W. Badock, Accountant General at 
the Indian Office]).
139. Panmure Gordon & Co. floated many Japanese government loans on the London 
capital market. Whenever the Hongkong Bank, Parr’s Bank and the Yokohama Specie 
Bank took up them, Panmure Gordon & Co. made the necessary arrangements because 
these loan issue banks (the banks with Far Eastern and Japanese connections) were not 
experts in loan issue business. Panmure Gordon & Co.’s substantial role in the 
underwriting of Japanese government loan issues will be seen in Part II. However, it is 
an interesting fact that Harry Panmure Gordon, the founder of the Company, had joined 
J. & A. Scrimgeour & Co., which was involved heavily in Colonial government loan 
issues, as a junior partner in the 1860s (MacDermot, op. cit.. p. 14).
14°. London Stock Exchange (Guildhall Library), Loans and Company Prospectuses.
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Crown Agents,141 ‘generally go to the Crown Agents and see them, and then we discuss 
it more or less informally together; they [the Crown Agents] come down to our office 
and the thing [the loan issue] is settled’.142 They, the financial experts to the Crown 
Agents,143 decided the details of new loan issues: i.e. the issues of prospectuses, issue 
prices, the time of issues and so on.144
R. Nivison & Co., with ‘its detailed knowledge of the sources of demand for 
Australia’s government loans’,145 placed many loans in the London capital market. The 
Company maintained direct and close relations with the Australian and Canadian 
governments. The London & Westminster Bank invariably employed R. Nivison & Co. 
as its stockbroker for Colonial government loan issues.146 The Company also co-operated 
with the Bank of Adelaide for South Australian government loan issues and the Bank of 
Montreal for Canadian government loan issues.
In this way, the important role of stockbrokers as the organisers of underwriting, 
the core of a loan issue on the London capital market,147 was gradually enhanced in many 
Colonial government loan issues. They could find the demand for the underwriting and 
broking of newly issued bonds on the market. ‘London broking firms were the key to 
arranging finance’148 for Colonies.
141. Evidence taken before the Committee of the Crown Agents’ Office, Q.3714 
(Mullens).
142. Ibid., Q.3712 (Mullens).
143. Ibid., Q.3713 (Mullens).
144. Ibid., QQ.3705 and3708 (Mullens).
145. Gilbert, op. cit., p.43. ‘All banks and governments, including the 
Commonwealth, used the same broking firm - Nivison & Co.’ (p.41) is misled.
146. Robert Nivison, the founder of the Company, was employed by the British Linen 
Bank (1863-1868) and the London & Westminster Bank (1869-1881). At that time the 
London & Westminster Bank took an active interest in the financial affairs of Colonial 
governments. Forming a partnership for stockbroking with another members (T.P. Baptie 
& Co.), he set up R. Nivison & Co. in 1887 (Obituary of Lord Glendyne [Robert 
Nivison], The Times. 16 June 1930).
147. ‘The successful manner in which they (R. Nivison & Co.) were carried through 
is largely attributed to the skill with which he, Nivison, built up his underwriting 
connexions’ (Ibid).
148. D. Wainwright, Government Broker (East Molesey, 1990), p.55.
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2.3 Conclusion
This chapter has examined the development of the loan issue mechanism, and the 
involvement of a variety of financial institutions in Colonial and foreign government loan 
issues. The discussion has not been related directly to Japanese government loan issues, 
but has provided their background in the London capital market. Indeed, without this 
important knowledge, it is almost impossible to understand the loan issue process of 
Japanese government loans.
Although the origin of syndicates went back earlier, syndication was highlighted 
in foreign government loan issues of the 1860s and the 1870s. The practice of 
underwriting was also introduced into loan issues in the late nineteenth century. It made 
loan flotations on the market much easier by dispersing the risks of loan issues to 
underwriters. Therefore, loan issue banks did not run any risks except for their 
underwriting amounts. Most of the foreign government loan issues on the London capital 
market were underwritten and carried out by public subscription. The market evaluated 
the quality of investments and reflected it directly in subscriptions. This loan issue 
mechanism freed loan issue banks from large risks involved in loan issues.
The extent of the involvement of financial institutions in Colonial and foreign 
government loan issues became varied, but some financial institutions formed definite and 
continuing relations with specific countries’ loan issues. The substantial role of 
stockbrokers, as ‘real’ loan issue organisers, needs to be emphasised especially in 
Colonial government loan issues.
PART n
JAPANESE GOVERNMENT LOAN ISSUES 
ON THE LONDON CAPITAL MARKET
Table 3.1 Total amount of Japanese Government Loan Issues. 1870-1913
Loan issue place Nominal
amount
(£000) (%)
Net
amount
(£000) (%)
London 87,893 48.4 82,106 48.6
New York 39,500 21.7 35,755 21.2
Germany 13,000 7.2 11,700 6.9
Paris 41,313 22.7 39,254 23.3
Total 181,706 100.0 168,815 100.0
Notes: The issue places in Germany included Hamburg and Berlin;
The difference of £3,000 in the net amounts between Table 1.4 and 
Table 3.1 is due to the rate of exchange in the bond re-sale of 
1897 (nominal amount £4,385,000 - Table 1.3 and Table 1.4; 
nominal amount £4,389,000 - Table 3.2).
Source: These sources will be referred to in chapters 3 to 7.
Table 3.2 Japanese Government Loan Issues. 1870-1913
Year Rate of Issue 
interest amount 
(nominal)
[Yield at 
issue]
Issue
price
(public)
Borrowing Object 
period
Loan
issuers
(%) (£000) (%) (year)
1870 9
[9.2]
1,000
(London)
98 13 railway Schroder 
construction
1873 7
[7.6]
2,400
(London)
92 1/2 25 redemption Oriental Bank
of pension
fund
1897 5
[4.9]
4,389
(London)
101 1/2 
(re-sale)
53 military Capital & 
Counties Bank 
Hongkong Bank 
Chartered Bank 
Yokohama 
Specie Bank
1899 4
[4.4]
10,000
(London)
90 55 railway
steelworks
telephone
Parr’s Bank 
Chartered Bank 
Hongkong Bank 
Yokohama 
Specie Bank
1902 5
[5.0]
5,104
(London)
100
(re-sale)
55 military
steelworks
telephone
tobacco
Baring Bros 
Hongkong Bank 
Yokohama 
Specie Bank
1904 6
[6.4]
10,000
London
(5.000) 
New York
(5.000)
93 1/2 7 military Parr’s Bank 
Hongkong Bank 
Yokohama 
Specie Bank
1904 6
[6.6]
12,000 
London 
(6,000) 
New York 
(6,000)
90 1/2 7 military Parr’s Bank 
Hongkong Bank 
Yokohama 
Specie Bank
1905 4 1/2 
[5.0]
30,000 
London 
(15,000) 
New York
90 25 military Parr’s Bank 
Hongkong Bank 
Yokohama 
Specie Bank
(15,000)
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Year
1905
1905
1907
1910
1910
Notes:
Source:
Table 3.2 Japanese Government Loan Issues. 1870-1913 (cont.l
Rate of 
interest 
(nominal) 
[Yield at 
issue]
( % )
Issue Issue Borrowing Object
amount price period
(public)
Loan
issuers
(£000) (%) (year)
4 1/2 
[5.0]
4
[4.4]
5
[5.0]
4
[4.2] 
4
[4.2]
30.000 
London 
(10,000)
New York 
(10,000) 
Germany 
(10,000)
25.000 
London 
(6,500)
New York
(3.250) 
Germany
(3.250) 
Paris
(12,000)
23.000 
London
(11.500) 
Paris
(11.500)
17,813
(Paris)
11,000
(London)
90 25 military Parr’ Bank 
Hongkong Bank 
Yokohama 
Specie Bank
90
99 1/2
95 1/2 
95
25 conversion Parr’s Bank
Hongkong Bank 
Yokohama 
Specie Bank 
London 
Rothschilds 
Paris Rothschilds
40 conversion Parr’s Bank
Hongkong Bank 
Yokohama 
Specie Bank 
London 
Rothschilds 
Paris Rothschilds
60 conversion Paris Rothschilds
60 conversion Parr’s Bank
Hongkong Bank 
Yokohama 
Specie Bank
The issue places in Germany included Hamburg and Berlin; 
Short-term loan issues in 1912 and 1913 were excluded. 
These sources will be referred to in chapters 3 to 7.
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CHAPTER 3 
EARLY LOAN ISSUES
Table 3.1 shows the total loan issue amounts (nominal and net) of Japanese government 
foreign loan issues in London, New York, Germany (Hamburg and Berlin) and Paris, in 
the period 1870 to 1913, and Table 3.2 their terms: rates of interest, issue amounts, issue 
prices (to the public), borrowing periods, objects and loan issuers. Following chapters 
3 to 7 will discuss these financial operations mainly on the London capital market. Before 
mentioning details of the individual loan issues, their brief outline can be followed from 
these tables.
*
As a result of Japan’s rapid industrialisation after the Meiji Restoration (1868), 
substantial funds were required for the development of social institutions and 
infrastructures. The Tokugawa Shogunate government (Bakufu) and some feudal clans 
(Han) had previously borrowed money from foreign banks and merchant houses in 
Japan.1 Yet the idea of a public loan was totally unfamiliar in Japan.
This chapter will examine the early Japanese government foreign loan issues in 
1870 and 1873, the purposes of which were railway construction and the redemption of 
pensions for the old feudal knight class (Samurai). In the 1870s, however, Japan was still 
an unknown country to British public investors, without a sound borrowing record. 
British financial journalists regarded these Japanese bonds as almost as unreliable as 
Turkish and Egyptian bonds. Even in the 1890s, one British banker confessed that ‘very
\  The total debts of the feudal clans (Daimvo) taken over by the Meiji government 
amounted to nearly Mexican $6,000,000 (approximately £135,000) (M.T.Z.. vol. 12, 
p.2). It is difficult to calculate accurately because of a silver currency (A.P. Andrew, 
‘The End of the Mexican Dollar’. Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol.xviii-no.3 (1904), 
pp. 321-56.
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shrewd people whom I know have bought Japanese stock [the 7 percent loan of 1873] to 
return 4 7/8 percent’.2
3.1 9 Percent Loan Issue in 1870
In 1870, just two years after the Meiji Restoration, the Japanese government first foreign 
loan issue was launched. This year was conspicuous for the number of many foreign loan 
issues on the London capital market. The Bankers’ Magazine described it as ‘the epoch 
of foreign loans’.3 Lowering of Bank Rate to 2 1/2 percent had encouraged foreign 
government loan issues, and under these rather unusually active circumstances financial 
journalists warned public investors against the dangers of highly remunerative foreign 
loans, nearly a 10 or 12 percent annual rate of interest.4 Landes pointed out the ‘lure of 
fabulous interest even more than the needs of trade that attracted British promoters and 
investors’.5 Obviously the Japanese government 9 percent loan of 1870 was felt to be in 
this high-risk, high-return loan category.
In order to foster industrialisation the new Meiji government, using western 
capital and techniques, made great efforts to develop infrastructures as rapidly as 
possible. The impetus for railway construction in Japan came from A.L.C. Portman, the 
United States Minister in Japan (Charge d’Affaires, 1865-1866). The Tokugawa 
Shogunate government had given him a railway building license in 1867, but the Meiji 
government had not recognised it.6 At that time there were a number of proposals
2. M.B.A., M153/44, Interview between T.R. Hughes and C. Whitburn, 3 June 
1896. In comparison with the yield at isse in 1873 (7.6 percent), the return shows that 
the price of this loan rose remarkably in 1896.
3. Bankers’ Magazine, vol.30 (1870), p.584.
4. The Economist. 25 June 1870, pp.786-87.
5. D.S. Landes, Bankers and Pashas (Cambridge[Mass.], 1958 [reprinted 1979]), 
p.57.
6. T. Tanaka, Meiji Ishin no Seikvoku to Tetsudo Kensetsu (Political Implications of 
the Meiji Restoration and Railway Construction in Japan! (Tokyo, 1963), pp.69-70.
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including British, French and American ones for railway construction.7 H.S. Parkes, 
the British Minister to Japan, therefore, advised the Japanese government to carry out the 
project with its own resources.8 Parkes was doing his best to remove the American 
influence over the railway construction.
3.1.1 Railway construction and Lay
Horatio Nelson Lay,9 a leading figure in the Japanese government loan issue of 
1870, was very knowledgeable about China.10 Initially he had acted as a supernumerary 
interpreter of the British government in China and from 1859 to 1863 had been the 
Inspector General of the Chinese Maritime Customs. He was one of the principals in the 
development of a European-Chinese naval force: the Lay-Osbom Flotilla.11
It was in about 1862 that Lay had the idea of a loan issue for the Chinese 
government which he brought to the Oriental Bank.12 On his return to England, Lay 
collaborated with associates, directors of the Consolidated Bank, a manager of the 
Telegraph Construction & Maintenance Co. and director of Fairbaim Engineering Co., 
to conduct mercantile business in China.13 He became a speculator concerned with 
Chinese affairs and aimed to build railway telegraphs in China.14 Lay soon saw the
7. IbicL, pp. 89-91.
8. Ibid.. p. 102.
9. There are two studies on Lay: J. King, ‘Oratio [Horatio is the right name - author] 
Nelson Lay, C.B. - A Pioneer of British Influence in the Far East’, Journal of the 
American Asiatic Association, vol.xiv-no.2 (1914), pp.49-54; J.J. Gerson, ‘Horatio 
Nelson Lay: His Role in British Relations with China, 1849-65’, Unpublished Ph.D. 
Thesis, University of London, 1967. Neither throws light on Lay’s activities connected 
with Japan.
10. His father G. Tradescant Lay was in China from 1841 to 1845 as the H.B.M. 
Consul in Amoy (Gerson, op. cit., p.34).
11. S.F. Wright, Hart and the Chinese Customs (Belfast, 1950), chapter ix.
12. C. 16/676/5146, 1870. S. No. 146, the Answer of Horatio Nelson Lay, f.2.
13. Ibid., ff.2-3.
14. Lay to T. Fairbaim, 18 March 1869 (ibid., f.3).
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possibility of raising a Chinese government loan for the building of railway telegraphs 
and considered that close relations with Morrison Dillon & Co. and the Consolidated 
Bank could probably help him to raise the required money.15 In 1869 Lay left for China 
to complete this project with the Chinese government, but it showed no interest.16
Lay then switched his attention to Japan as he had heard that the newly established 
Japanese government (the Meiji government) needed a large amount of money for 
industrialisation. Lay and his business partners held an optimistic view of Japanese 
investment business17 and regarded it as ‘a probable field for work’.18
3.1.2 Lay’s negotiations in Japan
In July 1869 Lay arrived in Japan. He was not confident of raising money for the 
Japanese government from his personal sources, and considered it indispensable to work 
with the Oriental Bank,19 which had been concerned with the establishment of the mint 
in Japan in 186920 and secured firm business opportunities there in 1860, the year of the 
opening of the Yokohama Branch. Lay immediately explained to Parkes his plan of 
offering money to the Japanese government. Even to Parkes, Lay always pretended to be 
a representative of large British capital interests, asserting he had been sent to offer 
money to China and Japan.21 E. Satow, an officer at the British Legation in Japan, 
arranged a meeting between Lay and S. Okuma, the Vice-Minister of Home Affairs
15. Ibid., f.4.
16. Ibid., f.6.
17. Lay to Fairbaim, 19 July 1869 (ibid., ff.6-7).
18. C. 16/676/5146, 1870. S. No. 146, Amended Bill of Complaint, f.10, Fairbaim 
to Lay, 29 July 1869.
19. Ibid., f.4.
20. Japanese Mint, Zoheikvoku Hvakunenshi (One Hundredth Anniversary History of 
the Japanese Minf) (Tokyo, 1976), pp.29-39; K. Tatewaki, Zainichi Gaikoku Ginkoshi 
(History of Foreign Banks in Japan) (Tokyo, 1987), chapter 6.
21. F .0.262/188, H.S. Parkes to Lord Clarendon, 31 July 1870; F.V. Dickins & S. 
Lane-Poole, The Life of Sir Harry Parkes. vol.ii (1894), p. 157.
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(Minbu Taihol.22
In September 1869 Lay officially proposed the provision of £2 or £3 million to 
the Japanese government.23 He also drew up many other ambitious business projects in 
Japan. Writing to T. Fairbaim he observed:
We should not get only one loan but several loans and much business besides 
which if done thoroughly will quite ensure us the monopoly as the agents of the 
Japanese Government and we should in time literally ‘coin money’. The field is 
here vast and capable of boundless development.24
Lay would have been one of the British pioneers in Japanese business if these projects 
had been successful.
In November 1869 Lay entered into negotiations with the Japanese government, 
dealing in particular with Okuma and H. Ito, the Vice-Minister of Finance (Okura 
Shoyu).25 The Japanese government intended to construct railways using money borrowed 
from Lay. Estimating the cost of the railway construction between Tokyo, Yokohama, 
Tsuruga and Hyogo at approximately £3,000,000, Lay offered to raise £1,000,000 of this 
amount from his friends in England on the security of the government’s customs revenues 
and receipts from these railways. He also proposed that the Japanese government should 
leave all the necessary management of the railway construction in Lay’s charge.26
Finally, in December 1869 the Japanese government agreed to make a loan 
contract with Lay on the following terms:27
22. W.U.A., Okuma Papers, C.719, E. Satow to S. Okuma, no date.
23. C. 16/676/5146, the Answer, f.7.
24. Ibid., Complaint, f.4.
25. Tanaka, op. cit.. p. 127.
26. M.T.Z.. vol. 12, p. 13.
27. S.A., Japanese Customs Loan File, the Contract dated 14 and 28 December 1869; 
there was also the Japanese edition including some additional contracts in M.Z.Z.K.S.S.. 
vol. 10, pp. 11-17.
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(i) The Japanese government should raise £1,000,000 ‘by a loan of that 
amount from any person or persons who may be willing to advance’ at a 
12 percent annual rate of interest repayable over 12 years.
(ii) The Japanese government should appoint Lay as the commissioner for 
raising and negotiating the loan.
(iii) The Japanese government should offer Lay all the customs revenues and 
net receipts of the railways constructed as the security of the loan.
(iv) The Japanese government should appoint Lay as its agent for buying 
materials for the railways.
It is obvious that this contract placed Lay ‘in the double position of a contractor for the 
loan and a commissioner to raise the sum for the Japanese government’.28 Subsequently, 
his intricate position would cause a serious difference between Lay and the Japanese 
government in understanding the character of the loan issue. It was almost beyond the 
Japanese government’s understanding that Lay conceived a plan of ‘putting this loan on 
the market’,29 that is to say, a public loan issued by subscriptions on the market rather 
than a private borrowing from his friends.
3.1.3 Lay’s activities in London
In March 1870 Lay returned to England and began to arrange the borrowing. Yet, as it 
happened, he was unable to count upon either the Consolidated Bank or Morrison Dillon 
& Co. as sources for the required money. Lay’s project to borrow money on behalf of 
the Japanese government did not attract them. Lay then pursued the money by a public 
loan and looked for a financier in the City who was favourably disposed to the idea. He 
approached the London Rothschilds and Thomson, Bonar & Co., but these prominent 
merchant banks all declined to handle the matter.30 The reputation of the new Japanese 
government was doubtful in British financial circles.
28. F.O. 262/188, Parkes to Lord Clarendon, 21 July 1870.
29. F.O.391/15, Parkes to E. Hammond, 4 July 1870.
“ . C. 16/676/5146, the Answer, ff. 10-11.
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Lay and his partners became sceptical about the success of the intended loan issue 
on the market. As a consequence, some of them withdrew from the operation and Lay 
approached E. Erlanger, a Paris-based merchant banker. On 31 March 1870 Erlanger 
agreed to undertake the Japanese government loan for £1,000,000 on the condition of 
being ‘entitled to 3/8th of the financial profits and l/4th of the other profits combination’ 
after deducting £50,000.31 It is clear from this contract that Erlanger’s share of the profit 
was enormous.
Yet Lay and Erlanger came to doubt the success of the loan issue and Erlanger 
wished to be free of his responsibility.32 Lay, therefore, was forced to revise the previous 
contract and to ensure Erlanger more of the profit as follows:33
(i) Erlanger should receive £50,000 and one half of all profits arising from 
Lay’s engagement with the Japanese government.
(ii) Erlanger and Lay should equally share all profits and losses from all future 
transactions in Japan.
On 23 April 1870 Erlanger issued a prospectus for the Japanese government 9 percent 
loan for £1,000,000 at 98 percent for 13 years.34 J. Henry Schroder & Co., a London 
merchant bank, played a limited role in this loan issue. In response to Erlanger’s 
proposal, the firm acted as the loan issuer at a 1 percent commission.35 There is no clear 
explanation as to why Erlanger avoided producing this loan issue directly. Erlanger would 
issue many loans in London through J. Henry Schroder & Co.36 because his head office 
was still in Paris.
31. Ibid., ff. 12-13.
32. Ibid., ff. 14-15.
33. Ibid., f. 16.
There was a prospectus in F.O.46/126, 21 July 1870.
35. S.A., Japanese Customs Loan File, An Agreement between Lay, Erlanger and 
Baron Henry Schroder dated 23 April 1870; C. 16/676/5146, Affidavit of J.H.W. 
Schroder, 14 May 1872, ff. 3-4.
M. S. Chapman, The Rise of Merchant Banking (1984), p.85.
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The result of this loan issue was successful and the total amount of the 
subscriptions reached £1,700,000. The Oriental Bank received £1,530,000 of the 
subscriptions from its clients.37 The assessment of this loan issue was not altogether good, 
however. The Economist regarded it as questionable because of the lack of adequate 
financial information on Japan;38 the Financier raised doubts about Japan’s credibility by 
saying that ‘Japan is more likely to prove another Turkey, another Egypt or an Argentine 
Republic .... in the scrupulous fulfillment of her obligations of a similar character.539 Yet 
public investors welcomed this loan issue fully because of its conspicuously high yield 
at issue, 9.2 percent (also see Table 3.3).
3.1.4 Divergence between Lay and the Japanese government
In the meantime, it was found that there had emerged a crucial divergence between Lay’s 
and the Japanese government’s understanding of the loan contract. In June 1870 C.E. De 
Long, the United States Minister in Japan, informed the Japanese government that Lay 
had carried out the public subscriptions of the Japanese government 9 percent loan in 
London by offering the customs revenues and railway receipts.40
The Japanese government had apparently expected a private borrowing. Parkes 
reported to Lord Clarendon, the British Secretary for Foreign Affairs, that the Japanese 
government appeared to have been willing for a loan in a private form and had no 
intention of relying upon the market, but that the order of the Japanese government duly 
empowered Lay to raise the necessary fund in a public form.41
In addition, the exorbitant commission was a further cause of argument. There
37. C. 16/676/5146, the Answer, f.28.
38. The Economist. 30 April 1870, p.530.
39. Financier. 6 May 1870.
40. C.E. De Long to the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 22 June 1870 (N.G.B.. 
vol.3, pp.490-94).
41. F.O.262/188, Parkes to Lord Clarendon, 21 July 1870.
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was a 3 percent difference between Lay’s lending rate to the Japanese government (12 
percent) and the annual interest rate of the public loan (9 percent). There was also a 2 
percent balance between the par (100 percent) and issue price (98 percent). It was Lay’s 
‘double position’, acting as both the contractor of the loan and the commissioner of the 
Japanese government, that brought him this huge margin. In fact, a letter addressed to 
the editor of the Daily Japan Herald argued that ‘if Mr. Lay acts as [the] agent or 
commissioner, to raise this, the Japanese government are entitled to reap the entire 
advantage of any transaction he may conduct, and that the ordinary commission of a 
quarter percent with expenses, would be ample remuneration’.42
Parkes, at first, felt satisfied to hear that British enterprises would be connected 
with the first Japanese railway construction,43 but also informed the British Foreign Office 
that Japan would have preferred to make a loan from private sources rather than the stock 
exchange.44 He regretted that the Japanese government could have enjoyed a loan issue 
of much better terms through an established financial channel such as the Oriental Bank.45 
Parkes had been concerned with the Oriental Bank in the Japanese government’s 
borrowing of U.S.$50,000 (£11,250) two years earlier.46
The reasons why the Japanese government desired to avoid a public loan on the 
foreign market were: firstly, it was afraid of revealing its financial difficulties, which 
might lower Japan’s reputation in the ongoing tariff reform negotiations; secondly, the 
new government, which had been established only two years earlier, did not want to 
disclose its financial vulnerability to the public; thirdly, the government itself was not 
confident of carrying out a foreign loan issue because of little knowledge of public
42. F .0.46/126, Parkes to Hammond, 25 July 1870.
43. Tanaka, op. cit.. pp. 122-23.
44. F.0.391/15, Parkes to Hammond, 22 April 1870.
45. Ibid., 22 July 1870.
46. N. Sekiyama, Nihon Kahei Kin-vushi Kenkvu (Study on Monetary History in 
Japan') (Tokyo, 1943), pp.70-72. Parkes, Okuma and Ito established very close relations 
with J. Robertson, the Manager of the Oriental Bank’s Yokohama Branch (M.A., 
Iko-W-3-37, Stenographic Note of Discussion [20 March 1912]).
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loans.47
3.1.5 Performance
On 29 June 1870 the Japanese government informed Lay that it was cancelling the entire 
loan issue contract48 and asked the Oriental Bank, instead of J. Henry Schroder & Co., 
to manage all the affairs of the loan.49 The government also proposed that the Oriental 
Bank should make a new loan issue for £3,000,000 for refunding the 9 percent one just 
issued.50 The Oriental Bank refused because a further loan issue would damage the price 
of the bonds on the market.51
Lay brought an action in the court52 but in December 1870 the Japanese 
government came to terms with him to pay £70,000 in total.53 The Japanese government 
authorised all bonds issued by J. Henry Schroder & Co. and their management to be 
taken over by the Oriental Bank. The remaining amount for the railway construction 
(£2,000,000) was never raised.54
Out of the £70,000, Lay obtained only £13,000 and Erlanger £57,000.55 This 
immense penalty alone amounted to 7 percent of the total issue amount.56 Foreign loan 
issue business at this time, especially with underdeveloped countries, could be very 
lucrative for financiers.
47. Tanaka, op. cit.. p. 196.
48. S.A., Japanese Customs Loan File; there was also the Japanese edition in 
M.Z.Z.K.S.S.. vol. 10, pp.23-24.
49. Japanese government to the Oriental Bank, 22 June 1870 (ibid.. p.23).
50. Japanese government to the Oriental Bank, 29 June 1870 (ibid.. pp.24-25).
51. P. Campbell to the Oriental Bank’s Yokohama Branch, 26 August 1870 (ibid.. 
pp. 34-35).
52. W.U.A., Okuma Papers, C.684, J. Russel to H. Ito, 10 December 1870.
53. Ibid., C.687, Imperial Government of Japan Customs Loan signed by E. Erlanger 
and H.N. Lay dated 6 December 1870.
M .T.Z.. vol. 12, pp. 13-14.
S5. C. 16/676/5146, 14 May 1872, Affidavits by J.E. Turner, f.5.
The Economist 1 March 1873, p.250.
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Ironically this loan issue revealed the fact that the Japanese government was 
ignorant of public loans. This gave a bitter lesson to the Japanese government when it 
launched a loan issue in 1873. Parkes, however, commented: ‘I trusted the firm 
establishment of the Mikado’s government [the Meiji government] would shortly enable 
them to enter the money market of the world whenever they needed funds for the 
development of the resources of their country’.57
Table 3.3 Yields of Foreign Government Loans issued during 1870
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Country Interest Issue Yield
rate price at issue
(nominal)
(%) (%) (%)
Chile 5 83 6.0
Egypt 7 75 9.3
Honduras 10 80 12.5
Japan 9 98 9.2
Romania 7 86 8.1
Russia 5 80 6.3
Spain 5 80 6.3
Note: (4)=(2)/(3)x 100.
Source: Table 1.3.
3.2 7 Percent Loan Issue in 1873
In 1873 the Japanese government made a second foreign loan issue in London. After 
the Meiji Restoration, the new government granted pensions to the old feudal knight class 
(Samurai) in exchange for their fiefs. This charge, 27 percent of the government annual 
ordinary expenditure in the years from 1868 to 1889, overloaded the government’s
57. F .0.262/188, Parkes to Lord Clarendon, 31 July 1870.
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finances.58 The main purpose of this loan issue was to secure funds for the redemption 
of these pensions. After the first foreign loan issue in 1870, Japan’s reputation in the City 
had improved to a certain extent: the Council of the Corporation of Foreign Bondholders, 
in response to many communications on Japan, noted her ‘further elements of stability’.59
In the absence of T. Okubo, the Minister of Finance (OkuraKyo), K. Inoue, the 
Vice-Minister of Finance (Qkura Taiho). directed all the negotiations of this loan issue.60 
Reflecting upon the lessons of the first foreign loan issue in 1870, the Japanese 
government was now aware of the risks of leaving financial operations entirely to a 
foreign agent and took the lead in the loan issue negotiations. In March 1872 K. Yoshida 
was appointed as the Japanese Government Loan Commissioner for this operation and 
ordered to raise a loan for from U.S.$15,000,000 (£3,375,000) to U.S.$30,000,000 
(£6,750,000) at 7 percent in either the United States or London.61
The Japanese government estimated the necessary redemption funds at 
U.S.$10,000,000 (£2,250,000) and also planned to invest the rest in mining and railway 
construction.62 The reason why the Japanese government aimed at the United States 
market first was that it was afraid of Lay’s interference in the loan issue negotiations in 
London. In addition, Yoshida, who did not like the Oriental Bank’s further involvement 
in the Japanese government finance,63 looked for a new financial source for the 
government.
Yoshida’s diary and correspondence are apparently the only sources revealing the 
process of these loan issue negotiations between the Japanese government and foreign
58. M. Takahashi, Meiji Zaiseishi Kenkvu (Study on the Financial History in the Meiji 
Era! (Tokyo, 1964), p.34.
59. Council of the Corporation of Foreign Bondholders, Annual Report, first report, 
(1874), p.21.
“ . S.I.D .. vol.2, pp. 170-71.
61. M.T.Z.. vol. 12, p.24.
62. Ibid.
M. Senda, ‘Meiji Rokunen Nanabu Ritsuki Gaisai no Boshukatei (Seven Percent
Foreign Loan Issue in 1873)’, Shakai Keizai Shigaku (Japanese Socio-Economic Journal).
vol.49-no.5 (1983), p. 18.
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financiers. The Oriental Bank, the issuer of this loan, went bankrupt in 1884 and its 
records were probably destroyed.64 A. & J. Scrimgeour, the stockbroker of this loan 
issue, has no records surviving concerning it.65
3.2.1 Yoshida’s mission
On 26 March 1872 Yoshida’s mission including G.B. Williams, American adviser to 
the Japanese government (Ovatoi Gaiiin). left for San Francisco.66 There they had an 
interview with the Bank of California on the general financial conditions in the United 
States market. The Japanese government had dealt with this bank in connection with the 
refining of Japanese gold coins.67 Yoshida noted that the rate of interest in the United 
States was higher than in London.
The Bank of California agreed on a small loan issue, but recommended that 
Yoshida should propose the intended loan issue to the Oriental Bank. The Bank of 
California, a correspondent of the Oriental Bank, set great store by the transactions 
between the Oriental Bank and the Japanese government, as shown previously. The Bank 
of California showed little interest in Yoshida’s proposal because J. Robertson, the 
Manager of the Oriental Bank’s Yokohama Branch, had warned the Bank of California 
that the Japanese government would not offer sufficient security for a new loan after the 
loan issue in 1870, and that nobody would lend money to Japan even at a 25 percent
The Bank’s surviving record (P.R.O., J.90/1770-1774) on customers’ securities 
for borrowings has no bearing to the Japanese government loan issue (L.S. Pressnell & 
J. Orbell, A Guide to the Historical Records of British Banking [1985], p .85).
*. Letter from Scrimgeour, Kemp-Gee & Co. dated 21 August 1984.
F.0.46/154, Parkes to Lord Granville, 17 June 1872.
67. T. Sagami, ‘Nanban Ginko Toraiki (Introduction of Western Banks into Japan) 2’,
fJapanesel Finance. vol.lO-no.4 (1974), pp.49-51. Sagami’s article was based on the
Bank of California Archives. Antony Gibbs’ Private Information Book accorded this bank 
a high reputation (A.G.A., Ms.ll,038B).
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annual rate of interest.68 Yoshida sent a telegram to the Oriental Bank’s Head Office to 
the effect that the Japanese government would issue a new foreign loan for £4,000,000.®
However, C. Delano, the United States Secretary of the Interior and a friend of 
Williams, made arrangements for a 9 percent loan for $5,000,000 (£1,125,000) with the 
guarantee of the United States government.70 Yet the Japanese government did not agree 
to this condition, especially the guarantee.71 Then Yoshida moved on to New York and
C.E. De Long, the United States Minsister to Japan, introduced J. Schiff, a German- 
born Jewish financier, to him.72 Schiff soon acceded to a 7 percent loan for £4,000,000 
and suggested offering it directly to his ‘head office’ in Frankfurt-on-Main.73
In his early days Schiff was thus involved in Japanese government loan affairs. 
As will be seen in Chapter 5, he became a key person in arranging the Japanese 
government loan issues on the New York capital market during the Russo-Japanese War.
3.2.2 Yoshida’s negotiations in London
On 18 June 1872 Yoshida arrived in London. In London many financiers offered 
a loan issue to Yoshida and his diary tells us the contemporary practice of loan issue 
negotiations. He went to see C.J.F. Stuart, the Chief Manager of the Oriental Bank. His 
[Stuart’s] assessment of the proposed loan issue was at a more than 8 percent annual rate 
of interest. This was calculated on the contemporary yield of the Japanese government 
9 percent loan of 1870, about 8.1 percent. Bischoffsheim & Goldschmidt, a London
®. Sagami, op. cit. 3, vol. 10-5 (1974), p.47. Yoshida was displeased with the 
Oriental Bank because of this telegram.
®. Yoshida’s Diary 1 (M.Z.Z.K.S.S.. vol. 10, pp.57-58).
TO. Ibid.. p.58.
71. Yoshida’s Diary 2 (ibid.. p.97).
72. Schiff regretted Yoshida’s death in 1891 (C. Adler, Jacob H. Schiff: His Life 
and Letters, vol.l [New York, 1928], p.212).
73. Yoshida’s Diary 1 (M.Z.Z.K.S.S.. vol. 10, pp.70-73).
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merchant bank, also made a similar assessment.74 Bischoffsheim & Goldschmidt had been 
notorious in dealing with South American government loans during the 1860s and the 
1870s for fabulous commissions. Ernest Cassel, a London merchant banker, participated 
in Bischoffsheim & Goldschmidt from 1871 to 188475 and Schiff had large transactions 
with them through Cassel because of their Jewish connections. Perhaps it was Schiff who 
introduced the Japanese government loan business to Bischoffsheim & Goldschmidt. 
Bischoffsheim & Goldschmidt offered the following loan issue terms to Yoshida:76
Issue amount £4,000,000 (£2,000,000 for the
Yet these came to nothing. In July and August 1872 Yoshida stayed in Frankfurt and 
Paris but there were no negotiations with Schiff s ‘head office’.77 The American Joint 
National Agency also proposed a loan issue in association with the Union Bank of 
London, but Yoshida did not put much confidence in such an inexperienced finance house 
and eventually declined the offer.78
An Anglo-American merchant bank, Morton Rose79 offered the most definite loan 
issue terms. At the end of August John Rose, one of the British partners, proposed the 
following alternatives to Yoshida:80
74. Yoshida’s Diary 2 (ibid.. pp.81-83).
75. P. Thane, ‘Financiers and the British State: The Case of Sir Ernest Cassel’, 
Business History, vol.xxviii-no.l (1986), p.81.
76. Yoshida’s Diary 2 (M.Z.Z.K.S.S.. vol. 10, p.85).
77Yoshida’s Diary 3 (ibid.. pp. 127-28).
78. Yoshida’s Diary 2 (ibid.. pp.92-93). This company was a United States 
Government’s foreign agent and located at Strand 446.
79. V.P. Carosso, Investment Banking in America (Cambridge[Mass.], 1970), p.22.
Yoshida’s Diary 3 (M.Z.Z.K.S.S.. vol. 10, p.111).
Interest rate (nominal) 
Issue price (to the public) 
Issue charges
moment)
7 percent 
about 91 percent 
from 7 to 8 percent.
134
Issue amount 
Interest rate (nominal) 
Issue price (to the public) 
Loan issue commission 
Borrowing period
£2,000,000
6 percent 
85 percent
7 percent 
15 years.
£2,000,000
5 percent 
70 percent
6 percent 
30 years.
This loan issue syndicate included the following financial institutions in the City: Glyn
Mills, Currie & Co.; J.S. Morgan & Co.; the International Financial Society; the 
Imperial Ottoman Bank; the Anglo-Austrian Bank; the Bank of Montreal; the Bank of 
Roumania; Morrison, Cryder & Co.; Lewis Cohen & Sons.
In September Morton Rose again offered a 6 percent loan issue for £4,000,000 
(only £2,000,000 would be transferred for the moment). Yoshida, who regarded Morton 
Rose as at most an upper-second class merchant bank, suspended the negotiations.81
J.G. Walsh, a partner of Walsh Hall and Co. in Yokohama, who was dealing with 
imported merchandise in Japan, informed Yoshida that his elder brother in London (T. 
Walsh) was anxious to contact Yoshida about the loan issue. In June 1872, T. Walsh 
proposed to Yoshida putting the loan issue matter into the hands of the Netherlands 
Trading Co..82 This Company had financed feudal clans in Japan.
In November D.G. van Polsbroek, an agent of the Netherlands Trading Co. and 
former Dutch Minister in Japan, told Yoshida that he [Polsbroek], together with W. van
der Tak, the Dutch Consul in Yokohama, would endeavour to arrange the Japanese
government loan in Holland.83 Polsbroek introduced this business to several Dutch 
financiers, but they could not raise the required money in Holland and brought it to 
eminent financiers in London and Paris. They acted only as an intermediary in this loan 
issue. Wercher-Bonverg, one of these Dutch financiers, sounded out Baring Brothers on 
the possibility of undertaking the Japanese government loan issue in London.84 Failing to 
obtain the necessary assistance from London and Paris, in January 1873 Polsbroek and
81. Yoshida’s Diary 3 (ibid.. pp. 117-18).
82. Yoshida’s Diary 2 (ibid.. pp.83-85).
83. Yoshida’s Diary 4 (ibid.. pp. 133-134).
84. B.B.A., HC. 17,296, Wercher-Bonverg to Baring Brothers, 28 December 1872.
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Van der Tak abandoned the proposed loan issue.85
These loan issue negotiations with a variety of financiers show that the credibility 
of the Japanese government was low. The financiers who took notice of Japan’s financial 
operation were ‘second class’ at best and notorious as takers of a large loan issue 
commission. The Japanese government had not yet been able to establish a sound rating 
in European financial circles.
3.2.3 Negotiations with the Oriental Bank
Yoshida was reluctant to depend upon the Oriental Bank for the loan issue, but the 
Japanese government, especially Inoue, placed full confidence in the Oriental Bank. The 
Bank had played a significant role in taking over the management of the previous 
Japanese government 9 percent loan from Lay. At that time, in Japan S. Okuma, the 
Minister of Finance (OkuraKyo), planned to borrow a small amount of money from the 
Bank.86 The Oriental Bank had thus built up close personal connections with the Japanese 
government. In addition, it had the bank accounts of the Legations in the Far East run 
by the British Foreign Office. Parkes also had particular interests with the Bank and 
helped the loan issue negotiations.87
The Oriental Bank showed a liberal attitude towards foreign loan issues. It was 
said that Stuart regarded a small loan as a principle of ‘bad banking’ and preferred a 
large loan when the Bank aimed at a Chinese government loan issue in 1874.88 Because
85. Yoshida’s Diary 4 (M.Z.Z.K.S.S.. vol. 10, p. 149). In January 1873 Malcolm, 
Hudson & Co., a merchant in London and Yokohama, also proposed a 7 percent loan 
issue for £2,500,000 but Yoshida disregarded it because the Oriental Bank had already 
been undertaken the loan issue (ibid.. p. 148).
86. W.U.A., Okuma Papers, A.2391, K. Inoue to Shoin, 8 September 1872.
87. Dickins & Lane-Poole, op. cit.. vol.2, p.243.
D.J.S. King, ‘China’s First Public Loan: The Hongkong Bank and the Chinese 
Imperial Government "Foochow" Loan of 1874’ in F.H.H. King (ed.), Eastern Banking 
(1983), p.239.
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of this expanding business policy, the Oriental Bank sustained heavy losses in the Chilean 
government loan issues in 1873 and 1875.89
In July 1872 Panmure Gordon, a junior partner of J. & A. Scrimgeour & Co., 
a stockbroker, proposed Yoshida that he [Panmure Gordon] should work with the 
Oriental Bank in forming a loan issue syndicate for the Japanese government loan issue. 
Then, Yoshida received the Oriental Bank’s own proposal: a 7 percent loan for 
£4,000,000 (£4,000,000 transferred for the moment and the other half within 6 months).90 
Inoue wrote to Yoshida that he should put more trust in the Oriental Bank when the loan 
issue took place in London, and Yoshida received it in September.91 On this occasion, he 
seems to have seriously considered the possibility of the loan issue through the Oriental 
Bank. After the authorisation of the government,92 Yoshida approached the Bank and 
decided to put the loan issue in the hands of the Oriental Bank,93 although noting that 
there were other more favourable offers, as mentioned previously.
Because of the huge amount of the French war indemnity loan issues, the 
circumstances of the London capital market during 1872 showed themselves to be ‘the 
most critical since the panic of 1866’.94 Bank Rate was at an unprecedentedly high 7 
percent in November 1872 and the market did not allow any new loan issues. On 4 
January 1873, Yoshida re-opened the negotiations with the Oriental Bank. The Bank 
agreed to act as the loan issuer and to engage J. & A. Scrimgeour & Co. for forming a 
syndicate for the loan issue.95 The role of this syndicate was ‘underwriting’ because the 
loan issue bank commission was separated from the syndicate profit (Table 3.4). On 9 
January Stuart informed Yoshida that the market had turned favourably to new loan issues
89. The Economist. 10 May 1884, p.567.
Yoshida’s Diary 2 (M.Z.Z.K.S.S.. vol. 10, pp.93-94). The Oriental Bank did not 
mention the borrowing period.
91. Yoshida’s Diary 3 (ibid.. p. 119).
92. Yoshida’s Diary 3 (ibid.. p. 120).
Ibid.. pp. 121-22.
94. Bankers’ Magazine, vol.32 (1872), p.630.
95. Yoshida’s Diary 4 (M.Z.Z.K.S.S.. vol. 10, p. 145).
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when Bank Rate fell from 5 to 4 1/2 percent. It is obvious that the Oriental Bank 
regarded Bank Rate as one of the indicators of the market conditions for new loan issues. 
The Oriental Bank and J. & A. Scrimgeour undertook the Japanese government loan issue 
at a 4 1/8 percent commission (Table 3.4).96 On 13 January 1873 Yoshida, together with 
M. Terajima, the Japanese Minister in London, made a contract with the Oriental Bank 
and J. & A. Scrimgeour & Co..97 The loan issue terms were as follows:98
Issue amount £2,400,000
Interest rate (nominal) 7 percent
Yield at issue 7.6 percent
Issue price 92 1/2 percent (to the public)
90 percent (to the government) 
Security 400,000 koku" of rice per annum
Borrowing period 25 years
Redemption the loan should be redeemed every
year after 1875, 2 percent of the 
principal by drawings.
3.2.4 Performance
By 16 January the subscriptions had reached £9,664,900, approximately 4 times 
oversubscribed.100 The Union Bank of London purchased £150,000 of the bonds in its 
portfolio investments but immediately re-sold.101 Mainly because of their high 
remuneration, 7.6 percent (Table 3.5), the Japanese government bonds proved very 
attractive to public investors.
British financial journals, however, published unfavourable comments on this 
operation. The Economist again pointed out the concomitant risks of the Japanese
96. Ibid.. pp. 145-146. The actual loan issue charges to the government including the 
interest on the deposit and communication charges amounted to £101,700, about 4 1/5 
percent of the total loan issue amount (M.Z.. vol.8, pp.640-641).
97. Ibid.. p. 149.
98. IbkL, pp. 155-59; M.T.Z.. vol. 12, pp.24-25.
". The average price of a koku of rice should be equivalent to 16s. 8d.
10°. W.U.A., Okuma Papers, C.642, J. Robertson to Okuma, 13 February 1873; 
Yoshida’s Diary 5 (M.Z.Z.K.S.S.. vol. 10, p. 169).
101. U.B.L.A., 1513, Investment Ledger.
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government loan issue as saying that ‘the result, we fear, is likely to be as unfortunate 
for the lenders as similar borrowings by new countries which wished to develop their 
resources’.102 In fact, in the financial year of 1873, large deficits occurred in the Japanese 
government’s revenue.103
After the Oriental Bank’s sudden suspension in May 1884, as mentioned in 
Chapter 2, the London Joint Stock Bank took over all the management of this loan and 
from 1886 the Yokohama Specie Bank undertook it. In July 1897 all the debts were 
redeemed on schedule.104
m. The Economist. 18 January 1873, p. 60.
103. F .0.46/166, Parkes to Lord Granville, 23 May 1873.
104. M.T.Z... vol. 12, p.34.
139
Table 3.4 Commission of Loan Issue in 1873 
(%)
Loan issue bank 1
Syndicate 2 1/2
Brokerage (application) 1/4
Stamp duty 1/8
Others 1/4
Total 4 1/8
Source: Yoshida’s Diary 4, M.Z.Z.K.S.S.. pp. 146; M .Z.. vol.8,
p.640.
Table 3.5 Yields of Foreign Government Loans issued during 1873
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Government Interest Issue Yield
rate price at issue
(nominal)
(%) (%) (%)
Chile 5 94 5.3
Egypt 1 84 1/4 8.3
Hungary 5 80 6.3
Hungary 6 89 6.7
Japan 7 92 1/2 7.6
Turkey 6 58 1/2 10.3
United State 5 102 3/8 4.9
Note: (4)=(2)/(3)xl00.
Source: Table 1.3.
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3.3 Conclusion
The two early Japanese government foreign loan issues in 1870 and 1873 were raised 
for social institutions and infrastructure investment. The loan issue in 1870 was organised 
by a British speculator (Lay). He proposed the plan of railway construction in Japan. 
The Japanese government unwisely provided him with full powers in making the loan 
issue. He raised the money in London from public rather than private sources. As far as 
foreign financiers’ influence upon loan issue negotiations was concerned, the loan issue 
in 1873 followed almost the same course as the previous one. The Japanese Government 
Loan Commissioner (Yoshida), hating the Oriental Bank’s further intervention in the 
Japanese government’s finance, made efforts to negotiate directly with foreign financiers 
and to have access to the New York and Frankfurt capital markets. Yet these efforts were 
not especially well received, and the Oriental Bank’s influence, through the Japanese 
government, frustrated his ambitious attempts to forge new financial links. The Oriental 
Bank, a great overseas bank of the time, took the initiative in the loan issue negotiations. 
Politically the Bank had built up close ties with the Japanese government and Parkes.
The two early Japanese government foreign loan issues successfully ensured the 
issue amounts mainly due to the high interest rates and yields at issue. In comparison 
with contemporary standards, these were extremely advantageous to investors, while the 
Japanese government bore heavy costs. The fact that the Japan of the day was a totally 
unknown country to many Western investors led to such an unfavourable assessment of 
the loan issue terms on the foreign capital market. It must be noted, however, that despite 
the high interest rate and yield at issue, the Oriental Bank charged a standard level of a 
loan issue commission.
The Japanese government of the 1870s had no specific knowledge of foreign loan 
issues. It is no exaggeration to say, therefore, that the government at this time put full 
trust in the Oriental Bank when it embarked upon financial operations abroad. After an 
interval of twenty four years, in 1897, the Japanese government would return to the
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London capital market for foreign loan issues. During that period, in 1879, the bank 
which would specialise in foreign business, the Yokohama Specie Bank, was established 
under the patronage of the Japanese government.
r
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CHAPTER 4 
SINO-JAPANESE WAR LOAN ISSUES
During the period from 1873 to 1897 Japan did not draw upon foreign capital markets. 
In this interval of nearly a quarter of a century, Japan financed its rapid industrialisation 
mainly in textile industries, from domestic savings. The Bank of Japan, the central bank, 
was founded in 1882 and the National Bank Act of 1872, modelled on the National 
Currency Act of 1863 in the United States, also provided considerable facilities for 
setting up banks (Kokuritsu Ginkol.1 The Yokohama Specie Bank was also set up with 
authorised capital of ¥3,000,000 (£306,250) in 1879 and its major business object was 
to finance Japanese importers and exporters.2 The Japanese government at this stage saw 
no reason to invite foreign capital to the industrialisation process.
After the Sino-Japanese War (1895), however, the government rapidly increased 
military expenditure. As a result, the balance of the Japanese government’s revenue and 
expenditure deteriorated markedly. The surplus ratios fell from 9.7 percent in 1896 to 0.1 
percent in 1898, and in 1899 revenue became equivalent to expenditure (Table 4.1). At 
first, domestic loans were the main source of funding, but the increased military 
expenditure led to severe trade deficits because most of the military goods were imported. 
As Japan’s trade balance went into the red almost every year after 1896 (Table 4.2), the 
Japanese government had to secure gold (foreign currency on the gold standard) for 
settling the trade deficits. The Japanese government inevitably came to rest on foreign 
loans because domestic loans were utterly incapable of achieving this purpose.
This chapter will view the three Japanese government loan issues after the Sino- 
Japanese War, the purpose of which was the settlement of the adverse trade balances 
caused by heavy military expenditure. However, these loan issues enabled the Japanese
'. N.G.H.S.. vol. 1, pp. 120 and 217-18.
2. Y.S.G.Z.S.. vol.2, pp.27-37; Banker’s Magazine, vol.59 (1896), pp.69-70.
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government to establish close financial ties with the City because Japan had been absent 
from the London capital market for long.
4.1 Re-sale of 5 Percent Domestic Bonds in 1897
4.1.1 Gold standard in Japan
Apart from the early foreign loans in 1870 and 1873 (sterling bonds - gold 
standard ones), the Japanese government domestic bonds (yen bonds - silver standard 
ones) had not yet been quoted on the London Stock Exchange. In 1884 S. Yoshihara, the 
Governor of the Bank of Japan, approached the Committee of the London Stock 
Exchange, but failed to win quotation mainly because of silver standard bonds.3 In 1895 
T. Minami, a Japanese banker, applied directly to H.C. Burdett, the Secretary to the 
Share and Loan Department at the London Stock Exchange, for the quotation of domestic 
bonds endorsed to pay the principal and interest in gold.4 In 1896 T. Kato, the Japanese 
Minister in London, agreed with the London Stock Exchange on the quotation of 5 
percent domestic bonds for ¥60,838,250 (£6,210,571).5 Yet, being silver standard bonds, 
their daily transactions were very small.6
Before 1897, the yen was based on the silver standard. As shown in chapter 1, 
silver standard bonds were valued unfavourably on the market because of exchange risks. 
The silver standard in Japan became a distinct impediment to building a close relationship 
with the City. In fact, one British merchant pointed out in 1884 that Japan could have 
effect a more favourable foreign loan issue in London with gold standard bonds.7 For
3. M.T.Z. . vol. 12, p.414.
4. J.M.F.A., Matsukata Papers, 40-35, T. Minami, May 1895.
5. L.S.E.A., Ms. 14,600, General Purpose Committee Minutes, vol.65, 12 October 
1896; also Ms. 18,000, 43B/557, Quotation Application.
6. J.M.F.A., Matsuo Papers, 44-13, no.3.
1. F.O.46/314, P. Le P. Trench to Foreign Office, 2 August 1884.
144
economic transactions the Japanese government needed the same standard as Britain. In 
order to enter the international economic community and to borrow money smoothly in 
London, the establishment of the gold standard became a prerequisite for Japan. It is 
hardly surprising, therefore, that the Japanese government was anxious to adopt the gold 
standard.
During the years from 1895 to 1898 Japan received a considerable amount of war 
indemnity money (£32,900,980) from China. On the basis of this M. Matsukata, the 
Japanese Minister of Finance, adopted the gold standard in Japan. The Japanese Gold 
Standard Act operated from October 1897 at the rate of ¥1 to 24.58 d.. Obviously this 
was to ‘command higher credit, and be able to borrow on more favourable terms in 
foreign countries’ as a gold standard country.8 The adoption of the gold standard in 
Japan, as well as the conclusion of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance in 1902, produced close 
relationships between Japan and Britain.
4.1.2 Re-sale negotiations
In 1894 war broke out between China and Japan. The Japanese government established 
a Special War Account for ¥225,230,127 (£22,992242) in the budget. The war was 
financed mainly by domestic loans and funds transferred from the Exchequer. Table 4.3 
suggests that the role of the domestic loans was significant in the war finances. After
8. The Economist. 24 April 1897, p.603. The whole text of the Japanese Gold 
Standard Act appears in M. Matsukata, Report on the Adoption of the Gold Standard 
in Japan (Tokyo, 1899), pp. 192-95. The war indemnity money was kept temporarily in 
London, but by 1900 most of it was transferred to Japan or used to pay for government’s 
expenditure abroad (ibid.. p.224), although the Bank of England feared a sudden 
withdrawal of this gold to Japan (F.O.46/471, British Foreign Office to E. Satow, 24 
December 1896).
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the war, in 1896, the Deposit Money Bureau (Yokinbu)9 at the Mimistry of Finance had 
temporarily taken a large amount of 5 percent military bonds10 because the domestic 
capital market had insufficient capacity to absorb all the loans issued by the public. The 
government considered re-selling some of these bonds abroad.
In 1896 the Japanese government ordered the Bank of Japan to re-sell the military 
bonds, held by the Deposit Money Bureau, for ¥43,000,000 on a foreign market. The 
Bank of Japan held full power at that time to negotiate directly with foreign financiers. 
In November 1896 the bond re-sale negotiations started. K. Fukuma, a manager of S. 
Samuel & Co. in Kobe, informed the Japanese Ministry of Finance that his London 
house, M. Samuel & Co. (Marcus Samuel”), a London merchant bank, wanted to 
purchase the 5 percent domestic bonds, held by the Deposit Money Bureau, for 
¥30,000,000 (£3,062,500).12 Samuel Samuel, Marcus Samuel’s younger brother, ran a 
merchant house (S. Samuel & Co.) in Yokohama and Kobe as an agent of M. Samuel 
& Co. and did a brisk business importing machinery, tools, textiles and petroleum into 
Japan.13 S. Samuel & Co. emphasised probable assistance from the London Rothschilds.14
In December 1896 Kato (the Japanese Minister in London), having confirmed M. 
Samuel & Co.’s reputation in the City, entered into preliminary negotiations. Marcus 
Samuel proposed buying ¥30,000,000 of the bonds, but soon found it difficult to
9. M.T.Z.. vol. 12, p.418. In Japan, the role of this Bureau was of extreme 
importance in circulating government domestic bonds in the embryonic capital market. 
The Deposit Money Bureau, established in 1885, invested the government’s funds and 
postal saving money (ibid.. vol. 13, pp.565-67).
10. In 1896 the Deposit Money Bureau held Japanese government bonds for 
¥56,408,199 (ibid.. vol. 13, p.809).
11. Marcus Samuel was famous as a joint founder of the Shell Transport & Trading 
Co. (R. Henriques, Marcus Samuel [1960], pp.59-60).
12. J.M.F.A.A., 3-4-4-4, Minister of Finance to T. Kato, no date; secret (secretriat) 
no.99, M. Matsukata to Kato, 26 January 1897.
13. Henriques, op. cit.. p.61.
14. J.M.F.A.A., 3-4-4-4, secret no.99 M. Matsukata to Kato. Marcus Samuel’s 
mother was a cousin of Lionel Nathan Rothschild, the former Head of the London 
Rothschilds (A.G.A., Ms.ll,038B, Information Book).
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purchase such a large amount of silver standard bonds. He mistakenly believed that these 
bonds had been gold bonds. They only agreed that W.F. Mitchell, a partner of M. 
Samuel & Co., would continue the negotiations in Japan.15
In the middle of April 1897, however, an abrupt bid by the Chartered Bank 
quickened proceedings. The Chartered Bank proposed to the Bank of Japan the purchase 
of the military bonds for ¥40,000,000 (£4,083,333) at £100 per ¥1,000 (97.9 percent to 
par),16 which was subsequently raised to £101 (98.9 percent to par).17 While the Chartered 
Bank hesitated at the final stage, in May S. Samuel & Co., together with the Hongkong 
Bank, offered to the Bank of Japan the purchase of bonds to the nominal value of 
¥35,000,000 (£3,572,917) at £102 per ¥1,000 (99.9 percent to par). The Bank of Japan, 
of course, accepted this more advantageous offer.18 The Chartered Bank finally agreed 
to participate in S. Samuel & Co.’s syndicate.19 The re-sale amount increased to 
¥43,000,000 (£4,389,583) and the principal and interest were guaranteed to pay in gold. 
The following contract was made between the Bank of Japan, S. Samuel & Co. and the 
Hongkong Bank on 28 May 1897:20
15. J.M.F.A.A., 3-4-4-4, no.5, Kato to N. Okuma, 17 December 1896.
16. J.M.F.A., Matsukata Papers, 40-36, I. Tajiri and S. Matsuo to Matsukata, 19 
April 1897. Tajiri misleadingly wrote that the Chartered Bank was a French bank.
17. J.M.F.A.A., 3-4-4-4, no.71, Minister of Finance to T. Kato, 14 May 1897.
,8. C.S.S.. 13 May 1897.
19. J.M.F.A.A., 3-4-4-4, no.71, op.cit.; Panmure Gordon & Co. to K. Sonoda 
(Yokohama Specie Bank), 12 May 1897.
20. J.M.F.A., Matsuo Papers, 44-13, no.4.
21. The yield at issue was 4.9 percent at the 101 1/2 percent issue price.
Re-sale amount 
Interest rate (nominal) 
Re-sale price
5 percent21
£102 per a nominal price of the ¥1,000 
(99.9 percent to par)
53 years
the government should guarantee to pay the principal 
and interest in gold at the rate of 2 s. 1/2 d. per ¥1; 
the government, for one year, should not issue 
any loan in Europe except through S. Samuel & 
Co. and the Hongkong Bank.
¥43,000,000 (£4,389,583)
C  *21
Borrowing period 
Others
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S. Samuel & Co.’s success in the loan issue negotiations resulted from the Chartered 
Bank’s reluctance to launch a foreign loan issue alone. Perhaps the Bank, under the 
direction of J.H. Gwyther, may have regarded such business as extremely risky.22
4.1.3 Subscriptions
The syndicate of this bond re-sale included a variety of City banks: the Capital & 
Counties Bank (a clearing bank); the Hongkong Bank (an overseas bank); the Chartered 
Bank (an overseas bank); the Yokohama Specie Bank (a foreign bank).23 Why did the 
Capital & Counties Bank participated in this loan re-sale as one of the loan issue banks? 
The Bank was founded in 1877 as the Hampshire & North Wiltshire Banking Co. and 
expanded its business mainly in the Southwest of England.24 The Bank established close 
relations with M. Samuel & Co. as an agent.25 To ensure a firm basis for subscriptions 
on the market, M. Samuel & Co., which was engaged largely in merchant activities, 
put this re-sale operation into the hands of the Capital & Counties Bank.26 The Statist, 
however, cast doubts on whether a clearing bank could become involved in foreign loan 
issue business.27 The Capital & Counties Bank only undertook two foreign government 
loan issues before 1914: the Santo Domingo government 6 percent loan in 1889 and the
22. C. Mackenzie, Realms of Silver (1954), p.206. Gwyther was the Chairman of the 
Bank from 1896 to 1904.
23. Unfortunately the forming of the syndicate could not be traced because of the lack 
of information.
24. R.S. Sayers, Lloyds Bank in the History of English Banking (Oxford, 1957), p. 18.
25. T. Skinner, London Banks, and Kindred Companies & Firms (1905); 
J.M.F.A.A., 3-4-4-4, Kato to S. Okuma, 14 May 1897.
26. In 1902 the Capital & Counties Bank also acted as loan issuers of the City of 
Yokohama 6 percent loan and the City of Osaka 6 percent one which S. Samuel & Co. 
undertook. It is regrettable that most of the early records, being equivalent to two lorry­
loads, have been destroyed and now there is no surviving records on the Japanese 
government loans in 1897 and 1899 at the M. Samuel & Co. Archives (an interview with 
Mr. D.G. Corbie, the Archivist of Hill Samuel & Co., on 10 July 1984).
27The Statist, vol.39, 15 May 1897, p.789.
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Japanese government 5 percent bond re-sale in 1897.
From 1 June 1897 the subscriptions started at £103 12s. 4d. per ¥1,000 (101 1/2 
percent to par). The syndicate received the 2 1/2 percent coupon of June 189728 and a 1 
1/2 percent underwriting commission. The Hongkong Bank underwrote £87,500 of the 
bonds.29 M. Samuel & Co.’s underwriters included the Lord Mayor (£10,000), Samuel 
Montagu & Co. (£25,000) and M. Samuel & Co. (£135,000).30 Panmure Gordon, Hill 
& Co., a stockbroker, mainly arranged the underwriting.31 The applications amounted to 
£27,750,000, 6.5 times oversubscribed (Table 4.4). It was found that the application list 
included investors with Jewish and Quaker connections and many clients of M. Samuel 
& Co. and the Capital & Counties Bank (Table 4.5). Kleinworts bought ¥80,000 (£8,167) 
of the bonds from the Hongkong Bank.32
4.1.4 Performance
This re-sale operation was sufficiently lucrative to the syndicate. On a rough estimate its 
profit, including the 2 1/2 percent half-yearly interest of June 1897, amounted to at least
4.1 percent of the whole re-sale amount. In comparison with the Japanese government 
loan issues of later periods, however, this level of commission was not as high as the 
Japanese government had feared.33 Yet Japanese journalists were critical, saying that the 
high interest (5 percent) bonds would injure government finances34 and that the re-sale
28. M .T.Z.. vol. 12, pp.419-23.
29. C.C.B.A., A53b/76, the Hongkong Bank to R.C. Henderson (the Capital & 
Counties Bank), 9 June 1897.
” . Ibid., M. Samuel & Co. to the Capital & Counties Bank, 19 May 1897.
31. C.B.A., Extract from Board Minutes, 10 May 1897. Another stockbroker was 
Linton, Clarke & Co.. Stephen Freeth, the Keeper of Manuscripts at the Guildhall 
Library wrote to me that the records of the Chartered Bank deposited at the Guildhall 
Library are now being catalogued and no part of them will be available before April 1991 
(27 April 1990).
32. K.A., Ms.22,105, Stocks Account Ledgers.
33. J.M .F.A., Matsukata Papers, no.40-37, K. Takahashi to K. Inoue, 31 May 1898.
F .0.46/484, Lowther to Marquis of Salisbury, 11 June 1897.
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price was much lower than the quotation prices of similar bonds on the domestic 
market.35
In the City these bonds were welcome. On 15 May 1897 Bank Rate fell to 2 
percent and the 5 percent interest bonds were particularly deserving of investors’ 
attention. In fact, after the subscriptions, the Chartered Bank attempted to purchase 
Japanese government 5 percent domestic bonds for re-sale in London.36 The yield of the 
bonds at issue was approximately 4.9 percent. The issuers of this bond re-sale were not 
leaders in the field of foreign government loan issue business,37 but it was on this 
occasion that the Japanese government first used, after a quarter century of an interval, 
the City for a financial operation.
35. T.K.Z.. no.877, 22 May 1897, pp.901-2.
“ Ibid.. no.880, 20 June 1897, p. 1116.
37. J.M.F.A.A., 3-4-4-4, received no.502, Kato to Okuma, 24 May 1897.
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Table 4.1 Revenue and Expenditure of the Japanese Government
(General Account!. 1893-1903
Year
(1)
Revenues
(¥000)
(2)
Expenditure
(¥000)
(3)
Balance
(¥000)
(4)
Ratio of
surplus
(%)
1893 113,769 84,582 29,187 25.7
1894 98,170 78,129 20,041 20.4
1895 118,433 85,317 33,116 28.0
1896 187,019 168,857 18,162 9.7
1897 226,390 223,679 2,711 1.2
1898 220,054 219,758 296 0.1
1899 254,255 254,166 89 0.0
1900 295,855 292,750 3,105 1.0
1901 274,359 266,857 7,502 2.7
1902 297,341 289,227 8,114 2.7
1903 260,221 249,596 10,625 4.1
Notes: ¥l=2s. l/2d. >
(4)=(3)/(l)x 100.
Source: M.H.S.K.T.. p. 128.
Table 4.2 Japan’s Balance of Trade. 1893-1903 
(¥000; ¥l=2s. l/2d.)
[Trade] [Gold & Silver]
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Total
Year Export Import Balance Export Import Balance balance
1893 89,713 88,257 1,456 2,302 496 1,806 3,262
1894 113,246 117,482 -4,236 3,547 555 2,992 -1,244
1895 136,112 129,261 6,851 2,791 1,029 1,762 8,613
1896 117,843 171,674 -53,831 1,996 10,217 -8,221 -62,052
1897 166,859 221,406 -54,547 8,863 64,313 -55,450 -109,997
1898 170,021 281,645 -111,624 46,281 37,083 9,198 -102,426
1899 222,942 224,052 -1,110 8,768 20,216 -11,448 -12,558
1900 212,869 291,664 -78,795 51,761 9,246 42,515 -36,280
1901 261,132 263,163 -2,031 11,477 11,840 -363 -2,394
1902 267,538 279,138 -11,600 453 31,871 -31,418 -43,018
1903 300,697 326,865 -26,168 16,798 26,715 -9,917 -36,085
Notes: Included import and export from Taiwan and Korea and excluded special
items;
(3)=(l)-(2); (6)=(4)-(5); (7)=(3)+(6).
Source: M.H.S.K.T.. pp.278-79 and 298-99.
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Table 4.3 Revenue of the Sino-Japanese War Account
Of) (%)
Loans 116,804,926 51.9
Transfer from Exchequer 102,396,250 45.4
Contributions 2,949,540 1.3
Others 3,079,411 1.4
Total 225,230,127 100.0
Note: ¥1 =2s. l/2d..
Source: M.T.Z.. vol. 1, pp. 136-39.
Table 4.4 Application and Allocation of 5 Percent 
Bond Re-sale in 1897
Loan issue bank Application Allocation
(£) (£) 00
Capital & Counties Bank 9,500,000 1,637,200 (16,400,000)
Hongkong Bank 8,500,000 1,217,900 (12,200,000)
Chartered Bank 7,750,000 1,138,100 (11,400,000)
Yokohama Specie Bank 2,000,000 306,800 (3,000,000)
Total 27,750,000 4,300,000 (43,000,000)
Note: ¥ l= 2s. l/2d..
Source: C.C.B.A., A53b/76.
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Table 4.5 Main Applicants for 5 Percent 
Bond Re-sale in 1897
Name
M. Samuel & Co.
Union Discount Co.
Capital & Counties 
Bank clients 
Armstrong Co.
Johannesburg Consolidated 
Investment Co.
Panmure Gordon, Hill & Co. 
Mercantile Investment & 
General Trust Co.
Samuel Montagu 
W. Koch
Bankers Investment Trust
Raphaels
Barclay & Co.
Bevan family 
R. Nivison & Co.
Samuel Gurney Buxton 
W. Greenwell & Co.
Sun Life Assurance 
C.H. Huth
Occupation Amount
(¥000)
merchant bank 1250
discount company 1000
clearing bank 820
merchant 500
investment company 490
stockbroker 392
investment company 294
merchant bank 250
stockbroker 245
investment company 245
merchant bank 196
clearing bank 196
(Quaker) 147
stockbroker 98
(Quaker) 49
stockbroker 49
insurance Company 49
merchant bank 49
Source: C.C.B.A., A53b/76; London Post Office Directory. 1898.
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4.2 4 Percent Loan Issue in 1899
The balance between the Japanese government’s revenue and expenditure deteriorated 
markedly following the Sino-Japanese War. The increased military expenditure because 
of Russia’s menace in Manchuria put the Japanese government’s finances in an awkward 
position.38 The domestic capital market became filled with government bonds, the issue 
amount of which was increased to about ¥391 million (£39 million) in 1898 (Table 4.6), 
and could bear no more new loan issues. In fact, the Japanese government failed to raise 
three public works loans for ¥79,282,028 (£8,093,374) in 1898 due to a slump caused 
by bad crops. The Japanese Ministry of Finance postponed them and temporarily 
transferred some of the Sino-Japanese War indemnity money to the required funds.39 To 
offset these difficult financial conditions in the domestic capital market K. Inoue, the 
Japanese Minister of Finance, was firmly in favour of raising a new foreign loan.40
4.2.1 Preliminary negotiations
After the re-sale of the domestic military bonds in 1897, the Japanese government, with 
a view to building up firm relations with more eminent financiers in the City, collected 
more financial information from the Japanese Consul in London.41 In 1898 Inoue ordered 
K. Takahashi, the Deputy-Govemor of the Yokohama Specie Bank, to scrutinise foreign 
capital markets for a future foreign loan issue.42 It was the first time that Takahashi was 
involved in government foreign loan business. Just 6 years later he would fulfill an
38. M .T.Z.. vol. 1, p.221.
39. Ibid, vol. 12, pp.35-36.
40. S .I.P .. vol.4, pp.569-70.
41. Regularly the Japanese Consul in London reported conditions of the London 
market to the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs. For the Japanese Consular Report, 
see S. Tsunoyama, ‘Japanese Consular Reports’, Business History, vol. xxiii-no.3 
(1981), pp.284-87.
42. T.K.J.. vol.2, p. 102.
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important mission to float a considerable amount of government loans abroad during the 
Russo-Japanese War.
In April 1898 Takahashi met Alexander Allan Shand (a Sub-manager of Parr’s 
Bank), W. Dun (a Director of Parr’s Bank) and R.W. Whalley (an Assistant Manager at 
the Head Office of Parr’s Bank) in London.43 Shand, who had been the Manager at the 
Yokohama Branch of the Chartered Mercantile Bank of London, India and China and had 
also been engaged as a Japanese Government’s Honourable Foreign Adviser fOvatoi 
Gaijinl in his early business career in the Far East, became a major influence in the 
Japanese government loan issues at Parr’s Bank. Takahashi had served in a junior 
capacity under Shand in Yokohama. Shand had returned to London to join the Alliance 
Bank, which amalgamated with Parr’s Bank in 1892.44 Obviously Takahashi depended 
upon his personal relations with Shand in researching the market.45 Takahashi looked into 
not only the City but also Paris and Berlin. The Credit Lyonnais gave only general 
explanations on the Paris capital market and showed no profound interest in a Japanese 
government loan issue.46
From these interviews Takahashi made the following outline of a future foreign 
loan issue and reported it to Inoue:47
(i) A 4 percent or 4 1/2 percent loan for less than £5,000,000 at 90 percent.
(ii) The loan issue should be divided into a three-year consecutive operation.
43. Ibid,, pp. 112-13.
44. P.B.A., U. Yoneyama, Alexander A. Shand (Tokyo, no date), pp.5-6; there were 
Shand’s obituaries in The Times. 16 April 1930 and Bankers’ Magazine, vol. 129 (1930), 
p.7. Also see O. Checkland, Britain’s Encounter with Meiji Japan. 1868-1912 (1989), 
p.250 (note 79).
45. T. Tsuchiya, Shand (Tokyo, 1966), p. 120.
46. J.M.F.A., Matsukata Papers, 40-39, Reply from the Credit Lyonnais, no date.
47. Ibid., 40-37, Takahashi to Inoue, 31 May 1898; T.K.J.. vol.2, p. 125.
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(iii) The Japanese government should create a standing post of loan 
commissioner in the Legation in London to keep close communications 
with the City.48
Takahashi also advised putting the loan issue matters, in collaboration with the Yokohama 
Specie Bank’s London Branch, into the hands of Kato (the Japanese Minister in 
London).49
Inoue aimed to raise ¥70,000,000 (£7,145,833) abroad by either a re-sale of 5 
percent domestic bonds or a new 4 1/2 percent loan issue.50 The Japanese government, 
which regarded M. Samuel & Co.’s commission from the previous bond re-sale in 1897 
as ‘exorbitant’,51 attempted to minimise M. Samuel & Co.’s influence in the forthcoming 
loan issue negotiations and to employ other eminent financiers in the City. Kato 
approached the Union Bank of London and Parr’s Bank, London clearing banks,52 and 
brushed aside Inoue’s idea of a simultaneous loan issue in both London and Paris.53 There 
was at that time no Japanese government representation in the Paris capital market.
Parr’s Bank offered ‘the cheapest and safest issue terms’ and Kato finally brought 
the negotiations with Parr’s Bank to the Yokohama Specie Bank’s London Branch.54 The 
new S. Okuma Cabinet, however, sought a Treasury bill issue for £2,000,000 at 3 1/2 
or 4 percent interest.55 Parr’s Bank agreed to undertake this at a 1/8 percent commission,56 
but was not able to conclude the issue mainly because of the Japanese Cabinet’s wavering
48. From this viewpoint, the Japanese government learnt much from the Russian 
government’s financial activities in London and Paris. But it was only after the Russo- 
Japanese War (1904-1905) that the Japanese government created a standing post of loan 
commissioner. (J.N.D.L., Takahashi Papers, 135, Diary, 22 April 1904).
49. J.M.F.A., Matsukata Papers, 40-40, Takahashi to Matsukata, 14 February 1899.
50. Ibid., Matsuo Papers, 45-10, Inoue to Kato, 16 June 1898.
51. As mentioned previously, the commission was not exorbitant.
52. J.M.F.A.A., 3-4-4-6, secret no.76, Kato to T. Nishi, 24 June 1898.
53. J.M.F.A., Matsuo Papers, 45-10, Inoue to Kato, 18 June 1898; 45-12, secret
no.77, Kato to Nishi, 24 June 1898.
54. Ibid., Matsuo Papers, 45-10, Kato to Inoue, 24 June 1898.
55. Ibid., 45-11, M. Matsuda to Kato, no date.
56. Ibid., Kato to Okuma, 3 September 1898.
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commitment.
Meanwhile, in 1898 J.R. Morse, the President of the American Trading Co. in 
Yokohama, proposed to J.P. Morgan & Co. in New York that they should take up a 
Japanese government loan issue for £20,000,000. But, both J.S. Morgan & Co., a 
London merchant bank and J.P. Morgan & Co.’s sister firm, and Hambros, a London 
merchant bank, which had intimate business relations with J.S. Morgan & Co., 
considered it difficult to place such a huge loan on the markets.57
4.2.2 Loan issue negotiations
In 1899 Matsukata (the Minister of Finance in the A. Yamagata Cabinet) embarked upon 
the foreign loan issue. The Japanese government enacted a new law for the convenience 
of raising a loan abroad (Law no. 101 of 1899),58 and to meet the government budget 
deficit Matsukata increased the issue amount to ¥100,000,000 (£10,208,333).59
Matsukata, though, being uneasy about dependence upon foreign borrowings for 
meeting the financial deficits,60 issued the following guidelines for the loan issue at a 
Cabinet Meeting of January 1899:61
Issue amount £10,000,000
(according to the market conditions, half the amount
should be placed in the first year)
Interest rate (nominal) less than 4 1/2 percent
Redemption within 40 years
Purpose railway construction and improvement; establishment
of steel works; expansion of the telephone service
57. M.G.A., Ms.21,760, HC 5.2.14, J.R. Morse to F.B. Jennings, 17 May 1898; 
also see V.P. Carosso, The Morgans (CambridgefMass.], 1987), p.423.
58. B.J.A., Draft of Report to the Prime Minister on the Foreign Loan Issue of 1899
- Draft of Report of the Financial Minister to the Prime Minister, 21 October 1899.
59. M .Z.. vol.8, pp. 171-75.
“ . Ibid., p. 168.
61. B.J.A., Draft of Report to the Prime Minister on the Foreign Loan Issue of 1899
- Cabinet Decision on the Foreign Loan Issue (M. Matsukata to T. Yamamoto, 23 
January 1899).
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In March 1899 the Japanese government ordered the Bank of Japan to arrange this 
loan issue in London.62 Its assessment of the loan issue was based on Takahashi’s 
previous research. K. Matsui, the Japanese Minister (Charge d’Affaires) in London, 
conducted all the loan issue negotiations. On behalf of the Bank of Japan, S. Hayakawa, 
the Secretary of the Japanese Ministry of Finance (Qkura Shokikan and Sanjikan). and 
Y. Nakai, the Manager of the Yokohama Specie Bank’s London Branch, became the 
principal negotiators of this loan issue with British financiers.63 This was the first time 
that the Yokohama Specie Bank was concerned with a Japanese government loan issue.
Hayakawa approached many banks in the City. M. Samuel & Co. offered a loan 
issue at favourable terms, a 4 percent loan at 95 percent,64 but the Japanese government 
found the condition of offering a mortgage on the loan totally unacceptable.65 One 
American merchant in Japan described the character of the Japanese hating borrowing 
on security as ‘the Japanese do not like the idea of being called upon to give security for 
a loan. It hurts their pride to be classed with the Chinese. They consider the guarantee
of their Government equal to any security than can be offered, ...... they will not
negotiate with us if we announce that security must be given. They consider the faith 
of this Government equal to any in the world’.66 Hayakawa’s original plan was to form 
a large loan issue syndicate inviting the Union Bank of London, the London Joint Stock 
Bank and Parr’s Bank, but only Parr’s Bank accepted the offer. Parr’s Bank became the 
main issuer and Panmure Gordon, Hill & Co. arranged the other issuers.67 Of the Far 
Eastern trade connections the Hongkong Bank and the Chartered Bank also participated
62. B.J.A., Order & Announcement of the Loan Issue of 1899 - secretariat no.278 
(secret), Matsukata to Bank of Japan, 23 March 1899.
63. Ibid., the Bank of Japan to Y. Nakai, 23 March 1899.
64. Ibid., Draft of Report to the Prime Minister on the Foreign Loan Issue of 1899 
- no.5, S. Matsuo’s Diary on the Loan Issue, 9 May 1899.
Ibid., no. 16, Apology to the Press on the Loan Issue.
“ M.G.A., Ms.21,760, HC 5.2.14, J.R. Morse to F.B. Jennings, 29 April 1898.
67. B.J.A., Matsuo’s Diary, op. cit., 6 May 1899.
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in the loan issue syndicate.®
In the loan issue negotiations, it is reported that the loan issue banks sought to 
impose the following conditions: (i) the loan should be secured; (ii) an annual redemption 
drawing method should be adopted; (iii) the Japanese government should not issue a 
foreign loan for several years and not raise tax rates for payment of the loan; (iv) the 
Japanese government should not transmit the loan proceeds to Japan to such an extent as 
to cause significant fluctuations in the market; (v) the loan proceeds should be deposited 
at the loan issue banks for the time; (vi) the Japanese government should not impose any 
tax on the bonds; (vii) the Japanese government should purchase up to £2,000,000 worth 
of the bonds within 2 months from the loan issue, should the quotation price on the 
market become lower than the issue price.69
Although the Japanese government desired a 95 percent issue price,70 Hayakawa 
agreed on a 4 percent loan at 90 percent (86 percent to the government).71 The loan issue 
commission was 4 percent, the standard level for contemporary loan issues.72 The 
Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs confirmed that many underwriters secured the whole 
issue amount, and the Union Bank of London and the London Joint Stock Bank 
participated in the underwriting syndicate.73 The London & South Western Bank 
underwrote £50,000 of the bonds through Panmure, Gordon, Hill & Co..74
The forming of the syndicates in this loan issue was as follows: Parr’s Bank, the 
Yokohama Specie Bank, the Hongkong Bank and the Chartered Bank (the loan issue 
banks) formed the loan issue bank syndicate, the role of which was to undertake the loan
®. J.M.F.A., Z314-2, Gikai Sankosho (Reference Book for Diet f4th Session! - 
Questions & Answer of the Foreign Loan Issued (1899).
69. B.J.A., Draft of Report to the Prime Minister on the Foreign Loan Issue of 1899 
- Report of the Financial Minister to the Prime Minister, 21 October 1899.
70. Ibid., Matsuo’s Diary, op. cit., 30 April 1899.
71. Ibid., 29 April & 8 May 1899.
72. J.M.F.A.A., 3-4-4-6, secret no.76, Kato to Nishi, 24 June 1898.
73. Ibid., secret no.33, K. Matsui to S. Aoki, 29 July 1899.
74. L.S.W.B.A., Board Minutes, 25 May 1899.
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issue from the Japanese government; subsequently, Panmure Gordon, Hill & Co. (the 
stockbroker) assisted the loan issue banks in forming their underwriting syndicates and 
also organised their own; these underwriting syndicates guaranteed the loan issue should 
the public subscriptions not absorb the issue amount. The role of the stockbroker in 
organising the underwriting was of extreme importance, and this loan issue mechanism 
would be followed in Japanese government loan issues of later periods.
By 29 May 1899 the loan issue banks and the Japanese government had reached 
the following accord on the impending loan issue:75
The Japanese government believed that ‘the terms offered are quite favourable especially 
when compared with [the] market value of bonds of several other countries’.77 The 4 
percent loan issue commission was nearly equivalent to those of the 1897 re-sale (Table 
4.7).78
75. G.K.S.. vol. 1, pp.3-6.
76. The Bank took them as portfolio investment (B.J.A., Order & Announcement of 
the Loan Issue of 1899 - the Bank of Japan to Nakai, 23 March 1899).
11. J.M.F.A.A., 3-4-4-6, no.30, Matsui to Aoki, 20 May 1899.
78. The contract stated the loan issue commission for £400,000 (not 4 percent) 
(P.B.A., D6800, Agreement, 1 June 1899). This amounts to 5 percent if £8,000,000 is 
the actual loan issue amount on the market.
Amount
Interest rate (nominal) 
Yield at issue 
Issue price
£10,000,000 (£8,000,000 to the public)
4 percent
4.4 percent
90 percent (to the public)
86 percent (to the government)
55 years 
4 percent
the Bank of Japan should apply for 
£2,000,000 of the bonds before the public 
subscriptions;76
the loan should be redeemable after 1909 by 
drawings at the option of the Japanese 
government on giving 6 months’ previous 
notice.
Borrowing period 
Loan issue commission 
Other
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4.2.3 Performance
The market assessed this loan issue as very dubious. For example, the Investors’ Review 
was scathing, saying that Japan’s deteriorating financial situation did not permit such an 
enormous loan issue amount (£10,000,000) given the current market conditions; the 
high issue price would deter many subscribers.79 Indeed, the yield of this loan (4.4 
percent at issue) was less favourable to investors than that of the 5 percent military bonds 
re-sold in 1897 (yielding about 4.8 percent at market at the end of June 1899).80
The subscriptions were carried out on 6 June but only £980,000, 9.8 percent of 
the total issue amount, was applied for. The remainder was taken by the underwriters. 
The quotation price of these bonds on the unofficial market sank immediately to 88 1/2 
percent.81 The Japanese government decided to purchase further £2,500,000 of the bonds 
from Sino-Japanese War Indemnity Special Account funds.82 As a result, in addition to 
£2,000,000 which was purchased in advance by the Bank of Japan, around 45 percent of 
the total issue amount was taken by the Japanese government and the Bank of Japan.
Even in September 1899 the underwriters held most of the unsubscribed bonds. 
Panmure Gordon, Hill & Co., through J.S. Morgan, proposed to J.P. Morgan & Co. 
(New York) that they should organise a group for selling these bonds in New York. Yet 
J.P. Morgan & Co. saw no opportunity of doing so.83 Parr’s Bank kept many of the
79. Investors’ Review. 13 May 1899,fp.671-72 and 3 June 1899, p.775.
I.M .M .. 30 June 1899.
81. B.J.A., Draft of Report to the Prime Minister on the Foreign Loan Issue of 1899 
- Report of the Financial Minister to the Prime Minister, 21 October 1899.
82. N.G.H.S.. vol.2, pp. 111-12. Of £2,500,000, £1,700,000 of the bonds were held 
by the Deposit Money Bureau at the Ministry of Finance. The Yokohama Specie Bank 
agreed with the other loan issue banks that the Bank should make up 50 percent of the 
deficiency if applications from the underwriters fell short of £8,000,000 (P.B. A., D6800, 
Agreement among Parr’s Bank, the Chartered Bank, the Hongkong Bank and the 
Yokohama Specie Bank, 2 June 1899).
83. M.G.A., Ms.21,760, HC 5.2.17, Panmure Gordon, Hill & Co. to J. Pierpont 
Morgan, 4 September 1900; also see Carosso, op. cit.. p.424.
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bonds (£316,558) in its investments.84 The underwriters suffered seriously from the lack 
of a market for the bonds.85
Table 4.7 indicates the commissions and underwriting amounts at the loan issue 
banks and stockbroker. It is clear that Panmure Gordon, Hill & Co. largely arranged the 
underwriting. The Hongkong Bank underwrote £200,000 of the bonds;86 the Chartered 
Bank £250,000;87 Parr’s Bank £300,000.88 From this loan issue, Parr’s Bank obtained 
£38,750 in commissions,8911.5 percent of its ‘declared profit’ for 1899 (£337,443).90
Why did this loan issue fail to attract public investors’ attention? The Japanese 
government concluded that the causes of this failure were: (i) the issue amount was too 
large; (ii) the yield of the bonds was disadvantageous in comparison with that of the 5 
percent military bonds of 1897; (iii) public investors had misgivings about the stability 
of Japan’s national finance; (iv) there was the competition with other countries’ loan 
issues on the market.91 The contemporary market conditions, especially high Bank Rate, 
discouraged new loan issues.
Up to that time the Japanese government, for its foreign loan issues, had relied 
upon specific financiers such as the Oriental Bank, the Hongkong Bank, the Chartered 
Bank and M. Samuel & Co., which had occupied an influential position in Far Eastern 
trade. This time Takahashi exploited a new channel, based on his personal relations with
8\  P.B.A., D1354, General Manager’s Report.
85. In 1902 J.S. Morgan & Co. participated in the syndicate for the sale of the 
unsubscribed bonds for £65,000 (M.G.A., Ms.21,760, HC 5.2.17, Panmure Gordon, 
Hill & Co. to J.S. Morgan & Co., 20 January 1902; Ms.21,793, vol.2).
86. H.S.B.A., Board Minutes, 30 May 1899.
87. C.B.A., Extract from Board Minutes, 8 May 1899.
88. P.B.A., B11417, Board Minutes, 29 May 1899.
89. The quotation price of the bonds sank to 84 percent at the end of December 1899, 
and the paper loss of Parr’s Bank (the balance between the issue price at the subscriptions 
and the quotation price) in this loan issue amounted to £18,993 because the Bank took 
£316,558 of the bonds in its portfolio investments (I.M.M. and P.B.A., D1354, General 
Manager’s Report).
Ibid..
91. B.J.A., Draft of Report to the Prime Minister on the Foreign Loan Issue of 1899 
- Report of the Financial Minister to the Prime Minister, 21 October 1899.
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Shand, and Parr’s Bank played a leading part in the loan issue. However beneficial these 
loan issue terms were to the Japanese government, the financial operation itself did not 
generate interest among investors.
The outcome of this loan issue revealed Japan’s low creditworthiness in the City: 
the Japanese government was overestimating this when it said that ‘Japan is now rated 
at between Germany and Italy’.92 The newly exploited financial channel, Parr’s Bank (a 
cleaning bank), was not so effective in Japan’s foreign loan issue operation as the 
government had expected. The Japanese government realised that foreign loan issues on 
the London capital market would require the assistance of merchant banks as well as 
clearing banks. In fact, the eminent merchant banks, such as Baring Brothers, J.S. 
Morgan & Co., Schroder and the London Rothschilds, showed no great interest in this 
operation.93
4.2.4 Parr’s Bank and Japanese government loan business
Chapter 2 mentioned the attitude of clearing banks towards foreign loan issue business. 
This is now examined in greater depth as a case study of Parr’s Bank. Why did Parr’s 
Bank play a prime role in the Japanese government loan issue in 1899?
At that time foreign loan issue business was often regarded as hazardous for 
clearing banks, but Parr’s Bank paid much attention to this business. Parr’s Bank started 
as a Small country bank at Warrington in 1865 and rapidly increased its business by 
amalgamation.94 After amalgamation with Fuller Banbury Nix & Co. in 1891, the Bank 
became a London clearing bank. However, the absorption of the National Bank of 
Liverpool in 1883, the Alliance Bank in 1892 and the Consolidated Bank in 1896
G.T.R.. no. 164 (15 July 1899), p.976.
93. J.M.F.A.A., 3-4-4-6, secret no.33, Matsui to Aoki, 29 July 1899.
w. T.E. Gregory, The Westminster Bank through a Century, vol.2 (1936), chapter
ix.
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afforded the Bank an opportunity for international transactions: acceptances in Liverpool 
and loan issues in London.
In 1896 Parr’s Bank underwrote the Chinese government 5 percent loan issue 
through Panmure Gordon, Hill & Co. and built up business connections with the 
Hongkong Bank.95 Perhaps it was because of this relationship that Parr’s Bank paid 
attention to the Japanese government loan issue in 1899. Shand’s personal connections 
with the Japanese government added additional impetus. Shand, even after his return to 
England in 1878 and joining the Alliance Bank, maintained extensive relations with 
Japan. For instance, in 1881 he introduced S. Hihara, of the Yokohama Specie Bank, to 
the Alliance Bank’s Bartholomew Lane Branch for the opening of a private account, and 
in 1885 an account for the Yokohama Specie Bank itself.96 After the amalgamation with 
the Alliance Bank, Parr’s Bank took over this relationship and favourably admitted 
unsecured advances to the Yokohama Specie Bank.97 In 1898, as shown, Takahashi 
approached Parr’s Bank through Shand.
In the period between 1890 to 1896 Parr’s Bank received a growing amount of 
deposits which had reached over £20 million by 1897 (Table 4.8). As indicated in Table 
4.9, Parr’s Bank’s advances plus discounts / deposits ratios were declining seriously in 
1894 and 1895. It is clear from these figures that at the beginning of the 1890s Parr’s 
Bank had some difficulties in finding lucrative investment projects. In order to employ 
these superfluous funds Parr’s Bank explored new business fields.
In 1895 Parr’s Bank underwrote the Brazilian government 5 percent loan issue. 
During the period between 1895 and 1899 the Bank was involved in the following 
operations connected with foreign government loan issues:
95. P.B.A., B11416, Board Minutes, 23 January and 10 September 1896.
96. Ibid., D1080, Connection of the Alliance Bank and Parr’s Bank on the New 
Account Signature Books of the Alliance Bank, Bartholomew Lane; Y.S.G.Z.. vol.l, 
p.96 (note 10).
97. P.B.A., B11416, Board Minutes, 5 December 1895.
1895 Brazilian government 5 percent loan underwriting98 
Chinese government 7 percent loan negotiation99
1896 United States government loan negotiation100
Chinese government 5 percent loan underwriting and application101
1897 Serbian government 4 1/2 percent loan issue102
1898 Chinese government 4 1/2 percent loan underwriting103
1899 Japanese government 4 percent loan issue
Table 4.11 indicates the amount and composition of Parr’s Bank’s portfolio 
investments. It must be noted that from 1899 the Bank obviously changed its investment 
policy and held an increased amount of miscellaneous investments, mainly foreign 
government bonds.104 The proportion of miscellaneous (foreign) securities to the total 
investments at Parr’s Bank was much larger than that at the Union Bank of London.105
In the foreign loan issue business, however, Parr’s Bank never ran great risks. Its 
maximum underwriting amount of a loan issue was usually under £300,000, which was 
only 2.2 percent of the total discounts and advances of 1896. Table 4.10 shows Parr’s 
Bank’s sources of earnings in the period from 1894 to 1901. The item ‘commission’ 
includes the underwriting and loan issue commissions, and the ‘realisations of investment’ 
means the profit earned from the sale of stocks held by the Bank. These figures did not 
occupy a large proportion of the Bank’s total earnings.106 It is fair to say, therefore, that
*. Ibid., 18 July 1895.
". Ibid., 2 May 1895.
10°. Ibid., 9, 23 and 30 January 1896.
101. Ibid., 23 January and 10 September 1896.
102. Ibid., 24 June 1897.
103. Ibid., 24 February 1898.
104. Ibid., D1354, General Manager’s Report. Most of them were Japanese 
government 4 percent bonds issues in 1899.
105. The proportion of foreign securities to the total investments at the Union Bank of 
London in 1900 amounted to 13.4 percent (calculated from C.A.E. Goodhart, The 
Business of Banking 1891-1914 [1972] pp.491-517 [appendix iv-i]).
106. For the Union Bank of London, security dealings were one of its main earning 
sources. For instance, the proportion of realisation of investment to the total earnings 
amounted to 17.1 percent in 1896 (U.B.L.A., B11508-9, Profit and Loss Account).
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Parr’s Bank behaved primarily as a London clearing bank and the business related to 
foreign loan issues was not major.
Table 4.6 Outstanding Amount of Japanese Government’s Borrowings. 1893-1903
(¥ million; ¥ l=2s. l/2d.)
[Long-term Borrowings] [Short-term Borrowings]
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Year Domestic Foreign Sub­
total
Treasury
bills
Borrowing Total Total/
General
account
revenue
(%)
1893 233 3 236 0 32 268 235.4
1894 272 2 274 0 53 327 332.2
1895 341 1 342 0 68 410 345.9
1896 357 0 357 0 53 410 219.4
1897 399 0 399 0 22 421 186.1
1898 391 0 391 0 22 413 187.8
1899 383 98 481 0 25 506 199.1
1900 389 98 487 0 32 519 175.3
1901 405 98 503 10 56 569 207.2
1902 433 98 531 10 44 585 196.6
1903 441 98 539 0 78 617 237.2
Notes: End of the Financial Year;
(3)=(l)+(2); (6)=(3)+(4)+(5). 
Source: M.H.S.K.T.. p.158.
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Table 4.7 Commission of 4 Percent Loan Issue in 1899
(percent)
Underwriting 2
Loan issue bank 1
Brokerage (placing 
underwriting) 1/2
Brokerage (application) 1/4
Advertising 1/4
Total 4
Underwriting
syndicate
Underwriting
(amount)
Underwriting
(commission)
(2%)
Broker­
age
(commi­
ssion)
(1/2%)
Loan
issue
bank
(commi­
ssion)
d% )
Total
commi­
ssion
Panmure Gordon 5,106,000 102,120 25,530 _ 127,650
Hongkong Bank 1,146,400 22,928 5,732 18,750 47,410
Chartered Bank 547,500 10,950 2,737.5 18,750 32,437.5
Yokohama Specie 
Bank 2,491,000 49,822 12,455.5 31,250 93,527.5
Parr’s Bank 709,000 14,180 3,545 31,250 48,975
Total 9,999,900 200,000 50,000 100,000 350,000
Notes: £;
There was a shortage of the underwriting for £100.
Source: W.B.A., D2469; C.S.S.. 8 June 1899.
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Table 4.8 Balance Sheets of Parr’s Bank. 1890-1903
(£000)
Year Capital Reserve Deposit Acceptance Profit
(index) (gross)
1890 600 370 6294(100) 576 185
1891 650 390 7153(114) 796 207
1892 1000 1000 10879(173) 1483 355
1893 1000 1000 10361(165) 2145 359
1894 1000 1000 13179(209) 1959 376
1895 1000 1000 17065(271) 2101 383
1896 1320 1320 19269(306) 2183 529
1897 1320 1320 20506(326) 2760 540
1898 1370 1370 21752(345) 2485 557
1899 1370 1370 23786(378) 2373 624
1900 1464 1464 24502(389) 2830 635
1901 1464 1464 24500(389) 2559 639
1902 1709 1709 27623(439) 2615 732
1903 1709 1709 27510(437) 3541 728
Year Cash Call
loan
Investment Discount
(index)
Advance
(index)
1890 *2358 1209 677(100) 2995(100)
1891 *2289 1106 903(133) 3881(130)
1892 1508 1675 1402 1485(219) 6779(226)
1893 1773 1951 1215 1334(197) 6003(200)
1894 2216 2986 1751 1339(198) 6704(224)
1895 2648 4929 2022 1697(251) 7580(253)
1896 2729 3201 2109 2143(317) 11472(383)
1897 3053 4215 1992 2317(342) 11288(377)
1898 3352 5249 2197 2093(309) 11257(376)
1899 3866 4370 3077 2200(325) 12595(421)
1900 4156 3437 3094 2280(337) 14103(471)
1901 4358 3576 3081 2422(358) 13600(454)
1902 4923 4833 3309 2461(364) 14673(490)
1903 4785 4469 3330 2690(397) 15057(503)
Note: ’“Cash + Call loan.
Source: Gregory, op. cit.. vol.2, pp.320-23.
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Table 4.9 Advances plus Discounts / Deposits Ratios 
at Main Clearing Banks. 1890-1903 
(percent)
Year CCB LB UB LPB LSB LWB MLB MB NPB PB UBL
1890 60.4 69.7 99.8 60.8 54.2 58.8 83.7 86.8 54.1 58.0 56.9
1891 57.3 62.5 77.9 59.5 55.0 61.4 77.6 73.3 57.2 66.9 56.8
1892 55.5 61.2 71.9 64.8 55.9 62.4 77.3 72.3 56.8 76.0 55.6
1893 58.1 62.8 78.3 71.0 53.0 64.3 83.6 70.8 56.2 70.8 54.0
1894 58.2 62.7 79.4 67.2 46.4 63.1 70.3 66.2 54.4 61.0 54.6
1895 53.8 60.1 85.4 67.2 48.8 64.5 74.5 64.6 54.0 54.4 59.9
1896 53.8 63.2 81.4 64.9 51.4 66.4 74.6 66.6 53.8 70.7 56.2
1897 55.8 62.0 78.9 70.2 53.3 59.3 70.0 65.9 52.7 66.3 57.7
1898 53.2 62.9 81.4 75.4 60.4 60.7 72.1 62.7 54.5 61.4 56.5
1899 56.0 63.2 82.8 72.9 59.5 63.6 72.4 65.2 55.8 62.2 55.6
1900 57.5 63.5 83.4 66.1 60.3 63.0 75.9 63.1 55.0 66.9 55.1
1901 58.0 63.9 53.3 65.6 58.9 60.9 73.6 61.9 54.1 65.4 55.7
1902 56.1 63.9 57.1 66.7 60.3 60.2 73.9 58.9 54.4 62.0 53.8
1903 58.1 68.3 54.0 67.3 60.6 61.3 76.1 63.7 58.5 64.5 61.3
Abbreviation:
CCB Capital & Counties Bank MB London & Midland Bank
(London City & Midland Bank)
LB Lloyds Bank MLB Manchester & Liverpool District Bank
UB London Joint Stock Bank NPB National Provincial Bank
LPB London Provincial Bank PB Parr’s Bank
LSB London & South Western UBL Union Bank of London (Union of
Bank London & Smiths Bank)
LWB London & Westminster Bank
Source: Bankers’ Magazine, annually; The Economist, annually.
Note: London Joint Stock Bank’s advance plus discount from 1890 to 1900
included call.
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Table 4.10 Earning Sources at Parr’s Bank. 1894-1901
(£) (percent)
Year Interest
received
(gross)
Commission (%) Realisa­
tion of 
invest­
ment
(%) Rebate Others Total (%)
1894 372089 81515 (17.6) 8370 (1.8) 798 459 463231 (100)
1895 376758 85606 (18.5) - 127 462491 (100)
1896 527903 101145 (15.1) 5000 (0.7) 1153 35730 670931 (100)
1897 612510 112678 (15.4) 3130 (0.4) 1067 155 729540 (100)
1898 694376 115528 (14.2) 1377 142 811423 (100)
1899 863264 123307 (12.4) 5738 (0.6) - 137 992446 (100)
1900 936800 135380 (12.6) 4481 132 1076793 (100)
1901 915424 131939 (12.6) - 1350 169 1048882 (100)
Source: P.B.A., D1354, General Manager’s Report.
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Table 4.11 Investments of Parr’s Bank. 1897-1901
(£)
Investment 1897
June
1897
December
1898
December
1899
December
British Funds 1,007,527 1,017,527 1,027,526 1,050,000
(100.0) (100.9) (101.9) (104.2)
[45.4] [49.4] [45.1] [32.7]
Colonial Stocks 326,600 262,467 295,066 368,666
(100.0) (80.3) (90.3) (112.8)
[14.7] [12.7] [13.0] [11.5]
Indian Railways 136,500 156,500 145,500 200,500
(100.0) (114.6) (106.5) (146.8)
[6.2] [7.6] [6.4] [6.3]
Home Railways 155,583 155,583 155,583 180,583
(debenture) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (116.0)
[7.0] [7.5] [6.8] [5.6]
Home Railways 180,510 120,510 96,510 146,510
(preference) (100.0) (66.7) (53.4) (81.1)
[8.2] [5.8] [4.2] [4.6]
Home Railways 50,000 25,000 40,000 175,000
(ordinary) (100.0) (50.0) (80.0) (350.0)
[2.2] [1.3] [1.7] [5.5]
Home Railways - - 95,000 65,000
(ordinary & - - (100.0) (68.4)
preference) - - [4.2] [2.0]
Miscellaneous 362,357 325,282 423,049 1,020,367
(100.0) (89.7) (116.7) (281.5)
[16.3] [15.7] [18.6] [31.8]
Total 2,219,077 2,062,869 2,278,234 3,206,626
(100.0) (92.9) (102.6) (144.5)
[100.0] [100.0] [100.0] [100.0]
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Table 4.11 Investments of Parr’s Bank. 1897-1901 (cont.)
(£)
1900
June
1900
December
1901
December
British Funds 1,098,050 1,237,000 1,380,000
(108.9) (122.7) (136.9)
[35.5] [37.8] [42.2]
Colonial Stock 294,766 294,766 247,000
(90.2) (90.2) (75.6)
[9.5] [9.0] [7.5]
Indian Railways 200,500 223,500 224,500
(146.8) (163.7) (164.4)
[6.5] [6.8] [6.8]
Home Railways 180,583 180,583 187,583
(debenture) (116.0) (116.0) (120.0)
[5.8] [5.5] [5.7]
Home Railways 146,510 146,510 139,510
(preference) (81.1) (81.1) (77.2)
[4.7] [4.5] [4.3]
Home Railways 65,562 67,761 87,250
(ordinary) (131.1) (135.5) (174.5)
[2.1] [2.1] [2.7]
Home Railways 175,000 175,000 158,000
(ordinary & (184.2) (184.2) (166.3)
preference) [5.7] [5.4] [4.8]
Miscellaneous 935,513 945,094 849,576
(258.1) (260.8) (234.4)
[30.2] [28.9] [26.0]
Total 3,096,485 3,270,214 3,273,419
(139.4) (147.3) (147.5)
[100.0] [100.0] [100.0]
Notes: ( ) annual index of amounts (base year for changes is 1897 June
[100]);
[ ] shares of investment;
‘Miscellaneous’ includes foreign government, corporation and 
industrial stocks;
There are differences with the investments published in annual 
balance sheets.
Source: P.B.A., D1354, General Manager’s Report.
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4.3 Re-sale of 5 Percent Domestic Bonds in 1902
The Japanese government’s financial position had not improved remarkably even after 
the foreign loan issue in 1899. The government still accumulated debts, both domestic 
and foreign, as indicated in Table 4.6. Further new loan issues were not acceptable on 
the sluggish domestic market and the government, in fact, failed to float domestic loans. 
To raise the required funds there was no other recourse left but a foreign loan. As early 
as 1901 various rumours spread in Japan concerning a new foreign loan issue. According 
to J.B. Whitehead, the British Minister (Charge d’Affaires) in Tokyo, however, Japan’s 
foreign loan issue was only a vain hope for the moment because of its reduced 
creditworthiness on the foreign capital markets.107
In 1901 the Japanese government started negotiations on the re-sale of the 5 
percent domestic bonds for ¥50,000,000 (£5,104,000), held by the Deposit Money 
Bureau at the Ministry of Finance.108 The Japanese government ordered K. Takahira, the 
Japanese Minister in Washington, to arrange this in the United States, but the negotiations 
with American financiers proved futile.109 After the Anglo-Japanese Alliance110 concluded 
on 30 January 1902, however, public opinion in Britain became more amicable to Japan.
In the summer of 1902, in response to the Hongkong Bank’s offer through the 
Industrial Bank,111 the Japanese government decided to sell these domestic bonds to British 
financiers. The government immediately directed the Deposit Money Bureau at the
107. F .0.46/540, J.B. Whitehead to Foreign Office, 22 July 1901.
108. In 1901 the Deposit Money Bureau held 5 percent domestic bonds for 
¥57,572,734 (M.T.Z.. vol. 12, p.809). The objects of this loan were railway construction 
and improvement, the establishment of steelworks, the expansion of the telephone 
service, the tobacco monopoly, military outlay and the colonisation of Fomosa.
109. T.K.Z.. vol.44-1101, 5 October 1901, pp.696-97; Japan Daily Mail. 20 October 
1901. Only ‘Colonel Mac’ was revealed as the concerned person (J.M.F.A., Sone 
Papers, 2-3b, T. Asahina to K. Sone, 14 August [probably 1901]).
M0. The alliance was for an exchange of benefits for both Japan and Britain in the Far 
East, especially against Russia’s menace in Manchuria.
in. J.M.F.A., Z317-1, Gikai Sankosho (Reference Book for Diet H7th Sessionll 
(1902).
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Ministry of Finance to sell abroad the bonds and to purchase in their place the new ones, 
scheduled for issue in the financial year of 1902. The re-sale of domestic bonds abroad 
produced the same effects as a new foreign loan issue to the government.
4.3.1 Loan issue negotiations
At that time there were two Japanese financial institutions, the Yokohama Specie Bank 
and the Industrial Bank, capable of arranging a foreign loan issue. These two banks 
stood in a special relation to the Japanese government. The Yokohama Specie Bank was 
set up in 1879. The Japanese government directly controlled its management; the Minister 
of Finance had the power to intervene in the Bank’s business and to nominate the 
Governor and directors. The Bank of Japan also exceptionally made large advances to the 
Yokohama Specie Bank.112 After 1899 the Yokohama Specie Bank was connected with 
most of the government’s foreign loan issues as one of the loan issue banks.
On the other hand, in March 1900 a special act to establish the Industrial Bank 
was promulgated. Two years later, with ¥2,500,000 (£255,208) paid up capital 
(¥10,000,000 [£1,020,833] authorised capital) the Industrial Bank was set up. The 
Japanese government provided several privileges for the Bank, as will be seen in chapter 
8. The Hongkong Bank undertook the management of share subscriptions when the 
Industrial Bank was founded in 1902 and thereafter they maintained close relations.113
In the period before the Russo-Japanese War, the Japanese government fixed no 
definite boundary between the Yokohama Specie Bank and the Industrial Bank in foreign 
loan issue business. Therefore, the Yokohama Specie Bank obviously regarded the 
Industrial Bank as a formidable competitor which was ‘squeezing into the foreign loan
112. Y.S.G.Z.S.. vol.2, pp.22-37; N.G.H.S.. vol.l, pp.382-83; N. Tamaki, ‘The 
Yokohama Specie Bank: A Multinational in the Japanese Interest 1879-1931’ in G. Jones 
(ed.), Banks As Multinationals (1990), pp. 193-94.
113. N.K.G.G.S.. pp.22-37.
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issue business’.114 In such an entangled situation, the Industrial Bank, in collaboration 
with the Hongkong Bank, took the initiative in the re-sale of the 5 percent domestic 
bonds.
In October 1902 the Japanese government decided to re-sell ¥50,000,000 
(£5,104,166) of the 5 percent domestic bonds to the Hongkong Bank through the 
Industrial Bank. The Hongkong Bank considered inviting three eminent merchant banks: 
Baring Brothers, the London Rothschilds and Ernest Cassel, to the bond re-sale. The 
London Rothschilds inquired of the British Foreign Office whether the proposed Japanese 
government loan business would be acceptable, both politically and commercially, to 
them.115 F. Bertie, the British Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, admitted that 
it was ‘a matter of political importance that Japan should be able to raise in this country 
rather than elsewhere the money which she requires’ and explained the Foreign Office’s 
non-intervention policy towards private transactions. In this re-sale operation the London 
Rothschilds only agreed to become a major underwriter.
Baring Brothers, which had growing interests in the Far East, agreed to become 
the main issuer.116 Cassel played an important part in also taking much of the 
underwriting.
In September 1902 the Hongkong Bank embarked upon the loan issue negotiations 
with the Industrial Bank. The Hongkong Bank’s role was, in substance, to be an 
intermediary between Baring Brothers and the Japanese government. The proposed terms 
were as follows: the bonds should be delivered to London at 98 percent per ¥1,000 (96 
percent to par); the Hongkong Bank and the Yokohama Specie Bank should become an 
issuer of this re-sale; the total issue amount should be at most ¥50,000,000 (£5,104,000) 
which, according to market conditions, could be reduced to ¥30,000,000 (£3,063,000); 
the Japanese government should not withdraw gold directly from the Bank of England but
114. T.K.J.. vol.2, pp. 158-61.
115. F .0.46/560, the London Rothschilds to F. Bertie, 17 September 1902.
116. B.B.A., PF302, Lord Lansdowne to Lord Revelstoke, 27 September 1902.
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would be allowed to purchase it on the open market; the intermediary commission to the 
Industrial Bank should be 3/4 percent of the total re-sale amount.117
The Japanese government was willing to conclude the negotiations by the end of 
September and the Minister of Finance approved most of these terms.118 On 30 September 
1902 the Hongkong Bank, with Baring Brothers’ consent, concluded the negotiations with
the Industrial Bank and the Japanese government. The outline of the contract was as 
follows:119
The Hongkong Bank invited the Yokohama Specie Bank to this re-sale as one of 
the issuers when the negotiations with the Japanese government were concluded. The 
Yokohama Specie Bank agreed to this.121 The Yokohama Specie Bank, because it set 
great store by its business relations with Parr’s Bank, persuaded the Industrial Bank to 
include Parr’s Bank as well in this bond re-sale as one of the loan issuers.122 The 
Hongkong Bank’s Yokohama Branch also suggested to the London Office that Parr’s
117. Ibid., Copy of telegram from Yokohama, 27 and 29 September 1902.
"8. J.N.D.L., Sakatani Papers, 497-10, Papers on the finance, 21 August 1902. Y. 
Sakatani, the Vice-Minister of Finance, thought that the re-sale price should be more 
than 95 percent and that the Industrial Bank should co-operate with the Bank of Japan and 
the Yokohama Specie Bank in this operation.
I19. J.N.D.L., Sone Papers, 1-28, Contract of a Re-sale of the 5 Percent Domestic 
Bonds dated 30 September 1902.
12°. The yield at issue was 5 percent at the issue price of £102 Is. 8d. (100 percent).
121. B.B.A., PF302, Telegram to Yokohama, 1 October 1902.
122. Y.S.G.Z.S.. vol.2, pp.95-96.
Interest rate (nominal) 
Borrowing period 
Others
Re-sale amount 
Re-sale price
¥50,000,000 (£5,104,000)
£98 per a nominal price of the ¥1,000 bond 
(96 percent to par)
5 percent120 
55 years
the Japanese government should guarantee to pay the 
principal and interest in sterling at the rate of ¥1 =2s. l/2d; 
the Japanese government should desire the Hongkong Bank 
to fix the re-sale price in London at more than £103, based 
on the quotation price of Japanese government 5 percent 
bonds.
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Bank should be included as an issuer, but the London Office only allowed Parr’s Bank 
to be an underwriter.123 Parr’s Bank underwrote ¥1,000,000 (£102,083) of the bonds.124
4.3.2 Forming a syndicate
The Hongkong Bank’s original idea of forming a syndicate for this re-sale can be seen 
from the letter addressed by E. Cameron, a Hongkong Bank’s London Manager, to Lord 
Revelstoke, the Head of Baring Brothers:
  if New Court [the London Rothschilds] and the Banque de Paris take 1
million, we then have 4 1/2 millions assured, as follows, Yourselves and the Bank 
[the Hongkong Bank] 2 millions, C.J. Hambro Co. 1 million (of which they have 
booked £350,000), Cassel, New Court and the Banque de Paris £1,500,000. I 
think one of the conditions with the syndicate should be that each member applies, 
when the lists are open, for the full amount of their subscription, and be prepared 
to take their full proposition of the allotment. In that way the issue would be 
bound to be a success as no one, either of the public or of the syndicate would get 
an allotment in full. That would give back bone to the market and would much 
more than compensate members of the syndicate for the extra amount they would 
have to hold. If the public applied very largely, the syndicate might be consulted 
and asked how much stock they would like to keep and we would allot 
accordingly.125
Baring Brothers, the Hongkong Bank and the Yokohama Specie Bank formed syndicates126 
to invite ‘leading Stock Exchange firms’ to participate. Panmure Gordon, Hill & Co. 
acted as the stockbroker for this re-sale.
In October Baring Brothers immediately started organising their own syndicate for 
guaranteeing the placement of the bonds on their world-wide business correspondent 
network, from the Continent to the United States. In regard to the Paris capital market, 
Baring Brothers informed the Banque de Paris of this re-sale. Their proposal was that the
123. B.B.A., PF302, Telegram from Yokohama, 3 October 1902.
124. P.B.A., D6801, Panmure Gordon, Hill & Co. to R.W. Whalley, 2 October 1902.
125. B.B.A., PF302, Cameron to Lord Revelstoke, 29 September 1902.
126. The character of this syndicate was an ‘underwriting’ syndicate, but the 
commission was not decided in advance and the profit of the syndicate was distributed 
among members according to their shares, after deducting the loan issue bank 
commission and miscellaneous charges.
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Banque de Paris should guarantee £250,000 of the bonds on the condition that the Banque 
de Paris would be allowed to share in the rest of the profit after deducting a 1 percent 
loan issue bank commission charged by the Hongkong Bank and Baring Brothers.127 The 
Banque de Paris was at first adverse to the proposed business because of the political 
climate there, namely hostility towards Japan under the alliance with Russia,128 but, after 
the French government’s authorisation, agreed to participate in the syndicate for 
£250,000.129 Baring Brothers offered Hottinguer, an old private financier in Paris, 
£25,000 of the share.130 Baring Brothers also invited Hope & Co., a long-established 
financial house in Amsterdam, to join the syndicate for £50,000131 and the Banque Federal 
in Zurich for £10,000.132
Since early in the nineteenth century, Baring Brothers had had firm relations with 
the United States markets. Kidder, Peabody & Co. in Boston133 shared £100,000 of the 
bonds.134 They also informed Baring, Magoun & Co. in New York135 of reserving the 
share for £50,000.136 In London many merchant banks, overseas banks, stockbrokers and 
merchants showed interest in this re-sale: Hambros, for instance, took £100,000 of the 
bonds;137 Cassel £500,000; the London Rothschilds £300,000.138
In this way, by 8 October Baring Brothers had completed their own syndicate for 
£2,100,000. Table 4.12 shows the names, shares and profits of Baring Brothers’
127. B.B.A., PF302, Baring Brothers to the Banque de Paris, 26 September 1902.
128. Ibid., the Banque de Paris to Baring Brothers, 27 September 1902.
129. Ibid., the Banque de Paris to Baring Brothers, 1 October 1902.
13°. Ibid., Hottinguer to Baring Brothers, 2 October 1902.
131. Ibid., Baring Brothers to Hope & Co., 30 September 1902.
132. Ibid., the Banque Federal to Baring Brothers, 3 October 1902.
133. For their intimate relations with Baring Brothers, see V.P. Carosso, More than 
A Century of Investment Banking (New York, 1979), pp.21-23.
134. B.B.A., PF302, Kidder Peabody & Co. to Baring Brothers, 1 October 1902.
135. J. Orbell, Baring Brothers & Co.. Ltd. (1985), p.65. The Company was formed 
in 1891 out of the old Kidder Peabody partnership.
136. B.B.A., PF302, Baring Brothers to Baring Magoun & Co., 30 September 1902.
137. Ibid., Hambros to Baring Brothers, 29 September 1902.
138. Ibid., the London Rothschilds to Baring Brothers, 29 September 1902.
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syndicate.
4.3.3 Performance
The Hongkong Bank and Baring Brothers asked the British government to inscribe the 
bonds at the Bank of England. In general, the method of inscribing stocks afforded 
several facilities to bondholders: transfer of inscribed stocks was exempt from the stamp 
duty, the payment of dividends could be posted and dividends could be invested 
automatically.139 The practice of inscribing stocks could be an impetus to public investors; 
Cameron acknowledged that ‘it will be a great encouragement to subscribers’.140 In 1891 
there were at least thirty five colonial government inscribed stocks quoted on the London 
Stock Exchange.141 This method was a characteristic of Colonial government loans, but 
was often employed also in the important foreign loans, such as the Chinese government 
5 percent loan in 1896 and the 4 1/2 percent loan in 1898, when the British government 
regarded them as diplomatically important. Because of the conclusion of the 
Anglo-Japanese Alliance, the Foreign Office and the Treasury recognised the political 
importance of this Japanese government 5 percent bond re-sale142 and the Bank of England 
agreed to inscribe the bonds for ¥5,731,000 (£585,039), 11.7 percent of the re-sale 
amount.143
On 7 October 1902 the Hongkong Bank, Baring Brothers and the Yokohama 
Specie Bank published the prospectus. The issue price was fixed at £102 ls.8d.per ¥1,000 
(100 percent to par). This was slightly lower than the price of more than £103, which the
139. S.E.O.I. (1903), p.3. The Bank of England did not charge for inscriptions of 
bonds.
14°. B.B.A., PF302, Cameron to Lord Revelstoke, 29 September 1902.
141. S.E.O.I. (1891), pp. 120-21.
142. F .0.46/560, E.W. Hamilton to T.H. Sanderson, 30 September 1902.
143. B.E.A., G4/125, Court of Directors Minutes, 9 October 1903 and SJ/Jap/1, Stock 
Jacket.
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Japanese government had been hoping for in the negotiations. The subscriptions took 
place from 7 to 9 October. The Statist assessed that ‘the high interest loving public’ 
favourably received the subscriptions.144 The total amount of the applications reached 
¥97,993,000 (£10,003,000), 1.96 times the issue amount (Table 4.13). On 20 October 
the scrips for ¥50,000,000 (£5,104,166) was quoted on the official price list of the 
London Stock Exchange.145
The Industrial Bank received a l l / 4  commission (3/4 percent from the syndicate 
and 1/2 percent from the Japanese government) in total; a 3 1/4 percent profit was paid 
to the members of the syndicate; the Hongkong Bank, Baring Brothers and the Yokohama 
Specie Bank received a 1 percent loan issue bank commission; the total commission of 
this bond re-sale amounted to 5 1/2 percent (Table 4.14). The cost of this bond re-sale 
seems expensive to the Japanese government, the level of the loan issue commission 
being higher than the previous loan issues in 1897 and 1899 (about 4 percent).
It was the first time that the Japanese government was successful in attracting the 
pre-eminent London merchant banks, such as Baring Brothers, the London Rothschilds 
and E. Cassel, to its financial operations. Although the outcome was not fully satisfactory 
to the Japanese government, this bond re-sale, without doubt, prepared for Japan’s future 
financial operations on the London capital market.
,44. The Statist. 11 October 1902, p.626.
14\  L.S.E.A., Ms. 18,000, 83B/464 and 89B/236, Quotation Application.
Table 4.12 Baring Brothers* Syndicate for 5 Percent Bond
Re-sale in 1902 
(£)
Name Occupation
(1)
Share of 
syndicate
(2)
Profit
E. Cassel merchant banker 500,000 16,250
N.M. Rothschild merchant bank 300,000 9,750
Banque de Paris foreign bank 250,000 8,125
C.J. Hambro merchant bank 100,000 3,250
Kidder Peabody foreign bank 100,000 3,250
Hope & Co. foreign bank 50,000 1,625
H.J. Lefevre & Co. merchant 50,000 1,625
Baring Magoun foreign bank 50,000 1,625
(No 2) 50,000 1,625
Friihing & Goschen merchant bank 25,000 812
Glyn Mills, Currie clearing bank 25,000 812
Hottinguer foreign bank 25,000 812
Cunliffes merchant bank 25,000 812
A. Wagg stockbroker 25,000 812
Derenberg Meyer merchant bank 10,000 325
Lord Farguhar - 10,000 325
J. Birch & Co. merchant 10,000 325
W. Bisset retired civil servant 10,000 325
F. Huth & Co. merchant bank 10,000 325
L. Messel & Co. stockbroker 10,000 325
J.C. & C.W. Morrice stockbroker 10,000 325
Steer Lawford & Co. stockbroker 10,000 325
J. & A. Scrimgeour stockbroker 10,000 325
Baring Brothers merchant bank 375,000 12,187
Banque Federal foreign bank 10,000 325
Lord Rothschild merchant banker 10,000 325
Senior Perugid - 10,000 325
W. Betzold - 10,000 325
Morris Prevost merchant bank 10,000 325
Total 2,090,000 67,922
Syndicate profit: £3 5s. per ¥1,000.
Notes: (1) 8 October 1902;
(2) 11 November 1902;
implies no information. 
Sources: B.B.A., 302,ff.70 and 146c;
London Post Office Directory. 1903.
Table 4.13 Subscriptions of 5 Percent Bond 
Re-sale in 1902 
(¥; ¥l = ls. l/2d.)
Loan issue bank Application Allotment
Hongkong Bank 45,525,000 22,330,000
Baring Brothers 44,986,000 24,590,000
Yokohama Specie Bank 7,482,000 3,080,000
Total 97,993,000 50,000,000
Source: B.B.A., 302, f. 112.
Table 4.14 Commission of 5 Percent 
Bond Re-sale in 1902 
(percent)
Loan issue bank commission 
Brokerage (placing 
underwriting)
Brokerage (application) 
Industrial Bank 
Syndicate profit
Total 5 1/2
1/4
1/4
3/4
3 1/4
Source: B.B.A.,302, f.2.
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4.4 Conclusion
After a long interval, in 1897, the Japanese government returned to the London capital 
market for its financial operations. The establishment of the gold standard in Japan in 
1897 facilitated the Japanese government’s financial operations in London. The three loan 
issues in 1897, 1899 and 1902, related to the Sino-Japanese War, included a variety of 
the financial institutions in the City. Their roles in these loan issues are reviewed here.
In 1897 the overseas bank (the Hongkong Bank), the clearing bank (the Capital 
& Counties Bank) and the merchant bank (M. Samuel & Co.) in collaboration carried out 
the bond re-sale. They had established commercial relations with Japan. Their position 
was much the same as that of the Oriental Bank which had issued the Japanese 
government loan in 1873. The loan issue negotiations were completed mainly in Japan 
and the Japanese government did not have direct access to the London capital market, 
only through intermediaries.
In the following loan issue, in 1899, the financial institution (the Yokohama 
Specie Bank), patronised by the Japanese government, played a prominent role for the 
first time. It was expected in Japan that this powerful Japanese bank could help the 
government’s loan issue negotiations with foreign financiers in London. The Bank’s 
Deputy-Govemor conducted the market research abroad and successfully built up business 
relations with Parr’s Bank. Yet this newly established channel between the Yokohama 
Specie Bank and Parr’s Bank was not very effective in this loan issue, so that the 
Japanese government turned more of its attention to merchant banks, the experts in loan 
flotations in London.
The bond re-sale negotiations in 1902 got off to a curious start. There was keen 
competition between two Japanese banks (the Yokohama Specie Bank and the Industrial 
Bank) in this business. Before 1905 the Japanese government had fixed no definite 
boundary between the two banks for foreign loan issue business. However, this financial 
operation, to a considerable extent, broadened the range of financiers for Japanese
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government foreign loan issues. The Japanese government could now depend upon the 
Hongkong Bank’s wide ranging business relationships in the City, especially with many 
pre-eminent merchant banks. The Hongkong Bank, in co-operation with Panmure 
Gordon, Hill & Co., had formed these relationships during the negotiations of Chinese 
government loan issues. The Hongkong Bank’s successful invitation of the first-class 
merchant banks (Baring Brothers, the London Rothschilds and Cassel)146 to the bond re­
sale was a goal that the Japanese government had pursued for a long time. The happy 
combination of the financial institutions, including both the banks with Far Eastern and 
Japanese connections (the Hongkong Bank and the Yokohama Specie Bank) and the 
merchant banks (Baring Brothers, the London Rothschilds and Cassel), on the loan issue 
market paved the way for Japan’s further large-scale financial operations on the 
international capital markets during the Russo-Japanese War period.
146. A Russian financier depicted a first-class merchant bank’s (J.S. Morgan & Co.’s) 
financial power on the London capital market as ‘we want a flag and a name in London 
and we think that the go and spirit that you have shown everywhere will insure a glorious 
success’ (M.G.A., Ms.21,760, HC 12.3, Alexander Koch to J. Pierpont Morgan, 10/22 
February 1898).
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CHAPTER 5 
RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR LOAN ISSUES (1)
The Japanese government needed to raise a considerable amount of money abroad during 
the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905). Japan had to fight another war with foreign 
financiers in London as Russia did in Paris.1 K. Takahashi, now the Deputy-Govemor 
of the Bank of Japan, conducted all these loan issue negotiations. It is no exaggeration 
to say that it was Takahashi who established the definitive pattern of the Japanese 
government’s foreign loan issues which his successors would follow. Up to the present 
time, Takahashi’s autobiography2 has been the only detailed study of these important 
financial operations on the international capital markets.3 It must be noted, however, that 
his autobiography had a decisive fault: Takahashi, because of his position as the Japanese 
Government Special Loan Commissioner, was shut out completely from the financiers’ 
internal negotiations. His autobiography cannot tell the whole story of the negotiations.
Takahashi firmly believed that ‘a stroke of good fortune’ won him success of the 
loan issues,4 but it was merchant banks’ world-wide business network that enabled the 
Japanese government to manage the huge loan issue operations in London, New York,
’. Romanov explained Russia’s financial operations in Paris during the Russo- 
Japanese War (B.A. Romanov [translated from the Russian by S.W. Jones], Russia in 
Manchuria \ 1892-19061 [Michigan, 1952], chapter vii).
2. T.K.J.. vol.2. Recently the Japanese National Diet Library obtained Takahashi’s 
Diary (from 22 February to 18 December 1904), written in English, which fully covered 
the period when he acted as the Japanese Government Special Loan Commissioner in 
1904. Obviously this becomes a new source for the study of foreign loan issues during 
the Russo-Japanese War (J.N.D.L., Takahashi Papers, 135, Diary).
3. The following pioneering studies mentioned the Japanese government war loan 
issues: U. Kobayashi, War and Armament Loans of Japan (New York, 1922), pp. 61- 
91; M .T.Z.. vol. 12, pp.50-86; M. Kajima, Nippon Gaikoshi (Diplomatic History of 
Japan), vol.7 (Tokyo, 1970), pp. 127-137. Nish argued the matter mainly from the 
diplomatic viewpoint on the basis of the British Foreign Office Papers, A.J. Balfour 
Papers and J. Austen Chamberlain Papers (I.H. Nish, The Anglo-Japanese Alliance. 2nd. 
ed. [1985], pp.287-89).
4. T.K.J.. vol.2, p.205.
185
Berlin and Paris. In this chapter, material from hitherto little-explored British and 
Japanese archival records will be used to illuminate the first foreign loan issue made by 
the Japanese government during the Russo-Japanese War.
Since the Boxer Rebellion of 1900 Japan had been exposed to the growing menace 
of Czarist Russia in Manchuria and Korea. At the end of 1903 the futile negotiations in 
St. Petersburg resulted in a diplomatic rupture. The Japanese government began to make 
full-scale preparations for war against Russia and made extraordinary military outlay 
from the annual budget. In addition, it made three interim military budgets for the war 
during 1904 and 1905.5 It is fair to say that the Japanese government financed the 
Russo-Japanese War largely by public loans. The total war expenditure amounted to 
¥1,826,290,483 (£186,433,819); 77.7 percent of which, approximately ¥1,418,731,000 
(£144,828,789), was raised by public loans and borrowings both abroad and in Japan 
(Table 5.1). Table 5.2 indicates the Japanese government loans in 1904 and 1905 during 
the Russo-Japanese War.
In March 1904 the Japanese government implemented the first domestic war loan 
(Exchequer bonds) issue ‘under very favourable feelings’.6 At the same time, it aimed to 
issue a foreign loan to obtain gold (or gold standard currency), because Japan’s trade 
balance at that time suffered severely from constant deficits and there was a continued 
drain of gold. From the outbreak of the war in February 1904, the Bank of Japan’s gold 
reserves sank rapidly and by May had plummeted to its lowest point, ¥68,087,262 
(£6,950,574).7 For Japan, it was obvious, a foreign loan was the most convenient and 
immediate way for obtaining gold on a large scale. C.M. MacDonald, the British 
Minister in Tokyo, predicted: ‘I cannot but think that the drain of gold must continue in 
such proportions as to render a foreign loan an absolute necessity before the end of the
5. M .T.Z.. vol. 1, p.225.
6. F .0.46/577, C.M. MacDonald to Lord Lansdowne, 18 February 1904.
7. The Bank of Japan roughly estimated the total drain of gold in a year at nearly 
¥65,000,000 (£6,635,416). It held the ¥116,962,184 (£11,939,889) gold reserves for the 
note issues at the end of 1903 (T.K.J.. vol.2, p. 182).
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year [1904]V
Table 5.1 Proportion of Loans to Total Military Expenditure 
for the Russo-Japanese War
Total military expenditure 1,826,290
Total amount of public loans and borrowings 1,418,731
(Ratio to total military expenditure 77.7 percent)
Total amount of foreign loans 689,594
(Ratio to total military expenditure 37.8 percent)
Total military expenditure for the Sino-Japanese War (1894-95) 233,400
Total amount of public loans and borrowings 116,8P£
(Ratio to total military expenditure 50.1 percent)
Notes: ¥000; ¥l=2s. l/2d..
Source: Japanese Ministry of Finance (S. Usami), Showa Zaiseishi (History
of Japanese Finance in the Showa Eral. vol.iv (Tokyo, 1955), 
pp.9 and 16-17.
Table 5.2 Japanese Government Loan Issues 
during the Russo-Japanese War
Loan Date Interest Net proceeds
rate (nominal)
(%) (¥)
Domestic (Exchequer Bond)
1st March 1904 5 92,376,123
2nd June 1904 5 90,981,795
3rd November 1904 5 71,288,675
4th March 1905 6 90,254,961
5th May 1905 6 89,984,080
Domestic total 434,885,634
(£44,459,230)
Foreign
1st May 1904 6 86,834,171
2nd November 1904 6 100,463,594
3rd March 1905 4 1/2 251,158,987
4th August 1905 4 1/2 251,137,817
Foreign total 689,594,569
(£70,396,112)
Note: ¥l=2s. l/2d..
Source: M.T.Z.. vol.l. pp.245-46.
8. F .0.46/578, MacDonald to Lord Lansdowne, received 31 May 1904.
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5.1 Diplomatic Negotiations
The Japanese government needed to secure funds when a Russo-Japanese War appeared 
inevitable in October 1903. Under the Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1902 Japan could 
expect some financial assistance from Britain, although Britain’s strict neutrality was 
stipulated in the treaty unless allied countries began war with Japan.9 T. Hayashi, the 
Japanese Minister in London, learnt that Lord Lansdowne, the British Secretary of State 
for Foreign Affairs, had confidentially told Marcus Samuel, a senior partner of M. 
Samuel & Co. (a London merchant bank),10 to take into serious consideration the 
possibility of Britain’s guaranteeing a Japanese government loan.11
The Japanese government, at the onset of the diplomatic negotiations, expected 
that Marcus Samuel’s influence over the British government could help Japan’s loan 
issue, intended as part of the preparations for the imminent Russo-Japanese conflict.12 His 
idea was for a loan for £20,000,000 to be raised by the British government and 
afterwards to be lent to the Japanese government at a 4 percent rate of interest. Marcus 
Samuel was reasonably confident that Baring Brothers and the Hongkong Bank would co­
operate with him in this loan issue. Yet Lord Lansdowne considered that the British 
government would not accept such an offer because of the current unfavourable market 
conditions to borrowings.13 Marcus Samuel made a revised proposal: a loan guaranteed 
by the British government to pay 4 percent annual interest for only £10,000,000. Lord 
Lansdowne, though, held out no hope of obtaining the British government’s guarantee.14
9. Nish, op. cit.. pp.216-17; A.M. Pooley(ed.\ The Secret Memoirs of Count Tadasu 
Hayashi (London, 1915), chapter iii-v.
10. R. Henriques, Marcus Samuel (1960), pp.59-60.
n. J.N.D.L., Sakatani Papers, 498-13, no.91, T. Hayashi to J. Komura, 31 
December 1903.
12. Henriques, op. cit.. p.472. For Hayashi’s career, see Pooley(ed), op. cit.. 
pp. 1-23.
13. F .0.46/575, Lord Lansdowne’s Memorandum, 29 December 1903.
14. F .0.46/564, Lord Lansdowne to MacDonald, 31 December 1903.
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These negotiations clearly show the British government’s attitude towards the 
Russo-Japanese War. The British Prime Minister A J .  Balfour, who had a policy of 
avoiding direct interference in other countries’ affairs, declared that ‘we must be most 
careful not to give any advice to the Japanese to which, in case of war, they might point 
and say "you must help us, for it was through following your lead that we find ourselves 
in this mess"’.15 In the Cabinet, J.A. Chamberlain, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, also 
upheld this opinion.16 As early as 26 December 1903 the British government, through the 
Hongkong Bank, was informed of the likelihood that the Japanese government would 
invoke the British government’s financial assistance. Lord Lansdowne replied: ‘I suppose 
a favourable answer is out of the question, and there seems no object in sending our 
unfavourable one’.17 E. Cameron, a Hongkong Bank’s London Manager, was afraid that 
the current market conditions were not favourable to the prospect of issuing a large 
Japanese government loan.18
The Japanese government started rather impetuous diplomatic negotiations with 
the British government on this matter. On 27 December J. Komura, the Japanese Minister 
for Foreign Affairs, ordered Hayashi to try to ascertain Lord Lansdowne’s opinion on 
whether Japan would be able to obtain some financial assistance from the British 
government on the basis of the Anglo-Japanese Treaty.19 Lord Lansdowne considered 
that the British government could probably only allow Japan to use British fleet coaling 
stations and colonial communications facilities. This reply was far from what the Japanese 
government hoped. Hayashi told Lord Lansdowne that the Japanese government desired 
assistance from the British government in raising money in London, and that for this 
purpose it had already authorised Marcus Samuel to negotiate informally with Lord
15. Add. Ms.49,728, A.J. Balfour to Lord Lansdowne, 22 December 1903.
16. Add. Ms.49,735, Extract from Letter to Lord Lansdowne in J.A. Chamberlain 
to Balfour, 30 December 1903.
17. F.0.46/575, Cameron to Lord Lansdowne, 26 December 1903.
18. Ibid., Cameron to Campbell, 28 December 1903.
19. The Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Komura Gaikoshi (History of the 
Diplomat Komura Jutaro (Tokyo, 1953 [reprinted 1966]), pp.407-8.
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Lansdowne. Yet the matter was too serious for the British Foreign Office to decide on 
its own and Lord Lansdowne saw reason to consult other Cabinet members.20
At the end of 1903 Lord Lansdowne reluctantly received from the Japanese 
government the direct proposal of a loan guarantee. Immediately Lord Lansdowne told
Balfour that ‘what she [Japan] most wants is money I do not suppose that there is any
chance of our finding the £20,000,000 for which they ask’.21 Balfour considered it 
unfeasible to find the £20,000,000 for Japan. He was of the firm opinion that Britain’s 
guarantee of the Japanese government war loan would be construed as 2m act of war 
against Russia.22 Chamberlain desired Lord Lansdowne to deal with the matter in the 
same spirit as Balfour had, and pointed out the unfavourable conditions of the money 
market for a new loan issue.23
On 1 January 1904 Hayashi again discussed the subject of financial assistance with 
Lord Lansdowne.24 Hayashi, although not explicitly, explained a plan of converting 
Japanese government domestic bonds to more favourable terms on the British 
government’s guarantee.25 Chamberlain, who thought that the current market would be 
unable to absorb the proposed Japanese government war loan issue because of an excess 
of loans issued during the Boer War, gave an unwilling reply to Lord Lansdowne that:
I [Chamberlain] fear that the moment is not opportune for raising any new loans 
in the London market, which, owing to the other large borrowings during the 
Transvaal War, is overstocked with what are known as ‘gilt edged’ securities.26
Thus the success of the diplomatic negotiations for securing the financial assistance of the 
British government was questionable. It seems to have achieved nothing so far.
Foreign governments 2md British financiers often requested that the British
20. F .0.46/564, Lord Lansdowne to MacDonald, 29 December 1903.
21. Add. Ms.49,728, Lord Lansdowne to Balfour, 29 December 1903.
22. Ibid., Balfour to Lord Lansdowne, 31 December 1903.
23. Add. Ms.49,735, J.A. Chamberlain to Balfour, 2 January 1904.
24. F .0.46/576, Lord Lansdowne to MacDonald, 1 January 1904.
25. Ibid..
26. F .0.46/585, Lord Lansdowne to T. Hayashi, 4 January 1904.
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government should guarantee payment of their intended loans. Yet this was completely 
against the practice of the British government and before the First World War only three 
foreign government loans enjoyed such unusual backing, as indicated in Table 5.3.
Table 5.3 British Government’s Guaranteed Loans before 1914 
Year Act Guaranteed loan Loan issuer
1855 18 & 19 Viet, c.99 Turkey£5,000,000 Bank of England
1885 48 Viet. c. 11 Egypt £9,424,000 the London Rothschilds
1898 61 Viet, c.4 Greece £6,800,000 Bank of England
Source: T. 168/55, Memorandum.
Also the Bank of England never dealt with any foreign loan issue business. A 
letter, addressed to the Serbian government from the Bank, declared that it was not its 
practice to undertake foreign loan issues as the Bank invariably acted for the British 
government, India and the British Colonies.27
In the middle of January 1904, as an alternative to Marcus Samuel the Japanese 
government looked around for financiers who could make favourable arrangements for 
its loan issue without the British government’s guarantee.28 The Japanese government 
courted the favour of the London Rothschilds,29 but Alfred Rothschild, the second son of 
Lionel Nathan Rothschild (younger brother of Nathaniel Meyer Rothschild), merely 
indicated his House’s possible support at a later occasion.30 The London Rothschilds could 
not openly participate in Japan’s financial operations during the war because of Jewish 
concerns in Russia.31
Meanwhile, Hayashi requested the Japanese government to send a financial expert
27. B.E.A., G23/87, Secretary to C.B. Norman, 4 August 1896.
28. No.32, Komura to Hayashi, 15 January 1904 (N.G.B.. vol.37-2, pp. 125-26); 
J.N.D.L., Sakatani Papers, 498-15, 7 January 1904.
29. No.31, Komura to Hayashi, 15 January 1904 (N.G.B.. vol.37-2, p. 125).
30. Count Corti, (translated by Brian and Beatrix Lunn) The Reign of the House of 
Rothschild (1928), pp.459-60.
31. J.N.D.L., Takahashi Papers, 135, Diary, 3 May 1904.
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as a Government Special Loan Commissioner to conduct loan issue negotiations in 
London directly.32 He also reported that some of the eminent financiers in the City would 
take up the loan issue on certain securities such as customs or railway revenues, instead 
of the British government’s guarantee.33
Apart from these diplomatic links, the Hongkong Bank desired to undertake the 
Japanese government war loan issue through its own channels. On 8 January 1904 the 
Hongkong Bank’s Yokohama Branch proposed to the London Office an issue of 
£5,000,000 Japanese government Treasury bills for less than 5 years.34 The London 
Office, after communicating with Baring Brothers, took a wait-and-see attitude and 
dispatched the following telegram to the Yokohama Branch:
our opinion is that a loan for a moderate amount can be floated if they are 
prepared to hypothecate some revenues as security. Probably five years Treasury 
Bills with holders’ option to convert later on into 5% Bonds. It is impossible to 
say now what the terms would be, but fear onerous. If unwilling to hypothecate 
in Japan probably Formosa would do. Others are now trying to float [a] loan, 
consequently we would do Japanese government more harm than good by our 
trying the market at the present moment.35
In this way, the Hongkong Bank’s London Office by no means rejected the possibility 
of the Japanese government loan issue on the London capital market.
5.2 Baring Brothers and War Loan Issue
Before Takahashi’s loan issue negotiations, Baring Brothers, together with the Hongkong 
Bank, had played a leading role in the early war loan issue negotiations with the Japanese 
government, although their all-out efforts came to naught. However, Baring Brothers’ 
original idea of developing the New York capital market for international loan issues
32. No number, Hayashi to Komura, 15 January 1904 (N.G.B.. vol.37-2, pp. 126-27).
33. No.34, Hayashi to Komura, 6 January 1904 (Ibid.. pp. 127-28).
34. F .0.46/587, Cameron to F. Campbell, 8 January 1904.
35. Ibid., Cameron to British Foreign Office, 9 January 1904.
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under London’s primacy was to be realised in the first Japanese government war loan 
issue of May 1904, as will be seen later.
The Hongkong Bank and Baring Brothers were looking for attractive opportunities 
for the Japanese government war loan issue. In February 1904 the Hongkong Bank 
started loan issue negotiations. The Hongkong Bank’s Yokohama Branch mediated the 
loan issue negotiations between the Japanese government and Baring Brothers. The 
Hongkong Bank’s Yokohama Branch suggested the following loan issue terms to the 
London Office: a £10,000,000 6 percent loan for 5 years at 85 percent without any 
security.36 Given the negative prospect for Japanese government bonds on the London 
Stock Exchange, the Hongkong Bank’s London Office considered it imperative to take 
prompt action and told the Yokohama Branch ‘to advise [the] Japanese government [that] 
do not delay [in] accepting] any money we can offer now[,] as [a] temporary reverse 
will occasion [a] heavy fall [of] Japanese government bonds rendering [a] new loan 
impossible on any terms’.37
The Hongkong Bank, together with Baring Brothers, agreed to offer the following 
preliminary terms for the Japanese government war loan issue:38
Issue amount £10,000,000
Interest rate (nominal) 6 percent
Government proceeds 85 percent per £100
Borrowing period 10 years
Security £2,000,000 of the proceeds to be retained in
London
Redemption option of repayment after 2 years
Others the Japanese government should not issue any
more foreign loans for 12 months except 
through Baring Brothers and the Hongkong 
Bank.
This was the most definite proposal of any submitted by the British banks before
36. B.B.A., PF303, Hongkong Bank Yokohama Branch to London Office, 17 
February 1904.
37. Ibid., Hongkong Bank London Office to Yokohama Branch, 18 February 1904.
38. Ibid., 19 February 1904; Memorandum given to Cameron, 12 February 1904.
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Takahashi’s loan issue negotiations. Yet, even given that a war loan was regarded as 
extremely risky among financiers, the terms were in every respect highly unfavourable 
to the Japanese government: i.e. the 6 percent high rate of interest; the low proceeds; the 
security condition. They were not acceptable.
Meanwhile, Baring Brothers took several diplomatic actions. Since Britain took 
a strictly neutral attitude towards the Russo-Japanese War, they were afraid of sowing 
discord between their business strategy and the British government’s diplomatic policy 
by becoming publicly connected with the Japanese government loan affairs. Lord 
Revelstoke, the Head of Baring Brothers, contacted Count Alexandre Benckendorff, the 
Russian Ambassador in London, about this matter.39 Lord Revelstoke also frankly asked 
Lord Lansdowne whether it would be inconvenient to the British government if they dealt 
with the Japanese government war loan. Because of the delicate character of the business, 
Baring Brothers considered it desirable to obtain the British government’s official 
approval before embarking upon it. Lord Lansdowne perfunctorily said ‘that I could not 
see that we had any business to object, but that of course we could take no official 
cognizance of the matter and that we would be able to say that we had not been in any 
way concerned in it’.40 Lord Lansdowne only reiterated the Foreign Office’s established 
rule - no intervention in private transactions.
Baring Brothers scrutinised the loan issue markets on the Continent, particularly 
the Paris capital market for the proposed Japanese government loan issue. Lord 
Revelstoke immediately contacted E. Noetzlin, Administrateur (Director) of the Banque 
de Paris, on whether it could take some part in the impending Japanese government loan 
issue. In spite of the antagonistic feelings to Japan there, Baring Brothers expected the 
Paris capital market to act as a buffer should the London capital market fail to take a 
sufficient amount.
39. Ibid., Count A. Benckendorff to Lord Revelstoke, Friday February 1904 [no 
date].
40. Add. Ms.49,728, Lord Lansdowne to Balfour, 21 February 1904.
194
Noetzlin declined this offer, saying that ‘you are right to foresee that political 
considerations would undoubtedly prevent the Banque de Paris doing so, however 
tempting such a business might be ... it would put us in the most awkward position if it 
became known here that the Banque de Paris has an interest in providing money for the 
Japanese’.41 At that time the Banque de Paris was negotiating an issue of the Russian 
government Treasury bills in Paris. The public sentiment in Paris showed the ‘tellement 
surchauffe en faveur des russes (really overheated in favour of the Russians)’.42
Baring Brothers found it impossible to arrange the proposed Japanese government 
loan issue in London alone, without the co-operation of Continental financiers, and 
subsequently, did similar market research in the United States. They paid much attention 
to the New York capital market which at that time had not yet sufficiently developed for 
foreign loan issues. Baring Brothers asked Baring, Magoun & Co. in New York whether 
it could take the Japanese government war loan for £5,000,000 there. Baring Brothers 
also made an urgent contact with several pre-eminent financiers in the United States: J. 
Stillman, the President of the National City Bank (New York), who had close connections 
with the Rockefellers; J. Schiff, a senior partner of Kuhn, Loeb & Co.; Kidder Peabody 
& Co. (Boston).43
F. A. Vanderlip, the Vice-President of the National City Bank, relayed Stillman’s 
message to the effect that he [Stillman] admitted the probability of being able to 
underwrite £5,000,000 of the bonds in the United States markets, but felt very dubious 
of a large amount of the loan being taken by public investors. Vanderlip also 
communicated with W.G. Rockefeller, son of William Rockefeller, and J.A. McCall, 
the President of the New York Life Assurance Co., who had been expected to become
41. B.B.A., PF303, Extract form Letter E. Noetzlin to Lord Revelstoke, 20 February 
1904. For a history of the Banque de Paris, see H. Collas, La Banque de Paris et des 
Pavs-Bas et les emissions d’emprunts publics et privds (Dijon, 1908).
42. R.A.L., XI/101/62, the Paris Rothschilds to the London Rothschilds, 29 February 
1904.
43. B.B.A., PF303, Baring, Magoun & Co. to Baring Brothers, 3 March 1904.
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large takers of this operation. Yet the proposed Japanese government loan business did 
not attract them partly because of neutral feelings in the United States towards the war 
and partly because of the great risks. Furthermore, Vanderlip strongly recommended that 
Baring Brothers should approach Kuhn, Loeb & Co., which had acquired much 
experience in dealing with railway securities, about the business.44
Baring, Magoun & Co., however, was optimistic about the proposed loan issue 
on the United States market saying ‘there must be a fair chance of attracting the public’. 
They considered that underwriting of the loan issue for £5,000,000 would be feasible and 
public subscriptions at 90 percent would take £2,000,000 of the bonds on the condition 
of the principal and interest being paid in New York.45 Baring, Magoun & Co. was keen 
to launch the Japanese government war loan issue in New York. Even after Baring 
Brothers’ withdrawal from the business early in March, it was still willing to handle it 
when the Hongkong Bank requested placing some of the loan directly in the United 
States,46 but Baring Brothers did not like their name [Baring] to be connected with any 
Japanese government borrowings during the Russo-Japanese War.47
On 4 March 1904 Baring Brothers taking into consideration all the factors 
surrounding the Japanese government loan issue business, finally found a reason to 
postpone involvement in it. Lord Revelstoke’s letter addressed to Hugo Baring, a partner 
of Baring, Magoun & Co., adduced his reasons for reaching such a conclusion:
44. Ibid.. For the business relations between the National City Bank and Kuhn Loeb 
& Co., see H. van B. Cleveland & T.F. Huertas, Citibank. 1812-1970 (Cambridge 
[Mass.], 1985), pp.37-41.
45. B.B.A., PF303, Hugo Baring to Lord Revelstoke, 4 March 1904. For the history 
of the Kidder, Peabody Co., see V.P. Carosso, More Than a Century of Investment 
Banking (New York, 1979).
46. B.B.A., PF303, Baring, Magoun & Co. to Baring Brothers, 9 March 1904.
47. Ibid., Baring Brothers to Baring, Magoun & Co., 9 March 1904.
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we have decided, after mature deliberation, not to take part in a public issue at 
the present moment. The fact is that there is a feeling here among the highest 
people that it would be well to preserve a more or less neutral attitude, in spite 
of the fact that the Japanese are our allies; and as it is obvious that these Japanese 
are not averse to raising a Loan, and that if things go against them they might 
have to come again for a still further issue: you will understand how averse we 
should be to making an issue which might go to a discount, and how much we are 
convinced that we had better await a probable conclusion of hostilities before 
embarking on a large responsibility, which we should have to carry through 
without any help from the Continent. We have explained our attitude fully to the 
Hongkong & Shanghai Bank, who are on the most friendly terms with us, and 
who quite recognised the wisdom and soundness of our views. They are evidently 
in a different position from ourselves: they have a large business with the East, 
and are above all things anxious that no competitor should wrest any good 
business from them. To this consideration we do not attach so much importance, 
and have, therefore, informed the Hongkong & Shanghai Bank that we consider 
they were quite justified in proceeding to arrange any negotiations they may have 
in hand with fresh partners.48
Obviously there were several reasons for Baring Brothers’ faltering in the business. 
Firstly, they were sensitive about the Russo-Japanese War and had still retained close 
connections with the Russian government as a London agent. In terms of business 
strategy, it was more prudent by far for Baring Brothers to maintain strict neutrality than 
to play an aggressive role in the Japanese government war loan issue. Secondly, and 
more important, Baring Brothers were afraid of being involved in a perilous loan issue, 
because they would have to carry out the Japanese government war loan issue without 
any assistance from the Paris capital market; their estimate of the United States markets 
was that it could absorb at most £ 2,000,000. Thirdly, Baring Brothers, unlike the 
Hongkong Bank, had no large volume of transactions with the Far East. In this situation 
they showed no inclination to plunge into such a risky venture. In fact, when Takahashi 
arrived in London toward the end of March 1904, Lord Revelstoke explained the 
impossibility of undertaking public subscriptions of the Japanese government loan issue 
and proposed a private borrowing to the extent of £60,000 in the form of Japanese
48. Ibid., Extract from Letter Lord Revelstoke to Hugo Baring, 8 March 1904. Later 
Takahashi found that Baring Brothers ‘have so much interest in Russia and at this 
moment they don’t want to come out’ (J.N.D.L., Takahashi Papers, 135, Diary, 22 
September 1904).
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government Treasury bills.49
However, when Baring Brothers as well as the London Rothschilds, desired to 
become one of the loan issuers of the Japanese government 4 percent loan in 1905, R.H. 
Whalley, the General Manager of Parr’s Bank, censured this conduct. He emphasised that 
even when hostilities to Japan had already commenced, Baring Brothers had felt that they 
could not have their name, which would have been of value to the Japanese government, 
publicly connected with any Japanese loan issue.50
The London Rothschilds’ attitude towards the Russian government was different. 
Despite an amicable letter from the Russian Ministry of Finance,51 since the 3 1/2 percent 
loan issue in 1893 the London Rothschilds had refrained from involvement in Russian 
government loan issues and were acting only as a paying agent because of the 
ill-treatment of Jews in Russia.52 The London Rothschilds no longer placed trust in the 
Russian government finance and Alfred Rothschild rightly depicted it as a ‘juggler’.53
Although the Japanese government had embarked upon the loan issue negotiations 
with the Hongkong Bank’s Yokohama Branch, on 3 March 1904 the government 
appointed K. Takahashi as the Special Loan Commissioner.54 This meant that the Japanese 
government had decided to negotiate the intended loan issue not through the Hongkong 
Bank’s Yokohama Branch but directly in London. The Hongkong Bank’s Yokohama 
Branch for its part, warned the Bank’s London Office that ‘it is not in the interest of the 
Hongkong Bank to wait [the] arrival of [the] person referred to [- Takahashi]’.55 Mainly
49. T.K.J.. vol.2, pp. 195-96. There is no record of this proposal in Baring Brothers’ 
Archives. It may have been made verbally.
50. F .0.800/134, R.W. Whalley to Takahashi, 1 November 1905.
51. R.A.L., XI/89/10A, W. Kokovtzoff to the London Rothschilds, 7 February 1904.
52. The London Rothschilds sent much money to the Jewish Committee in Russia 
(R.A.L. XI/130A/0, the London Rothschilds to Paris Rothschilds, 1 January 1906).
53. Add. Ms.49,747, Alfred Rothschild to Balfour, 4 April 1905; an anonymous 
paper which discussed the Russian government finance also concluded that ‘equipment 
provided by the help of French capital.. .by no means succeeded in enriching the country’ 
(M.B.A., ACC36/231, France and England, and the Future Russian Loans, 1909).
54. B.B.A., PF303, Hongkong Bank in Tokyo to London Office, 3 March 1904.
55. Ibid., Hongkong Bank Yokohama Branch to London Office, 5 March 1904.
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because of Baring Brothers’ withdrawal from the loan issue negotiations, the Hongkong 
Bank’s London Office decided to negotiate directly with Takahashi.56
Cameron was unwilling to give up this lucrative business opportunity and 
persuaded Lord Revelstoke to reconsider the previous decision.57 Although the Hongkong 
Bank’s original plan of issuing the Japanese government loan in conjunction with Baring 
Brothers had reached an impasse, Cameron believed it feasible saying:58
Our [the Hongkong Bank London office] opinion is that danger is exaggerated, 
but we do not feel confident that money can be got here, in any case it is certain 
not without American help.
The Hongkong Bank considered that the Japanese government war loan issue was, 
perhaps, possible with ‘American help’.
5.3 Takahashi’s Mission
On 6 February 1904 Japan broke off diplomatic relations with Russia and the 
Russo-Japanese War broke out. Initially M. Matsukata, a Senior Statesman, who was 
in charge of the management of the war finance, nominated Takahashi to be the Japanese 
Government Loan Commissioner.59
The Japanese government decided to raise war loans for ¥200,000,000 
(£20,417,000) at the Cabinet Meeting held on 17 February 1904,60 and ordered the Bank 
of Japan to arrange a foreign loan for £10,000,000 on the following terms:61
56. B.B.A., PF303, Hongkong Bank London Office to Yokohama Branch, 5 March 
1904.
57. Ibid., Cameron to Lord Revelstoke, 4 March 1904.
58. Ibid., Hongkong Bank London Office to Yokohama Branch, 7 March 1904.
59. T.K.J.. vol.2, pp. 186-89.
60. J.M.F.A., Shoda Papers, 27-1, Cabinet Decision on the Foreign Loan Issue, 17 
February 1904.
61. Ibid., Order dated 22 February 1904.
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Issue amount 
Interest rate (nominal)
Issue charges 
Others
Redemption
Security
£10,000,000
less than 5 percent
within 45 years
customs and railway revenues
less than 4 percent excluding the British stamp duty
re-sale of existing domestic bonds should also be
taken into consideration.
On 19 February 1904 Takahashi left for London via New York. At that time Takahashi 
pondered the lack both of money and of experience in dealing with large foreign loan 
issues which he felt would hamper the Japanese government war loan issue on the New 
York capital market.62
Towards the end of March Takahashi began loan issue negotiations with financiers 
in the City and looked for a loan issue bank which could favourably undertake the 
intended war loan. He considered it best to approach the Yokohama Specie Bank’s 
correspondents, for the loan issue. First, Takahashi sounded out A. A. Shand, a Manager 
of Parr’s Bank, on the possibility of the loan issue for £10,000,000. Shand introduced 
him to Cecil P. Parr, the Chairman of Parr’s Bank, and John Dun, former General 
Manager and now a Director of Parr’s Bank.63 Takahashi continued interviews on the loan 
issue with several banks and stockbrokers, such as Cameron,64 W.M. Koch and A. 
Levita, partners of Panmure Gordon & Co.,65 J.H. Gwyther, the Chairman of the 
Chartered Bank,66 and the Union of London & Smiths Bank’s directors.67
Takahashi made the acquaintance of several pre-eminent merchant bankers, such 
as Lord Revelstoke68 and Alfred Rothschild.69 Meanwhile, H.R. Beeton, a stockbroker in
62. T.K.J.. vol.2, pp. 191-92.
63. J.N.D.L., Takahashi Papers, 135, Diary, 12 April 1904.
Ibid., 7 and 13 April 1904.
Ibid., 12 April 1904. I.D. Cameron, of Panmure Gordon & Co., informed me 
in his letter of 18 July 1984 that no record of the Japanese government loan issues during 
this period survives at its archives.
J.N.D.L., Takahashi Papers, 135, Diary, 13 April 1904.
67. There is no description of the Japanese government loan in Court Minutes of the
Union of London & Smiths Bank from February to June in 1904 (U.L.S.B.A., B11498) 
nor in the letter book from Felix Schuster from July 1902 to March 1905 (ibid., D3610).
J.N.D.L.yTakahashi Papers, 135, Diary, 14 April 1904.
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the firm of Woolston, Beeton, Brodrick & West, suggested to Takahashi that the Japanese 
government should employ its financial agent in London, in the same way as Colonial 
governments, and depend upon influential financiers such as Ernest Cassel who was able 
to arrange Anglo-American loan issues by inviting the Rothschilds, J.S. Morgan and so 
on.70 Ernest Cassel was a string-puller of huge financial operations in the City and an 
intimate friend of King Edward VII. Cassel seems to have played an important role in 
the series of Japanese government war loan issues during 1904 and 1905, even though 
his name never became public. In fact, Takahashi often relied upon Cassel’s paramount 
influence over financiers, as a last resort, when difficulties occurred in the loan issue 
negotiations.71 It must be noted that from the early stage of the Japanese government loan 
issue negotiations, financial experts in the City paid much attention to the possibility of 
an Anglo-American loan.
Takahashi did not easily make headway in the loan issue negotiations. Not only 
because of the ominous market conditions for a large new loan issue, but also because 
of misgivings over Japan’s supremacy in the war, the British banks cast doubts upon the 
success of the proposed loan issue on the market. Since the outbreak of the war (6 
February) the prices of the Japanese government bonds on the London Stock Exchange 
had fallen considerably, while those of the Russian government bonds had remained more 
stable (Chart 5.1). The Russian government secured firm financial assistance from 
France. Unlike the French government, the British government did not make its attitude 
clear towards the Russo-Japanese War. There were serious debates on the neutrality under 
the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and some bankers even considered that raising money for
% . .continued)
Ibid., 13 April 1904.
70. Ibid., 22 April 1904. Beeton was asked to visit Takahashi by Malcolm D. 
McEacham, Mcllwraith, McEacham & Co., an Australian merchant, shipowner and 
commission agent.
71. T.K.J.. vol.2, p. 194. For Cassel’s business career, see P. Thane, ‘Financiers and 
the British State: The Case of Sir Ernest Cassel’ (Business History, vol.xxviii-no.l 
[1986], pp.80-99). There was a description of Cassel’s transaction with de Zoete & 
Gorton, a stockbroker, in de Zoete & Gorton: A History (no place and date), pp.48-49.
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Japan might violate it.72
Takahashi had to hasten completion of the loan issue. The drain of gold from 
Japan being so immense since the outbreak of the war, the specie reserves at the Bank 
of Japan were rapidly diminishing, far more in fact than had been anticipated. They fell 
from ¥116,962,184 (£11,939,000) in December 1903 to ¥100,931,306 (£10,303,000) in 
February 1904, to ¥92,127,709 (£9,405,000) in March and to ¥80,821,272 (£8,250,000) 
in April. In May the reserves reached a bottom of ¥68,087,261 (£6,951,000).73 The 
Japanese government was afraid of depleting gold stocks reserved for settlement of the 
trade balances. Takahashi lost no more time in bringing about the loan issue, even though 
the terms proposed by British financiers in the loan issue negotiations were not fully 
satisfactory.
So imperative was it to ensure financial resources for the war that on 9 April 1904 
Komura informed Hayashi that if it should prove impossible to conclude the loan issue 
negotiations immediately, the Japanese government gave permission even for making 
temporary private borrowings and afterwards converting them to public bonds when the 
market showed a favourable turn.74
In spite of Takahashi’s proposal of the loan issue to the City financiers, only three 
banks: Parr’s Bank, the Hongkong Bank and the Yokohama Specie Bank, accepted this. 
The Chartered Bank which had participated in some of the Japanese government loan 
issues in the past, after long deliberation, refused to undertake the proposed loan.75 
Because of the unfavourable outcome of the previous loan issue in 1899, it came to hold 
to a conservative policy towards the Japanese government war loan issue.
Why was Parr’s Bank involved in this operation?, for it is true that Shand took 
the initiative in Takahashi’s loan issue negotiations with Parr’s Bank. On the basis of the
* T.K.J.. vol.2, pp. 199-201.
73. Japanese Ministry of Finance, Report on the War Finance (Tokyo, 1906), p.24.
74. No.210, Komura to Hayashi, 8 April 1904 (N.G.B.. vol.37-2, p. 134).
75. T.K.J.. vol.2, p. 194.
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established business relationship with the Japanese government, Takahashi persuaded 
Parr’s Bank to become the main loan issuer.76 Hayashi described it thus ‘he [Takahashi] 
had approached several financiers on the subject [the loan issue] .... but all of them 
declined to take the matter up, except Mr. Dun of the Parr’s Bank. He .... succeeded in 
forming a group of issuing banks and in floating the loans’.77
The Hongkong Bank was looking for a new partner in the Japanese government 
war loan business after Baring Brothers’ withdrawal. At the next stage, Takahashi and 
Shand mediated between the Hongkong Bank and Parr’s Bank, and successfully formed 
a group of the loan issue banks.78
Takahashi considered the three following methods of raising money on the market:
(i) an issue of Treasury bills for 1 or 2 years; (ii) an issue of new bonds; (iii) a re-sale 
of domestic bonds. Given the bad market circumstances, Takahashi at first supposed that 
either an issue of Treasury bills or a re-sale of domestic bonds would be more feasible. 
The Japanese government instructed him to attempt an issue of Treasury bills rather than 
a re-sale of domestic bonds.79
However, Japan’s victories at the onset of the war brought about favourable 
changes in the ongoing negotiations. This is clear from the fluctuations of the prices of 
the Japanese government bonds on the London Stock Exchange, which suddenly began 
rising in the middle of April 1904 (Chart 5.1). Given these improved circumstances, 
Takahashi now proposed to issue a new secured loan for £10,000,000, not Treasury bills, 
and the loan issue banks finally agreed to this for half the proposed amount.80 On 27
76. Parr’s Bank’s Board of Directors agreed to present Shand with £1,000 for his 
services in the Japanese government loan and in maintaining for the Bank the Japanese 
connections. (P.B.A., B11417, Board Minutes, 23 June 1904).
77F.0.800/134, Hayashi to Lord Lansdowne, 2 November 1905.
78. J.N.D.L., Takahashi Papers, 135, Diary, 20 April 1904.
79. Ibid., 17 April 1904; no.217, Komura to Hayashi, 18 April 1904 (N.G.B.. 
vol.37-2, p. 136); The Japanese Ministry of Finance, Qkurasho Hvakunenshi (One 
Hundredth Anniversary History of the Japanese Ministry of Finance!, vol.l (Tokyo, 
1969), p. 192.
80. J.N.D.L., Takahashi Papers, 135, Diary, 24 April 1904.
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April 1904 Takahashi informed the Japanese government of the following provisional 
terms reached with the loan issue banks:81
In response to this proposal, the Japanese government directed Takahashi to re­
negotiate on the following points: (i) to raise the government proceeds closer to 90 
percent from 88 percent; (ii) to remove the clause of the remittance of the principal to 
London. S. Matsuo, the Governor of the Bank of Japan, urged him to complete the 
negotiations as soon as possible.82 It seemed likely that the Japanese government would 
accept the terms of the loan issue.
Takahashi raised the proceeds to 90 percent from 88 percent.83 In the final stages, 
the Japanese government, through Cameron, received confirmation of the British 
government’s favourable views towards this financial operation in London.84 In this way, 
by 3 May 1904 the loan issue negotiations between Takahashi, Parr’s Bank, the 
Hongkong Bank and the Yokohama Specie Bank were closed, leaving the other half of 
the £5,000,00 issue amount reserved for the future. However, the ongoing loan 
negotiations with the loan issue banks effected a significant change. Baring Brothers,
81. Ibid., 27 April 1904; J.M.F.A., Matsukata Papers, 40-42, On the 6 percent 
Sterling Loan Issue of May 1904.
82. No.230, S. Matsuo to Takahashi through Komura, 30 April 1904 (N.G.B.. 
vol.37-2, p. 136).
83. J.N.D.L., Takahashi Papers, 135, Diary, 2 May 1904; no. 147, Hayashi to 
Komura, 1 May 1904 (N.G.B.. vol.37-2, p. 137).
84. No. 149, Hayashi to Komura, 2 May 1904 (ibid.. pp. 139-40).
Issue amount
Interest rate (nominal) 
Borrowing period 
Security 
Issue price
Others
£5,000,000 (half of the total amount of £10,000,000)
6 percent
7 years
revenue of the customs duty (nominal)
93 percent (to the public)
88 percent (to the government) 
every month one-twelfth of the total yearly payment 
of the principal and interest should be paid to the 
representative bank of bond holders in London.
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probably as the result of Cassel’s influence, had almost persuaded J. Schiff, a senior 
partner of the Kuhn, Loeb & Co. in New York, to become a loan issuer of the other 
£5,000,000. The ‘team activity’ nature of merchant banks produced an international 
linkage of the loan issue markets to the Japanese government loan issue.
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Chart 5.1 Prices of British. Russian and Japanese Governments Bonds 
in London (January. February. April and May 19041
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5.4 Loan Issue in New York
Early in March 1904 Baring Brothers had withdrawn from the loan issue negotiations. 
At the end of March Lord Revelstoke, in accordance with the progress of Takahashi’s 
negotiations with the loan issue banks, directed G. Farrer, a Director of Baring Brothers 
and then temporarily in the United States, to make contact again with Stillman on the 
possibility of floating the Japanese government war loan on the New York capital 
market.85 Stillman, however, was not keen to issue it.86
However, as a consequence of Cassel’s strong influence in the City, the other half 
of the Japanese government war loan (£5,000,000) was to be arranged on the New York 
capital market. Cassel always acted as a co-ordinator behind the scenes among financiers 
involved in a connection, and it is difficult to know to what extent Cassel was actually 
concerned in this operation. E. Fukai, Takahashi’s secretary in the loan issue 
negotiations, inferred in his reminiscences that Cassel would persuade Schiff to take part 
in the Japanese government war loan issue in the United States,87 although he [Schiff] had 
already been approached by Baring Brothers. Following a trip to Egypt in May 1904, it 
is certain that Cassel and Schiff met in Frankfurt.88 Both were Jewish emigrants from 
Germany. There is no definite evidence but probably they should discuss the possibility 
of a Japanese government war loan issue in the United States.89 It should be noted that 
the Japanese government war loan issue in the United States was thus promoted by a 
merchant banker’s network connected by filial, ethnic and religious ties.
Schiff had moved to the United States from Frankfurt in 1865 when he was 18 
years old, and ten years later threw himself energetically into the affairs and operations
85. B.B.A., PF303, Lord Revelstoke to G. Farrer, 31 March 1904.
86. Ibid., G. Farrer to Lord Revelstoke, 6 April 1904.
87. E. Fukai, Kaiko Shichijunen (My Retrospect for Seventy Years') (Tokyo, 1941), 
p.70.
88. C. Adler, Jacob H. Schiff: His Life and Letters, vol.2 (New York, 1928), p.337.
89. E. Fukai, Jinbutsu to Shiso (Man and Thought) (Tokyo, 1939), p.60.
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of Kuhn, Loeb & Co. founded by Abraham Kuhn and Solomon Loeb in 1867.90 Schiff 
had made substantial transactions in American railway investment with Cassel and their 
relations were so intimate that Cassel always retained his own account at Kuhn, Loeb & 
Co. .9I It was said that ‘he [Schiff] had the advantage of the guidance of that distinguished 
financier [Cassel]’.92 It was the second time that Schiff was involved in Japanese 
government loan issue business. In 1873, although it had been fruitless, the young Schiff 
had attempted to raise money for the Japanese government in Frankfurt, as seen in 
Chapter 3.
No evidence survives showing the negotiations between Schiff and Cassel but 
perhaps Cassel, who was looking for a loan issuer for the other half of the Japanese 
government war loan, persuaded Schiff to introduce it on the United States market. This 
idea of Cassel accidentally coincided with Baring Brothers’ business strategy to develop 
the New York capital market for foreign loan issues. Cassel probably mediated between 
Lord Revelstoke and Schiff. It is confirmed that Lord Revelstoke met Schiff towards the 
end of April 1904.93
The negotiations between Lord Revelstoke and Schiff seemed to go well and Lord 
Revelstoke immediately despatched a telegram to Farrer that ‘[I have] seen Schiff who 
is anxious [to] take £5,000,000 loan .... [as a] part of the £10,000,000 issue here and 
in America - Schiff [is] very confident’.94 It was in that evening that Schiff first met 
Takahashi in London at a dinner given by Arthur Hill.95 Hill, a former partner of 
Panmure Gordon, Hill & Co. and then a partner of Hill & Sons and also of Speyer
90. Adler, op. cit.. vol.l, pp.6 and 11. For the foundation of Kuhn Loeb & Co., see 
[Kuhn, Loeb & Co.], Investment Banking through Four Generations (New York, 1955), 
pp. 7-8.
91. A.J.A.A., Schiff Papers, Box 442, Schiff to Cassel, 13 May 1915.
92. Adler, op. cit.. vol.l, p. 10.
93. Southampton University Library, Sir Ernest Cassel Papers, X17, Lord Revelstoke 
to Cassel, 28 April 1904. Schiff depicted Lord Revelstoke’s negotiations as ‘your 
masterly and straight-forward conduct of affairs’ (Adler, op. cit.. vol.l, p.230).
94. B.B.A., PF303, Lord Revelstoke to Farrer, 3 May 1904.
95. J.N.D.L., Takahashi Papers, 135, Diary, 3 May 1904.
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Brothers, may have arranged this so as to introduce Schiff to Takahashi.
On 4 May Takahashi informed the Japanese government that Schiff had agreed 
to undertake the other half amount of the loan in New York and by this, he had 
successfully completed the war loan issue for £10,000,000. Hayashi strongly advised 
Komura to accept this offer promptly by pointing out ‘not only financial but also political 
benefits’.96 The Japanese government approved this proposal97 and declined M. Samuel 
& Co.’s offer of a loan for £12 or £13 million on the same terms as the loan issue 
banks’.98
The negotiations were nearing the final stage. Now Schiff was fully empowered 
to conclude the negotiations with the loan issue banks99 and Baring Brothers agreed to 
prepare marketing for the loan issue in New York. Lord Revelstoke offered the business 
to Stillman and expected him to ‘choke off the probable competition among financiers 
there.100 The terms of the loan issue in New York arranged between Lord Revelstoke, 
Schiff and Cameron were as follows:'01
(i) The London issue banks (Parr’s Bank, the Hongkong Bank and the 
Yokohama Specie Bank) should purchase the Japanese government 6 
percent bonds for £10,000,000.
(ii) The London issue banks should pay a 90 percent price of the bonds with 
a half-yearly coupon payable 5 October 1904.
(iii) Kuhn, Loeb & Co. should agree to purchase bonds to the value of 
£5,000,000 from the London issue banks at 90 percent and pay a 1/2 
percent commission to Baring Brothers.
(iv) The bonds and coupons should be payable in sterling and dollars otherwise 
at the rate of exchange of U.S.$4.87 to £1.
96. No. 153, Hayashi to Komura, 4 May 1904 (N.G.B.. vol.37-2, pp. 140-141).
97. No.240, Komura to Hayashi, 5 May 1904 (ibid.. pp. 143-44).
98. No.249, Governor of the Bank of Japan [Matsuo] to Deputy Governor 
[Takahashi], 7 May 1904 (ibid.. p. 144).
99. B.B.A., PF303, Schiff to Lord Revelstoke, 4 May 1904.
10°. Ibid., Lord Revelstoke to J. Stillman, 4 May 1904.
101. Ibid., Memorandum of Conversation held at 8 Bishopsgate on 5 May 1904.
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(v) Issue price was to be 93 1/2 percent and an underwriting syndicate was to 
be formed at a 2 percent commission. The London issue banks and Kuhn 
Loeb & Co. should place £5,000,000 of the bonds separately for 
underwriting but the London issue banks should have an interest of 
£1,000,000 in the bonds underwritten in American.
These terms of the New York issue banks were almost same as the London issue banks’, 
except for paying the 1/2 percent intermediary commission to Baring Brothers. Baring 
Brothers’ position in this agreement was rather ambiguous. Baring Brothers were the 
intermediary of this loan issue in New York. The loan issue banks, especially Parr’s 
Bank, from the outset to the end, regarded Baring Brothers’ role as ‘Kuhn, Loeb & Co. ’s 
agent’.102
Why was Schiff so ardent to tackle the Japanese government war loan issue in the 
United States? As an investment banker he seems to have sufficiently assessed the 
potential of this business.103 In addition, Schiff, as the President of the American Jewish 
Association, had a particular interest in the outcome of the Russo-Japanese War. 
Takahashi, in his contribution to Schiff s biography, explained what he felt to be Schiff s 
subconscious intention as ‘he [Schiff] felt sure that if defeated, Russia would be led in 
the path of betterment, whether it be revolution or reformation, and he decided to 
exercise whatever influence he had for placing the weight of American resources on the 
side of Japan’.104 Ill-treatment of Jews in Russia may have influenced Schiff’s final 
decision to embark upon the Japanese government war loan issue.
In this loan issue the London issue banks were somewhat pressed to find a partner 
for the other half of the amount. It was their established business practice, in the first 
place, to look to the Continent, especially the Paris capital market. Yet the
m. F .0.800/134, R.W. Whalley to Takahashi, 1 November 1905.
103. Fukai, Jinbutsu to Shis5. op. cit.. p.60.
104. Adler, op. cit.. vol.l, p.218. Schiff referred to the Russian government privately 
as "the enemy of mankind" (Investment Banking Through Four Generation, op. cit. 
p. 18). The Economist paid much attention to this point by saying that ‘it is also noted 
that the Jewish factor in the floating of the loan here [in New York] is pronounced, and 
the popular inference is that something of sentiment is behind it all, in view of what has 
been so heartily resented - Russia’s treatment of Jews’ (21 May 1904, p. 872).
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Russo-Japanese War frustrated Paris financiers’ desire of taking up the Japanese 
government war loan business. Instead of Paris, Baring Brothers switched their attention 
to the New York capital market. However, there had been ‘a harbinger of change’105 in 
1900 when the Chancellor of the Exchequer (M.H. Beach), on the basis of J.S. Morgan 
& Co.’s London-New York axis, turned more of his attention to the New York capital 
market for issuing the Boer War loans.
Baring Brothers’ efforts to introduce the Japanese government war loan issue to 
New York were of great importance in the history of the foreign loan issues in the United 
States. Cassel was highly appreciative of Baring Brothers’ conduct in this loan issue.106 
Up to about the beginning of the century the New York capital market had only worked 
in an underwriting capacity, in conjunction with London, for large volume Continental 
securities, and sold bonds especially for German and Swedish governments. The Japanese 
government war loan issue in New York accelerated the rise of a foreign loan issue 
market in the United States.107 Carosso in his general history of American investment 
banking depicted this as ‘one of its [Kuhn, Loeb & Co.’s] largest and most important 
flotations up to this time [1904]’.108 All things considered, it is fair to say that this loan 
issue altered the contemporary structure of the international loan issue markets, 
over-centralised as they were on Europe, and assisted New York’s rise.
Meanwhile, the loan issue in New York held another significance for Britain, in 
a political sense. The British government did not like to be seen giving direct assistance 
to Japan and desired to keep strictly a neutral attitude towards the Russo-Japanese War. 
The Japanese government loan issue in London would surely have presented a crucial 
problem for the British government even though there had been no official intervention.109
105. K. Burk, Morgan Grenfell 1838-1988 (1989), p. 112.
106. B.B.A., PF303, Cassel to Lord Revelstoke, 9 May 1904.
107. Takahashi anticipated the great rise of the New York capital market in the post 
world war (A.A.J.A., Schiff Papers, Box 446, Takahashi to Schiff, 11 February 1915).
108. V.P. Carosso, Investment Banking in America (Cambridge[Mass.], 1970), p .81.
109. Lord Lansdowne wrote on the back of the correspondence that ‘we must be very
(continued...)
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Such worry was now ended by the American banks’ participation. The co-operation of 
the two markets, Schiff wrote, prepared for the success of the subsequent Japanese 
government war loan issues during 1904 and 1905.1,0
5.5 Performance
By 6 May 1904 the loan issue negotiations for £10,000,000, equally split between 
London and New York were completed. The final terms of the loan issue contract with 
the loan issue banks were as follows:111
Issue amount £10,000,000
Issue place London and New York equally
Issue price 93 1/2 percent (to the public)
90 percent (to the government)
Interest rate (nominal) 6 percent
Yield at issue 6.4
Borrowing period 7 years
Security first charge on the customs revenues
Others the Japanese government should pay 1 /12 of the sum
required for the interest every month to the 
Hongkong Bank and the Yokohama Specie Bank; 
the principal should be first charge on the secured 
customs revenues if the principal of the loan is not 
paid at least 14 days before the due date;
Kuhn, Loeb & Co. should pay a 1/2 percent 
commission to Baring Brothers; 
the Japanese government should reserve the right to 
redeem at par, all or any of the bonds, at any time 
after 1907, on giving 6 months’ previous notice.
Yet the Japanese government was not entirely satisfied with these terms. In fact, Y. 
Sakatani, the Japanese Vice-Minister of Finance, complained of the low issue price and
109(.. .continued)
careful to steer clear of any official connection into the loan issue’ (F.0.46/581, 
MacDonald to Lord Lansdowne, 9 May 1904).
no. J. Schiff, ‘Japan after the War’ in North American Review, vol.l 83-no.dxcvii 
(1906), p. 162.
1U. P.B.A., D.6802, Agreement, 7 May 1904.
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the high rate of interest.112
The loan issue in London and New York was to be underwritten fully by the 
separate syndicates113 at a 2 percent commission. In London the loan issue banks 
organised their own syndicates, as indicated in Table 5.4.
The Hongkong Bank itself underwrote £235,000 of the bonds;114 the Chartered 
Bank participated in the Yokohama Specie Bank’s underwriting syndicate for £30,000;115 
the London Joint Stock Bank underwrote for £20,000;116 J.S. Morgan & Co. for 
£50,000.117 Baring Brothers underwrote £202,000 of the bonds for the Hongkong Bank’s118 
and £300,000 for Kuhn, Loeb & Co.’s underwriting syndicates.119 Baring Brothers 
employed several sub-underwriters, including Hambros, Friihling & Goschen and 
Derenberg & Meyer.120 The Japanese records emphasised that Cassel121 and the London 
Rothschilds took a significant role as large underwriters in this loan issue.122 The amounts 
which the London Rothschilds received from the Yokohama Specie Bank (£539 7s. 9d.), 
the Hongkong Bank (£219 18s. 3d.) and Parr’s Bank (£905 18s. 3d.),123 imply that the 
scale of their underwriting was approximately £83,350. The underwriting syndicate in
112. F.0.46/578, MacDonald to Lord Lansdowne, 7 June 1904.
113. The Agreement Clause 5 and 6 (B.B.A., PF303, ff.54-58).
114. H.S.B.A., Board Minutes, 10 May 1904.
115. C.B.A., Extracts from Board Minutes, 11 May 1904. It also decided to apply 
the subscriptions for £100,000.
"6. L.J.S.B.A., Q 12, Board Minutes, 12 May 1904.
117. M.G.A., Ms.21,793, vol.3.
118. B.B.A., PF303, Cameron to Lord Revelstoke, 9 May 1904.
119. Ibid., Kuhn, Loeb & Co. to Baring Brothers, 9 May 1904.
12°. Ibid.,ff.78 and .241.
121. According to Takahashi, Cassel would take the £50,000 (J.N.D.L., Takahashi 
Papers, 135, Diary, 7 May 1904).
122. The Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Nichiei Gaikoshi (Anglo-Japanese 
Diplomatic History), vol.l (Tokyo, 1937), p.594. It was quite difficult to trace Cassel’s 
behaviour in a loan issue. For instance, The London Rothschilds’ correspondence to the 
Paris Rothschilds concerning the Russian government loan issue of 1909 said ‘no one 
knows exactly how much Sir Ernest Cassel underwrote business in Paris’ (R.A.L., 
XI/130A/3, the London Rothschilds to the Paris Rothschilds, 6 December 1909).
123. R.A.L., VIII/13/191, Cash Book with the Union of London & Smiths Bank.
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New York included many of largest banks and insurance companies there. Kuhn, Loeb 
& Co. completed the underwriting syndicate for U.S.$25,000,000 (£5,000,000).124 It was 
confirmed that J.P. Morgan & Co. underwrote £100,000 of the bonds for Kuhn, Loeb 
& Co.’s syndicate.125
On 11 May 1904 the prospectuses were issued simultaneously both in London and 
New York.126 Kuhn, Loeb & Co. persuaded the National City Bank and the National 
Bank of Commerce in New York to take part in this loan issue as the loan issuers.127 
Enthusiasm for the Japanese government bonds on the London Stock Exchange began and 
their prices suddenly and steeply rose after the announcement of the new 6 percent war 
loan issue. Many financial papers made a very favourable assessment and had an 
optimistic view of placing the loan on the market. The Statist, from the viewpoint of 
public investors, pointed out the following advantages of this loan issue:128 the low rate 
of the issue price, an excellent security of the loan and the high rate of interest.
The number of the subscribers was enormous: the Financial Times described them 
as ‘expecting to receive no more than 2 percent, of their subscriptions’129 and the London 
& Brazilian Bank reported that ‘[the] Japanese war loan applications were made for 
£100,000,000 within a few hours of the publication of the prospectus’.130 A clerk at the 
Hongkong Bank’s London Office depicted the rush of the subscriptions as ‘when the door 
was opened the crowd pushed the Bobbies inside and bent many of our railing in their 
scramble to get application forms. It was necessary to call out all the Rugger players’.131 
In London the total amount of the applications reached £151,975,500, almost 30 times
124. Financial Times. 9 May 1904.
125. V.P. Carosso, The Morgans (Cambridge[Mass.], 1987), pp.526-27.
126. B.B.A., PF303, ff.54-58.
127. Schiff was also a director of these two banks at that time (J.N. Ingham, 
Biographical Dictionary of America Business Leaders [Connecticut, 1983]).
128. The Statist. 7 May 1904, p.894.
129. Financial Times. 13 May 1904.
13°. L.B.B.A., G3/7, Head Office to Rio de Janeiro, 12 May 1904.
131. H.S.B.A., G8. I, Extract from Enclosure to Letter from Hongkong Bank New 
York Branch dated 1 July 1949.
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oversubscribed, and the total number was 30,022.132 One of the prominent features of 
these subscriptions was a large number of small applicants. The scrips were transacted 
at a 2 1/2 percent premium.133 The London Rothschilds recommended to their Continental 
clients to purchase the bonds, saying that they were better secured than the Japanese 
government 4 percent loan of 1899.134 Thus the operation in London showed great 
success. Temporary pressure on the money market, caused by the subscriptions, had 
been feared, but the money requirements for them brought about only a slightly higher 
rate of interest than usual.135
The subscriptions in New York were also over-subscribed fivefold. The closing 
price on the kerb market (an unofficial market) amounted to 94 3/4 percent, 11/4 percent 
above the issue price.136
The first Japanese government war loan issue in 1904 deserved many investors’ 
especial interest.137 The reason was that, compared with other foreign government loans 
issued on the London capital market in 1904, the yields of the two Japanese government 
war loans issued in 1904 (6.4 percent and 6.6 percent) were the most advantageous 
(Table 5.5), and the loan issue was firmly underwritten by many first-class merchant 
banks, which undoubtedly gave some assurance to public investors.138 Owing to the 
enormous amount of the subscriptions, the applications were cut off in the allotment
132. M.T.Z.. vol. 12, p.75.
133. Financial Times. 16 May 1904.
134. R. A.L., XI/148/390jLondon Rothschilds to Iavasche Bank (Amsterdam), 12 May 
1904.
135. Financial Times. 13 May 1904.
136. The Times. 14 May 1904.
137. Secret no.3, M. Arakawa to Komura (Report on the Japanese Government Bond 
Subscriptions addressed to Minister of Finance, dated 19 May 1904), 19 May 1904 
(N.G.B.. vol.37-2, p. 155).
138. ‘When subscriptions to a foreign issue are invited by means of a public 
prospectus, it is almost certain that that issue will be vouched for by one of these issuing 
houses [merchant banks] whose name will be evident that it has been thoroughly 
examined and the interests of the investors protected as far as possible’ (Committee on 
Finance and Industry, Report, 1931 [Cmd. 3897], B.P.P. 1930-31, xiii, para 387).
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(Table 5.6). For instance, Kleinworts were actually allotted only £1,000 of its £50,000 
application.139
The scrips (48 1/2 percent paid) were quoted on the London Stock Exchange 
Daily List on 23 June 1904140 and on 23 November the bonds were officially quoted.141 
In the United States the bonds were also admitted for dealing on the New York Stock 
Exchange on 10 June 1904142 and on 1 December the Governing Committee granted the 
official quotation.143
In comparison with the bond re-sale in 1902 (the 5 1/2 percent) and the loan issue 
in 1899 (the 4 percent), the 6 1/2 percent loan issue commission, partly deriving from 
the balance of the interest paid in October 1904,144 was very expensive to the Japanese 
government (Table 5.7). Undoubtedly the financiers considered the character of this war 
loan to be parlous.
5.6 Conclusion
The Japanese government, depending upon the merchant banks’ widely scattered network 
of correspondents, successfully accomplished the first foreign war loan issue, even though 
the loan issue terms themselves were not favourable. Now the New York capital market 
came to be included in the Japanese government financial operations. The collaboration 
of the Anglo-American markets would lead the Japanese government to success in further 
loan flotations on the international capital markets. Without doubt, this newly established 
loan issue pattern was bom of the combination of the loan issue banks which had been
139. K.A., Ms.22,105, Stock Account Ledgers.
14°. London Stock Exchange Daily Official List. 23 June 1904.
141. L.S.E.A., Ms. 18,000, 96B/530, Application for Listing.
142. B.B.A., PF303, Kuhn, Loeb & Co. to Baring Brothers, 10 June 1904.
143. L.S.E.A., Ms. 18,000, 96B/530, New York Stock Exchange to London Stock 
Exchange, 2 December 1904; B.B.A., PF303, Kuhn, Loeb & Co. to Baring Brothers, 
2 February 1905.
144. P.B.A., D6802, Agreement, 7 May 1904.
216
formed in the previous Japanese government loan issues. At first, the banks with Far 
Eastern and Japanese connections, such as the Hongkong Bank, Parr’s Bank and the 
Yokohama Specie Bank, brought loan issues to the London capital market and floated 
it in conjunction with the merchant banks (Baring Brothers and Cassel) and stockbroker 
(Panmure Gordon & Co.). The banks with Far Eastern and Japanese connections, 
however, were not experts in international financial operations and played only a limited 
role in linking the international capital markets. Subsequently, the merchant banks, 
although their names did not appear publicly, prepared the expansion of the loan issue 
markets for the Japanese government loan issue. The merchant banks brought off the 
Japanese government loan issue in London and New York simultaneously.
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Table 5.4 London Issue Banks’ Underwriting 
(May 1904. London!
(£)
Underwriting Underwriting Underwriting Brokerage
syndicate amount commission commission
(2 %) ( 1/2 %)*
Panmure Gordon 2,500,000 50,000 50,000
Hongkong Bank 1,152,666.66 23,053.33
Yokohama Specie Bank 646,666.66 12,933.33
Parr’s Bank 1,000,666.66 20,013.33
Total 5,300,000 106,000 50,000
Notes: £300,000 over-underwritten;
* 1/2 percent of £10,000,000 (total issue amount). 
Source: W.B.A., D2469.
Table 5.5 Yields of Foreign Government Loans issued in London during 1904
(percent)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Month Government Interest Issue price Yield
rate at issue
(nominal)
February Ecuador 4 68 5.9
May Japan 6 93 1/2 6.4
May Cuba 5 97 5.2
June Greece 4 84 4.8
July China 5 97 1/2 5.1
November Japan 6 90 1/2 6.6
December Mexico 4 94 4.3
Note:
Source:
(5)=(3)/(4) x 100- 
Table 1.3.
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Table 5.6 Allotment of 6 Percent Loan Issue (May 1904. London)
(£)
Application amount Allotment amount
100 and 200 passed over
300 3,000 100
3,000 5,000 200
5,000 10,000 300
10,000 30,000 700
Source: Financial Times. 19 May 1904.
Table 5.7 Commission of 6 Percent Loan Issue 
(Mav 1904. London")
(percent)
Underwriting 2
Brokerage (placing
underwriting) 1/2
Brokerage (application) 1/4
Advertising 1/4
Coupon paying 1 23/48
Issue banks 2 1/48
Total 6 1/2
Notes: Balance of the interest of October 1904 was included
in the commission.
Source: W.B.A., D2469.
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CHAPTER 6 
RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR LOAN ISSUES (2)
Japan’s unprecedented financial experience during the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905) 
is of great use for a study of foreign loans on the international capital markets. In a very 
short span of time (19 months), Japan floated a series of five foreign loans in London, 
New York, Germany and Paris. The large scale of financial operations on the 
international capital markets, especially the expansion of the loan issue markets, was so 
remarkable that the Bankers’ Magazine paid extraordinary attention to the Japanese 
Government Special Loan Commissioner, K. Takahashi.1
The first Japanese government foreign war loan was floated on the London and 
the New York capital markets in May 1904, as shown previously. In November the 
second one was made by the same banks. This loan was placed on the practically same 
terms as the first. The Japanese government, however, reconsidered the excessive reliance 
on the Anglo-American capital markets. In the third loan issue of March 1905 German 
banks approached the London issue banks: i.e. Parr’s Bank, the Hongkong Bank and the 
Yokohama Specie Bank, to participate in this loan issue, but the London issue banks 
refused this. The pattern of the fourth war loan issue in July 1905 did not follow the 
previous three and the loan issue places came to include Germany. Through Kuhn, Loeb 
& Co.’s business channel the German banks floated the Japanese government war loan 
in Germany.
After the Russo-Japanese War, in November 1905 the French government came 
to agree to the Japanese government loan issue in Paris. The Paris and the London 
Rothschilds were finally involved in this large financial operation as the main loan 
issuers. This became a landmark in the history of Japanese government foreign loan 
issues. Now, with London’s profound influence on Japan’s borrowing undermined, the
'. ‘Mr. Korekiyo Takahashi’, Bankers’ Magazine, vol.78 (1904), pp.355-56.
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Japanese government held to a new policy of systematically seeking to concentrate loan 
issues on the international centre offering the most attractive terms.
The expansion of loan issue markets for Japanese government loans becomes a key 
question here. Hobson noted ‘the elasticity of the foreign demand’ in a market responding 
to a rate of interest;2 Hall, though very vaguely, pointed out ‘the purely market elements’ 
working in the long-term capital movements.3 Borrowing countries, pursuing more 
favourable loan issue terms, could move from one capital market to another through 
merchant banks’ correspondent networks.4 In this chapter the effect of the liaison of the 
loan issue markets in the Japanese government loans during 1904 and 1905 will be 
scrutinised. To what extent did this geographical expansion of the loan issue markets help 
to reduce loan issue commissions in the Japanese government loan issue negotiations?
6.1 6 Percent Loan Issue in November 1904
The Japanese government repeatedly attempted to bring out a new war loan after the first 
in May 1904. The specie reserves at the Bank of Japan had reached their minimum, 
£6,808,700, in May and showed a considerable increase from June.5 Yet the Japanese 
government nervously anticipated accelerated military expenditure in accordance with the 
progress of the war. In order to build up firm specie reserves for the settlement of the 
trade balances, the Japanese government aimed at further foreign loan issues.
In July 1904 K. Sone, the Japanese Minister of Finance, drew up a plan for 
raising money for either £10,000,000 or £20,000,000 within 1904.6 His initial idea was
2. C.K. Hobson, The Export of Capital (1914), p.42.
3. A.R. Hall, ‘Introduction’ in Hall (ed.), The Export of Capital From Britain. 1890- 
1914 (1968), p. 11.
4. D.S. Landes, Bankers and Pashas (Cambridge[Mass.], 1958 [reprinted 1979]),
p. 16.
5. Japanese Ministry of Finance, Report on the War Finance (Tokyo, 1906), p.24.
6. M.T.Z.. vol. 12, p.87.
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to re-sell Japanese government 5 percent domestic bonds endorsed to pay the principal 
and interest in sterling.7 Yet Takahashi suggested a new 5 percent loan issue because the 
5 percent domestic bonds had not yet been quoted on the New York Stock Exchange.8 
Finally they agreed on the following terms:9
Issue amount £10,000,000
Rate of interest (nominal) 5 percent
Government proceeds not less than 90 percent
Borrowing period within 50 years
Other unsecured.
The allure of Japanese government bonds on the London Stock Exchange was 
not sufficiently strong and their quotation prices had temporarily plummeted. Public 
investors expected a new more advantageous Japanese government loan issue.10 On 20 
September Takahashi reported that under the contemporary market conditions he was 
forced to accept a 6 percent loan.11
Meanwhile, the Japanese government received many inquiries about a new loan 
issue from both inside and outside Japan: for instance, in June 1904 S. Samuel & Co. 
offered to purchase 5 percent domestic bonds for ¥50,000,000 (£5,104,000);12 in August 
one American made an offer through J. Soyeda, the Governor of the Industrial Bank, to 
take 5 percent domestic bonds for the Mutual Alliance Trust Co. (New York);13 in 
September Baring Brothers desired to buy 5 percent domestic bonds through Kirby &
7. Ibid.. p.88.
8. Ibid..
9. Ibid..
10. Secret no.6, M. Arakawa to J. Komura, 16 September 1904 (N.G.B.. vol. 37-2, 
p. 175).
n. M .T.Z.. vol. 12, p.88. He admitted that ‘in order to float [a] 5%  [loan] some 
change or turn is necessary’ (J.N.D.L., K. Takahashi Papers, 135, Diary, 10 September 
1904).
12. J.N.D.L., Y. Sakatani Papers, 370-4, Y. Sakatani to K. Inoue, 8 September 1904.
13. Ibid., 498-2, Diary, 21 June 1904; No. 1500, K. Sone to Komura, 20 August 
1904 (N.G.B.. vol.37-2, p. 168).
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Co., their agent in Japan.14 The Japanese government, however, rejected them all.
On 17 September Parr’s Bank sounded out Kuhn, Loeb & Co. on a new Japanese 
government loan issue.15 The usual loan issue banks, except for Kuhn, Loeb & Co., did 
not seem to oppose it if the terms were reasonable. E. Cameron, a Hongkong Bank’s 
London Manager, told C.S. Addis, a Sub-manager, that ‘we have no objection [to 
placing the new Japanese government loan], if the Japanese are prepared to take the risk 
of what may happen during the next few months, but we have to consult with America’.16
Towards the end of September Takahashi reached a preliminary accord with Parr’s 
Bank on a new 6 percent loan issue.17 Clearly the 6 percent rate of interest was far from 
what Takahashi really wanted. On 11 October R.W. Whalley, the General Manager of 
Parr’s Bank, Cameron and Lord Revelstoke, the Head of Baring Brothers, arranged the 
following provisional terms on the second Japanese government war loan issue:18
Issue amount £12,000,000
Kind of loan Exchequer bonds
Rate of interest (nominal) 6 percent
Government proceeds 90 percent
Borrowing Period 3 or 4 years
Security the second charge on the customs revenues
Issue price 90 percent.
Kuhn, Loeb & Co. proposed obtaining the railway receipts and tobacco monopoly 
revenues for the security and increasing the issue amount to a figure large enough to 
cover probable war requirements.19 In response to this, Parr’s Bank made a second
14. J.N.D.L., Sakatani Papers, 498-19.
15. B.B.A., PF304, Parr’s Bank to Kuhn, Loeb & Co., 17 September 1904.
16. S.O.A.S.A., PP MS 14, 354, Addis Papers, E. Cameron to C.S. Addis, 22 
August 1904. For Addis’s career, see R.A. Dayer, Finance and Empire (1988). She 
made no mention of Addis’s activities for the Japanese government loan issues in this 
period.
,7. M.T.Z.. vol. 12, p.89. Takahashi’s initial contact with Parr’s Bank was through 
A. Shand (B.B.A., PF304, Parr’s Bank to Kuhn, Loeb & Co., 17 September 1904).
18. B.B.A., PF304, Parr’s Bank to Kuhn, Loeb & Co., 11 October 1904; J.N.D.L., 
Takahashi Papers, 135, Diary, 11 October 1904.
19. B.B.A., PF304, Kuhn, Loeb & Co. to Parr’s Bank, received 11 October 1904.
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proposal.20 Yet Kuhn, Loeb & Co. had no confidence in placing the insufficiently secured 
long-term bonds on the market,21 since the popularity of the first Japanese government 
war bonds had temporarily faded in New York and the quotation price was always much 
lower than in London (see Chart 6.1). The demand for them in New York was limited. 
This cleavage in the quotation prices between the two markets decisively impeded the 
smooth conclusion of the second war loan issue negotiations. On 14 October Kuhn, Loeb 
& Co. made a new proposal of pooling the subscriptions both in London and New 
York.22 Yet Parr’s Bank considered that the London Stock Exchange Committee would 
not give permission to quote the interim certificates (scrips) issued abroad, and that most 
of the underwriters and subscribers in London were unwilling to do so.23
Cassel began to co-ordinate various interests among the loan issue banks behind 
the scenes.24 By lowering the issue price Kuhn, Loeb & Co. finally agreed to take half 
the issue amount (£6,000,000) in much the same way as before.25 On 17 October Kuhn, 
Loeb & Co. and the London issue banks agreed on the following loan issue terms:26
Issue amount £12,000,000 (split equally between London
and New York)
Rate of interest (nominal) 6 percent
Yield at issue 6.6 percent
Issue price 91 percent (to the public)
87 1/2 percent (to the government) 
Borrowing period 7 years
Security remainder of the customs revenues
Loan issue commission nearly 4 7/10 percent including the half yearly
interest.
Ibid., Parr’s Bank to Kuhn, Loeb & Co., 12 October 1904.
21. Ibid., Kuhn, Loeb & Co. to Parr’s Bank, 14 October 1904.
” Ibid..
23. Ibid., Parr’s Bank to Kuhn, Loeb & Co., 14 October 1904. Cameron was afraid 
that London might be imposed the whole burden of the loan issue (F.0.46/587, F.A. 
Campbell Memorandum, 15 October 1904).
74. B.B.A., PF304, Kuhn, Loeb & Co. to Lord Revelstoke, 14 October 1904.
25. Ibid., Kuhn, Loeb & Co. to Parr’s Bank, 17 and 18 October 1904.
26. Ibid., Parr’s Bank to Kuhn, Loeb & Co., 14 and 17 October 1904.
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Takahashi immediately reported these to the Japanese government,27 but the 
government did not readily assent to them because these were very different from what 
Sone and Takahashi had previously agreed. In particular, the low government proceeds 
(87 1/2 percent) were unsatisfactory and S. Matsuo, the Governor of the Bank of Japan, 
ordered Takahashi to raise them.28 On 21 October Matsuo also gave instructions to 
postpone finalising the present negotiations, unless more favourable terms were offered.29 
As things turned out, however, this wait-and-see attitude of the Japanese government 
proved wrong. The movement in rates of interest was upwards and they rose sharply 
from November;30 accordingly the quotation prices of the Japanese government bonds 
began to fall steeply in the New York Stock Exchange. Once it perceived the exacerbated 
market conditions, the Japanese government authorised Takahashi to conclude the 
negotiations promptly on the previous terms,31 but the loan issue banks had by then 
withdrawn the offer.
The Japanese government’s mistaken appreciation of the contemporary market 
conditions frustrated Takahashi’s procuring the advantageous loan issue terms which the 
government could have enjoyed. Loan issue terms are always regulated by current market 
conditions and a definite tender cannot be valid for long.32
British public opinion showed a considerable change. At the beginning of October,
S. Okuma’s pessimistic speech at the Tokyo Clearing House, in which he stressed the 
need for further foreign loan issues for the war, caused a considerable decline in the
21. No.61, S. Matsuo to Takahashi, 17 October 1904 (N.G.B.. vol.37-2, p. 186).
28. No number, Matsuo to Takahashi, 19 October 1904 (ibid.L After the continued 
victories in Manchuria the public in Japan would not be satisfied with the 87 1/2 percent 
(J.N.D.L., Takahashi Papers, 135, Diary, 19 October 1904).
29. No number, Matsuo to Takahashi, 21 October 1904 (N.G.B..vol.37-2. 
pp. 187-88); J.N.D.L., Takahashi Papers, 135, Diary, 21 October 1904.
30. S. Nishimura, The Decline of Inland Bills of Exchange in the London Money 
Market 1855-1913 (Cambridge, 1971), table-30.
31. Secretariat secret no. 1965, Sone to Komura, 25 October 1904 (N.G.B.. vol.37-2, 
pp. 188-89); J.N.D.L., Takahashi Papers, 135, Diary, 25 and 26 October 1904.
32. B.B.A., PF304, Lord Revelstoke to Whalley, 21 October 1904.
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prices of the Japanese government bonds in London and New York. In addition, the 
Russian Baltic Fleet’s brutal attack on British fishing boats in the North Sea raised British 
war fears.34
On 26 October Kuhn, Loeb & Co. informed the London issue banks that the 
critical downfall in the prices of the first Japanese government war bonds on the New 
York Stock Exchange made it impossible at 91 percent for them to place any Japanese 
government loan for the moment (see Chart 6 .1).35 Kuhn, Loeb & Co. wished to reduce 
the issue price reflecting the market conditions in New York.36 In general, new loan issue 
prices are determined by the prices of existing bonds on the market.37 The quotation price 
of the first 6 percent war bonds sank to 91 7/8 in New York, only a 7/8 surplus to the 
new issue price. Obviously the 91 percent issue price was too high for the New York 
capital market.
On 3 November Takahashi and the loan issue banks, again, agreed on the second 
war loan issue for £12,000,000:38
Issue amount £12,000,000 (split equally between London
and New York)
Rate of interest (nominal) 6 percent
Yield at issue 6.6 percent
Issue price 90 1/2 percent (to the public)
86 1/2 percent (to the government)
Borrowing period 7 years
Others the excess of the issue price above 90 percent,
namely 1/2 percent, should be divided
between the loan issue banks and the Japanese 
government;
33. No.83, Arakawa to Komura, 7 October 1904 (N.G.B.. vol.37-2, p. 181); 
Commercial & Financial Chronicle, vol.lxxix, p.2053, 5 November 1904.
34. The Times. 26 October 1904; The Economist. 29 October 1904, p. 1725.
35. B.B.A., PF304, Kuhn, Loeb & Co. to Parr’s Bank, 28 October 1904.
36. Ibid., 29 October 1904. Takahashi even proposed to cancel Kuhn, Loeb & Co.’s 
participation (J.N.D.L., Takahashi Papers, 135, Diary, 30 October 1904).
37. J. Riesser, The German Great Banks and their Concentration in Connection with 
the Economic Development of Germany (Washington, 1911), p.353.
38. B.B.A., PF304, Parr’s Bank to Kuhn, Loeb & Co., 2 November 1904; P.B.A., 
D6802, Agreement, 8 November 1904.
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the proceeds raised in New York should be 
kept there at the disposal of the Japanese 
government and not be transferred to London; 
the Japanese government should reserve the 
right to redeem at par, all or any of the 
bonds, at any time after 1907, on giving 6 
months’ previous notice.
Speyer Brothers, an Anglo-American merchant bank, was set up in London in 
1861. Speyer Brothers were closely linked with their sister firms: i.e. Speyer & Co. in 
New York and Lazard Speyer-Ellissen in Frankfurt-on-Main. Speyer Brothers, with a 
correspondent network covering the United States, the Continent and London, would be 
most effective in placing a loan simultaneously in major financial centres.39
Speyer Brothers had maintained close connections with the Hongkong Bank 
through Panmure Gordon & Co.. In the middle of October Speyer Brothers suddenly 
asked the Hongkong Bank to introduce them to the Japanese government war loan 
business.40 Speyer Brothers, until that time, had had no direct relations with Japan,41 but 
were perhaps attracted by the success of the first war loan issue. It was likely that they 
would become Kuhn, Loeb & Co.’s most formidable competitor in New York. Kuhn, 
Loeb & Co. could organise a loan issue on the New York capital market alone, but 
Speyer Brothers were capable of arranging a loan issue internationally through their sister 
firms.42
39. For Speyer Brothers’ history, T.C. Barker & M. Robbins, A History of London 
Transport, vol.ii (1974), pp.70-71 and 372 (note 44); A.M. Mandeville, The House of 
Speyer (1915).
40. B.B.A., PF304, Lord Revelstoke to Kuhn, Loeb & Co., 17 October 1904. Before 
then, E. Speyer, A. Hills and H. Oppenheimer, partners of Speyer Brothers, had 
proposed Takahashi to issue a new loan with the security of railway revenues (J.N.D.L., 
Takahashi Papers, 135, Diary, 21 September 1904).
41. In 1900, through Panmure Gordon, Hill & Co., Speyer Brothers intended to 
purchase Japanese government domestic bonds for the United States markets (T.K.J.. 
vol.2, pp. 143-44).
42. Similarly Burk placed much emphasis on the advantageous position of J.S. Morgan 
& Co. as an Anglo-American house in loan issues (K. Burk, Morgan Grenfell 1838- 
1988 [1989], p. 123).
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Merchant bankers’ business conduct was no longer strictly competitive and co­
operation was often preferred.43 Lord Revelstoke advised Kuhn, Loeb & Co. to make a 
political offer to Speyer Brothers, that is to say, Speyer Brothers would undertake a 
certain amount of the loan issue on the same terms as the London issue banks.44 Yet 
Kuhn, Loeb & Co. was strongly opposed to this.45 Speyer Brothers could bring about the 
loan issue more favourably than Kuhn, Loeb & Co., for Kuhn, Loeb & Co. had to pay 
a 1/2 percent intermediary commission to Baring Brothers. Kuhn, Loeb & Co. only 
agreed to offer Speyer Brothers £500,000 of the bonds at a 1 percent commission in New 
York and London respectively,46 but Speyer Brothers refused this.47
The underwriting syndicates were organised on a 2 percent commission (Table 6.1 
and Table 6.2).48 Parr’s Bank participated on its own for £150,000.49 Baring Brothers 
joined the Parr’s Bank’s for £200,000 and the Hongkong Bank’s for £50,000.50 The 
Chartered Bank underwrote the bonds for £30,000;51 the London Joint Stock Bank for 
£50,000;52 J.S. Morgan & Co. for £40,000;53 the Hongkong Bank for £220,000.54 The 
loan issue banks authorised the Swiss Bankverein to receive the subscriptions in 
Switzerland.55 In New York, Kuhn, Loeb & Co. did not form an underwriting syndicate 
and the loan issue banks (loan issue syndicate) underwrote the whole amount. Baring
43. S. Chapman, The Rise of Merchant Banking (1984), p. 158. On this point Landes 
mentioned that ‘it was easier to absorb rivals [in the syndicate] than to fight them’ 
(Landes, op. cit.. p. 30).
44. B.B.A., PF304, Lord Revelstoke to Kuhn, Loeb & Co., 18 October 1904.
45. Ibid., Kuhn, Loeb & Co. to Lord Revelstoke, 18 October 1904.
46. Ibid., Kuhn, Loeb & Co. to Speyer Brothers, 10 November 1904.
47. Ibid., Speyer Brothers to Kuhn, Loeb & Co., 11 November 1904. But Speyer 
Brothers joined the underwriting in London for £500,000.
49. P.B.A., B11417, Board Minutes, 10 November 1904.
" B.B.A., PF304, f. 130.
51. C.B.A., Extracts from Board Minutes, 9 November 1904.
52. L.J.S.B.A., Q 12, Board Minutes, 10 November 1904.
53. M.G.A., Ms.21,793, vol.3.
54. H.S.B.A., Board Minutes, 15 November 1904.
55.8.&A • ~ ~ ink to KuluijLoeb & Co., 11 November 1904.
48 . Ibid., f.130.
P F 3o^
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Brothers also participated in the underwriting in New York for £300,000.56
On 14 November the prospectuses were published and the public subscriptions 
implemented. All the subscriptions were oversubscribed. In London the total number of 
applicants amounted to 29,938 and the total sum £80,533,800, 13 2/5 times 
oversubscribed;57 in New York the oversubscription was 1 1/2 times;58 in Hamburg there 
were subscriptions for £101,000.59 These bonds were quoted on the official list of the 
London Stock Exchange on 31 May 1905 and of the New York Stock Exchange on 15 
June 1905.60
The London Joint Stock Bank’s allotment was £25,000.61 The Imperial Bank of 
Persia was allotted £25,000 of the bonds in November 1904 and in March 1905 sold it 
at 101 5/8 percent.62 The commission earned from this loan issue was remunerative to the 
loan issue banks: Parr’s Bank obtained £50,90063 and the Hongkong Bank £38,000.64
Takahashi and the loan issue banks had much difficulty in fixing the issue prices, 
which resulted mainly from the different quotation prices of the first war bonds in 
London and New York. In addition, the rise in interest rates also frustrated the smooth 
loan issue. However, the terms of the loan issue still seemed too expensive to the 
Japanese government and incurred much criticism in Japan: the 6 percent interest rate was 
too high and the 90 1/2 issue price was less than the first by 2 percent. Perhaps most 
Japanese expected that the second war loan issue would have obtained a more favourable 
assessment from foreign investors on the basis of the victories against Russia in
56. Ibid., Kuhn, Loeb & Co. to Baring Brothers, 5 November 1904.
57. M .T.Z.. vol. 12, p. 109.
58. B.B.A., PF304, Kuhn, Loeb & Co., to Parr’s Bank, 22 November 1904. M.T.Z. 
mentioned fourfold oversubscribed (vol. 12, p. 109).
59. H.S.B.A., LOHI/57, Hamburg Branch to London Office, 15 November 1904.
60. L.S.E.A., Ms. 18,000, 98B/257, Quotation Application.
61. L.J.S.B.A., Q12, Board Minutes, 24 November 1904.
62. I.B.P.A., W2/1, Investment Ledger.
®. W.B.A., D2469.
H.S.B.A., Board Minutes, 29 November 1904.
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Manchuria.65 The Japanese government reconsidered its current policy of counting so 
heavily upon the Anglo-American capital markets alone for war finance. It attempted to 
approach other notable American financiers, for instance the Morgan group, which was 
often in opposition to Kuhn, Loeb & Co. in railway investment business.66 Furthermore, 
Sone ordered the Japanese Minister in Paris to investigate the likelihood of a Japanese 
government war loan issue there.67 The Japanese government was looking around for 
more favourable loan issue facilities.
Table 6.1 Commission of 6 Percent Loan Issue (November 1904. London')
(percent)
Underwriting 2
Brokerage (placing
underwriting) 1/2
Brokerage (application) 1/4
Advertising 1/4
Coupon 1 107/240
Loan issue banks 2 73/240
Total 6 3/4
Source: W.B.A., D2469.
Table 6.2 London Issue Banks’ Underwriting (November 1904. London!
(£)
Underwriting Underwriting Underwriting Brokerage
syndicate amount commission commission
(2 %) (1/2 %)*
Panmure Gordon 2,100,000 52,000 30,000
Speyer Brothers 500,000
Hongkong Bank 1,367,000 27,340
Yokohama Specie Bank 666,000 13,320
Parr’s Bank 1,367,000 27,340
Total 6,000,000 120,000 30,000
Note: * 1/2 percent of the issue amount in London (£6,000,000).
Source: W.B.A., D2469.
65. F .0.46/579, C.M. MacDonald to Lord Lansdowne, 21 November 1904.
J. Komura to T. Uchida, 10 December 1904 (N.G.B.. vol.37-2, p. 198).
67. Secretariat secret 1983, Sone to I. Motono, 28 October 1904 (ibid.. pp. 189-90).
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Table 6.3 Allotment of Bonds (November 1904. London)
(£)
Hongkong Bank 
Yokohama Specie Bank 
Parr’s Bank
1.638.600 
1,540,800
2.820.600
Total 6 ,000,000
Source: H.S.B.A., LOHI/57.
6.2 4 1/2 Percent Loan Issue in March 1905
The Japanese government had not obtained really advantageous foreign loan issues so 
far. In order to ensure more favourable loan issue terms for the third war loan issue, it 
intended to extend a loan issue to the markets on the Continent, but I. Motono, the 
Japanese Minister in Paris, reported that it would be absolutely impossible to place any 
Japanese government war loan on the Paris capital market during the Russo-Japanese 
War.68 France had built up close relations with Russia under the Franco-Russian Entente 
of 1894. The diplomatic situation in France thus frustrated Japan’s financial operations 
there.
Germany’s political posture towards the Russo-Japanese War was a contrast to 
France’s. Initially Germany had maintained strict neutrality in the war but in January 
1905 Russia floated a loan for DM325,000,000 (£15,979,166) under the auspices of the 
leading Berlin banks such as Mendelssohn, the Disconto-Gesellschaft, S. Bleichroder 
and the Berliner Handels-Gesellschaft.69 In this situation, Bernhard Biilow, Reichskanzeler 
(Chancellor) asserted that Japan was equally free to borrow money on the German capital
68. Secret no.l, Motono to Komura, 5 January 1905 (ibid.. vol.38-2, pp.46-48).
w. H. Lemke, Finanztransaktionen und Aufienpolitik (Berlin, 1985), p. 14; V.N. 
Kokovtsov ([ed.] by H.H. Fisher and [translated] by L. Matveev), Out of My Past 
(Stanford University [California], 1935), chapter iv.
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markets.70 K. Inoue, the Japanese Minister in Berlin, reported that it would be feasible 
to bring about a Japanese government war loan issue in Germany because Baron Freiherr 
O. von Richthofen, the German Minister of Foreign Affairs, would allow it.71
In November 1904 the Japanese government drew up the second war budget of 
¥700,000,000 (£71,458,333)72 (Table 6.4). A Japanese Cabinet Meeting in January 1905 
decided, for the moment, to issue a new foreign loan for ¥200,000,000 (£20,416,666).73 
On 10 February 1905 Sone ordered Takahashi to arrange a new foreign loan, one at less 
than 6 percent, for £20,000,000.74 Japan needed further foreign loans because it had to 
import much of its military equipment.
From early in 1905 the market conditions in London improved remarkably for 
new loan issues; money was extremely plentiful and on 9 March Bank Rate was brought 
down to 2 1/2 percent. The Japanese government 6 percent high interest rate war bonds 
then began attracting much investor attention not only in London and New York but also 
on the Continent, and this growing demand resulted in their price soaring. Due to these 
favourable market conditions, the loan issue banks became optimistic about flotation of 
the third war loan and considered a 5 percent loan on the security of either the tobacco 
monopolies or railway revenues.75 Takahashi’s proposal was a 5 percent loan for either 
£20,000,000 or £30,000,000 on the security of the tobacco monopolies at 90 to 92 1/2 
percent. He was keen to invite German banks to participate in this loan issue.76
On 20 March Takahashi started the negotiations with the loan issue banks 
involving Baring Brothers. They submitted the following two alternative plans:77
70. The Times. 18 March 1905.
71. No.86, K. Inoue to Komura, 3 March 1905 IN.G.B.; vol.38-2, pp. 55-56).
M.T.Z.. vol. 1, pp. 228-29.
7\  T.K.J.. vol.2, p.223.
74. Secret no.4, Komura to Hayashi, 16 February 1905 (N.G.B.. vol.38-2, pp.50-52).
75. B.B.A., PF305, Kuhn, Loeb & Co. to Lord Revelstoke, 3 February; Lord 
Revelstoke to Kuhn, Loeb & Co., 15 February 1905.
76. Ibid., Kuhn, Loeb & Co. to Lord Revelstoke, 9 March 1905.
77. Ibid., Baring Brothers to Kuhn, Loeb & Co., 20 March 1905.
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Yield at issue 
Borrowing period 
Security
Issue amount
Rate of interest (nominal)
Issue price (to the government)
(to the public)
£30,000,000 30,000,000
(£15,000,000 in London and New York 
respectively)
5 percent 4 1/2 percent
96 percent 90 percent
92 1/2 percent 85 1/2 percent
5.2 percent 5.0 percent
25 years 25 years
Tobacco monopolies Tobacco monopolies.
Both included the following term of the redemption: the Japanese government should 
reserve the right to redeem at par, all or any of the bonds, at any time after 1910, on 
giving 6 months’ previous notice.
Takahashi opted for the second proposal. The Japanese government wanted to raise 
the issue price by 1 or 2 percent and to reduce the loan issue commission which it still 
considered too high. The negotiations were concluded immediately: the government 
proceeds were raised from 85 1/2 to 86 3/4 percent; the borrowing period was fixed at 
20 years.78 As early as 24 March Takahashi made a contract with the loan issue banks.79 
According to The Statist, these loan issue terms were ‘very much better than last time’.80 
In addition to the favourable market conditions, the vying tender from the German banks 
and Speyer Brothers may perhaps have made the loan issue negotiations go smoothly.
The loan issue banks again encountered Speyer Brothers’ keen competition. Speyer 
Brothers approached the Japanese government directly in Tokyo. Early in March 1905 
their agent in Japan, Faber & Voigt,81 proposed a 5 percent loan issue on the security of 
the railways.82 By mid-March Speyer Brothers asked the loan issue banks whether they 
could take part in the forthcoming loan business as a co-issuer.83 Except for Germany’s
78. Ibid., Parr’s Bank to Kuhn, Loeb & Co., 20 March 1905; P.B.A., B11417, Board 
Minutes, 23 and 30 March 1905.
TO. G.K.S.. vol. 1, pp. 137-41.
The Statist. 25 March 1905, p.521.
81. This was a respectable firm in Yokohama (K.A., Ms.22,025, Information Book).
82. B.B.A., PF305, Kuhn, Loeb & Co. to Lord Revelstoke, 9 March 1905; 
P.A.A.A., Abteilung I A, Japan 3, Finanzen, Bd.5, A.4095 dated 10 March 1905.
83. B.B.A., PF305, Baring Brothers to Kuhn, Loeb & Co., 20 March 1905.
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participation, Takahashi and the loan issue banks had already agreed to conduct the loan 
issue through the usual business channels: i.e. Parr’s Bank, the Hongkong Bank, the 
Yokohama Specie Bank and Kuhn, Loeb & Co..84 The loan issue banks refused to 
authorise Speyer Brothers as a loan issuer and their final decision was that Speyer 
Brothers should only be allowed to be an underwriter.85 Speyer Brothers did not accept 
this.86
The loan issue banks, in fact, paid more attention by far to an offer from two 
other groups of German banks. Without doubt the Japanese government aimed to spread 
out the loan issue markets to the Continent. Schiff, who understood that the German 
government would no longer be opposed to a Japanese government loan issue there, 
suggested to Takahashi that a Japanese government war loan issue could be made in 
Germany through Warburg in Hamburg. Schiff maintained close relations with Warburg 
- more than the usual business correspondence.87 At that time the Japanese government 
foreign loan issue became a delicate matter in Germany, because some of the eminent 
Berlin banks had substantial interests in the Russian government loan business, as shown 
previously. Schiff considered it expedient to ask Warburg in Hamburg, in conjunction 
with the Hongkong Bank’s Hamburg agent M. Brussel, to float the Japanese government 
loan in Germany.88
In addition to Warburg, the German bank group headed by the Deutsch-Asiatische 
Bank attempted to place the Japanese government war loan on the Berlin capital market.89 
They, with the consent of the German government, made a firm proposal to undertake
84. Ibid., Kuhn, Loeb & Co. to Lord Revelstoke, 9 March 1905.
85. Ibid., Lord Revelstoke to Kuhn, Loeb & Co., 23 March 1905.
86. Ibid., Kuhn, Loeb & Co. to Parr’s Bank, 28 March 1905.
87. They had filial relations (E. Rosenbaum & A.J. Sherman, M.M. Warburg & Co.. 
1798-1938 [1979], p.94).
88. B.B.A., PF305, Kuhn, Loeb & Co. to Lord Revelstoke, 10 March 1905. ‘We 
shall act jointly with the Hongkong Shanghai Bank branch as agents of the issuing houses 
in Hamburg’ (P.B.A., D6804, Max Warburg to Parr’s Bank, 25 March 1905).
89. B.B.A., PF305, Lord Lansdowne to Lord Revelstoke, 15 March 1905.
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£10,000,000 worth of the bonds out of the total amount (£30,000,000). This group 
included the leading German credit banks, such as the Deutsche Bank and the Dresdner 
Bank.90 The Hongkong Bank and the Deutsch-Asiatische Bank had maintained close 
relations since the Chinese government war indemnity loan issues in 1896 and 1898.
The Japanese government considered allocating £10,000,000 or even £15,000,000 
worth of the bonds to the Deutsch-Asiatische Bank group, but the London issue banks 
strenuously opposed it on the same terms as theirs.91 The London issue banks, pioneers 
of the Japanese government war loan business, did not see the necessity of inviting an 
additional partner and had full confidence in being able to place the present loan issue on 
the Anglo-American markets alone. The loan issue banks only authorised the 
Deutsch-Asiatische Bank group as underwriters and agents for the public subscriptions 
in Germany.92 The Deutsch-Asiatische Bank group, however, refusing to play such a 
secondary role,93 withdrew from the business.94
In consequence, the loan issue banks organised the public subscriptions in 
Germany through Warburg alone. Warburg, confirming that the attitude of the German 
Foreign Office was favourable, participated in the business as an agent for the public 
subscriptions in Hamburg.95 The names of the Continental agents for this loan issue were
90. Ibid., Baring Brothers to Kuhn Loeb & Co., 21 March 1905; F.0.46/602, the 
Hongkong Bank to F.A. Campbell, 27 March 1905. For the relations between the 
Hongkong Bank and the Deutsch-Asiatische Bank, see M. Miiller-Jabusch, Fiinfzig Jahre 
Deutsch-Asiatische Bank. 1890-1939 (Berlin, 1940), pp.206-8.
91. P.A.A.A., Abteilung I A, Japan 3, Finanzen, Bd., 5, A.4893, the Deutsche Bank 
to G.L. Klehmet, 23 March 1905; A.4816, 22 March 1905.
92. B.B.A., PF305, Lord Revelstoke to Kuhn, Loeb & Co., 21 March 1905; no.99, 
Komura to Hayashi, 25 March 1905 (N.G.B.. vol.38-2, p.59); P.A.A.A., Abteilung I 
A, Japan 3, Finanzen, Bd. 5, A.4816, dated 22 March 1905. Takahashi’s tentative plan 
was an offer for £100,000 to Speyer Brothers and for £300,000 to the Deutsch-Asiatische 
Bank group at a 2 3/4 percent commission (T.K.J.. vol.2, p.234).
93. B.B.A., PF305, Parr’s Bank to Kuhn, Loeb & Co., 23 March 1905; The 
Economist. 23 March 1905, p.486.
94. The Standard. 22 March 1905.
95. M.M. Warburg, Aus Meinen Aufzeichnungen (New York, 1952), p. 19; 
Rosenbaum & Sherman, M.M. Warburg & Co.. op. cit.. p. 101. Warburg also 
underwrote £1,000,000 of the bonds at a 1 1/2 percent commission.
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as follows:96
M.M. Warburg & Co. 
Amsterdamsche Bank 
Swiss Bankverein 
Caisse General 
Banque. d ’ Outremer 
Anglo-Osterreichische Bank
Hamburg
Amsterdam
Switzerland
Brussels
Brussels
Vienna.
Although the loan issue banks’ network thus covered most of the Continent except for 
France, it was still difficult for the Japanese government to effect a loan issue on the 
Continent with an independent loan issuer, not a subsidiary of the London issue banks.
The subscriptions started from 29 March 1905.97 The loan was oversubscribed 
elevenfold in London and sevenfold in New York.98 The total amount of applications in 
Hamburg reached £4,121,500." As shown in Table 6.5, the loan issue commission was 
significantly reduced this time. The loan issue banks, which now felt safe about Japan’s 
borrowing for the war, agreed to lower them to 5 1/2 percent. In addition, competition 
with Speyer Brothers and the German banks in the loan issue negotiations also helped to 
bring about this reduction. The Continental subsidiary loan issue banks took the 
underwriting for £2,210,000. Panmure Gordon & Co. underwrote a large amount of the 
loan, £8,690,000 (Table 6.6). Baring Brothers participated in the underwriting syndicate 
organised by Parr’s Bank for £500,000.100 Parr’s Bank itself underwrote £200,000 of the 
bonds. Baring Brothers and Cassel participated in the underwriting in New York for 
£500,000 respectively.101 The London Joint Stock Bank underwrote £50,000 of the 
bonds;102 J.S. Morgan & Co. £75,000;103 the Hongkong Bank £400,000104 and the Imperial
96. B.B.A., PF305, Parr’s Bank to Kuhn, Loeb & Co., 27 March 1905.
S.O.A.S.A., PP MS 14/23, Addis Diary, 23 March 1905.
M .T.Z.. vol. 12, p. 133.
". B.B.A., PF305, Warburg to Lord Revelstoke, 30 March 1905.
,0°. Ibid., f.109.
101. Ibid., Kuhn, Loeb & Co. to Baring Brothers, 24 March 1905.
102. L.J.S.B.A., Q 12, Board Minutes, 30 March 1905.
103. M.G.A., Ms.21,793, vol.3.
104. H.S.B.A., Board Minutes, 28 March 1905.
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Bank of Persia £25,000.105 As for the subscriptions the Chartered Bank applied for 
£250,000 of the bonds.106 The London Joint Stock Bank received an allotment for £30,000 
against an application for £100,000;107 the Imperial Bank of Persia for £5,000.108 It is 
worth noting that the National Provident Institution purchased £32,000 of the bonds.109 
This investment, made by an insurance company, meant that the Japanese government 
war bonds were now recognised as a respectable investment venture among conservative 
financial institutions in the City.
In the third war loan issue negotiations, the loan issue banks were confronted with 
keen competition from the German banks which had not occurred previously. Japan, 
since its first foreign loan issue in 1870, had depended mainly upon the London capital 
market for raising the funds, and London, therefore, had become established as the main 
market. But this time, the Japanese government approached the German market to float 
the loan as the eagerness of the Continental markets for Russian government loans had 
diminished.110
105. I.B.P.A., W2/1, Investment Ledger.
106. C.B.A., Extract from Board Minutes, 29 March 1905.
107. L.J.S.B.A., Q12, Board Minutes, 6 April 1905.
108. I.B.P.A., W2/1, Investment Ledger.
109. National Provident Institution Archives, Ms.20,274, Investment Ledger, vol.l.
110. B.B.A., PF305, Kuhn, Loeb & Co. to Baring Brothers, 30 March 1905.
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Table 6.4 Japanese Government’s Sources of Military Expenditure 
Budget for the Russo-Japanese War 
(¥ million; ¥ l=2s. l/2d.)
Budget Public loans 
and
borrowings
Transfer 
from Special 
Account
Others
Imperial Ordinance 
No.291 (1903) 156 131 25
First War 
Budget (1904) 380 280 30 70
Second War 
Budget (1905) 700 571 8 121
Outlay out of 
Budget in 1905 60 60
Third War 
Budget (1906) 450 450 - -
Total 1,746 1,492 63 191
(percent) (100) (85) (4) (11)
Source: M.T.Z.. vol.l. pp.228-29.
Table 6.5 Commission of 4 1/2 Percent Loan Issue 
(March 1905. London!
(percent)
Underwriting 2
Brokerage (placing
underwriting) 1/2
Brokerage (application) 1/4
Advertising 1/4
Coupon paying 29/30
Loan issue banks 1 8/15
Total 5 1/2
Source: W.B.A., D2469.
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Underwriter
(£)
Underwriting
amount
Underwriting
commission
(2%)
Brokerage
commission
(1/2%)*
Panmure Gordon 8,690,000 173,800 69,475
Hongkong Bank 1,600,000 32,000
Yokohama Specie Bank 900,000 18,000
Parr’s Bank 1,600,000 32,000
Continent 5,525
Warburg 1,000,000 20,000
Swiss Bankverein 500,000 10,000
Amsterdamsche 500,000 10,000
Banque d’ Outremer 100,000 2,000
Caisse Gdndrale 110,000 2,200
Total 15,000.000 300,000 75,000
Note: * 1/2 percent of the issue amount in London (£15,000,000).
Source: W.B.A., D2469.
6.3 4 1/2 Percent Loan Issue in July 1905
The Battle of Tsushima on 27 May 1905 paved the way for peace-making between Russia 
and Japan. Early in June Theodore Roosevelt, the President of the United States, played 
a leading part in the diplomatic negotiations for peace.111 On 8 July 1905 J. Komura, the 
Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs, left for the peace negotiations at Portsmouth [New 
Hampshire].
£
The outlook for peace seemed good in June 190J5 when Takahashi started 
negotiations on the fourth war loan issue. In order to meet deficits from the military 
expenditure budget in the financial year of 1905, the Japanese government decided to
1U. I.H. Nish, The Anglo-Japanese Alliance (1985), pp.293-97; Japanese Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, Komura Gaikoshi (History of the Diplomat Komura Jutarol (Tokyo, 
1966), pp.459-620.
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raise ¥300,000,000 (£30,625,000) by a further foreign loan.112 The Japanese government, 
always fearing the exhaustion of specie reserves abroad for the settlement of trade 
deficits, was keen to seek funds for the continuation of the war, reasoning also that, in 
the event of peace being concluded, these funds could be used for the military 
expenditure on the evacuations from Manchuria and for the redemption of domestic war 
bonds.
It was at this time that M. R. Morriss, the representative of Speyer Brothers, 
proposed to the Japanese Ministry of Finance the purchasing of Japanese government 5 
percent domestic bonds for between ¥200,000,000 (£20,416,666) and ¥300,000,000 
(£30,625,000).113 The Japanese government immediately sounded out Takahashi on the 
possibility of his arranging a new loan for between ¥150,000,000 (£15,312,500) and 
¥300,000,000 (£30,625,000) with the usual loan issue banks. The Japanese government 
was confident that should not the loan issue banks agree on the proposed loan issue, it 
would accept an offer from Speyer Brothers.114
It was barely two and a half months since the third war loan had been floated. 
Schiff reluctantly agreed to this prompt action.115 Considering the current enthusiasm for 
Japanese government bonds, he advised Takahashi to raise the loan issue as soon as 
possible.116 Lord Revelstoke and Cassel unwillingly acceded to this proposal.117 According 
to A. Levita, a partner of Panmure Gordon & Co. and known as ‘Willy Koch’s right- 
hand man’, the London issue banks were of the firm opinion that the intended loan for 
£30,000,000 might possibly be feasible, provided that ‘the Mediterranean horizon [the 
diplomatic tension in Morocco between France and Germany] clears’.118
112. T.K.J.. vol.2, pp.244-45.
113. S.I.D.. vol.5, pp.79-82.
114. T.K.J.. vol.2, pp.245-46.
115. IbkL, pp.247-48.
116. B.B.A., PF305, Kuhn, Loeb & Co. to Parr’s Bank, 19 June 1905.
117. Ibid., Lord Revelstoke to Kuhn, Loeb & Co., 19 June 1905; T. Davidson to Lord 
Revelstoke, 20 June 1905.
118. Ibid., Parr’s Bank to Takahashi, 19 June 1905. On the other hand, A.M.
(continued...)
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Takahashi’s initial idea was for a £30,000,000 loan to be placed equally in 
London, New York and Germany. This constrained the loan issue banks to include some 
eminent German banks in the operation.119 Fearing that Japan would overload the 
Anglo-American markets, Schiff strongly recommended that Takahashi should approach 
the Deutsch-Asiatische Bank through Warburg.120 From a diplomatic viewpoint, the 
Japanese government welcomed German banks’ full participation in the war loan issue.121
However, W.M. Koch, a partner of Panmure Gordon & Co. and a key figure of 
the previous Japanese government war loan issues, was unwilling to authorise any 
German banks as a loan issuer. It seems likely that he had an intention of placing a 
Japanese government loan on the Paris capital market after the war. He believed that 
Germany’s participation would discourage his ambitious plan.122 The London issue banks 
were also averse to Germany’s new participation.123 They were afraid of a reduction in 
their loan issue commission by sharing a loan issue with German banks. However, the 
London issue banks finally admitted Germany’s participation on the same terms as Kuhn, 
Loeb & Co.’s.124
Warburg introduced the Deutsch-Asiatische Bank to this business through Max 
von Schinckel, a Geschaftsinhaber (owner) of the Norddeutsche Bank and the 
Disconto-Gesellschaft.125 He was also a Geschaftsinhaber (owner) of the 
Deutsch-Asiatische Bank. The Deutsch-Asiatische Bank was set up in 1889 to boost 
German overseas banking in the Far East. The Bank had a composite character: most of
1I8(... continued)
Townsend, a Hongkong Bank London Manager, with his much surprise, informed the 
British Foreign Office of Japan’s intention (F.0.46/602, Campbell Memorandum, 27 
June 1905).
119. B.B.A., PF305, Takahashi to Parr’s Bank, received 21 June 1905.
12°. Ibid., Kuhn, Loeb & Co. to Lord Revelstoke, 21 June 1905.
121. Secret no. 11, Inoue to Komura, 31 March 1905 (N.G.B.. vol.38-2, pp.64-69).
122. T.K.J.. vol.2,£250.
123. B.B.A., PF305, Parr’s Bank to Takahashi, no date.
124. Ibid., Parr’s Bank to Takahashi, 23 June 1905.
125. Ibid., Warburg to Lord Revelstoke, 27 June 1905; P.A.A.A., Abteilung I A, 
Japan 3, Finanzen, Bd., 6, A. 11080 (26 June 1905), A. 11128 (27 June 1905).
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its stock being held by the major private and credit banks in Germany which constituted 
the Bank’s board of directors.126 Warburg and the Deutsch-Asiatische Bank, in 
combination, formed a syndicate for the flotation of the fourth Japanese government war 
loan in Germany. About half of the founders of the Deutsch-Asiatische Bank became 
involved in this operation (Table 6.7).
The other group, Mendelssohn, the Disconto-Gesellschaft, S. Bleichroder and the 
Berliner Handels-Gesellschaft, which had taken part in bringing out the Russian 
government loan in January 1905, declined to participate in the Japanese government 
loan issue.127 In 1906 A. Schoeller, a Geschaftsinhaber (owner) of the 
Disconto-Gesellschaft apologised to Takahashi for his conduct of 1905, saying that at that 
time he had had to be mindful of the financial relations with the Russian government.128 
Warburg became an independent issuer in Hamburg.129 By 4 July 1905 the German loan 
issue banks and Warburg provisionally agreed with the London issue banks on the 
placement of the loan for £10,000,000 in Germany.130
This loan issue, however, caused debate among German industrialists as to what 
extent the money raised there would be used for purchasing German manufactured goods. 
They were afraid that the Japanese government would promptly transfer the loan proceeds 
to London and purchase British military goods.131 In 1905 the total amount of the 
securities issued in Germany amounted to DM3,091 million (about £152 million),132 so 
the two Japanese government war loans of 1905 (July and November) issued in Germany 
for DM270,962,500 (£13,250,000) amounted to 8.8 percent of that total.
126. M. Miiller-Jabusch, op. cit.. pp.31-32; Riesser, op. cit.. pp.455-56.
,27. The Economist. 8 July 1905, p. 1124.
128. J.M.F.A., Mizumachi Papers, 5-8, no. 12, K. Takahashi to K. Saionji & Y. 
Sakatani, 25 December 1906.
129. M. Muller-Jabusch, op. cit.. pp.208-9.
13°. B.B.A., PF305, Baring Brothers to Kuhn, Loeb & Co., 4 July 1905.
131. The Economist. 15 July 1905, p. 1162.
132. A. Spiethoff, Die wirtschaftlichen Wechsellagen. vol.ii (Tubingen, 1955), Tafel 
3. The rate of exchange was fixed £1 at DM20.45 (M.T.Z.. vol. 12, p. 163).
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On 3 July Takahashi started the fourth war loan issue negotiations with the London 
issue banks. On 4 July they agreed on the following terms.133
These were practically identical to those of the third loan issue.
Baring Brothers joined the underwriting syndicate in London for £250,000 and 
formed the sub-underwriting syndicate for £189,000, including 26 members such as 
Cunlife Brothers, Wallance Brothers, Friihling & Goschen and so on. Baring Brothers 
also participated in the underwriting syndicate in New York for £335,000.134 Parr’s Bank 
underwrote £200,000 of the bonds;135 the London Joint Stock Bank £40,000;136 J.S. 
Morgan £50,000;137 the Hongkong Bank £300,000.138 Table 6.8 and Table 6.9 show the 
commission and underwriting in London.
The prospectuses were issued on 11 July and the public subscriptions started in 
London, the United States and Germany simultaneously. In addition to the original loan 
issuers: i.e. Kuhn, Loeb & Co., the National City Bank and the National Bank of 
Commerce, the following various financial institutions received public subscriptions in
133. G.K.S.. vol. 1, pp. 171-75.
134. B.B.A., PF305, f. 138, Underwriting Statement.
135. P.B.A. B11418, Board Minutes, 13 July 1905.
136. L.J.S.B.A., Q12, Board Minutes, 13 July 1905.
137. M.G.A., Ms.21,793, vol.3.
138. H.S.B.A., Board Minutes, 4 July 1905.
Rate of interest (nominal) 
Issue price
Issue amount
Yield at issue 
Borrowing period 
Security
Redemption
£30,000,000 (£10,000,000 in London,
New York and Germany respectively)
4 1/2 percent
90 percent to the public
86 3/4 percent to the government
5.0 percent
20 years
receipt of the second charge on the tobacco 
monopolies
the Japanese government should reserve the 
right to redeem at par, all or any of the 
bonds, at any time after 1910, on giving 6 
months’ previous notice.
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the United States:139
Old Colony Trust Co.
Kidder, Peabody and Co.
Lee, Higginson & Co.
Fidelity Trust Co.
Girard Trust Co.
Sailer and Stevenson 
Illinois Trust and Savings Bank 
Merchants Loan and Trust Co. 
Francis Brothers & Co.
A.G. Edwards & Sons 
Wells Fargo Nevada National Bank 
of San Francisco 
Anglo-Califomian Bank
Boston
Boston
Boston
Philadelphia
Philadelphia
Philadelphia
Chicago
Chicago
St. Louis 
St. Louis
San Francisco 
San Francisco.
The assessment of this loan issue was favourable everywhere: in London The 
Statist mentioned an optimistic view of the operation;140 in the United States Kidder 
Peabody & Co. was confident of immense success;141 in Berlin it was understood that the 
Germans could absorb the loan issue at whatever price they paid.142
The first simultaneous loan issue in the three major countries was successfully 
implemented. The loan was heavily oversubscribed by 10 times in London, 4 1/2 times 
in the United States and 10 times in Germany.143 Japanese government bonds had now 
become very popular especially in London, so much so that many shrewd premium 
hunters deceived the loan issue banks by applying several times over for small amounts.144 
The London Joint Stock Bank received an allotment for £30,000;145 the Imperial Bank of 
Persia for £2,000;146 Kleinworts for £14,900.147 Parr’s Bank’s profit, earned from this
139. The New York Prospectus in G.K.S.. vol.l, pp. 185-88.
14°. The Statist. 8 July 1905, pp.58-59.
141. B.B.A., PF305, Kidder Peabody & Co. to Baring Brothers, 10 July 1905.
142. The Economist. 8 July 1905, p. 1124.
143. M.T.Z.. vol. 12, pp. 174-75; The Economist. 22 July 1905, p. 1199; B.B.A., 
PF305, Kuhn Loeb & Co. to Baring Brothers, 11 July 1905 and Warburg to Baring 
Brothers, 12 July 1905.
144. The Statist. 15 July 1905, p. 105.
145. L.J.S.B.A., Q12, Board Minutes, 20 July 1905.
,46. I.B.P.A., W2/1, Investment Ledger.
147. K.A., Ms.22,105, Stocks Account Ledgers.
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operation, amounted to £75,537.148
Germany’s participation gave a considerable jolt to the established pattern of the 
Japanese government loan issues depending upon the Anglo-American markets, although 
London still retained a more or less leading role in the Japanese government loan issue 
negotiations. From a strictly economic point of view, this new policy of expanding the 
loan issue markets benefited the Japanese government, which was now able to obtain 
more favourable loan issue terms on the international capital markets.
Table 6.7 Amounts of 4 1/2 Percent Loan Issue (July 1905. Germany 1
(£000)
Bank Amount
Bank fur Handel und Industrie 
Bayerische Hypotheken und Wechsel Bank 
Bom und Busse 
Delbriick, Leo & Co.
Deutsch-Asiatische Bank 
Deutsche Bank 
Dresdner Bank
National Bank fur Deutschland
Norddeutsche Bank
Sal Oppenheim Jr. & Co.
A. Schaaffhausenscher Bankverein 
Jacob S.H. Stem 
M.M. Warburg & Co.
972
342
342
563
972
1,458
972
729
850
342
729
729
1,000
Total 10,000
Note: £1 = DM20.45.
Source : P.B.A., D6804, Agreement, 7 July 1905.
148. W.B.A., D2469.
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Table 6.8 Commission of 4 1/2 Percent Loan Issue ("July 1905. London)
(percent)
Underwriting 2
Brokerage (placing underwriting) 1/2
Brokerage (application)
Advertising
Coupon
Loan issue banks 1
1/4
1/4
233/240
127/240
Total 5 1/2
Source: W.B.A., D2469.
Table 6.9 London Issue Banks’ Underwriting (7ulv 1905. London!
(£)
Underwriting
syndicate
Underwriting
amount
Underwriting 
commission 
(2 percent)
Brokerage 
commission 
(1/2 percent)*
Panmure Gordon & Co. 
Switzerland 
Continent
6,000,000
25,000
125,000
Sub-total 6,150,000 123,000 50,000
Hongkong Bank 
Yokohama Specie Bank 
Parr’s Bank
1.375.000 
845,000
1.630.000
27,500
16,900
32,600
Total 10,000,000 200,000 50,000
Note: * 1/2 percent of the issue amount in London (£10,000,000).
Source: W.B.A., D2469.
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Table 6.10 Outstanding Amount of Japanese Government’s
Borrowings. 1901-1913
(1) (2) (3)
[Long-term borrowings]
(4) (5) (6)
[Short-term borrowings]
Year Domestic Foreign Sub­
total
Treasury Borrowing Total 
bills
Total/
General
account
revenue
(%)
1901 405 97 502 10 56 568 207.2
(100) (100) (100)
1902 433 97 530 10 44 584 196.6
(107) (100) (106)
1903 441 97 538 - 78 616 237.2
(109) (100) (107)
1904 661 312 973 35 70 1,078 329.4
(163) (322) (194)
1905 900 970 1,870 99 144 2,113 394.9
(222) (1000) (373)
1906 1,050 1,146 2,196 96 35 2,327 438.7
(259) (1181) (437)
1907 1,089 1,166 2,255 22 28 2,305 268.9
(269) (1202) (449)
1908 1,063 1,166 2,229 37 28 2,294 288.4
(262) (1202) (444)
1909 1,417 1,166 2,583 19 49 2,651 391.3
(350) (1202) (515)
1910 1,203 1,447 2,650 10 120 2,780 413.2
(297) (1492) (528)
1911 1,146 1,437 2,583 50 108 2,741 417.3
(283) (1481) (515)
1912 1,116 1,457 2,573 35 142 2,750 400.2
(276) (1502) (513)
1913 1,055 1,529 2,584 - 102 2,686 372.1
(260) (1576) (515)
Notes: ¥ million (¥l=2s. l/2d.);
End of the Financial Year; 
(3)=(l)+(2); (6)=(3)+(4)+(5). 
Source: M.H.S.K.T.. p. 158.
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6.4 4 Percent Loan Issue in November 1905
On 5 September 1905 Komura and S. Witte, the representative of the Russian 
government, signed the Russo-Japanese Peace Treaty at Portsmouth.149 This Treaty was 
not entirely satisfactory to the Japanese who expected considerable indemnity money from 
Russia as had been the case with the Sino-Japanese War.
The Japanese government was left with enormous national debts mainly from the 
huge military expenditure during the war. In 1905 the total government long-term debts 
outstanding amounted to ¥1,870,386,000 (£190,935,257), ¥899,976,000 [£91,872,550] 
in domestic and ¥970,410,000 [£99,062,687] abroad (also see Table 6.10); the foreign 
debts outstanding amount rose as high as 9.9 times the figure in 1901 and the ratio of the 
borrowing to the total government general account revenue remained at over 394 percent 
in 1905.
In September 1905 the Japanese government sounded out Takahashi on the 
possibility of a new 4 percent conversion loan issue in Britain, the United States, 
Germany and France simultaneously, for redeeming the first and the second 6 percent 
foreign war loans for £22,000,000 and the fifth 6 percent domestic Exchequer bills for 
¥100,000,000 (£10,208,333). The Japanese government instructed him to produce an 
unsecured 4 percent loan issue for between ¥300,000,000 (£30,625,000) and 
¥400,000,000 (£40,833,333) at more than 90 percent.150
Since 1903 the Japanese government had desired to float a loan on the Paris 
capital market.151 In 1904 M. Arakawa, Japanese Consul in London, pointed out that 
probable competition between British and French financiers would restrict the London
149. G.P. Gooch & H. Temperley (eds.), British Documents on the Origins of the 
War 1898-1914. vol.iv (1929), pp. 107-11.
15°. J.N.D.L., Inoue Papers, 686-8, Takahashi to T. Katsura and Sone, 21 September 
1905. According to Takahashi’s autobiography, the amount of the domestic bonds was 
¥200,000,000 (T.K.J.. vol. 2, p.281).
151. J.M.F.A.A., 3-4-4-25, Secret no.5, I. Motono to Komura, 24 March 1903.
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issue banks’ initiative in loan issue negotiations and allow Japan to obtain more 
favourable loan issues. He suggested inviting the Paris Rothschilds to a Japanese 
government loan issue.1521. Motono, the Japanese Minister in Paris, was, on the other 
hand, pessimistic in this regard, learning that the Paris Rothschilds had declared that 
during the Russo-Japanese War no Japanese government loan issues in France would have 
been feasible. But he was confident that this attitude would change after the war.153
Meanwhile, Takahashi himself intended to establish a channel to the Paris capital 
market through Koch. Koch, through his kinship, introduced Takahashi to M. de
Vemeuil, Syndic des Agents de Change (Paris Stock Exchange), and M. Rouvier, the
\
French Minister of Finance.154 On 28 March 1905 Takahashi had an interview with 
Vemeuil and he gave Takahashi a message from Rouvier to the effect that he [Rouvier] 
wished to build up much closer economic relations with Japan after the Russo-Japanese 
War.155 This action of Rouvier’s obviously meant that the French government no longer 
objected to a Japanese government loan issue on the Paris capital market once the peace 
negotiations between Japan and Russia were concluded.
In July 1905 Takahashi contacted the French government,156 since without 
governmental authorisation it was impossible to make any foreign loan issues there. On 
16 September Takahashi and Koch discussed the new Japanese government loan issue 
with Vemeuil and Jacque de Giinzbourg, the Head of Giinzbourg et Cie and of the 
Societe Gendrale de Credit Industriel et Commercial. Takahashi made the following 
tentative proposals for the loan issue:157
152. Secret no.6, Arakawa to Komura, 16 September 1904 (N.G.B.. vol. 37-2, p. 176).
153. Secret no.l, Motono to Komura, 5 January 1905 (ibid.. vol.38-2, pp.46-48).
154. T.K.J.. vol.2, pp.272-73.
155. J.N.D.L., Inoue Papers, 686-8, Takahashi to Katsura & Sone, 21 September 
1905.
156. No.74, Takahashi to Sone, 15 July 1905 (N.G.B.. vol. 38-2, p.89).
157. T.K.J.. vol.2, pp.285-87.
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Rate of interest (nominal) 
Government proceeds
Issue amount £50,000,000
(£24,200,000 in Britain and the United States 
for redemption of the first and second foreign 
war loans of 1904;
£25,800,000 in Germany and France for 
redemption of the fourth and fifth domestic 
war Exchequer bills)
4 percent
more than 90 percent.
Vemeuil and Giinzbourg agreed on most points saying, however, that it remained 
difficult for the French government to authorise the new Japanese government loan issue 
before the Russian government loan issue which had been pending since March 1905. 
Although Takahashi and Koch confirmed Rouvier’s approval for placing the Japanese 
government loan on the Paris capital market, French diplomatic relations with Russia 
greatly influenced the progress of the Japanese government loan issue in Paris.158
In addition to the channel through Koch, Takahashi, through the London 
Rothschilds, approached the Paris Rothschilds. During the Russo-Japanese War the 
London Rothschilds had never became involved in the Japanese government war loan 
business except as underwriters. It was a long-established policy for them to avoid war 
lendings.159 Following the Russo-Japanese War Takahashi asked the London Rothschilds 
to introduce him to the Paris Rothschilds for a new loan issue in Paris.160 The Rothschilds 
were in a paramount position to form an international loan issue consortium on the basis 
of their strong family ties covering most of the main European cities: Frankfurt-on-Main, 
Vienna, Paris, Naples and London.161
A series of correspondence between the London and the Paris Rothschilds
158. No. 183, Motono to Katsura, 20 September 1905 (N.G.B.. vol.38-2, p.94); 
R.A.L., XI/101/68, the Paris Rothschilds to the London Rothschilds, 20 September 
1905.
159. J.N.D.L., Inoue Papers, 686-9, Takahashi to Inoue, 27 September 1905. F. 
Stem, Gold and Iron: Bismarck. Bleichroder. and the Building of the German Empire 
(1977 [reprinted 1987]), p.73.
160. T.K.J.. vol.2, pp.288-89.
161. Burk, Morgan Grenfell, op. cit.. p.31.
250
unequivocally indicates their involvement in the Japanese government loan issue. In the 
middle of September 1905 the London Rothschilds informed the Paris Rothschilds of the 
Japanese government’s intention to place a new loan in Paris. The Paris Rothschilds of 
course showed ‘un grand interet (a great interest)’ but also pointed out difficulties in this 
business: firstly, political discord between France and Germany might prevent a 
simultaneous loan issue in France and Germany; secondly, the imminent Russian 
government loan issue in France would profoundly influence the progress of the Japanese 
government loan issue, since the French were much more familiar with Russia; thirdly, 
it was indispensable to obtain the French government’s authorisation for a new loan issue 
in Paris.162 The Paris Rothschilds also emphasised that they were not able to undertake 
any Japanese government loan in Paris without the London Rothschilds’ participation in 
the London issue.163 The London Rothschilds eventually agreed to be included in the new 
Japanese government loan in London as one of the loan issue banks.164
However, the London issue banks were unanimously opposed to the new Japanese 
government loan issue. They felt that Japan had already borrowed a huge amount, and 
saw no reason to borrow further even after the war. At this stage Takahashi found no 
way of completing the loan issue negotiations with them.
Notwithstanding Takahashi’s successful approach to the Paris capital market, it 
is clear that the Japanese government could launch no operation before the Russian 
government loan issue. The Japanese government loan issue in Paris depended entirely 
upon the progress of the Russian government loan issue negotiations.165 Furthermore, until 
the end of September, nothing had been decided on the German banks’ participation in
162. R.A.L., XI/101/68, the Paris Rothschilds to the London Rothschilds, 13 
September 1905.
163. Ibid., 15 September 1905.
164. B.B.A., PF305, Whalley to Kuhn, Loeb & Co., 25 October 1905; J.N.D.L., 
Inoue Papers, 686-9, op. cit.
165. R.A.L., XI/101/69, the Paris Rothschilds to the London Rothschilds, 3 October 
1905.
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this loan issue.166 Takahashi’s tentative plan for the loan issue in London, New York, 
Germany and Paris was as follows:167
Total issue amount 
Present issue amount
Rate of interest (nominal) 
Government proceeds 
Borrowing period
£50,000,000
£25,000,000 (the other half of the amount 
was to be carried out in the future)
Paris £12,500,000
London £ 6,250,000
New York £ 3,125,000
Germany £ 3,125,000
4 percent 
90 percent
either between 10 and 20 years or between 
10 and 25 years.
However, the London issue bankfagreed to issue the new loan and Takahashi 
started the negotiations. Interest in Japanese government bonds was still high everywhere 
and the loan issue banks wanted as large a share of the new loan as possible. The major 
problem in the loan issue negotiations was how to distribute the issue amount to the 
members equitably. Lord Revelstoke, in fact, feared that the inclusion of the Paris capital 
market would lead ‘either to a diminution in the amount available for London, New York 
and Germany, or possibly to the transfer of the German interest to Paris’.168 The London 
issue banks were of the firm opinion that Kuhn, Loeb & Co.’s and Germany’s shares 
should be reduced.169 Kuhn, Loeb & Co. was, for its part, dissatisfied with such an 
inequitable allocation.170 Warburg would have great difficulty in persuading the German 
loan issue banks unless the share of the German banks’ participation were equivalent to 
that of New York issue banks’.
On 14 November Kuhn, Loeb & Co. asked the London issue banks to postpone
166. The Economist. 30 September 1905, p. 1552.
167. B.B.A., PF305, Memorandum between Whalley and Baring Brothers, 1 
November 1905; Whalley to Kuhn, Loeb & Co., 25 October 1905.
168. Ibid., Lord Revelstoke to J. Schiff, 29 September 1905.
169. Ibid., Baring Brothers to Kuhn, Loeb & Co., 3 November 1905.
17D. Ibid., Kuhn, Loeb & Co. to Parr’s Bank, 4 November 1905.
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the loan issue for the time because it wanted to negotiate its share of the new loan issue,171 
although the Japanese government wished for an immediate conclusion.172 Yet the London 
issue banks were about to launch the immediate loan issue in London, Germany and Paris 
alone, excluding New York.173 They informed Kuhn, Loeb & Co. that they were unable 
to increase the share to Kuhn, Loeb & Co., and finally it acquiesced.174 However, as the 
demand for the Japanese government bonds in the United States was limited and their 
quotation prices on the New York Stock Exchange were lower than in London, the 
Japanese government war bonds often flowed out from the United States to Britain.175 
The fact that the bonds, even issued in New York, were sterling ones accelerated their 
outflow to Britain.176 It was revealed in 1907 that most of the first 6 percent war bonds, 
issued in London and New York, were in British investors’ hands (Table 6.11).
These negotiations revealed that an international loan issue consortium was 
vulnerable to the entangled interests of the members involved and the different market 
circumstances. Once the Paris capital market was opened to Japanese government loan 
issues, the position of the New York capital market became relatively insignificant. 
Available funds for foreign investment in the New York of that time was nowhere near 
the level of London and Paris. Paris had retained the second place in the world’s financial 
markets. It was certain that the Japanese government could raise much cheaper money 
there than in New York. Now the London issue banks, as well as the Japanese 
government, turned more of their attention to the Paris capital market.
The Russian government loan issue negotiations made no progress. In the middle 
of October, the Russian government called a meeting in St Petersburg on the pending
171. Ibid., Kuhn, Loeb & Co. to Baring Brothers, 14 November 1905.
172. Ibid., Parr’s Bank to Kuhn, Loeb & Co., 15 November 1905.
m. Ibid., Baring Brothers to Kuhn, Loeb & Co., 14 November 1905.
174. Ibid., Baring Brothers to Kuhn, Loeb & Co., 20 November 1905.
175. Ibid., Whalley to Kuhn, Loeb & Co., 11 November 1905.
176. All the Japanese government loans issued during 1904 and 1904 were sterling 
loans. Their interest and principal were paid at the fixed rates of exchange.
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new loan issue. It was found that the international consortium banks could not readily 
agree to the Russian government’s proposal.177 As a result of this disagreement, the new 
Russian government loan was eventually to be issued in the following year.178 The 
diplomatic hinderance towards the Japanese government loan issue in Paris was removed.
Hearing rumours of the postponement of the Russian government loan issue, early 
in November the Japanese government ordered Motono to discuss with Rouvier an 
immediate issue of the Japanese government loan on the Paris capital market.179 The 
French government agreed to issue the Japanese government loan before the Russian 
one180 and the Russian government had no objection to this.181
In the final stage Takahashi had an interview with the Paris Rothschilds on the 
loan issue in Paris.182 On 15 November Takahashi and Koch called at ‘Rue Laffitte’.183 
Meyer Alphonse de Rothschild had died in May 1905184 and the whole burden of the Paris 
Rothschilds’ direction fell upon James de Rothschild, a nephew of Meyer Alphonse de 
Rothschild, because Edouard de Rothschild, the Head of the Paris Rothschilds, was ill.185 
In these negotiations Takahashi and the Paris Rothschilds agreed on the following outline 
of the loan issue:186
177. No.347, M. Boutiron to Rouvier, 23 October 1905; no.361, ibid., 27 October 
1905 (D.D.F.. T  serie, vol.viii, p. 105 and pp. 122-23).
178. No. 14, Rouvier to Boutiron, 12 January 1906 (ibid.. p.517).
179. T.K.J.. vol.2, pp.294-95; no.228, Katsura to Motono, 4 November 1905 
(N.G.B.. vol.38-2, pp. 94-95).
18°. No.203, Motono to Katsura, 13 November 1905 (ibid.. p.95).
181. A.M.A.E., N.S.53, M.A. Nelidoff to President, 17 November 1905.
182. R. A.L., XI/101/69, the Paris Rothschilds to the London Rothschilds, 9 November 
1905.
183. R.A.L., XI/176/47, the London Rothschilds to the Paris Rothschilds, 13 
November 1905.
184. Obituary of Baron Alphonse de Rothschild (The Economist. 3 June 1905, p.918).
185. B.B.A., PF305, Extract from Lord Revelstoke’s Letter to E. Noetzlin, 15 
November 1905.
186. R.A.L., XI/101/69, the Paris Rothschilds to the London Rothschilds, 16 
November 1905; T.K.J.. vol.2, p.295.
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Issue amount
Sale price (to the Paris Rothschild) 
Rate of exchange 
Date of the issue
half an amount of the total issue 
89 1/2 percent to the Paris Rothschilds 
£1 to Fr25-25 
within November 1905.
Subsequently, the Paris Rothschilds came to terms with the banks engaged in the 
Russian government loan business187 and had a conference to co-ordinate a smooth 
placement of the Japanese government loan on the market.188 Vemeuil had approached the 
Credit Lyonnais and obtained its assurance to collaborate with the Paris Rothschilds in 
the forthcoming Japanese government loan issue, although the Crddit Lyonnais had 
declined to become the chief issuer in Paris because of its close relations with Russia.189 
As shown in Table 6.15, the two large banques de depots (the Credit Lyonnais and the 
Comptoir National d’Escompte), which had been leading members of the pending Russian 
government loan issue syndicate, decided to participate in the Japanese government loan 
issue with the Paris Rothschilds.190 Once the French government removed the restriction 
on a Japanese government loan business, many Paris financiers began to take it up 
openly, deeming it most advantageous.191
According to Addis, from 15 November the Hongkong Bank, with ‘usual worry’, 
started underwriting for this loan issue.192 The London issue banks accepted most of the 
agreement which Takahashi and the Paris Rothschilds had reached,193 and authorised the 
Paris Rothschilds as the principal issuer in Paris. On 24 November the London issue 
banks, Kuhn, Loeb & Co. and Warburg agreed to undertake the loan issue.194 The
187. R. A.L. XI/101/69, the Paris Rothschilds to the London Rothschilds, 2 November
1905.
188. B.B.A., PF305, Extract from Noetzlin’s letter, 14 November 1905.
189. J.N.D.L., Inoue Papers, 686-9, op. cit.; A.M.F., F30-376, Ministbredes Finances 
to Vemeuil, 1 October 1905; R.A.L., XI/101/69, the Paris Rothschilds to the London 
Rothschilds, 6 October 1905.
19°. Ibid., the Paris Rothschilds to the London Rothschilds, 25 November 1905.
191. Takahashi clearly understood this point (Inoue Papers, 686-8, op. cit.).
192. S.O.A.S.A., PP MS 14/23, Addis Diary, 15 November 1905.
193. B.B.A., PF305, Parr’s Bank to Kuhn Loeb & Co., 15 November 1905.
194. T.K.J.. vol.2, pp.296-97; Kuhn, Loeb & Co. told Baring Brothers that ‘the result
(continued...)
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following contract between the Japanese government, Parr’s Bank, the Hongkong Bank, 
the Yokohama Specie Bank, the London Rothschilds and the Paris Rothschilds was 
made:195
Issue amount
Issue purpose
Rate of interest (nominal) 
Issue price
Yield at issue 
Borrowing period 
Security 
Redemption
£50,000,000
present issue amount should be £25,000,000 
(other £25,000,000 to be reserved for a 
future issue for the redemption of the 6 
percent foreign loans of 1904)
£12,000,000 in Paris 
£6,500,000 in London 
£3,250,000 in New York196 
£3,250,000 in Germany 
redemption for the 6 percent domestic war 
Exchequer bills 
4 percent
90 percent to the public 
88 percent to the government
4.4 percent 
25 years 
nil
the Japanese government should reserve the 
right to redeem at par, all or any of the 
bonds, at any time after 1921, on giving 6 
months’ previous notice.
The market organisation of this loan issue was very intricate: first, the London 
issue banks and the Paris Rothschilds should purchase the bonds for £13,000,000 and 
£12,000,000 respectively from the Japanese government; of the £13,000,000 of the 
London issue banks, the £3,250,000 respectively should be sold to Kuhn, Loeb & Co. 
and the German loan issue banks; Kuhn, Loeb & Co. should pay a 1/2 percent 
commission to Baring Brothers, and the German loan issue banks should pay a 1/2
194(.. .continued)
is not satisfactory to us ... but in view of Mr. Takahashi’s earnest request not to delay 
the negotiations we yielded this time’ (B.B.A., PF305, 21 November 1905).
195. Ibid., ff. 83-88, Agreement between the London Issuing Syndicate and Kuhn Loeb 
& Co..
m. £250,000, out of £3,250,000 in Germany, was ceded to the loan issue in New 
York (M.T.Z.. vol. 12, p. 187).
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percent commission in total to Baring Brothers and the London issue banks;197 the Paris 
Rothschilds should pay a 1/2 percent commission to Panmure Gordon & Co..198
As far as the London issue was concerned, the whole amount of £6,500,000 was 
underwritten at a 1 1/2 percent commission (Table 6.12 and Table 6.13). Parr’s Bank 
underwrote £200,000 of the bonds;199 Baring Brothers £250,000;200 the Hongkong Bank 
£193,000;201 the London Joint Stock Bank £40,000;202 J.S. Morgan & Co. £20,000.203
At that time underwriting was already regarded as sufficiently sound and 
remunerative to financial institutions. Notwithstanding Lord Rothschild’s (Nathaniel 
Meyer Rothschild’s) censure,204 the London Rothschilds themselves organised an 
underwriting syndicate. This underwriting list included many companies or persons firmly 
linked with them such as South African financial groups, merchant banks, merchants and 
stockbrokers.205
The prospectuses were issued on 27 November and the public subscriptions were 
carried out simultaneously in London, New York, Germany and Paris.206 In London ‘a 
giant rush for the loan’ took place207 and the subscriptions were oversubscribed by 28 
times (Table 6.14). The Parr’s Bank general meeting depicted the subscriptions as ‘a 
record in itself in 1905.208 The subscriptions in New York were also oversubscribed by 
5 times and those in Germany by 10 times.209 The Hongkong Bank was allotted
197. B.B.A., PF305, ff.83-88.
198. A.N., 132/AQ/69, B-13-1, Panmure Gordon to the Paris Rothschilds, 5 January
1906.
199. P.B.A., B11418, Board Minutes, 30 November 1905.
”  B.B.A., PF305, f.145.
301. H.S.B.A., Board Minutes, 5 December 1905.
202. L.J.S.B.A., Q12, Board Minutes, 30 November 1905.
”  M.G.A., Ms.21,793, vol.3.
204. See chapter 2.
205. R.A.L., XI/111/33, Underwriting List.
“  B.B.A., PF305, ff.68-69.
207. S.O.A.S.A., PP MS 14/23, Addis Diary, 28 November 1905.
208. P.B.A., B110201, General Meeting Minutes, 25 January 1906.
"  M.T.Z.. vol. 12, p.218; B.B.A., PF305, Kuhn, Loeb & Co. to Parr’s Bank, 28
November 1905.
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£100,000;210 the Imperial Bank of Persia £3,000;2n the London Joint Stock Bank £20,000 
against its application for £100,000.212 Parr’s Bank earned the £34,958 profit from this 
loan issue;213 its profit (£209,632) earned from the three Japanese government loan issues 
during 1905 amounted to 27.3 percent of its annual gross profit (£769,000).
In Paris there were no public subscriptions. The syndicate purchased the whole 
issue amount of the loan and placed it directly to their clients through ‘guichets 
(counters)’.214 As indicated in Table 6.15, the Paris Rothschilds established the ‘syndicate 
de prise ferme et de placement’,215 which encompassed eminent banques de depots and 
banques d’affaires such as the Credit Lyonnais, the Comptoir National d’Escompte, the 
Socidte Generate, the Societd Gdnerale de Credit Industriel et Commercial and the 
Banque de Paris. The ‘ferme’ (to take the loan firm) was a 1.5664 percent and the 
‘placement’ (to place the loan) a l l / 2  percent commission. The shares of the Credit 
Lyonnais and the Paris Rothschilds in the placement were particularly larger than others. 
In Paris, the loan issue banks had to pay some charges to manipulate the press and 
political parties to smooth the placement.216 The 3.8164 percent loan issue commission 
in Paris was a little cheaper than in London. On 29 December 1905 the French Minister 
of Finance admitted quotation of the portion of the Japanese government loan issued in
21°. H.S.B.A., Board Minutes, 5 December 1905.
2U. I.B.P.A., W2/1, Investment Ledger.
212. L.J.S.B.A., Q12, Board Minutes, 30 November and 5 December 1905.
213. W.B.A., D2469.
214. The direct placement through a ‘guichet (counter)’ was the placement of bonds 
which loan issuers took directly to other banks or their customers. In France this method 
became the preferred channel to place bonds (E. Baldy, Les banques d’affaires en France 
depuis 1900 [Paris, 1922], p. 83).
215. Syndicat de prise ferme et de placement took the loan issue amount fully or partly 
at a fixed price from the borrower at their own risk, that is to say, it directly purchased 
a full or a certain part of the issue amount and subsequently carried out the placement. 
The profit of the syndicate came from a difference between the purchase and the 
placement prices, (ibid.. pp.64-67).
216. A.N, 132/AQ/69, B-13-1/8.
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Paris for Fr300,000,000 on ‘la cote officielle’ of the Paris Stock Exchange.217 As for the 
subscriptions in Germany, Table 6.17 shows the share of the German loan issue banks.
In the loan issue of November 1905 the Japanese government finally organised 
a loan issue operation in the Paris capital market. During the Russo-Japanese War such 
a facility had been totally denied to Japan, and therefore it had had to rely excessively 
upon the Anglo-American markets.218 This ingress into the Paris capital market led the 
Japanese government to establish a new pattern of foreign loan issues, one which 
Takahashi’s successors would follow in the future, of counting upon simultaneous loan 
issue markets. Now the Japanese government became relatively independent of the 
London financiers’ strong influence and was able to pursue the most favourable loan issue 
terms on the international capital markets. As a result, it was able to float the loan at the 
minimised commission, about 4 percent (Table 6.12 and 6.16), because of the element 
of competition among financiers involved in loan issue negotiations.
217. A.M.F., F30-377, Ministbre des Finances to Syndic des Agents de Change, 29 
December 1905.
218. Commercial & Financial Chronicle, vol.lxxix (1904), p.2174.
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Table 6.11 Main Position of First 6 Percent Bonds in 1907
Country Amount(£)
France 394,875
Germany 177,075
Italy 115,550
Belgium 223,025
Holland 99,500
U.S.A. 4,650
Britain 8,706,875
Japan 50,000
Note: Based on the interest payment at the Yokohama Specie Bank in
1907;
Bonds were issued in June 1904 in London and New York for 
£ 10,000,000.
Source: J.M.F.A., Shoda Papers, 28-6.
Table 6.12 Commission of 4 Percent Loan Issue (November 1905. London!
(percent)
Underwriting 1 1/2
Brokerage (placing
underwriting) 1/2
Brokerage (application) 1/4
Advertising 1/4
Loan issue Banks 1 1/2
Total 4
Source: W.B.A., D2469.
260
Table 6.13 London Issue Banks’ Underwriting (November 1905. London)
(£)
Underwriting Underwriting Underwriting Brokerage
syndicate amount commission commission
(1 1/2%) (1/2%)*
Panmure Gordon 
London Rothschilds 
Hongkong Bank 
Yokohama Specie Bank 
Parr’s Bank
2.375.000
1.125.000 
1,000,000
700,000
1.300.000
35,625
16,875
15,000
10.500
19.500
32,500
Total 6,500,000 97,500 32,500
Note: * 1/2 percent of the issue amount in London (£6.500.0001. 
Source: W.B.A.. D2469.
Table 6.14 Aoolication and Allotment (November 1905. London!
Loan issuer Applications
(£)
Allotment
(£)
Allotment
(number)
Parr’s Bank 
Hongkong Bank 
Yokohama Specie Bank 
London Rothschilds
77,000,660
51,604,600
28,330,700
25,803,550
2,878,500
1,410,100
1,295,600
915,800
28,789
13,509
15,158
3,223
Total 182,739,510 6,500,000 60,679
Source: H.S.B.A., LOHI/47.
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Table 6.15 4 Percent Loan Issue (November 1905. Paris') 
(Fr; F rl= 9  l/2d.)
[Ferme] [Placement]
Loan issue bank Amount Benefit
(1.5664%)
Amount Benefit
(1.5%)
Credit Lyonnais 40,000,000 626,560 97,565,000 1,463,475
Vemes & Cie 30,000,000 469,920 18,309,000 274,635
Comptoir d’Escompte 20,000,000 313,280 32,282,500 484,237.5
Societe Generale de 20,000,000 313,280 32,282,500 484,237.5
Credit Industriel
et Commercial 10,000,000 156,640 6,631,000 99,465
Banque Frangaise 7,000,000 109,648 4,000,000 60,000
Banque de Paris 56,500,000 885,016 24,430,000 366,450
Syndicat des Agents 21,000,000 328,944 21,000,000 315,000
Participants 12,000,000 187,968
M.M. Rothschilds 83,500,000 1,307,944 63,500,000 952,500
Total 300,000,000 4,699,200 300,000,000 4,500,000
Source: A.N., 132/AQ/69, B-13-1/8, Syndicat Emprunt Japonais 4% (1905).
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Table 6.16 Syndicate Account of 4 Percent Loan Issue
(November 1905. Paris')
Payment to the Japanese government 
(deducting the interest)
Commission to Panmure Gordon 
Various charges 
Commission (placement)
Syndicate profit (ferme)
(%)
88.5
(0.5)
(0.2)
(1.5)
(1.6)
Amount (Fr)
265,584,000
1.509.000 
709,539.90
4.500.000 
4,699,200
(Commissions total) (3.8)
Total 92.3 277,001,739.90
Proceeds of the bonds (Fr300,000,000) 
Half yearly interest from 1 January 1906 
Other interests
89.9
2.0
0.4
269,700,000
6,036,000
1,265,739.90
Total 92.3 277,001,739.90
Note: Frl =9 l/2d.
Source: A.N., 132/AQ/70, B-14-1/4.
Table 6.17 Amounts of 4 Percent Loan Issue (November 1905. Germany)
(£)
Loan issue bank Amount
Bank fur Handel und Industrie 315,900
Bayerische Hypotheken und Wechsel Bank 111,150
Bom und Busse 111,150
Delbriick, Leo & Co. 182,975
Deutsch-Asiatische Bank 315,900
Deutsche Bank 473,850
Dresdner Bank 315,900
National Bank fur Deutschland 236,925
Norddeutsche Bank 276,250
Sal Oppenheim Jr. & Co. I l l ,  150
A. Schaaffhausenscher Bankverein 236,925
Jacob S.H. Stem 236,925
M.M. Warburg & Co. 325,000
Total 3,250,000
Note: £1=DM20.45.
Source : P.B.A., D6804, Agreement, 24 November 1905.
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Chart 6.1 Highest Prices of First 6 Percent Bond in London and New York 
(August-November 1904. and March and June 1905)
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Sources: London Stock Exchange Daily Official List: Commercial & Financial
Chronicle.
6.5 Conclusion
In the 4 percent loan issue of 1905, the loan issue markets for the Japanese government 
eventually covered not only London, New York and Germany but also Paris. Now the 
Japanese government could move freely in pursuing the most favourable loan issue terms 
on the international capital markets. For this market expansion, the banks with Far 
Eastern and Japanese connections, such as the Hongkong Bank, Parr’s Bank and the 
Yokohama Specie Bank, did not take the initiative in linking the main world’s capital 
markets. Their operations did not cover such a far-reaching area and their power of 
access to the international capital markets was, at this time, limited. The merchant banks
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managed the expansion of the markets mainly on their own business relations.
The main motive, for the part of the Japanese government, in its expansion of the 
loan issue markets obviously lay in the desire to improve the unfavourable loan issue 
terms resulting mainly from the over-dependence on the Anglo-American markets. The 
Japanese government attempted to gain access to other financiers and markets in Germany 
and France. This background of competition led to the reduction in London’s primacy 
in Japanese government loan operations.
The expansion of the loan issue markets, however, produced critical discord 
among the loan issue banks in fixing loan issue prices, which reflected different market 
conditions in countries. In addition, the Japanese government had to take diplomatic 
situations into consideration when it launched a loan issue in France where the 
government invariably regarded foreign loan issues as a kind of a diplomatic implement. 
The expansion of the loan issue market necessarily made the Japanese government pay 
more attention to diplomatic matters which it had not fully experienced so far in the loan 
issues on the Anglo-American markets.
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CHAPTER 7 
LOAN ISSUES 
AFTER THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR
The Japanese economy after the Russo-Japanese War maintained a marked growth in the 
formation of fixed capital. The First Saionji Cabinet (1906-1908) increased national 
expenditure on several governmental undertakings: the expansion of armaments; the 
nationalisation and the new construction of railways; the extension of steelworks and the 
telephone. In contrast with the First Katsura Cabinet (1901-1906), which made an effort 
to redeem the national debt, this First Saionji Cabinet financed these undertakings 
hurriedly by both domestic loans and increased taxation.1 As a result, the Japanese 
government came to pay an immense sum on the national debt. As shown in Table 7.1, 
the expenditure related to the national debts in the government general account rose 
rapidly from 1906.
The increase of government expenditure led to the increased imports and caused 
severe trade deficits. In fact, S. Matsuo, the Governor of the Bank of Japan, warned that 
the Bank’s gold reserves would probably be depleted within a few years.2 It was 
imperative, therefore, that the Japanese government should secure gold, in any way, for 
settling the trade deficits. The imposition of a newly revised tariff of 1906 attempted to 
conserve gold by restricting rising imports.3 However, the Japanese government came 
to consider the reduction of interest payments on foreign debts by the conversion of 
outstanding issues to new issues bearing smaller coupons.
Japan, now on the verge of becoming a heavy-debtor country, was encouraged to 
follow this course. From the standpoint of debt burden by country, represented by public
\  M.T.Z.. vol.l, pp.259-72; T. Nakamura, Meiji-Taishoki no Keizai (Japanese 
Economy 1867-1925^ (Tokyo, 1985), pp.89-91.
2. N.G.H.S.. vol.2, p. 194.
3. F .0.371/271, H. Lowther to Lord Grey, 22 January 1907.
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debt per head of population, the rate at which Japan’s debt burden multiplied from £1.2 
in 1900 to £5.2 in 1910 was remarkable.4 British diplomats closely monitored this 
financial difficulty in Japan: in 1906 F. Lindley’s report distinctly raised the question of 
whether Japan was able to maintain its financial equilibrium without further foreign loan 
issues.5
This chapter will examine two Japanese government conversion loan issues in 
London and Paris after the Russo-Japanese War. As a consequence of the rise of the Paris 
capital market, London’s unchallenged lead in Japanese government loan issue business 
was being undermined and the loan issue markets were decentralised. Now the Japanese 
government was in the position of being able to find the most favourable loan issue terms 
by moving between the London and Paris capital markets. However, both diplomatic 
affairs in France and the different market conditions often hindered Japan’s financial 
operation there.
7.1 5 Percent Loan Issue in 1907
According to the agreement of November 1905 with the loan issue banks: i.e. Parr’s 
Bank, the Hongkong Bank, the Yokohama Specie Bank, Kuhn, Loeb & Co., the London 
Rothschilds and the Paris Rothschilds, the Japanese government was obliged to fulfill 
immediately another 4 percent loan issue for the remaining amount (£25,000,000). In 
August 1906 the Japanese government instructed K. Takahashi, the Government Loan 
Commissioner, to arrange it. The purpose of this loan issue was to convert the high 
interest rate (6 percent) war bonds (£22,000,000) of 1904, issued in London and New 
York, to lower ones (4 percent). Takahashi and the government agreed on the following 
outlines of the new loan issue:6
4. S.E.O.I. (1912), p.xciii.
5. F .0.371/87, C.M. MacDonald to Lord Grey, 5 June 1906.
6. Secret (secretariat) no.2344, Y. Sakatani to T. Hayashi, 22 August 1906 (N.G.B.. 
vol.39-1, pp.387-88); M.T.Z.. vol. 12, p.240.
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(i) to issue £25,000,000 4 percent sterling bonds in Britain, the United States, 
France and Germany for conversion or redemption of the £22,000,000 6 
percent loan of 1904.
(ii) the loan issue should be based on the loan issue terms of the 4 percent 
loan in November 1905.
(iii) a new syndicate for this loan issue should be formed, should the loan issue 
banks refuse to take up the loan issue.
(iv) Treasury bills should be issued temporarily if market conditions were 
unfavourable, and afterwards these should be converted into bonds.
The enthusiasm for Japanese government bonds which had surged during the 
Russo-Japanese War now ebbed everywhere, and many foreign investors became 
apprehensive about the predicament of Japan’s finances after the Russo-Japanese War.7 
In 1906, especially the closing quarter, the conditions of the London money market 
became very tight: in the early part of the year the withdrawal of gold from London to 
the United States, stemming from the San Francisco Earthquake and a boom on the New 
York Stock Exchange, gradually narrowed the market; in November the Bank of England 
raised Bank Rate to 6 percent; in December there was a danger of an unprecedented 7 
percent. Most of the central banks on the Continent followed a similar high interest rate 
policy to maintain their gold reserves.8 Bond prices fell sharply.
The extraordinarily high interest rate had a dampening effect upon new loan 
issues.9 In fact, on the London capital market there were new loan issues for 
£167,187,400 during 1905, but during 1906 these rapidly decreased to £120,173,200.'° 
Under these adverse circumstances Japan’s efforts to reorganise the national 
finance did not, of course, receive favourable attention from foreign financiers. The
7. The Statist. 3 February 1906, pp. 193-94.
8. The Economist. 16 February 1907, pp.6-7 (‘Commercial History & Review’).
9. J.M.F.A., K. Mizumachi Papers, 5-8, 7th Report, K. Takahashi to K. Saionji and 
Y. Sakatani, 20 November 1906.
10. The Economist, op. cit., p.5. According to Simon, £128,900,000 (calls total) of 
Colonial and foreign loan issues in 1905 decreased to £85,000,000 in 1906 (M. Simon, 
‘The Pattern of New British Portfolio Foreign Investment, 1865-1914’ in A.R. Hall 
[ed.], The Export of Capital from Britain 1870-1914 [1968], p.39).
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London Rothschilds and the Paris Rothschilds considered it quite out of question to issue 
any Japanese government conversion loan for the moment.11 Therefore, Takahashi had 
to wait for a recovery of the loan issue markets. Taking into full consideration the 
different quotation prices of the Japanese government 4 percent bonds of 1905 in New 
York, London, Germany and Paris, Takahashi prepared for the following three loan issue 
alternatives:12
(i) a 4 percent simultaneous loan issue in London and Paris.
(ii) a 4 percent loan issue in Paris alone.
(iii) a 4 percent loan issue in Paris and 5 percent in London separately.
Takahashi had formulated the definite intention of floating a simultaneous loan 
equally in London and Paris. Because of the low quotation prices in New York and 
Germany, he cast doubts on arranging the simultaneous loan issue there.13 The high 
interest rate, as mentioned previously, hampered his immediate negotiations with the 
London issue banks. The banks took a wait-and-see policy as the London Rothschilds had 
noted that there was no chance of placing a Japanese government loan then.14
In Paris Takahashi found that it was the French government’s diplomatic policy, 
rather than financial matters,15 which entangled the loan issue negotiations. In the middle 
of November 1906 Takahashi and S. Kurino, the Japanese Ambassador in Paris, had an 
interview with S. Pichon, the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, and J. Caillaux, the 
French Minister of Finance, on the Japanese government loan issue in Paris.16 Pichon, 
in return for the loan issue, demanded a certain quid pro quo, namely an entente for
u. R.A.L., XI/130A/0, the London Rothschilds to the Paris Rothschilds, 8 May
1906.
12. M .T.Z.. vol. 12, p.241.
13. J.M.F.A., Mizumachi Papers, 5-8, 10th Report, 27 November 1906.
14. R.A.L., XI/130A/0, the London Rothschilds to the Paris Rothschilds, 9 October
1906.
15. A. Gerard, Ma mission au Japon. 1907-1914 (Paris, 1919), p. 13.
16. Secret no.35, S. Kurino to T. Hayashi, 5 December 1906 (N.G.B.. vol.39-1, 
pp.515-21).
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protection of their mutual interests in the Far East. Pichon made the following definite 
proposals:17 (i) Japan should co-operate with the Anglo-French group in the China Central 
Railways construction; (ii) Japan should guarantee the security of the French Indo-China 
Colonies. Caillaux was keen to take up the loan issue in Paris and promised Takahashi 
to introduce other eminent financiers in Paris should the Paris Rothschilds decline it.18 
Perhaps Caillaux, who had particular interests with the Banque de lTndo-Chine, intended 
to put the loan issue into the hands of the Banque.19
However, P. Cambon, the French Ambassador in London had a major impact on 
the negotiations between Pichon and Takahashi by warning that the Japanese government 
loan issue in Paris would probably upset diplomatic relations between France and 
Russia.20 Pichon, who paid much attention to affiliations with Russia, confirmed the 
Russian government’s posture towards the Japanese government loan issue in Paris.21 The 
Russian government, for its part, insisted that the matters should proceed in accordance 
with the Portsmouth Treaty, and desired the French government not to allow any 
Japanese government loan issue in Paris until a treaty of amity with Japan was to be 
concluded.22 Japan and Russia were, at that time, negotiating a commercial treaty and 
fishery convention.23
On 10 January 1907 Pichon told Kurino that the French government was not able 
to disregard Russia’s opinion.24 After the Russo-Japanese War in which Russia had been 
the aggressor, Japan now conversely became a menace to Russia in the Far East. 
Likewise, the United States was nervous of Japan’s foreign loan issues which might be
17. S. Pichon to P. Cambon, 16 and 22 November 1906 (D.D.F.. 2C serie, vol.x, 
pp.435-37, 471-72).
18. No.94, Kurino to Hayashi, 16 November 1906 (N.G.B.. vol.39-1, p.511).
19. J.M.F.A., Mizumachi Papers, 5-8, 7th Report, 20 November 1906.
20. Cambon to Pichon, 24 November 1906 (D.D.F.. vol.x, pp.486-90).
21. Pichon to M. Bompard, 17 November 1906 (ibid.. vol.x, pp.446-47).
22. Bompard to Pichon, 10 December 1906 (ibid, vol.x, p.546).
23. The Times. 28 December 1906.
24. A.M.A.E., N.S.53, Note Verbale, 23 January 1907; no.3, Kurino to Hayashi, 10 
January 1907 (N.G.B.. vol.40-2, pp.46-47).
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used to expand its armaments. M. Bompard, the French Ambassador in St Petersburg, 
gave assurance to the Russian government that the French government would never open 
the Paris capital market to Japan until the Russo-Japanese Amity Treaty was signed.25
Meanwhile, there was serious diplomatic confrontation between France and 
Germany. The French government and financiers showed unanimous irritation towards 
Takahashi’s visit to Germany in December 1906. They suspected that he attempted to 
draw some financial assistance from Germany.26 The growing antagonism to Germany 
seriously deterred the smooth progress of Takahashi’s loan issue negotiations in Paris.
As shown in Chapter 1, the Japanese government 4 percent bonds of 1905 
(sterling bonds) were sustained artificially at a much higher price in Paris, in contrast 
with those in London and New York. There was a significant and continuous difference 
between London, New York and Paris in the quotation prices (Chart 7.1). On the 
‘Frenchman’s watertight system’27 the Paris Stock Exchange admitted quotation only of 
the securities issued in France. The restricted supply of securities on the Paris capital 
market accordingly pegged the quotation prices at higher levels than in London and New 
York. Hence, the Japanese government, at the outset, aimed to place the intended 4 
percent loan on the Paris capital market.28 Takahashi, in fact, considered that the 4 
percent loan issue was feasible in Paris alone or in Paris and London simultaneously on 
the condition that the quotation of the London and New York tranche of the 4 percent 
bonds of 1905 was admitted on the Paris Stock Exchange.29 However, as he set great 
store by the established relations with the London issue banks, he finally pursued the 
possibility of the 4 percent simultaneous loan issue in London and Paris rather than a 
franc loan in Paris alone. In order to do so, it was unavoidable for the Japanese 
government to level off the different quotation prices of these bonds in London and Paris.
25. Bompard to Pichon, 17 January 1907 (D.D.F.. vol.x, pp.620-23).
26. J.M.F.A., Mizumachi Papers, 5-8, 13th Report, 15 January 1907.
27. See chapter 1.
28. Secret no.25, Kurino to Hayashi, 10 August 1906 (N.G.B.. vol.39-1, pp.385-86).
29. J.M.F.A., Mizumachi Papers, 5-8, 14th Report, 7 February 1907.
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In June 1906 Kurino had desired the French government to admit the quotation 
of the tranche of the 4 percent bonds of 1905, issued outside France, on the Paris Stock 
Exchange.30 The London Rothschilds considered that no large number of the 4 percent 
bonds would flow from London to Paris because of the high quotation price there.31 Yet 
M. de Vemeuil, Syndic des Agents de Change, and the Paris Rothschilds disagreed on 
the quotation because of the probable damage to French public investors.32
On 9 January 1907 Kurino made the following apologies to Pichon for the 
misapprehensions concerning Japan’s intentions, explaining that: (i) the Japanese 
government had no intention of waging war on Russia or the United States, and the 
purpose of the loan was not for armaments but for the conversion of the 6 percent foreign 
loans of 1904; (ii) for a simultaneous loan issue in both Paris and London the French 
government should admit the quotation of the Japanese government 4 percent bonds of 
1905, issued outside France, on the Paris Stock Exchange; (iii) in accordance with this 
the Bank of Japan could purchase £3,000,000 of the 4 percent bonds, issued in London.33
On 16 January 1907 the 6 percent Bank Rate came down to 5 1/2 percent and the 
rates of 3 and 6 months bank bills also had a downward tendency.34 The market 
conditions became more favourable to new loan issues. I. Motono, the Japanese Minister 
in St Petersburg, was attempting to persuade the Russian government to agree on Japan’s 
loan issue in Paris,35 but the Russian government insisted that the Japanese government 
should delay the present loan issue until the remainder of the Russian government’s 
previous loan issue was fulfilled.36 Takahashi, fearing to lose an opportunity, firmly
30. No.42, Hayashi to Kurino, 21 June 1906 (N.G.B.. vol.39-1, p.379).
31. R.A.L., XI/130A/0, the London Rothschilds to the Paris Rothschilds, 20 June
1906.
32. J.M.F.A., Mizumachi Papers, 5-8, 13th Report, 15 January 1907.
33. Ibid..
S. Nishimura, The Decline of Inland Bills of Exchange in the London Money 
Market 1855-1913 (Cambridge, 1971), table 30.
35. No. 16, Hayashi to I. Motono, 9 February 1907 (N.G.B.. vol.40-2, pp.56-57).
36. No.28, Motono to Hayashi, 13 February 1907 (ibid.. pp.59-60).
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objected to this postponement.37 On 15 February Pichon finally agreed to float an 
immediate issue of the Japanese government loan.38 The matter was put into the hands of 
the French Minister of Finance (Caillaux) and Caillaux conceded the new 4 percent loan 
issue on the Paris capital market in March.39
Caillaux authorised the new loan issue, but did not give permission to quote the 
tranche of the 4 percent bonds of 1905, issued outside France, on the Paris Stock 
Exchange. The French government feared that these low price bonds would flow into 
France so as to damage French investors’ benefits.40 Without such permission, in practice, 
it was impossible to average the different quotation prices and this would ultimately 
hinder the loan issue banks from fixing the issue price of the new 4 percent simultaneous 
loan, because the quotation prices of existing bonds on the market usually determine the 
issue price of a new loan. Takahashi was thus forced to abandon the new 4 percent loan 
issue in Paris.41
Takahashi immediately switched the intended 4 percent loan issue to a 5 percent 
loan issue in London and New York.42 It was impracticable for Takahashi, who intended 
to issue the new loan at as high a price as possible (nearly par),43 to arrange a new 4 
percent loan issue in London and New York, because the quotation prices of the Japanese 
government 4 percent bonds of 1905 were hovering around low levels in London (88 1/4 
percent, yielding 4.5 percent at market)44 and New York (84 percent, yielding 4.8 percent
37. No. 16, Kurino to Hayashi, 15 February 1907 (ibid.. p.61).
38. No. 17, Kurino to Hayashi, 15 February 1907 (ibid.. pp.61-62).
39. No. 18, Kurino to Hayashi, 18 February 1907 (ibid.. vol.42-2, pp.63-64).
Ibid..
41. A.M.A.E., N.S.53, Note verbale, 19 February 1907.
42. R.A.L., XI/130A/1, the London Rothschilds to the Paris Rothschilds, 20 February 
1907. On 7 February 1907 Takahashi considered that he would issue a 5 percent loan in 
Britain, the United States and Germany unless the French government admitted the 
quotation within two weeks (J.M.F.A., Mizumachi Papers, 5-8, 14th Report, 7 February 
1907).
43. No. 17, Takahashi to Japanese Government, 3 February 1907 (J.M.F.A., 
Mizumachi Papers, 5-8, 14th Report).
44. X .M .n.. December 1906, p.686.
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at market)45 at that time.
At the beginning of 1907, the London Rothschilds and the Paris Rothschilds were 
fully aware of the awkward situations surrounding the Japanese government loan issue 
negotiations. The London Rothschilds pointed out that: the 6 percent Bank Rate did not 
allow any new loan issues on the market; the diplomatic conflicts between Japan, Russia 
and the United States had repercussion on the loan issue negotiations.46 As for the 
quotation of the London tranche, the Paris Rothschilds were not agreeable to it,47 despite 
the London Rothschilds’ support for Takahashi.48
This hesitancy on the part of the Paris Rothschilds seemingly coincided with the 
French government’s policy. Had the French government exceptionally admitted the 
Japanese government’s 4 percent bonds of 1905, it would, no doubt, have been forced 
to do the same for others.49 On 15 February 1907 the Paris Rothschilds wrote to the 
London Rothschilds that the Japanese government should withdraw the proposal of 
quoting the London tranche of the 4 percent bonds of 1905 on the Paris Stock Exchange; 
the Paris Rothschilds suggested a 4 percent simultaneous loan issue in Paris and London, 
based on the quotation price of the London Stock Exchange, for £25,000,000.5° It was 
obvious that French investors would gain a considerable advantage from such a low issue 
price.
In the middle of February 1907, after resolving the diplomatic discord between 
Japan and Russia, Caillaux proposed to Takahashi that he should put the Japanese 
government loan issue in Paris into the hands of the Banque de l’lndo-Chine. Yet
45. The price was on 2 January 1907 (Commercial & Financial Chronicle [Bank & 
Quotation Section], vol.lxxxiv, no.2189 [8 June 1907], p.23).
46. R.A.L., XI/130A/1, the London Rothschilds to the Paris Rothschilds, 8 January 
1907.
47. Ibid., 5 February 1907.
48. Ibid., 6 February 1907.
49. Ibid., 19 February 1907.
R.A.L., XI/101/74, the Paris Rothschilds to the London Rothschilds, 15 February 
1907; J.M.F.A., Mizumachi Papers, 5-8, 15th Report, 3 March 1907.
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Takahashi placed more confidence by far in the Paris Rothschilds than the Banque de 
l’lndo-Chine, because the Paris Rothschilds were able to invite many eminent banks to 
loan issue operations. As the Paris Rothschilds could not agree to quoting even the 
London tranche (£6,500,000), Takahashi broke off the 4 percent loan issue negotiations, 
informing them that he intended to arrange a new 5 percent loan with the London issue 
banks.51
From 20 February 1907 Takahashi started the 5 percent loan issue negotiations 
with the London issue banks anew. Although the Paris Rothschilds were still committed 
to the 4 percent loan issue in Paris,52 the London Rothschilds advised Takahashi to invite 
the Paris Rothschilds to the 5 percent loan issue.53 Takahashi, who considered the 5 
percent loan issue for £18,000,000 mainly in London, agreed that the Paris Rothschilds 
could act as underwriters in this loan issue.54 The London Rothschilds enquired of the 
Paris Rothschilds as to what extent they could involve themselves in the underwriting of 
the 5 percent loan issue,55 and Takahashi also contacted the Paris Rothschilds on the loan 
issue in Paris through the London Rothschilds.56 On 26 February 1907 the Paris 
Rothschilds agreed to participate in it as loan issuers in Paris.57 Thus the Paris capital 
market showed interest in the Japanese government loan business again. The London 
Rothschilds told the Paris Rothschilds that ‘no doubt when the time comes everyone will
51. Ibid.. The Paris Rothschilds were ‘afraid of artificial markets’ (R.A.L., 
XI/130A/1, 18 February 1907).
52. There was a legal debate on a 5 percent loan issue between the Japanese 
government and the Paris Rothschilds, because the Paris Rothschilds regarded this issue 
as the remaining part of the 4 percent loan of 1905 (ibid., XI/101/74, the Paris 
Rothschilds to the London Rothschilds, 20 February 1907).
53. J.M.F.A., Mizumachi Papers, 5-8, 16th Report, 7 March 1907.
5\  Ibid..
55. R. A.L., XI/130A/1, the London Rothschilds to the Paris Rothschilds, 20 February
1907.
56. Ibid., 22 February 1907.
57. R.A.L., XI/101/74, the Paris Rothschilds to the London Rothschilds, 26 February 
1907; J.M.F.A., Mizumachi Papers, 5-8, 16th Report.
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want to participate [in it]’58 and emphasised that the 5 percent loan would be very 
alluring, the underwriting commission should be 2 percent and the fact of its being a 
conversion loan would by no means hamper cash subscriptions.59
After the rapprochement, the Paris Rothschilds and Takahashi started direct 
negotiations from 1 March 1907.60 Both provisionally agreed to issue the 5 percent loan 
for £11,500,000 in Paris61 without mentioning the quotation of the London tranche of the 
4 percent bonds of 1905 on the Paris Stock Exchange.62
The Japanese government had to negotiate with Kuhn, Loeb & Co., the main 
issuer of the 6 percent loan of 1904 in New York, as well. Since Kuhn, Loeb & Co. 
appraised the proposed issue price (at par) as too high for the New York capital market,63 
it decided to accept subscriptions there in 6 percent bonds of 1904 only and gave up 
subscriptions in cash.64 Kuhn, Loeb & Co. participated in the loan issue (underwriting) 
in London for £1,000,000 on the original issuer’s terms.65 The German banks: the 
Deutsch-Asiatische Bank and Warburg, refused to be involved in this operation in any 
form because the market conditions in Germany were not acceptable.66
On 6 March 1907 the contract of the Japanese government 5 percent loan issue 
was made between Takahashi, Parr’s Bank, the Hongkong Bank, the Yokohama Specie 
Bank, the London Rothschilds and the Paris Rothschilds. The outline of the loan issue
58. R.A.L., XI/130A/1, the London Rothschilds to the Paris Rothschilds, 27 February
1907.
59. Ibid., the London Rothschilds to the Paris Rothschilds, 28 February 1907.
®. Ibid., XI/101/74, the Paris Rothschilds to the London Rothschilds, 1 March 1907.
61. Ibid., 4 March 1907; A.N., 132/AQ/69, B-13-2/3, Provisional Contract dated 4 
March 1907.
62. This quotation would finally be realised in 1910 (A.M.F., F30-377, Gerard to 
Pichon, 27 February 1910).
63. B.B.A., COF-05-2-9, Kuhn, Loeb & Co.to Parr’s Bank, 22 February 1907.
w. Ibid., Kuhn, Loeb & Co. to Baring Brothers, 27 February 1907; Parr’s Bank to 
Kuhn Loeb & Co., 27 February 1907.
Ibid., Kuhn, Loeb & Co. to Baring Brothers, 1 March 1907.
F .0.371/271, A.M. Townsend to F. Campbell, 4 March 1907.
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terms was as follows:67
£23,000,000
(£11,500,000 in London and £11,500,000 in Paris) 
redemption of the Japanese government 6 percent 
sterling loans issued in 1904 for £10,000,000 and 
£12,000,000 in London and New York 
5 percent
99 1/2 percent (to the public)
real issue price included interest should be
98 1/2 percent
95 1/2 percent (to the government)
5.0 percent 
40 years
Fr25-25 per £1 and at the current rate of exchange 
on London in New York
the Japanese government should reserve the right to 
redeem at par, all or any of the bonds, at any time 
after 1922, on giving 6 months’ previous notice.
The London issue banks started organising the underwriting at a 1 1/2 percent 
commission.68 The Hongkong Bank underwrote £200,000 of the bonds.69 Parr’s Bank 
underwrote £200,000;70 J.S. Morgan & Co. £100,000;71 the London Joint Stock Bank 
£40,000 in the Yokohama Specie Bank’s syndicate.72 Table 7.2 shows the London issue 
banks’ shares in underwriting. The London Rothschilds completed their underwriting 
syndicate for £725,000 including South African connections, merchant houses and 
stockbrokers.73
From 9 March 1907 the subscriptions were implemented in London and Paris 
simultaneously. In London, despite ‘rather a poor opening’,74 the amount of the
67. P.B.A., D6805, Agreement, 6 March 1907.
68. R.A.L., XI/111/36, Japanese government 4 percent loan of 1907.
69. H.S.B.A., Board Minutes, 5 March 1907.
w. P.B.A., B11418, Board Minutes, 7 March 1907.
71. M.G.A., Ms.21,793, vol.3.
72. L.J.S.B.A., Q 12, Board Minutes, 7 March 1907.
73. R.A.L., XI/111/36, op. cit.. The London Rothschilds were not always anxious to 
rely upon underwriting, complaining that ‘it is astonishing how this form of speculation 
[underwriting] invariably appeals to our Public’ (R.A.L., XI/130A/1, the London 
Rothschilds to the Paris Rothschilds, 7 March 1907).
74. S.O.A.S.A., PP MS 14/25, Addis Diary, 9 March 1907.
Issue amount 
Issue purpose
Rate of interest (nominal) 
Issue price
Yield at issue 
Borrowing period 
Rate of exchange
Redemption
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applications was over £11,000,000 and the total numbers of the applicants and amount 
are indicated in Table 7.3. The total loan issue commission in London amounted to 4 
percent, including a l l / 2  percent underwriting and a l l / 2  percent loan issue bank 
commission (Table 7.4). The loan issue in Paris also firmly secured the issue amount75 
and Table 7.5 calculates the French issue banks’ shares in this operation. They formed 
a syndicate for taking ‘firm’ and placing the loan, and carried out the placement directly 
through their ‘guichets (counters)’ at a 1 1/2 percent commission.76 In addition to the 
Paris Rothschilds, the Banque de Paris and the Credit Lyonnais became main loan issuers 
and these three banks mainly placed the bonds. The total commission paid to the 
members of the Paris syndicate amounted to 3.5566 percent.77 For the Japanese 
government, the total cost of this conversion amounted to about £1,104,923 (£920,000 
for the commissions to financiers and £184,923 for other charges78), but it could reduce 
the annual payment of interest for £220,000.
Initially the Japanese government aimed at Paris as the main market for this 
conversion loan issue. Because of the artificial price manipulation on the Paris capital 
market, the Japanese government 4 percent bonds of 1905 were being traded at a much 
higher price there than in London and New York. The Japanese government could not 
easily conclude the 4 percent loan issue negotiations with the French financiers in part 
because of the French government’s diplomatic relations with Russia, and in part because 
of the difficulty in fixing the issue price resulting from the French government’s refusal 
to quote on the Paris Stock Exchange the tranche of the 4 percent bonds of 1905, issued 
outside France. The French government finally agreed to float the 4 percent loan in Paris 
but never permitted the quotation of the London tranche and the Paris Rothschilds also 
paid little attention to it. Owing to this impediment, Takahashi made up his mind to
75. R.A.L., XI/101/74, the Paris Rothschilds to the London Rothschilds, 12 March
1907.
76. A.N., 132/AQ/69, B-13-2/1.
77. Other costs were not revealed.
TO. M .T.Z.. vol. 12, p.226.
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depart from Paris and counted upon largely the London issue banks for the new 5 percent 
loan issue. Finally the Paris Rothschilds, under the leadership of the London issue banks, 
agreed to be involved in this operation. For the Japanese government, this loan issue 
became the one in which the diplomatic situations intervened most.
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Table 7.1 Proportion of Japanese Government’s Debt Expenditure
(General Account). 1903-1913
Year
(1)
Expenditure
(2)
Debt
expenditure
(3)
(2)/(l)
(%)
1903 250 36 14.4
1904 277 32 11.6
1905 421 49 11.6
1906 464 151 32.5
1907 602 174 28.9
1908 636 177 27.8
1909 533 153 28.7
1910 569 154 27.1
1911 585 147 25.1
1912 594 142 23.9
1913 574 143 24.9
Notes: ¥ million (¥l=2s. l/2d.);
(3)=(2)/(l) x 100.
Source: M.H.S.K.T.. p.131.
Table 7.2 Underwriting of 5 Percent Loan Issue 
(1907. London)
(£)
Underwriting
syndicate
Underwriting
amount
Underwriting 
commission 
(1 1/2 %)
Brokerage 
commission 
(1/2 %)
Panmure Gordon 4,926,000 73,890 52,500
London Rothschilds 1,500,000 22,500
Kuhn, Loeb & Co. 1,000,000 15,000
Hongkong Bank 1,150,000 17,250
Yokohama Specie Bank 1,000,000 15,000
Parr’s Bank 1,424,000 21,360
Warburg 
British syndicate
500,000 7,500
5,000
Total 11,500,000 172,500 57,500
Note: * 1/2 percent of the issue amount in London (£11,500,000).
Source: W.B.A., D2469.
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Table 7.3 Subscriptions of 5 Percent Loan Issue
(1907. London!
(£)
[Cash] [Bond] [Total]
Loan issue 
bank
Application Allotment Application Application 
(Allotment)
Allotment
Parr’s Bank 2,815,340 1,985,300 2,480,700 5,296,040 4,466,000
Hongkong 1,176,900 841,700 1,534,400 2,711,300 2,376,100
Bank
Yokohama 1,327,000 987,600 1,475,100 2,802,100 2,462,700
Specie Bank
London 354,480 243,900 793,300 1,147,780 1,037,200
Rothschilds
New York 91,400 64,000 385,000 476,400 449,000
Switzerland 484,800 386,900 241,100 725,900 628,000
Hamburg 90,600 70,400 10,600 101,200 81,000
Total 6,340,520 4,579,800 6,920,200 13,260,720 11,500,000
Notes: Allottees who paid in 6 percent bonds (converted ones) should receive the
following for each £100 of 6 percent bonds: (i) £100 new 5 percent bonds;
(ii) £1 (being equivalent to the advantage obtained by cash subscribers);
(iii) 10 s. (the difference between the issue price of new 5 percent bonds 
[99 1/2] and the redemption of 6 percent bonds at par [100]).
Allottees who paid in 6 percent bonds should have priority in the 
subscriptions.
Source: L.R.A., XI/111/36.
Table 7.4 Commission of 5 Percent Loan Issue 
(1907. London!
(%)
Underwriting 1 1/2
Brokerage (placing underwriting) 1/2
Brokerage (application) 1/4
Advertising 1/4
Issue banks 1 1/2
Total 4
Source: W.B.A., D2469.
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Table 7.5 5 Percent Loan Issue (1907. Pari si 
(Fr)
[Ferme] [Placement]
Loan issue bank Amount Benefit 
(1 1/2%)
Benefit
(0.5566%)
Amount Benefit 
(1 1/2%)
Banque de Paris 71,623,645 1,074,354 398,657 45,030,850 675,462
Credit Lyonnais 38,715,320 580,729 215,489 62,188,225 932,823
Hottinguer & Co. 29,036,490 435,547 161,617 13,782,460 206,736
Societe Generale 19,357,660 290,364 107,744 31,094,365 466,415
Comptoir 19,357,660 290,364 107,744 31,094,365 466,415
d’Escompte
Society 9,679,335 145,190 53,875 6,387,240 95,808
Generate de Credit
Industriel et
Commercial
Banque Frangaise 5,807,500 87,112 32,324 4,000,105 60,001
Rothschilds
Syndicate
(Rothschilds) 86,297,390 1,294,460 480,331 61,447,390 921,710
(Others) 10,500,000 157,500 58,443 - -
(Credit Lyonnais) - - - 35,350,000 530,250
Total 290,375,000 4,355,625 1,616,227 290,375,000 4,355,625
Notes:
Source:
F rl= 9  l/2d.;
- implies no transactions. 
A.N., 132/AQ/69, B-13-2/1.
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Note:
Sources:
Chart 7.1 Quotation Prices of 4 Percent Bonds of 1905 
in London. New York and Paris. 1906-1913
100
95
90
05
90
75
70
1906 1907 190B 1909 1910 1911 1912 1913
The highest and lowest prices of the years were averaged.
Compagnie des Agents de Change, Annuaire des valeurs admises 
h la cote officielle. annees 1915-1917, vol.i (Paris, 1917), p .259; 
Commercial & Financial Chronicle.
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7 .2 4 Percent Loan Issue in 1910
Apart from the ¥476,318,800 (£48,624,210) 5 percent domestic loans issued in 1908 and 
1909 for the railway nationalisation,79 there had been no significant increase in Japan’s 
national debts in the period between 1906 and 1910. Yet the burden of these railway 
nationalisation debts placed a heavy load on the national finances because the government 
had to create 5 percent bonds in exchange for the nationalised railway companies’ shares. 
In January 1910, the amount of the debts outstanding (long-term) reached approximately 
¥2,650,355,000 (£270,557,070) and the annual government’s debt expense ¥154,270,000 
(£15,748,395) (also see Table 6.10 and Table 7 .1).80 In particular, the proportion of 
relatively higher rate of interest (5 percent) bonds to the total national debts occupied 63 
percent.81
The Second Katsura Cabinet (1908-1911) tended to convert these higher interest 
rate bonds to lower ones, as had been done in 1907. Early in 1910 the Cabinet decided 
a huge financial reorganisation scheme, namely the conversion of ¥595,000,000 
(£60,739,583) 5 percent domestic bonds to new ones bearing smaller coupons. The 
Japanese government estimated that approximately ¥160,000,000 (£16,333,333) of these 
bonds, including the ¥93,000,000 [£9,493,750] that had been re-sold by the Japanese 
government in 1897 and 1902, had been exported.82 It carried out the following separate 
financial programme in 1910: two 4 percent domestic loan issues for ¥200,000,000 
(£20,416,666) and two 4 percent foreign loan issues in London and Paris.83
In February 1910 T. Katsura, the Japanese Prime Minister, ordered K. 
Mizumachi, the Japanese Vice-Minister of Finance and Government Loan Commissioner, 
to issue a 4 percent loan in London and Paris either simultaneously or separately. After
79. M.T.Z.. vol. 11, pp.881-82.
80. M.H.S.K.T.. pp. 130 and 158.
81. M.T.Z.. vol. 12, pp.270-71.
82. Ibid..
83. Ibid.. vol. 11, pp.885-86 and vol. 12, pp.270-71.
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the conversion loan issue in 1907, the Japanese government had little wish to arrange a 
loan issue on the New York capital market because it could raise the required funds in 
London and Paris more cheaply. Market conditions in London, however, became more 
and more sluggish and ‘the financial deadlock’ appeared: on 8 January 1910 Bank Rate 
declined to 4 percent and sank lower to 3 percent on 9 February.84 At the beginning of 
the year, the financial deficits occurred at the British government’s finance and the 
political confusion in Britain also affected the conditions of the loan issue market.85 Under 
these circumstances, Mizumachi’s proposal of a Japanese government 4 percent 
conversion loan issue was not readily accepted by the London issue banks.86
In April 1910 Mizumachi and several London issue banks agreed on the following 
preliminary loan issue terms: (i) they, in coalition with Paris, should undertake the 
Japanese government loan issue; (ii) the probable lowest issue price should be fixed at 
94 percent on the basis of the lowest quotation prices of the Japanese government 4 
percent bonds of 1905 in London.87 Mizumachi regarded the Paris capital market as 
playing a competitive role in the loan issue negotiations. The London Rothschilds 
informed the Paris Rothschilds that the Japanese government aimed to place a conversion 
loan in both London and Paris simultaneously for between £20,000,000 and 
£25,000,000.88
From 18 April Mizumachi started the negotiations with the Paris Rothschilds. 
Their broad outline of the agreement was as follows:89
(i) to issue a 4 percent franc loan for less than Fr450,000,000 (£17,812,500) 
in Paris.
84. The Economist. 12 February 1910, p.313.
85. The Times. 14 January 1910.
R.A.L., XI/130A/4, the London Rothschilds to the Paris Rothschilds, 7 March
1910.
87. M.T.Z.. vol. 12, pp.271-72.
“ . R.A.L., XI/130A/4, the London Rothschilds to the Paris Rothschilds, 15 April 
1910.
89. M .T.Z.. vol. 12, pp.272-74.
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(ii) the issue price should be fixed at 95 percent to the public and at 91 percent 
to the government.
(iii) the loan issue should be carried out at the beginning of May 1910.
The Paris Rothschilds strongly insisted on a franc loan issue in Paris, separated from 
London, although Mizumachi pursued the possibility of a simultaneous loan issue and 
tried to raise the issue price.
This time, however, he encountered no diplomatic conflicts with the French 
government in floating the loan on the Paris capital market,90 because there were no 
German issuer in this loan issue and the Franco-Japanese Agreement and the Russo- 
Japanese Convention had been concluded in 1907. The Balkans, rather than the Far East, 
deserved diplomatic attention at that time. French manufacturers only requested the 
Japanese government to purchase their goods in return for the loan issue.91 The French 
Ministry of Finance admitted the quotation of the tranche of the Japanese government 4 
percent loan of 1905, issued in London, on the Paris Stock Exchange, which the Japanese 
government had for long desired.92 On 25 April Mizumachi and the Paris Rothschilds 
agreed to the 4 percent franc loan issue on the following conditions:93
Issue amount Fr450,000,000 (£17,812,500)
Rate of interest (nominal) 4 percent
Yield at issue 4.18 percent
Borrowing period 60 years
Issue price (to the public) 95 1/2 percent
(to the government) 911/2 percent
Redemption the Japanese government should reserve the
right to redeem at par, all or any of the 
bonds, at any time after 1920, on giving 6 
months’ previous notice.
90. A.M.A.E., N.S.56, Note, 23 April 1910; J.M.F.A.A., 3-4-4-45, no.30, Kurino 
to Komura, 22 April 1910.
91. J.M.F.A.A., 3-4-4-47, Secret no.24, Kurino to Komura, 25 July 1910.
92. A.M.F., F30-377, G. Cochery to Minisfere des Affaires Etrangbres, 24 February 
1910; A.M.A.E., NS.56, Ministre des Affaires Etrangbres to Ministre des Finances, 12 
February 1910.
M. G.K.S.. vol. 1, pp. 165-69.
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Financiers in Paris were keen to take up this loan issue and the Paris Rothschilds 
successfully organised a syndicate: the Credit Lyonnais, the Banque de Paris, the Socidtd 
Generate, the Comptoir National d’Escompte, the Socidtd Gdndrale de Crddit Industriel 
et Commercial and Hottinguer participated in it (Table 7.6). The prospectus was 
published on 5 May when the loan issue negotiations in London had been concluded.94 
The seven banks, including banques de depots, banques d ’affaires and haute banques, 
agreed to take up the loan at a 2.33 percent commission and to place it directly to their 
clients at a 1 1/2 percent commission (Table 7.7).95 On 9 May this loan received 
authorisation to be quoted on the Paris Stock Exchange.96
In London, it was anticipated that the London issue banks would probably take 
up the loan issue by the beginning of May. Yet their assessment of the loan issue market 
in general made it difficult to conclude the new loan issue,97 and eventually the London 
Rothschilds withdrew from the business.98
The London Rothschilds predicted in 1906 that the boom in Japanese bonds, 
especially during the Russo-Japanese War, would end.99 The main reason for their 
withdrawal from the negotiations was perhaps to be ascribed to the unfavourable 
assessment of the Japanese government loans on the market and partly also to the 
separation of the loan issue in Paris from that in London, which freed the London 
Rothschilds from co-operating with the Paris Rothschilds in this business. Yet London 
Rothschilds’ withdrawal from the loan issue negotiations startled the Japanese 
government.
A.N., 132/AQ/70, B-14-1/2, Prospectus.
95. Ibid., B-14-1/4.
96. A.M.F., F30-377, Cochery to Syndic, 9 May 1910.
97. R.A.L.,XI/130A/4, the London Rothschilds to the Paris Rothschilds, 28 April 
1910.
98. Ibid., 2 May 1910.
". Ibid., 11 June 1906. They had said, ‘the day [the end of the boom] will come, and 
is probably not far distant when the conversion of the sixes [6 percent loans of 1904] may 
take place’.
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On 5 May Parr’s Bank, the Hongkong Bank and the Yokohama Specie Bank 
arranged the 4 percent loan issue on almost similar terms as in Paris:100
From 6 May the London issue banks invited subscriptions, but out of the 
£11,000,000 only £8,500,000 had been applied for by 18 May.101 Such an unexpected 
outcome had not been experienced in the Japanese government loan issues since 1899. 
The market conditions of that time were not appropriate for new loan issues: for instance, 
in February 1910 even the British government failed to float £4,000,000 British Treasury 
bills (2 1/8 percent interest).102 The dull market conditions did not improve markedly and 
the rate of interest was still dropping. The official history of the Yokohama Specie Bank 
explained the reasons for the unsatisfactory conditions thus:103 King Edward VII’s death 
had temporarily depressed the market; the loan issue in Paris attracted many British 
investors; most importantly, the issue terms themselves, especially the 95 percent issue 
price (yielding 4.21 percent at issue), were not sufficiently alluring to public investors, 
in comparison with the prices of the existing Japanese government 4 percent bonds of 
1905 on the market (yielding 4.18 percent at market).104
10°. P.B.A., D6806, Agreement, 5 May 1910.
101. S.O.A.S.A., PP MS 14/28, Addis Diary, 18 May 1910.
102. The Economist. 26 February 1910, p.425; The Times. 24 February 1910.
103. Y.S.G.Z.. vol.2, p. 144.
104. The quotation price of the Japanese government 4 percent loan of 1905 at the end 
of May 1910 was about 95 3/4 Q.M.M.l.
(to the government) 
Redemption
Issue amount
Rate of interest (nominal)
Yield at issue
Borrowing period
Issue price (to the public)
£11,000,000 
4 percent 
4.21 percent 
60 years 
95 percent 
91 percent
the Japanese government should reserve the 
right to redeem at par, all or any of the 
bonds, at any time after 1920, on giving 6 
months’ previous notice.
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The London, City & Midland Bank agreed to underwrite the loan for £100,000;105 
the London Joint Stock Bank for £75,000;106 the Imperial Bank of Persia for £10,000.107 
Table 7.9 and Table 7.10 show the commission and the underwriting amounts of the 
members of the loan issue banks. The Hongkong Bank organised an underwriting 
syndicate for £1,100,000.108 The underwriters took the unsubscribed portion (£2,437,370, 
approximately 23 percent of the issue amount). The underwriters of the Hongkong Bank’s 
syndicate took £253,000 (23 percent of its underwriting amount).109 Table 7.8 indicates 
the subscriptions of the loan at the loan issue banks including underwriters’. As the 
quotation price of the bonds was 93 1/4 percent at the end of August 1910,110 1 3/4 
percent (the balance between the issue price to the public and the quotation price) became 
a paper loss of the underwriters in this loan issue.
Table 7.11 sets out the Hongkong Bank’s broking list of this loan issue. It is no 
surprise to find that most kinds of financial institutions in Britain: London clearing banks; 
overseas banks; foreign banks; merchant banks; Scottish banks; stockbrokers, were 
involved in it, but it was impossible to trace further who finally bought these bonds.
The predominance of the London issue banks in Japanese government loan issue 
business had declined after 1905 because of the rise of Paris. The London and the Paris 
capital markets were no longer dependent upon each other. Now the Japanese government 
could have access to Paris directly, not just through the London issue banks. This 
competitive market structure enabled the Japanese government to arrange its loan issue 
on more favourable terms.
105. L.C.M.B.A., ACC/26/8, Holden’s Diary, 4 May 1910.
106. L.J.S.B.A., Q 13, Board Minutes, 5 May 1910.
107. I.B.P.A., W2/1, Investment Ledger.
108. H.S.B.A., LOHI/54.
109. Ibid., LOHI/2.
no. I.M.M.. August 1910.
Table 7.6 4 Percent Loan Issue (1910. Paris) 
(Fr)
Loan issue bank Amount Benefit
(2%)
[Ferme]
Benefit
(0.33%)
Amount
[Placement]
Benefit 
(1 1/2%)
Credit
Lyonnais
67,000,000 1,340,000 221,100 100,440,000 1,506,600
Banque 
de Paris
99,000,000 1,980,000 326,700 57,270,000 859,050
Socidt6
Gendrale
46,000,000 920,000 151,800 57,195,000 857,925
Comptoir
d’Escompte
43,000,000 860,000 141,900 51,615,000 774,225
Socidtd 15,000,000 
Generale de Credit 
Industriel et 
Commercial
300,000 49,500 11,160,000 167,400
Hottinguer & Co. 
Rothschilds 
syndicate
30,000,000 600,000 99,000 22,320,000 334,800
(Rothschild) 139,500,000 2,790,000 460,350 100,000,000 1,500,000
(Others) 10,500,000 210,000 34,650 - -
(Crddit
Lyonnais)
50,000,000 750,000
Total 450,000,000 9,000,000 1,485,000 450,000,000 6,750,000
Notes: F rl= 9  l/2d.;
- implies no transaction. 
Source: A.N., 132/AQ/70, B-14-1/4.
Table 7.7 Syndicate Account of 4 Percent 
Loan Issue (1910. Paris)
(%) Amount
(Fr)
Bonds (at 91 1/2) 
Commission (placement) 
Syndicate profit (‘ferme’) 
Advertisement
411,750,000 
1.5 6,750,000
2.33 10,485,000
0.17 802,732.91
Commission total 
Amount total 429,787,732.91
Note: F rl= 9  l/2d..
Source: A.N., 132/AQ/70.
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Table 7.8 Subscriptions of 4 Percent Loan Issue (1910. London)
(£)
Hongkong Bank 2,437,370
Parr’s Bank 5,465,690
Yokohama Specie Bank 3,096,940
Total 11,000,000
Note: Underwriters took 23 percent of the issue amount.
Source: H.S.B.A., LOHI/2.
Table 7.9 Commission of 4 Percent Loan Issue (1910. London!
(percent)
Underwriting 1 1/2
Brokerage (placing underwriting) 1/2
Brokerage (application) 1/4
Advertising 1/4
Loan issue banks 1 1/2
Total 4
Source: W.B.A., D2469.
Table 7.10 Underwriting of 4 Percent Loan Issue 
(1910. London)
(£)
Underwriting
syndicate
Underwriting
amount
Underwriting 
commission 
(1 1/2%)
Brokerage
commission
(1/2%)*
Panmure Gordon 
Hongkong Bank 
Yokohama Specie Bank 
Parr’s Bank
7.500.000
1.100.000 
980,000
1,420,000
112,500
16,500
14,700
21,300
55,000
Total 11,000,000 165,000 55,000
Note: * 1/2 percent of the issue amount in London (£11,000,000).
Source: W.B.A., D2469.
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Table 7.11 Hongkong Bank’s Broking List of
4 Percent Loan Issue (1910. London!
(£)
Name Occupation Amount
(£)
Anglo-Austrian Bank foreign bank 14,650
Anglo-Foreign Banking Co. overseas bank 1,400
Barclay & Co. clearing bank 194,310
Clydesdale Bank clearing bank 3,470
Coutts & Co. clearing bank 108,360
Credit Lyonnais foreign bank 25,100
Deutsche Bank foreign bank 11,100
Glasscock Wallance stockbroker 43,930
Glyn Mills & Co. clearing bank 98,070
R. & J. Henderson Co. merchant 15,000
Keyser A. & Co. merchant bank 13,890
Lamond, W. - 10,000
Lawford G. & Co. stockbroker 10,000
Lazard Bros. merchant bank 20,000
Lloyds Bank clearing bank 113,360
London County &
Westminster Bank clearing bank 624,650
London Joint Stock Bank clearing bank 10,120
London & Provincial Bank clearing bank 1,120
London & South Western
Bank clearing bank 124,670
Manchester & Liverpool
District Bank clearing bank 500
Martin Bank clearing bank 24,180
W.N. Middleton & Co. stockbroker 5,750
Mullens Marshall & Co. stockbroker 10,720
National Bank of China overseas bank 5,170
National Bank of Scotland clearing bank 24,690
Panmure Gordon stockbroker 100,750
Pawle H. & Co. stockbroker 6,760
Roberts Lubbock & Co. merchant bank 24,290
N.M. Rothschild merchant bank 6,350
Royal Bank of Scotland clearing bank 1,500
Spencer Thornton & Co. stockbroker 10,000
Standard Bank of
South Africa overseas bank 2,140
Union of London &
Smiths Bank clearing bank 39,080
Union Bank of Scotland clearing bank 6,050
William Deacons Bank clearing bank 12,470
Hongkong Bank overseas bank 124,960
Note: - implies no information.
Sources: H.S.B.A., LOHI/54; London Post Office Directory. 1911;
S. Jones, Two Centuries of Overseas Trading (1986).
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7.3 Conclusion
The rise of the Paris capital market after the Russo-Japanese War produced a flurry of 
activities among the financiers concerned with the Japanese government loan issues. 
London’s unchallenged lead, which had been established since the first foreign loan issue 
in 1870, was lost. This decisively effected the loan issue markets for the Japanese 
government. The market linkages became relatively decentralised, although the markets 
were not really separate and had much possibility of co-operating in simultaneous loan 
issues. As the result of both the development of markets and the improvement of Japan’s 
borrowing position abroad, Japan could have access to the world’s main capital market! 
directly, not through the main market (London). With the increased competition among 
the markets, the Japanese government could now pursue the most advantageous loan issue 
on the international capital market^ and the patterns of loan issues for the Japanese 
government became more diversified. In this sense, the market linkages became closer 
for borrowers.
Until 1923 when the severe earthquake fKanto Daishinsail occurred, however, the 
Japanese government had no necessity of floating foreign loans, mainly because Japan 
enjoyed large trade surpluses during and after the First World War. Had not the 
continuous trade deficits improved remarkably, the Japanese government would probably 
have depended upon more foreign loan issues after 1914 and would have been thrown 
into a debt crisis.
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CHAPTER 8 
MUNICIPAL AND COMPANY LOAN ISSUES
After the Russo-Japanese War many British financiers paid heed to the Japanese economy 
as an attractive field of investment.1 From the turn of the century British Diplomatic and 
Consular Reports began to mention foreign investments in Japan: in 1901 a scarcity of 
available capital in Japan was revealed and the question of seeking investment was 
raised;2 in 1902 it was pointed out that many Japanese companies needed cheap foreign 
capital.3 The establishment of the Anglo-Japanese Corporation, an investment company 
for promoting enterprises in Japan with British capital, was projected in 1904.4
American investors also sought to invest in Japan. In August 1906 J.H. Schiff, 
a senior partner of Kuhn, Loeb & Co., who had played a prime part in the Japanese 
government foreign loan issues during the Russo-Japanese War, visited Japan with E.H. 
Harriman, who was at that time called the ‘American Railway King’.5 Schiff emphasised 
that investment in Manchuria, where Japan was creating a new market after 1905, should 
be open to foreign capital.6 Paris financiers such as A. Kahn also encouraged Japanese 
investment by French capital after the conclusion of the Franco-Japanese Agreement in 
1907.
As a consequence of the enthusiasm for the Japanese government war bonds on 
the foreign capital markets, investment in Japanese industries and enterprises received
'. For instance, E.H. Holden, the Managing Director of the London City & Midland 
Bank (L.C.M.B.A., ACC/150/2, Mr. Holden’s Report on his Visit to America, 10 
September to 5 November 1904).
2. Annual Series Diplomatic and Consular Reports (Japan) for 1901, no.2789 (1902),
p.22.
3. Ibid., for 1902, no.3009 (1903), p.35.
4. B.B.A. PF297, C.V. Sale to Lord Revelstoke, 15 January 1904.
5. S.I.D.. vol.5, pp. 109-13.
6. J.H. Schiff, ‘Japan after the War’, North American Review. vol.l83-no.dxcvii 
(August, 1906), p. 166; C. Adler, Jacob H. Schiff: His Life and Letters, vol.l (New 
York, 1928), p.236.
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more attention among foreign investors. Obviously government foreign loan issues paved 
the way for company ones. A series of articles written by Henry Dyer, the First Principal 
of the Imperial College of Engineering in Tokyo, advocated industrial investment in 
Japan, saying that the opportunities for it were numerous and highly remunerative.7
Foreign investment in Japan peaked after the Russo-Japanese War. From 1906 
several British financiers started an intensive investigation of Japanese investments. They 
even considered the possibility of direct investments which were regarded as having ‘a 
higher yield for their money than debentures would offer’.8
The contemporary Japanese economy needed much capital for its rapid 
industrialisation. Several Japanese chambers of commerce welcomed low interest rate 
foreign capital.9 Meanwhile, the Japanese government itself regarded municipal and 
company foreign loans, as well as the government foreign loans, as an important source 
of funds for paying trade deficits.10 In fact, K. Takahashi, the Japanese Government Loan 
Commissioner, admitted in 1906 that the Japanese government had no intention of raising 
a further foreign loan because of its heavy borrowing abroad, but that there would be the 
possibility of municipal and company foreign loan issues.11
This chapter will examine municipal and company foreign loan issues in the 
period from 1902 to 1913. It also includes the intention of comparing them with the 
government foreign loan issues, especially with respect to the investment channels 
between Japanese borrowers and the London capital market.12
7. H. Dyer, ‘Japanese Industries and Foreign Investments’, Financial Review of 
Reviews, no.4 (February 1906); ‘Commercial Morality of Japan’, ibid.. no.7 (May 
1906); ‘Legal Aspects of Foreign Investments in Japan’, ibid.. no. 10 (August 1906).
8. Annual Series Diplomatic and Consular Reports (Japan) for 1905, no.3377 (1906),
p.3.
9. Y. Horie, Gaishi Yunvu no Kaiko to Tenb5 (Recollection and Prospect of the 
Import of Foreign Capital to Japan! (Tokyo, 1950), pp.60-62.
10. R. Wakatsuki, Kofuan Kaikoroku (My Retrospect! (Tokyo, 1950), pp. 146-47. 
n. ‘The Japanese Loan Conversion: Interview with Mr. K. Takahashi, the
Government Commissioner’, Financial Review of Reviews, no. 13 (1906), p.333.
12. Reubens dealt largely with the Japanese government foreign loans and only limited 
consideration was given to the investment in private sectors (E.P. Reubens, ‘Foreign
(continued...)
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8.1 Industrial Bank and Foreign Loan Issues
The Japanese government took a strictly defensive posture towards foreign capital on the 
‘Prinzip der Erziehung der Nation zur Selbstandigkeit (principle of bringing up a nation 
for independence)’.13 On 21 August 1906 the Cabinet Meeting decided the following 
policy for the import of foreign capital:14
(i) municipalities and companies which intended to import foreign capital (or 
to issue debentures abroad) should consult the government.
(ii) the Industrial Bank, the most eligible financial institution for importing 
foreign capital to Japan, should invariably mediate it.
The Japanese government intended to control fully the import of foreign capital to 
municipalities and private sectors.15 For this purpose it immediately reorganised the 
Industrial Bank as an intermediary of capital imports.
In March 1902 the Industrial Bank was founded with ¥10,000,000 (£1,020,833) 
authorised capital (¥2,500,000 [£255,208] paid up capital) under a special act of 
Parliament. The Governor and directors were all appointed by the Japanese government. 
The Bank also retained several privileges: a 5 percent annual dividend upon the share 
capital was guaranteed by the government for 6 years from the foundation; the Bank 
was empowered to create debentures to the extent of 5 times of its paid up capital.16 At
12(... continued)
Capital and Domestic Development in Japan’ in S. Kuznets, W.E. Moore & J.J. Spengler 
[eds.], Economic Growth [Durham [N.C.], 1955], chapter 6).
13. F. List, Schriften. Reden. Briefe. vol.vi (Das nationale System der politischen 
Okonomie) (Berlin, 1930), p.42.
14. M.T.Z.. vol. 12, p.237. This idea stemmed from T. Megata’s proposal in 1902 
(J.M.F.A.A., T. Megata Papers, 9-5, 9 May 1902).
15. Mark Mason, ‘With Reservations: Prewar Japan as Host to Western Electric and 
ITT’ in T. Yuzawa & M. Udagawa (eds.), Foreign Business in Japan before World War 
II (Tokyo, 1990), p. 175.
16. N.K.G.G.S.. pp.22-28. According to a letter from M. Nunome (the former 
Chief of the Research Department of the Industrial Bank) dated 20 August 1986, no Bank 
record covering this period survives.
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the outset, the ambiguously stipulated business object was that the Bank should long-term 
capital to borrowers.17 Therefore, its character was regarded simply as a Japanese ‘Credit 
Mobilier’. Yet it was also understood that in the near future the Bank would begin the 
business of importing capital to Japan.18
Although a channel for government foreign loan issues in London: i.e. the 
Yokohama Specie Bank, Parr’s Bank and the Hongkong Bank, had been established 
during the Russo-Japanese War, the Japanese government created another for municipal 
and company ones. K. Inoue, a senior statesman, turned more of his attention to the 
Industrial Bank.19 In February 1905 K. Sone, the Japanese Minister of Finance, directed 
Takahashi in London to promote the Industrial Bank to the City as a new joint venture 
for Japanese investment.20 For this purpose, the Japanese government intended to invite 
eminent foreign financiers to the Industrial Bank’s directors.
Baring Brothers, which had been examining the possibility of Japanese private 
railway investments since 1902, were informed by Sale & Frazer Co., their 
correspondent in Yokohama, of the reorganisation of the Industrial Bank.21 C. V. Sale had 
set up Sale & Co. in London for Anglo-Japanese trade in 1882 and afterwards Sale & 
Frazer Co. was established in Yokohama as a sister firm.22 Sale & Frazer Co. acted as
17. Ibid.. pp.30-31.
18. B.B.A., PF295, Nippon Kogyoginko (a pamphlet). In 1903 the Industrial Bank 
applied to the Bank of England for making advances to the Industrial Bank, but the Bank 
of England refused this (B.E.A., G23/88, S.H. Morley to J. Soyeda, 30 November 
1903).
19. S.I.D.. vol.5, pp.96-97.
20. Secret (Secretariat), no.295, Sone to Takahashi, 9 February 1905 (N.K.G.G.S.. 
p.57).
21. B.B.A., PF298, Sale to Baring Brothers, 11 February 1905.
22. J. Tsushima, Hoto Zuiso (My Essav). vol. 12 (on K. Mori) (Tokyo, 1964), 
pp.251-54. Sale & Frazer Co. ’s business was to import steam-locomotives, rail and other 
manufactured goods into Japan and to export Japanese government and municipal bonds 
to London (T.K.Z.. vol.53-1339, 2 June 1906, p.920).
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Baring Brothers’ correspondent in Japan from 1903.23
In April 1905 Takahashi approached Baring Brothers and explained that the 
Industrial Bank was the most eligible financial institution to mediate between borrowing 
Japanese municipalities and companies and the City. He invited Baring Brothers to 
nominate a foreign director for the Industrial Bank.24 Yet Baring Brothers considered that 
such an financial intermediary (the Industrial Bank) would impede direct transactions 
between Japanese companies and foreign investors and have an ill effect on foreigners’ 
investment.25 They refused even Sale’s participation in the Industrial Bank.26 Perhaps 
Baring Brothers were anxious to deal with the Japanese private railway investments by 
themselves.27
Subsequently, Takahashi invited Panmure Gordon & Co., a stockbroker, to this 
reorganisation project, but W. Koch, a partner of Panmure Gordon & Co., proposed the 
following conditions for its participation:28
(i) The unpaid capital (¥7,500,000 [£765,625]) of the Industrial Bank, out of 
the ¥10,000,000 (£1,020,833) authorised capital, should be paid up 
immediately and the paid up capital should be increased to ¥20,000,000 
(£2,041,666).
(ii) Panmure Gordon & Co. should undertake the issue of the newly increased 
stock (¥10,000,000 [£1,020,833]).
(iii) The Industrial Bank should engage Panmure Gordon & Co. exclusively 
as the Bank’s sole stockbroker, and Panmure Gordon & Co. should take 
up security issues in London at a 1/2 percent commission.
23. B.B.A., PF297, MacDonald to Lord Revelstoke, 9 October 1903. Sale & Frazer 
Co. was regarded as ‘eine respectable Firma (a respectable firm)’ (K.A., Ms.22,025, 
Information Book).
24. B.B.A., PF298, Memorandum from K. Takahashi, 6 April 1905.
25. Ibid., Sale to Baring Brothers, 11 February 1905; Farrer to Sale, 11 April 1905.
26. J.N.D.L., Inoue Papers, 686-5, Takahashi to Inoue, 16 May 1905.
27. T.K.J.. vol.2, pp. 269-70.
28. J.N.D.L., Inoue Papers, 687-15, no. 119, 3 October 1905. In December 1905 
¥2,500,000 (£255,208) capital was paid up and the Bank’s paid up capital increased to 
¥5,000,000 (£510,416).
298
Koch obviously aimed to reform the Industrial Bank into an Anglo-Japanese joint venture 
to share the stock equally. But Takahashi and the Japanese government responded that: 
the payment of the unpaid capital was to be fulfilled by June 1906; Panmure Gordon & 
Co. had only a priority of the security issues; out of the newly increased stock, only 
¥7,000,000 (£714,583) should be sold abroad.29 They were firm in minimising foreign 
influences on the Industrial Bank’s management.
On 23 October 1905 the provisional contract was made between them, and the 
Industrial Bank appointed Panmure Gordon & Co. as its London agent.30 Similar agent 
contracts would be placed with Giinzbourg et Cie (Paris) and Warburg (Hamburg) in 
1907.31 Yet the Japanese government was not entirely successful in transforming the 
Industrial Bank into joint venture because the contract omitted a stipulation that the Bank 
should have foreign directors. However, these agent contracts played an important role 
in placing abroad at a very low commission the foreign loans which the Industrial Bank 
undertook.
In February 1906 an amendment of the Industrial Bank Act was brought into 
effect: the Bank’s paid up capital increased to ¥6,250,000 (£638,020) out of the 
¥10,000,000 (£1,020,833) authorised capital; then the Bank increased the authorised 
capital to ¥17,500,000 (£1,786,458); the ¥7,500,000 (£765,625) newly increased stock 
was all placed abroad and paid up fully. As a result, the Bank’s paid up capital now 
became ¥13,750,000 (£1,403,645) and the proportion of the capital, held by foreigners, 
reached 43 percent.32
The Industrial Bank was formidable for foreign financiers in Japanese loan issue
79. Matsuo to Takahashi, 25 August 1905 in T.K.J.. vol.2, pp.270-71.
30. N.K.G.G.S.. pp.59 and 98.
31. Industrial Bank of Japan, Honkoku ni okeru Gaishi Donvu Sh5shi (Short History 
of Capital Imports in Japan (Tokyo, 1948), p.5.
32. N.K.G.G.S.. pp.60 and 83. The Japanese government increased the Industrial 
capital by ¥7,500,000 (£765,625) only, in spite of the Panmure Gordon & Co. ’s previous 
proposal. J.S. Morgan & Co. bought 2,000 shares (M.G.A., Ms.21,793, vol.3).
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business. After 1906 the Bank was deeply concerned with many municipal and company 
foreign loan issues, so much so that foreign financiers were very wary of its 
advantageous position. Foreign financiers often blamed the Japanese government’s unfair 
intervention, through the Industrial Bank, in private transactions. In fact, foreign 
merchants in Japan complained that Japanese municipal foreign loan issues were almost 
unavailable except through the Industrial Bank.33 C.M. MacDonald, the British 
Ambassador in Tokyo, commented that the Japanese government gave too much favour 
to the Industrial Bank ‘at the expense of its [foreign] rivals’.34
8.2 Municipal Loan Issues
After the Russo-Japanese War Japan entered a new era of foreign loan issues for 
municipalities and companies. The loan issues concentrated on 1908 and 1909 in 
particular (Table 8.1 and 8.8). Municipalities were willing to introduce low interest rate 
foreign capital into their infrastructure establishments. Owing to the low capital 
accumulation, interest rates in Japan were much higher than those in Western developed 
countries. Table 8.2 shows that the interest rate differentials between Japan and Britain.
At that time there were the following three common channels of municipal foreign 
loan issues:
(i) by foreign financiers directly (through correspondents in Japan).
(ii) by foreign financiers through the Industrial Bank.
(iii) by foreign financiers through other Japanese banks.
Before July 1902 the Japanese government had not yet followed any definite
guideline for municipal foreign loan issues. In July 1899 the City of Kobe negotiated on
33. F.O.371/86, C.M. MacDonald to Lord Grey (Memorandum of the Industrial Bank 
of Japan), 29 May 1906.
34. Ibid., 26 September 1906.
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an issue of ¥1,000,000 (£102,083) 6 percent bonds with J.M. Morse, the President of 
the American Trading Co. in Yokohama and Kobe.35 They agreed to issue ¥500,000 
(£51,042) of the 6 percent bonds. Morse purchased ¥250,000 (£25,521)* in sterling. This 
was the first municipal foreign loan issue in Japan, although the character was very 
different from public loans placed through subscriptions on the market. In 1902 the 6 
percent City of Yokohama waterworks foreign loan for £90,000 was arranged by S. 
Samuel & Co. in Yokohama and M. Samuel & Co. placed it in London.37
Thereafter, in July 1902 the Japanese Ministry of Home Affairs gave notification 
that municipalities should invariably inform both the Ministry of Home Affairs and the 
Ministry of Finance of loan issues before commencing negotiations with foreign 
financiers.38 This aim was obvious. The Japanese government intended to control the 
import of foreign capital to municipalities. Although foreign financiers were never shut 
out wholly, there was only a little room for them to vie effectively with the Industrial 
Bank in municipal loan issue business. In order to escape censure of its unfair trade 
interventions, the sagacious Japanese government reserved a limited number of municipal 
foreign loan issues for foreign financiers. For instance, it was under the Japanese 
government’s administrative guidance that Sale & Frazer Co. took the City of Nagoya 
5 percent loan issue in 1909.39
The municipal foreign loan issues before the Russo-Japanese War period were 
arranged mainly by British merchants in Japan. They did not always offer favourable loan 
issue terms. The City of Osaka 6 percent harbour loan contract in 1902 between the 
Daisan Bank, the Yasuda Bank and S. Samuel & Co. exemplifies one of the early
35. The City of Kobe, Kobe Shishi (History of Kobe). vol.Honpen Kakusetsu Ge 
(Kobe, 1924), p.258; T.K.Z.. vol.40-988, 22 July 1899, p.202.
* M.T.Z.. vol. 12, p.714.
37. B.B.A., PF295, Bisset to Lord Revelstoke, 26 July 1902.
38. Ministry of Home Affairs Circular, dated 4 July 1902 (M.T.Z.. vol. 12, p.715).
39. The City of Nagoya, Taisho Sh5wa Nagovashishi (History of the City of Nagoya 
from 19171. vol. 7 (Nagoya, 1955), p.236.
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unfavourable municipal foreign loan issues.40
(i) The Daisan Bank should purchase ¥3,500,000 (£357,292) of the bonds 
from the municipality.
(ii) S. Samuel & Co. should sell them in London through M. Samuel & Co. 
at a 7 1/2 percent commission including all the charges.
(iii) The Yasuda Bank should underwrite half the issue amount (¥1,750,000 
[£178,646]) and S. Samuel & Co. the other half.
(iv) S. Samuel & Co. should pay a 2 1/2 percent underwriting commission 
to/Yasuda Bank.
It must be noted that the municipality paid a large loan issue commission, 7 1/2 percent.
S. Samuel & Co.’s real commission amounted to nearly 8 percent including the balance 
between the issue price (99 percent) and the purchase price from the municipality (about 
97 3/4 percent). The reason for the 6 percent rate of interest was ascribed to the character 
of a domestic loan. ¥3,500,000 [£357,292], out of the ¥17,038,000 [£1,739,296] bonds 
issued, was offered to the subscriptions abroad.41 S. Samuel & Co. agreed to underwrite 
only half the amount (¥1,750,000) and the Yasuda Bank was to sell the other half in the 
domestic market should the subscriptions in London fail. S. Samuel & Co. also obtained 
a 10 percent commission in the City of Yokohama 6 percent waterworks loan of 1902.42 
These show that the Japanese municipalities did not enjoy favourable foreign loan issues 
before the Russo-Japanese War.
In view of these unfavourable loan issue circumstances, in August 1906 the 
Ministry of Finance gave notification that small municipal loans (less than ¥1,000,000 
[£102,083]) should either be floated on the domestic market or aggregated to the form 
of Industrial Bank foreign debentures; municipal foreign loan issues should be made
40. Contract dated 11 October 1902 in G.K.S.. vol.2, pp.308-16.
41. J.M.F.A.A., 3-4-4-5, vol.l, Daisan Bank to Komura, 22 October 1902; S.E.O.I. 
(1906).
42. T.K.Z.. vol.45-1134, 31 May 1902, p. 1010; S.E.O.I. (1909).
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through the Industrial Bank.43 Although the Japanese government announced that it had 
no intention of interfering in transactions, it was obvious that this was the virtually 
inevitable result for municipalities.44
How could British merchants in Japan find a loan issue market for municipalities? 
In other words, how could they mediate between municipalities and the City? 
Correspondence between Sale & Frazer Co., Baring Brothers and Antony Gibbs45 in the 
City of Tokyo loan issue negotiations of 1906 provides a rich source of information on 
this matter. This reveals their practice in contemporary foreign loan business.
In July 1905 Sale & Frazer Co. (Yokohama), through its sister firm Sale & Co. 
(London), offered the City of Tokyo harbour loan issue to Baring Brothers. Yet Baring 
Brothers showed little interest in it because their Japanese investment business was 
confined strictly to government or first class private railway company loan issues. Baring 
Brothers, therefore, exhorted Sale & Co. to take this business to Antony Gibbs. Brien 
Cokayne, a partner of Antony Gibbs, and Lord Revelstoke met to discuss it and Lord 
Revelstoke assured him that this would be as sound as a government loan issue. Cokayne 
was afraid of locking up capital in a loan issue and hesitated to launch such a risky 
venture without full knowledge of its character. Vicary Gibbs, another partner of Antony 
Gibbs, was, however, rather keen to seize the proposed loan issue46 and consulted 
Panmure Gordon & Co. on the possibility.47 Despite the information supplied being very
43. M .T.Z.. vol. 12, pp.717-18. This was in accordance with the decision of the 
Cabinet Meeting on 21 August 1906 which has been mentioned previously.
44. Ibid.. p.718. However, in the City of Yokohama harbour work loan of 1907 S. 
Samuel & Co. received only a 2 1/2 percent commission including the British stamp 
duty. This low level of the commission was very favourable to the municipality (Contract 
dated 14 September 1906 in G.K.S.. vol.2, pp.351-54; T.K.Z.. vol.54-1350, 18 August 
1906, p.284). This reason may have lain in the condition that the payment of the 
proceeds be made in yen.
45. For Antony Gibbs’s brief history, see M.J. Daunton, ‘Inheritance and Succession 
in the City of London in the Nineteenth Century’, Business History, vol.xxx-no.3 (1988), 
pp.276-82.
4<s. A.G.A., Ms. 11,040, Brien Cokayne to Herbert Gibbs, 28 July 1905.
47. Ibid., 29 July 1905.
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imprecise and no statistics being available on the City of Tokyo, by the end of July Gibbs 
had decided on the following tentative loan issue terms:48
(%)
Rate of interest 6
Issue price 97 (to the public)
90 (to the municipality) 
Commission 7
2 to Antony Gibbs
1 to Sale & Frazer Co.
2 to underwriters
1/2 brokerage
1 printing and advertising
1/2 the stamp duty.
The loan issue commission amounted to 7 percent and there was a 1 percent intermediary 
commission to Sale & Frazer Co..
It seems likely that Sale & Frazer Co. had not yet firmly grasped the business 
opportunity. Antony Gibbs became sceptical about the progress of the negotiations in 
Japan, and in September it proposed either a 6 percent loan at 95 1/2 percent or a 5 1/2 
percent one at between 90 percent and 88 percent.49
Ultimately Antony Gibbs’ bid ended up unfulfilled. In June 1906 the Industrial 
Bank and the City of Tokyo agreed to issue a 5 percent loan for £1,500,000 through 
Parr’s Bank, the Hongkong Bank and the Yokohama Specie Bank. The 5 percent rate of 
interest and 3 1/2 percent commission were much better than Antony Gibbs’ offer.50 Sale 
& Frazer Co. reported to Baring Brothers that ‘it is a triumph for the Industrial Bank of 
Japan, and for those Japanese who insisted that their credit has now reached such a 
standard that foreign intermediaries are no longer required’.51 Foreign financiers,
48. Ibid., Vicary Gibbs to Herbert Gibbs, 31 July 1905 and Henry Gibbs to Herbert 
Gibbs, 1 August 1905.
49. Ibid., Brien Cokayne to Herbert Gibbs, 25 September 1905.
Provisional Contract between the City of Tokyo and the Industrial Bank dated 30 
June 1906 in G.K.S.. vol.2, pp.7-8.
51. B.B.A., PF301, Sale & Frazer to Baring Brothers, 20 July 1906.
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however, were dissatisfied with this outcome. In particular, S. Samuel & Co. complained 
that the City of Tokyo had an obvious motive for putting the loan issue into the hands 
of the Industrial Bank, disregarding many foreign financiers’ more advantageous offers.52
The Industrial Bank took the initiative in underwriting the loan issue through 
Panmure Gordon & Co..53 The result of this loan issue was undersubscribed and the 
underwriters took £283,840 of the bonds, 18.9 percent of the issue amount (Table 8.3).
Sale & Frazer Co. often mediated loan issues between Japanese borrowers and the 
City. Lazard Brothers placed the loans Sale & Frazer Co. undertook in Japan, on the 
London capital market. Through these business connections, both the City of Nagoya 5 
percent loan of 1909 and the City of Yokohama 5 percent one of 1912 were floated. 
The City of Nagoya 5 percent loan was issued at a 5 1/2 percent commission.54 In 
comparison with the loan issues undertaken by the Industrial Bank, the terms were 
slightly less favourable to the municipality.
Table 8.1 shows that in the period from 1906 to 1913 there were four municipal 
foreign loan issues which the Industrial Bank undertook. Their cumulative amount in that 
period comprised nearly 80 percent of the total municipal foreign loan issues. As shown, 
the Bank ensured a firm business channel with Panmure Gordon & Co. through its agent 
contract, and the usual Japanese government loan takers in London: i.e. Parr’s Bank, the 
Hongkong Bank and the Yokohama Specie Bank, invariably placed all of them.
In 1909 the City of Osaka issued a 5 percent loan for £3,084,940 in London 
through the Industrial Bank. £1,250,000 of the bonds had been purchased in advance and 
the balance of £1,834,940 was subscribed on the market (Table 8.4).55 The 5 percent loan 
issue commission excluding miscellaneous charges56 was more expensive to the
52. Ibid..
53. H.S.B.A., Board Minutes, 17 July 1906.
54. L. A., W.94/5, Memorandum of Provisional Contract, 8 May 1909.
55. P.B.A., B11418, Board Minutes, 29 April 1909.
56. H.S.B.A., LOHI/2; Contract between die City of Osaka and the Industrial Bank 
dated 22 May 1909 in G.K.S.. vol.2, pp.319-22.
305
municipality than the 3 1/2 percent in the City of Tokyo loan issue of 1906. In the same 
year the Industrial Bank also took the City of Yokohama 5 percent waterworks loan issue 
for £716,500. Parr’s Bank, the Hongkong Bank and the Yokohama Specie Bank floated 
it at a 4 percent commission through Panmure Gordon & Co.. It was oversubscribed 
fivefold (Table 8.5).57
In February 1912 the City of Tokyo raised a £9,175,000 foreign loan for 
purchasing private electric tramway companies. Despite many foreign financiers’ 
vigorous offers, the Industrial Bank finally took it. The loan was placed on the three 
major capital markets: London, New York and Paris, simultaneously. The Industrial 
Bank completed these operations through Panmure Gordon & Co. and Giinzbourg et 
Cie.58 Parr’s Bank, the Hongkong Bank and the Yokohama Specie Bank undertook the 
issue in London, Kuhn, Loeb & Co. in New York, and the Societe G6nerale, the 
Banque de Paris and the Comptoir National d’Escompte in Paris. K. Mori, the Japanese 
Government Financial Commissioner, conducted all these negotiations on behalf of the 
Industrial Bank.59 He assessed the capacity of the Anglo-American markets at £6,000,000 
at most and included Paris in this operation.60 According to the different market 
conditions, the following separate loan issue terms were prepared:61
Loan issue amount £9,175,000
London £3,175,000
Paris £4,000,000
New York £2,000,000
Rate of interest (nominal) 5 percent
57. H.S.B.A., LOHI/2 and 51; London Stock Exchange (Guildhall Library), Loan and 
Company Prospectuses.
58. Contract between the City of Tokyo and the Industrial Bank dated 6 February 1912 
in G.K.S.. vol.2, pp.40-43; N.K.G.G.S.. pp.94-95.
59. Contract (B) between K. Mori and Panmure Gordon & Co. dated 16 February 
1912 in G.K.S.. vol.2, pp.51-53; A.M.E.A., N.S.57, French Chargd d’Affaires in 
Tokyo to Poincare, 3 February 1912.
J.M.F.A., K. Sh5da Papers, 28-7, K. Mori to K. Shoda, 5 December 1911.
61. G.K.S.. vol.2, pp.41-53.
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Loan issue price*
London
Paris
New York
(to municipality) (to the public)
93 percent 98 percent
92 percent 96 3/4 percent
93 1/2 percent 98 percent
Yields at issue
London
Paris
New York
5.1 percent
5.2 percent 
5.1 percent.
The outcome of the subscriptions in London was very poor and only £1,523,600, 48 
percent of the London issue amount, was taken by the public (Table 8.6).
French investors also paid much attention to investments in Japan after the 
conclusion of the Franco-Japanese Agreement in 1907. In the very same year the Banque 
de Paris sent H. Finally, Sous-directeur (Sub-director), to Japan to look into the 
possibility of Japanese investments.62 Japanese businessmen were also willing to build up 
commercial relations with French financiers. In 1907, J. Soyeda, the Governor of the 
Industrial Bank, on a business trip, approached several financiers in Paris through J. de 
Giinzbourg63 and T. Masuda, a Director of the Mitsui Zaibatsu, contacted the Paris 
Rothschilds and Vemes et Cie.64
In 1909 and 1912 the City of Kyoto floated 5 percent loans on the Paris capital 
market through the Mitsui Bank. The main figure of these loan issues was A. Kahn, an 
influential French financier, who had established close connections with the Mitsui 
Zaibatsu.65 In 1906 the City of Kyoto decided to construct waterworks, roads and an 
electric tramway on borrowing. Initially the City brought this business to the Industrial 
Bank, but the Bank failed to float the loan in Europe because of adverse market 
conditions. K. Saigo, the Mayor, approached the Mitsui Bank, instead of the Industrial 
Bank, and in 1908 made temporary borrowings of ¥2,700,000 (£275,625) from the 
Mitsui Bank. The Mitsui Bank, which was at that time considering redirecting its business
62. A.M.E.A., N.S. 54, French Ambassador in Tokyo to Pichon, 3 September 1907.
®. Ibid., N.S.59, French Ambassador in Tokyo to Pichon, 3 April 1907.
M.A., Iko-182, Masuda’s Interview in France, no date.
*. A.M.E.A.,N.S.55, French Ambassador in Tokyo to Pichon, 20 January 1909.
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from deposit to investment banking,66 intended to raise further necessary funds abroad.67
In March 1909 the City of Kyoto agreed with the Mitsui Bank to issue a 5 percent 
loan in France for ¥17,000,000 (£1,735,417).68 S. Watanabe, the Manager of Mitsui 
Bussan Kaisha in London, became a prime negotiator.69 Kahn mediated between 
Watanabe and the loan issue banks in Paris: the Banque de l’Union Parisienne and the 
Societe Marseillaise de Credit Industriel et Commercial et de Depots.70 On 28 June 1909 
Watanabe concluded the following loan issue terms:71
Issue amount Fr45,000,000 (£1,781,250)
Rate of interest (nominal) 5 percent
Issue price 99 percent (to the public)
The total issue amount was purchased by the syndicate.72 The contract stated that the 
syndicate could re-purchase 20 percent of the issue amount from the market to manipulate 
the market price of the bonds properly.73 The 6 percent loan issue commission, including 
miscellaneous charges, was not particularly advantageous to the municipality. The
MT.B.A., 4-2, Shitenchokai Ssokiroku (Stenographic Notes of Branch Managers’ 
Meeting) held on 21 September 1907, p.7.
67. Mitsui Bank, Mitsui Ginko Hachijunenshi (Eightieth Year Anniversary History 
of the Mitsui Bankl (Tokyo, 1958), pp. 184-85.
68.I'1t,b.a.j12-10 , Telegram, Manager at the Kyoto Branch to S. Hayakawa (Managing 
Director of the Mitsui Zaibatsu), 21 March 1909.
69. At that time Watanabe was in charge of the Bank’s affairs in Europe (ibid.j2-l; 
Board Minutes, vol.l, 2 November 1909).
70. A.M.F., F30'377, Watanabe to Kahn (Copy), 3 August 1909.
71. M.A., Ginko 13-6, T. Toyama, Mitsui Ginko Obei Shucchoin Hokokusho (Report 
of an officer dispatched by the Mitsui Bank to Europe and America) (1909), pp. 106-18.
72. According to the syndicate contract, the main members of the syndicate were as 
follows: Banque de l’Union Parisienne; Societe Marseillaise; Banque de Paris; Societe 
Generate; Comptoir National d’Escompte; Credit Algdrien; Hottinguer; Mallet Freres; 
Mirabaud; Mitsui Bussan Kaisha (London Branch); Lazard Fr&res; Vemes; Kahn; the 
Paris Rothschilds; Kleinworts (London); Warburg (Hamburg) (Toyama, op. cit.,
Yield at issue 
Borrowing period
93 percent (to the municipality) 
5.4 percent 
30 years.
pp. 122-23).
73. Ibid., pp. 118-21.
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distribution of the commission among the concerned financial institutions is indicated in 
Table 8.7.
The syndicate successfully secured the issue amount74 and the French government 
immediately admitted the quotation of the loan on the Paris Stock Exchange.75 The 
syndicate desired the City of Kyoto to use French manufactured goods for the works 
which the loan financed.76 In 1912 an additional 5 percent loan for Fr5,000,000 
(£197,917) was issued at a 5 percent commission through the same channel.77
Perhaps it was in these two financial operations that French financiers gained a 
firm foothold in Japanese loan issue business and fully eliminated Britain’s strong sway 
over their activities.78 Meanwhile, the Mitsui Bank was proud of accomplishing these 
issues without any British intermediary.79
74. MT.B.A., 5-7, Hochi (Announcement), dated 6 July 1909.
75. A.M.F., F30'377, Order 38, Minisfere des Finances to Syndic, 8 July 1909.
76. J.M.F.A.A.,3-4-4-42, Secret no.24, S. Kurino to Komura, 26 August 1909.
77. MT.B.A., 2-1, Board Minutes, 12 and 26 August 1909.
78. A.M.F., F30377, no.643, Ministbre des Affaires Etrangbres to Ministbre des 
Finances, 18 June 1909.
79. MT.B.A., 4-2, op. o o n  13 September 1909, p.5.
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Table 8.1 Japanese Municipal Foreign Loan Issues. 1899-1913
Year Municipality Issue Interest Issue Intermediary Issuers
(Object) amount rate price (issue place)
(nominal) (to the
[yield public)
at issue]
(¥000) (%) (%)
1899 Kobe 250 
(Waterworks)
6
[6.5]
92 Morles
(Yokohama)
Morles 
(Yokohama) 
(possibly in 
London)
1902 Yokohama 900 
(Waterworks)
6
[6.1]
98 S. Samuel M. Samuel 
Capital & 
Counties 
Bank 
(London)
1902 Osaka* 3,085 
(Harbourworks)
6
[6.1]
99 Daisan Bank 
Yasuda Bank 
S. Samuel
M. Samuel 
Capital & 
Counties 
Bank 
(London)
1906 Tokyo** 14,580 
(Harbourworks,
Street
Improvements)
5
[5.0]
100 Industrial
Bank
Hongkong Bank 
Parr’s Bank 
Yokohama 
Specie 
Bank 
(London)
1907 Yokohama*** 3,108 
(Harbourworks)
6
[6.1]
99 S. Samuel M. Samuel 
(London)
1909 Yokohama 648 
(Gasworks)
5
[5.1]
97 1/2 Hongkong
Bank
Hongkong Bank 
(London)
1909 Osaka+ 30,220 
(Waterworks,
Electric
Tramway)
5
[5.2]
97 Industrial
Bank
Hongkong Bank 
Parr’s Bank 
Yokohama 
Specie Bank 
(London)
1909 Nagoya++ 7,816 
(Waterworks)
5
[5.2]
95 1/2 Sale & 
Frazer Co.
Lazard
Bros
(London)
1909 Kyoto+ + + 17,550 
(Waterworks, 
Electricity 
and others)
5
[5.1]
99 Mitsui Bank 
(Kahn)
Banque de 1’ 
Union 
Parisienne 
(Paris)
Table 8.1 Japanese Municipal Foreign Loan Issues. 1899-1913 (cont.l
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Year Municipality Issue 
(Object) amount 
(nominal)
(¥000)
Interest Issue 
rate price
(to the 
[yield public) 
at issue]
(%) (%)
Intermediary Issuers 
(issue place)
1909 Yokohama*+ 7,000 5
(Waterworks) [5.1]
1912 Kyoto*+ + 1,950 5
(Waterworks, [5.1]
Electricity 
and others)
1912 Tokyo**+ 89,564 5
(Electricity) [5.1]
5
[5.1] 
5
[5.1]
1912 Yokohama 1,200 5
(Gasworks) [5.1]
98
97 3/4
96 3/4
97 1/2
Notes:
Industrial Hongkong Bank
Bank Parr’s Bank 
Yokohama 
Specie Bank 
(London)
Mitsui Banque de 1*
Bank Union
(Kahn) Parisienne
(Paris)
Industrial Hongkong Bank
Bank Parr’s Bank 
Yokohama 
Specie Bank 
(London) 
Kuhn, Loeb 
(New York) 
Socidtd 
Gdndrale 
(Paris)
Sale & Law
Frazer Debenture
Corp.
(London)
Sources:
The issue amounts were based on Japanese records and not converted at 
the fixed rate of exchange (for instance, ¥ l=2s. l/2d. and ¥ l=Fr2  
11/19);
according to the contract, the amount was ¥3,500,000; 
the original amount was £1,500,000; 
the original amount was £317,000; 
the original amount was £3,084,940; 
the original amount was £800,000; 
the original amount was Fr45,000,000; 
the original amount was £716,500; 
the original amount was Fr5,000,000;
the original amounts were £9,175,000 (London), £5,175,000 (New 
York) and Fr100,880,000 (Paris).
M.T.Z.. vol. 12, p.721; The Finance Bureau of the Japanese Ministry of 
Finance, Kin-vu Jiko Sankosho (Annual Reference Bulletin on Financial 
Matters').for the year of 1920 (1920, Tokyo), p.27; Industrial Bank of 
Japan, Nippon Gaisai Shoshi (Short History of Japanese Foreign Loans') 
(Tokyo, 1948); G.K.S.. vol.2; S.E.O.I.. annually; London Stock 
Exchange (Guildhall Library), Loan and Company Prospectuses.
* *
* * *
+
+ +
+ + + 
* +
* +  +
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Table 8.2 Interest Rate Differentials (Bank Rates and 
Official Discount Rates'). 1900-1910 
(percent)
Year Bank Rate Official Discount Rate
(Britain) (Japan)
1900 4.0 8.8
1901 4.0 8.8
1902 4.0 6.2
1903 4.0 5.8
1904 3.0 7.3
1905 4.0 8.0
1906 6.0 6.6
1907 7.0 7.3
1908 2.5 7.3
1909 4.5 5.8
1910 4.5 4.8
Note: End of December.
Sources: J. Clapham, The Bank of England, vol.ii (Cambridge, 1944),
appendix b; N.G.H.S.. vol.data, p.426.
Table 8.3 Subscriptions of the City of Tokyo 
5 Percent Loan Issue in 1906 
(£)
Public Subscriptions 
Hongkong Bank 258,140
Yokohama Specie Bank 512,700 
Parr’s Bank 445,320
Underwriters (19 percent) 283,840
Total 1,500,000
Note: The quotation price at the end of February
1907 was 99 percent (I.M.M.J; the paper loss 
of the underwriters was 1 percent.
Source: H.S.B.A., LOHI/2.
(£)
Loan issue bank Allotment Subscriptions
Hongkong Bank 511,660 ii
Parr’s Bank 2,177,280 | 5,562,000
Yokohama Specie Bank 396,000 ii
Total 3,084,940 5,562,000
Source: H.S.B.A., LOHI/2.
Table 8.5 Subscriptions of the City of Yokohama 5 Percent Loan Issue in 1909
(£)
Loan issue bank Application Allotment
Hongkong Bank 853,400 137,900
Parr’s Bank 1,910,740 465,200
Yokohama Specie Bank 899,900 113,400
Total 3,664,040 716,500
Source: H.S.B.A., LOHI/2.
Table 8.6 Subscriptions of the City of Tokyo 5 Percent Loan Issue in 1912
(£)
Public Subscriptions
Parr’s Bank 1,103,700
Hongkong Bank 255,700
Yokohama Specie Bank 164,200
Underwriters (52 percent) 1,651,400
Total 3,175,000
Note: the quotation price at the end of April 1912 was 98
1/4 percent (I.M.M.l: there was no paper loss for 
the underwriters.
Source: H.S.B.A., LOHI/48.
Table 8.7 Distribution of Loan Issue Commissions 
in the City of Kyoto 5 Percent Loan Issue in 1909 
(percent)
Mitsui Bank (intermediary) 1/2
Kahn (intermediary) 1/2
Banque de 1’Union Parisienne (loan issue bank) 1/2
Socidtd Marseillaise (loan issue bank) 1/2
Syndicate profit 4
Total 6
Note: Syndicate profit included miscellaneous charges.
Source: M.A., Ginko 13-6, Toyama, op. cit., pp. 121-22.
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8.3 Company Loan Issues
Japanese industries and enterprises needed cheap foreign capital. For instance, the Osaka 
Merchant Shipping Co. intended to issue low interest rate foreign debentures in 1900.80 
In 1902 Baring Brothers’ experimental operations to scrutinise the possibility of Japanese 
private railway investments started. But both defects in the Japanese mortgage law and 
the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War frustrated the business. Like the municipal 
foreign loan issues, it was after the Russo-Japanese War period that company foreign loan 
issues reached their peak. It is obvious from Table 8.8 that the proportion of the railway 
company foreign debenture issues to the total foreign ones from 1905 to 1913 was well 
over 35 percent, and would probably have been higher, had not railway nationalisation 
taken place. Table 8.9 also shows the total number and amount of company debenture 
issues, domestic and foreign, from 1902 to 1913.
The attitude of the Japanese government towards company foreign loan issues was 
almost the same as that towards municipal ones. The previous announcement of 1906 was 
also applicable to company foreign loan issues. In addition to this, the Japanese Secured 
Debentures Trust Law stipulated that a company which intended to enter a trust 
agreement with foreigners should file an application with the Ministry of Finance.81 On 
these grounds the Japanese government could legally intervene in private transactions.
Several foreign merchants resident in Japan, such as Kirby & Birch Co., S. 
Samuel & Co. and Sale & Frazer Co., played a leading role in placing company loans, 
especially the earlier ones, abroad as agents or correspondents of London merchant 
banks. These merchant houses dispatched useful business information directly to the 
City.
80. Osaka Merchant Shipping Co., Osaka Sh5sen Kabushiki Kaisha Gojvunenshi 
(Fiftieth Anniversary History of the Osaka Merchant Shipping Co.) (Osaka, 1934), 
p.507.
81. F.O. 371/87, MacDonald to Lord Grey, 9 June 1906.
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Apart from the large-scale government, municipal and company domestic loan 
issues, merchant houses were able to take part effectively in company foreign issues. In 
particular, S. Samuel & Co. was most deeply involved in company foreign loan business. 
It undertook the Kansai Railway Co. debenture issue in 1905 and in 1908 made a private 
borrowing for ¥3,000,000 (£306,250) for the Keihan Railway Co. on the Daiichi Bank’s 
guarantee.82 These transactions resulted in many concomitant orders for British 
manufactured railway goods. In 1910 Sale & Frazer Co. arranged the ¥5,000,000 
(£510,416) Hokkaido Colonial Bank 5 percent foreign debentures, the purpose of which 
was conversion of high interest rate domestic debentures to lower foreign ones.83
Overseas banks also became involved in Japanese company foreign loan issues. 
The Hongkong Bank, since the re-sale of the Japanese government domestic bonds in 
1902, collaborated with Baring Brothers in Japanese investment business. Its Yokohama 
Branch often supported Sale & Frazer Co., the Baring Brothers’ agent in Japan, in 
several Japanese private railway debenture issues. The Hongkong Bank, however, 
switched the partner of its Japanese investment business from Baring Brothers to the 
Industrial Bank, because the Industrial Bank made an agent contract with Panmure 
Gordon & Co., as mentioned previously. In 1905 the Chartered Bank issued the 5 percent 
Hokkaido Colliery & Coal Railway Co. debentures through Faber & Pigot Co..84
French financiers had stakes in several Japanese company loan issues. In 1908 
Kahn mediated the Kanegafuchi Cotton Spinning Co. 7 1/2 percent debenture issue 
between the Mitsui Bank and the banks in Paris.85 In 1909 Gysin Freres in Paris mediated 
the 6 1/2 percent debenture issue in Paris for the Matsui Muslin Spinning Co..86 In 1913 
the newly established Banque Franco-Japonaise placed the first Oriental Colonial Corp.
82. F.O. 371/475, MacDonald to Lord Grey, 9 April 1908.
83. Hokkaido Colonial Bank, Hokkaido Takushoku Ginkoshi fHistorv of the Hokkaido 
Colonial Bank! (Sapporo, 1971), pp.62-63.
84. Hokkaido Collier & Coal Railway Co., Nanajunenshi fSeventieth Anniversary 
History) (Tokyo, 1958), pp.76-77.
85. A.M.F., F30'377, Charpentier to Pichon, 13 February 1909.
86. Ibid., 14 May 1909.
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5 percent debentures, guaranteed by the Japanese government, on the Paris capital 
market.87
It seems likely that British investors were reluctant to channel money through a 
financial intermediary specialised in Japanese investment. Merchant banks invariably took 
the initiative in Japanese investment, as the Anglo-Japanese Bank had not gained a high 
reputation in the City. By contrast, French financiers, much behind the British in 
Japanese investment business, set up a specific intermediary for Japanese investments. In 
1913 the Society Generate, together with the Industrial Bank, founded the Banque 
Franco-Japonaise, the purpose of which was to establish direct financial linkages between 
France and Japan, not through British intermediaries.88
The Industrial Bank played a key role in mediating most of the large scale 
company foreign loan issues. Its business network, covering London (Panmure Gordon
6  Co.), Paris (Giinzbourg et Cie) and Hamburg (Warburg), enabled the Bank to issue 
more favourable foreign loans than any foreign merchants in Japan could arrange. During 
the period from 1906 to 1913 the Industrial Bank made eight out of the eleven company 
foreign loan issues.
In following sections, several Japanese company foreign debenture issues, by both 
foreign financiers and the Industrial Bank, will be discussed as case studies.
8.3.1 Baring Brothers and railway investments
Gordon’s Report on the Japanese railway system pointed out that a number of railway 
companies in Japan urgently needed cheap foreign capital because of the high interest 
rates there.89 The first attempt at raising foreign loans for Japanese private railway
87. A.M.E.A., N.S. 57, French Ambassador in Tokyo to Ministere des Affaires 
Etrangeres, 8 March 1913.
88. A.M.F., F30377, Note pour Ministre, 4 April 1912.
89. F.O. 46/561, Mr. Gordon’s Report and Account of the Japanese Railway System 
in 1902.
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companies took place in 1901. In June 1901 R. Kirby, a Director of John Birch & Co. 
(London), informed MacDonald (the British Minister in Tokyo at that time) that his 
company was looking for British banks which could look after Japanese private railway 
company foreign debenture issues. John Birch & Co. supplied railway instruments to 
many railway companies. The Kyushu Railway Co. required borrowings for extending 
and improving the lines. The Hokuetsu Railway Co. mainly for paying off the high 
interest rate (10 percent) domestic bonds.90
The Kyushu Railway Co. was set up in June 1888 and amalgamated many small 
local railway companies in a coal mining area of the Kyushu district. E. Shibusawa, the 
Governor of the Dai-ichi Bank, became a major influence in the Company.91 The 
Hokuetsu Railway Co. was established in December 1895 and Shibusawa retained large 
stakes.
British diplomats were deeply concerned with Japanese private railway 
investments. MacDonald introduced this business to Baring Brothers through Lord 
Lansdowne, the British Secretary for Foreign Affairs.92 However, the most crucial 
obstacle to this business was that foreigners were not able to secure their investments in 
railway companies, that is to say, railway companies were not able to mortgage lands and 
railway properties to foreigners.93 MacDonald, therefore, warned T. Hayashi, the 
Japanese Minister in London, that no one could put money into Japanese railway 
companies, unless the Japanese government immediately altered the law so as to provide 
security for foreign investors.94
In September 1901 Baring Brothers entered into negotiations with John Birch & 
Co. on the proposed Japanese private railway debenture issues. J.S. Homer, a Director
90. F.O. 800/134, Kirby to MacDonald, 3 June 1901.
91. K. Nakanishi, Nippon Shiyu Tetsudoshi Kenkvu (Study on the History of Japanese 
Private Railwavsl (Kyoto, 1979), p.80.
92. B.B.A., PF295, MacDonald to Lord Revelstoke, 4 May 1901.
93. Ibid., Copy of Letter from M. Sengoku to J.S. Homer, 28 June 1901.
94. F.O. 800/134, MacDonald to Lord Lansdowne, 18 July 1901.
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of John Birch & Co., listed the following three major difficulties of Japanese private 
railway investments:95 firstly, Japanese law stipulated that foreigners should not be 
entitled to become a mortgagee; secondly, under the Japanese law railway companies 
should not mortgage their properties; thirdly, the Japanese government retained the power 
to purchase private railways after twenty five years from the authorisation of the 
construction. Baring Brothers, therefore, saw reasons to scrutinise both the Japanese law 
and the management of these railway companies.96
In the middle of December 1901, Baring Brothers and J. Birch & Co. agreed to 
send W. Bisset, the former Chief Officer at the Indian Railway Bureau, to Japan.97 British 
financiers often used such a direct approach for assessing an investment object. For 
instance, in 1909 the London, City & Midland Bank dispatched S.B. Murray, the Joint 
General Manager, to examine Russian government finances and railway investments.98
Baring Brothers and Bisset agreed to the following guidelines on the Japanese 
railway investments:99 an issue amount should not exceed 50 percent of company paid 
up capital; the annual payment of interest should be less than the average of a company’s 
net earnings over the previous three years; Bisset should avoid direct negotiations with 
the railway companies and only examine their management and properties. Baring 
Brothers considered a 5 percent loan, despite Homer’s suggestion that the companies 
could afford even a 7 1/2 percent interest rate. Foreign loan issues for Japanese 
companies became very lucrative to foreign financiers when they took advantage of the 
vast interest rate differentials between Britain and Japan.
Homer received loan issue applications from the Hankaku Railway Co. and the
95. B.B.A., PF295, Birch to Baring Brothers, 30 September 1901.
96. Ibid., Hayashi to Homer, 10 December 1901.
97. Ibid., Memorandum of Conversation between Lord Revelstoke, Bisset, Homer 
and Farrer, 18 December 1901.
98. L.C.M.B.A., ACC/26/14, S.B. Murray’s Diary, 2 September 1909; also see 
A.R. Holmes and E. Green, Midland (1986), p. 136.
". B.B.A., PF295, Baring Brothers to Bisset, 16 January 1902.
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Sanyo Railway Co. as well.100 Both the Hokuetsu Railway Co. and the Hankaku Railway 
Co. were experiencing difficulties with the high interest rate payments of domestic 
debentures.101 Perhaps these railway companies intended to convert them to lower interest 
rate foreign debentures.
In April 1902 Bisset arrived in Japan102 and met Shibusawa with Kirby at the 
British Legation in Tokyo.103 Bisset soon discerned that the Japanese law did not make 
sufficient provision for mortgaging of properties for trustees, even if the Japanese 
government could permit railway companies to mortgage railway properties to foreign 
investors.104 So far a mortgage law had not been enacted in Japan and the feasibility of 
Japanese private railway investments to foreigners depended entirely upon this legislation. 
Shibusawa brought this matter to T. Katsura, the Japanese Prime Minister, and they 
agreed to ask Baring Brothers to draft a mortgage law immediately for their review.105
Bisset returned to London in July 1902 and reported to Baring Brothers that the 
Kyushu Railway Co. and the Sanyo Railway Co. were to have ‘a first call’ of the 
Japanese private railway investments. Baring Brothers did not want to undertake more 
than two Japanese company debenture issues in a year.106 Bisset also confirmed that 
Japanese private railways were a promising investment object for foreigners if an 
appropriate mortgage law were duly enacted. In 1902 Shibusawa made a business trip to 
the United States and Europe, and negotiated directly with Baring Brothers on the railway
10°. Ibid., Homer to Lord Revelstoke, 6 March 1902.
101. Japanese Ministry of Communications, Tetsudokvoku Nenpo (Annual Report of 
the Railway Department (for 1907) (Tokyo, 1909 [reprinted 1981]), appendix, pp.30-32.
102. B.B.A., PF295, Bisset to Lord Revelstoke, 10 April 1902.
103. Shibusawa’s Diary in Shibusawa Eiichi Denki Shirvo (Shibusawa Eiichi’s 
Biographical Records!, appendix 1 (Diary 1) (Tokyo, 1966), p.231; T.K.Z.. 
vol.45-1128, 19 April 1902, pp.696-97.
104. B.B.A., PF295, Bisset to Lord Revelstoke, 12 and 17 April 1902.
105. Ibid., Bisset to Lord Revelstoke, 14 May 1902; Shibusawa’s Diary, 15 February 
1902 (op. cit.. p.222).
106. B.B.A., PF295, Bisset to Lord Revelstoke, 26 July 1902; Bisset to Kirby, 7 
August 1902.
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investments.107 Baring Brothers only confirmed that a conclusion of the business relied 
fundamentally upon the legislation of a mortgage law.108
Once it was found that there was a legal difficulty in the Japanese law for 
borrowing money abroad, the Industrial Bank promptly proposed an alternative: Baring 
Brothers should purchase Industrial Bank’s debentures guaranteed by the Japanese 
government and the Industrial Bank should make loans to railway companies with the 
funds so procured from Baring Brothers.109 Baring Brothers, however, refused to accept 
such an indirect way of foreign investment.110
The railway companies were no longer able to wait for the long-hoped-for foreign 
capital. Many of them issued debentures and made temporary borrowings on the domestic 
market, when the Bank of Japan brought down Official Discount Rate at the end of 1902. 
The Hokuetsu Railway Co., for instance, issued a 7 1/2 percent loan for ¥3,000,000 
(£306,250).111
In September 1902 the draft of the railway mortgage law, drawn up by Norton 
Rose, Norton & Co., was sent to Japan through Baring Brothers, and the Katsura Cabinet 
promised to place it before the Diet.112 In December 1902, however, the Diet was 
abruptly dissolved113 and the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War in 1904 also hampered 
the passage of the legislation.
The Japanese railway mortgage law was enacted on 26 February 1905.114 Baring
107. F.O. 46/560, Homer to E. Brrington, 31 July 1902; Shibusawa’s Diary, 29 July 
1902 (op. cit.. p.256).
108. B.B.A., PF295, Bisset to Kirby, 7 August 1902; Shibusawa’s Diary, 5 September 
1902 (op. cit.. p.272).
109. B.B.A., PF295, Kirby to Homer, 15 October 1902.
uo. Ibid., Bisset to Farrer, 3 November 1902.
,n. Ibid., PF296, Kirby to Homer, 27 February 1903.
m. Ibid., PF295, Kirby to J. Birch & Co., 19 September 1902.
113. M. Shimizu, ‘Zaidan Teit5h5 (Foundation of the Japanese Mortgage Laws)’ in N. 
Ukai and others (eds.), Nippon Kindaihfi Hattatsushi (History of the Progress of the 
Japanese Modem LawL vol.4 (Tokyo, 1958), pp. 111-12.
114. Shugiin Giii Sokkiroku (Stenographic Journal of the Japanese Lower HouseL 
vol.20 (Tokyo, 1905 [reprinted 1980]), p.345.
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Brothers and Sale & Frazer Co. re-opened the loan issue negotiations with the railway 
companies.115 They confined their investment target to the following three railway 
companies:116 the Kyushu Railway Co., the Sany5 Railway Co. and the Nippon Railway 
Co.. Characteristically these companies were not only ranked extremely high on business 
performance but also owed a large amount of domestic debentures. In January 1906, 
however, it was abruptly decided that the Railway Nationalisation Bill was to be 
introduced to the Diet during the session.117 This would probably put an end to all 
opportunities for Japanese private railway investments.118 It had been the original policy 
of the Japanese government to construct all railways in state-ownership, but national 
finances had not permitted it. In consequence, the government had authorised private 
railways, provided that in the future the government was able to purchase them.119 During 
the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905) the Katsura Cabinet had decided to nationalise most 
of the private railways for military purposes. In 1906 the Saionji Cabinet finally 
implemented this.120
This Bill provoked much controversy in the Diet but passed in the Upper House 
(Kizokuin) on the last day of the Session, 31 March 1906.121 The cost of this operation 
was to be financed by newly created 5 percent government bonds in exchange for the 
railway companies’ shares. In this way, by 1906, all the efforts to introduce foreign 
capital into the Japanese private railway companies were wasted. It is fair to say, 
however, that foreign investments in Japanese private railways could have been more 
successful had not the railway nationalisation occurred.
115. B.B.A., PF298, Farrer to Sale, 5 January 1905.
"6. Ibid., 2 March 1905.
117. Ibid., PF301, Sale & Frazer Co. to Baring Brothers, 22 January 1906.
118. Ibid., Sale & Frazer Co. to Baring Brothers, 12 February 1906.
119. S .I.P .. vol.5, pp. 156-57.
12°. M L , pp. 161-65.
121. Kizokuin Giji Sokkiroku (Stenographic Journal of the Japanese Upper House), 
vol.22 (Tokyo, 1906 [reprinted 1980]), p.420.
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8.3.2 South Manchurian Railway Co. debenture issues
After the Russo-Japanese War the Japanese government guaranteed payment of the 
principal and interest of several companies’ loans. The South Manchurian Railway Co. 
and the Oriental Colonial Corp. were set up under the patronage of the Japanese 
government and were those which obviously reflected the policy of colonising Korea and 
Manchuria. The Industrial Bank and the Banque Franco-Japonaise, under the 
government’s rigid protection, dealt exclusively with these loan issues. Unlike the private 
railway investments, other financiers, domestic or foreign, found no way to compete with 
the Industrial Bank and the Banque Franco-Japonaise in these businesses.
After cancellation of the preliminary agreement with C.H. Harriman made in 
October 1905 for joint-management of the South Manchurian Railways,122 the South 
Manchurian Railway Co. was set up in November 1906 by Japan’s own effort for 
managing the railways, coal mines and harbours in Manchuria.123 Of ¥200,000,000 
(£20,416,667) authorised capital, the Japanese government invested half the amount 
(¥100,000,000 [£10,208,333]) in kind; ¥20,000,000 (£2,041,667) of shares out of the 
other half of authorised capital were publicly issued in Japan in 1906. However, as the 
total required funds for running the company were estimated at approximately 
¥100,000,000, the rest (¥80,000,000 [£8,166,666]) was to be raised abroad in the form 
of debentures.124 The Industrial Bank arranged these vital funds for the South Manchurian 
Railway Co. by depending upon low interest rate foreign capital.125 The South 
Manchurian Co. drew the guarantee for payment of the principal and interest of these
122. Memorandum of Preliminary Understanding between T. Katsura and Harriman 
dated 12 October 1905 in G. Kennan, E.H. Harriman’s Far Eastern Plan (New York, 
1917), pp. 23-25; Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Komura Gaikoshi (History of 
the Diplomat Komura Jutarol (Tokyo, 1966), pp.662-69.
123. Kanpo (Gazette) dated 7 June 1906 (N.G.B.. vol.39-1, pp.632-33).
124. Secret no.57, Hayashi to Hayashi (in Peking), 24 August 1906 (Ibid.. pp.639-40); 
M.T.Z.. vol. 12, p.408.
125. Order, K. Saionji to S. Goto, 13 November 1906 (toe. ~ ’/'v
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debentures from the Japanese government.126 In April 1907 the Japanese Minister of 
Finance ordered J. Soyeda, the Governor of the Industrial Bank, to issue South 
Manchurian Railway Co. foreign debentures for £8,000,000 on the following conditions 
that:127 (i) Soyeda should negotiate first with Schiff on this issue because Schiff had 
agreed to offer ¥50,000,000 (£5,104,167) to the South Manchurian Railway Co. in 
Harriman’s abortive project of 1905;128 (ii) then Soyeda should move on to Britain and 
France if Schiff declined; (iii) the debenture issue negotiations should be based on the 
terms of the Japanese government 5 percent loan issue of 1907 and the rate of interest 
(nominal) should be less than 4 1/2 percent; (iv) Soyeda should not offer the railway 
properties as the security for the debentures.
Tight market conditions frustrated Soyeda’s access to the United States market. 
He shifted the loan issue market to Europe but found many of the financiers there 
indifferent to such a risky project. Finally, in July the usual Japanese government loan 
takers in Londonri.e. Parr’s Bank, the Hongkong Bank and the Yokohama Specie Bank, 
agreed to take half the intended issue amount on the following terms:129
Issue amount £4,000,000
Rate of interest (nominal) 5 percent
Issue price 97 percent (to the public) 92 1/2 percent (to
the company)
Yield at issue 5.2 percent
Borrowing period 25 years
Others the government should guarantee a payment
of the principal and interest.
126. Secret no. 12, Goto to K. Saionji, 7 December 1906 (ibid.. pp.655-57).
127. Secret (secretariat) no.750, Y. Sakatani to J. Soyeda dated 1 April 1907 (in 
N.K.G.G.S.. pp. 102-3).
128. F.O. 371/36, MacDonald to Lord Grey, 30 August 1906.
129. Contracts between the South Manchurian Railway Co. and the Industrial Bank 
dated 13 July 1907, and between the Industrial Bank and the Associated Banks, dated 18 
July 1907 in G.K.S.. vol.l, pp.349-54; H.S.B.A., LOHI/34.
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Panmure Gordon & Co. arranged most of the underwriting129 but the outcome of 
the subscriptions was unsatisfactory (Table 8.10). Out of £4,000,000, only £2,087,080 
of the bonds (52 percent) were taken by the public and the price of the debentures on the 
unofficial market sank immediately by 1 1/2 percent.130 Perhaps this was in part due to 
Japan’s attempt to raise the loan too quickly after the government’s conversion loan issue, 
made in March 1907, in the tight condition of the money market,131 and in part to 
antagonism against the South Manchurian Railway Co. because it had ordered all railway 
materials from the United States.132 The London Rothschilds refused to be involved in the 
issue even as underwriters.133 They also advised the Paris Rothschilds to decline it in 
Paris.134 Out of the remaining amount (£4,000,000), £2,000,000 was raised in the form 
of a short-term loan in May 1908 (the second issue) and Panmure Gordon & Co. placed 
it privately.135 The third debenture issue for £2,000,000 was made in December 1908 
(Table 8.11). In 1911 the Company issued £6,000,000 of fourth debentures for the 
redemption of the second debentures (£2,000,000) and the further expenditure of 
£4,000,000 (Table 8.12).136
Table 8.14 comprises the terms of the four South Manchurian Railway Co. 
debenture issues. Only the third loan issue (1908) was oversubscribed by 11.3 times and 
the fourth (1911) nearly secured the issue amount. Throughout these operations many 
British financiers had misgivings over this diplomatically delicate project in Manchuria.137
129. P.B.A., B11418, Board Minutes, 18 July 1907. Parr’s Bank agreed to underwrite 
the loan to the extent of £100,000.
13°. No.93, S. Sakata to Hayashi, 24 July 1907 (N.G.B.. vol.40-2, pp.313-14).
131. The Economist. 20 July 1907, p. 1212.
132. F.0.371/475, Trade Report, 16 April 1908.
133. R.A.L., XI/130A/1, the London Rothschilds to the Paris Rothschilds, 16 July
1907.
134. Ibid., 12 August 1907.
135. N.K.G.G.S.. p. 104.
136. M.T.Z.. vol. 12. p.411.
137. At that time the United States Government strongly demanded a principle of 
equality for commercial opportunities in Manchuria (F.O.371/636, Memorandum by W. 
Rdd, 9 November 1909).
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In fact, E.H. Holden, the Chairman and Managing Director London City & Midland 
Bank, refused Panmure Gordon & Co’s proposal of the underwriting of the fourth 
debenture issue.138
8.3.3 Industrial Bank debenture issue
In November 1908 the Industrial Bank floated its debentures (thirteenth), guaranteed by 
the Japanese government, the purpose of which was to finance the Korean government. 
This operation was carried out simultaneously by Panmure Gordon & Co., Parr’s Bank, 
the Hongkong Bank and the Yokohama Specie Bank in London and by the Socidtd 
Generale in Paris. The loan issue terms in London were as follows:139
Issue amount £1,000,000
The loan issue in London was about 10 times oversubscribed.140 The loan issue in Paris 
was arranged through the channel between the Industrial Bank, Panmure Gordon & Co. 
and Giinzbourg et Cie. W.M. Koch, a partner of Panmure Gordon & Co., preferred the 
Societe Generale to the Paris Rothschilds as a partner in this business. He told Takahashi 
that the ‘co-operation [with the Societe Gendrale] will in future for business of the
138. L.C.M.B.A., ACC/26/8, E.H. Holden’s Diary, 23 December 1910.
139. Contracts between the Societe Generale and the Industrial Bank dated 3 
November 1908, and between Panmure Gordon & Co. and the Industrial Bank dated 12 
November 1908 in G.K.S.. vol.2, pp.3-27.
14°. R.A.L., XI/130A/2, the London Rothschilds to the Paris Rothschilds, 19 
November 1908.
Yield at issue 
Loan issue commission 
Borrowing period
Rate of interest (nominal) 
Issue price
(other £1,000,000 in Paris) 
5 percent
97 percent (to the public) 
93 percent (to the Bank)
5.2 percent 
4 percent 
25 years.
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Industrial Bank be most useful for getting French capital into Japanese industries’.141
Koch obviously aimed to exploit a new Japanese investment channel for the Paris capital 
market through the Soci6t6 Generale. This idea, as shown, finally bore fruit in the 
foundation of the Banque Franco-Japonaise in 1911.
In return for this loan issue, the French government desired the Japanese 
government to place orders for goods to French industries.142 Diplomatically, it also 
demanded a quid pro quo, that is to say, the Japanese government should assist in the 
China Central Railway construction project in which the Anglo-French group was 
engaged.143
M1. J.M.F.A.A., 3-4-4-38, secret no.2915, Takahashi toKomura, 1 December 1908.
142. A.M.F., F30'377, Minsfere des Affaires Etrangkres to Minisfere des Finances, 24 
October 1908.
143. No.64, J. Komura to M. Terauchi, 25 July 1908 (in N.G.B.. vol.41-1, 
pp. 859-60).
Table 8.8 Company Foreign Loan (Debenture') Issues. 1905-1913
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Year Company Issue Interest Issue
amount rate price
(nominal) (to the 
[yield public) 
at issue]
(¥000) (%) (%)
Kind of Intermediary Loan 
loan issuer
(issue
place)
1905 Kansai 9,763* 4 1/2
Railway [4.6]
1906 Hokkaido 9,763* 5
Colliery [5.1]
& Coal
Railway
1907 South 39,052** 5 
Manchurian [5.2] 
Railway
97 1/2 debenture
98 1/2
97
1908 South 19,526+ 5 98
Manchurian [5.1]
Railway
1908 Kanega- 2,000 
fuchi 
Cotton 
Spinning Co.
7 1/2
1908 South 19,526+ 5 
Manchurian [5.1]
Railway
97 1/2
debenture
(trustee:
Industrial
Bank)
S. Samuel 
(trustee: 
Debenture 
Corp.)
Chartered
Bank
government Industrial 
guaranteed Bank 
debenture 
(1st)
government Panmure 
guaranteed Gordon 
debenture 
(2nd)
debenture Mitsui
Bank
government Industrial 
guaranteed Bank 
debenture 
(3rd)
M. Samuel 
(London)
Chartered
Bank
(London)
Hongkong
Bank
Parr’s
Bank
Yokohama
Specie
Bank
(London)
Privately
placed
(London)
Banque 
fran?aise 
pour le 
commerce 
e t r
Industrie 
[A. Gy sin] 
(Paris)
Hongkong
Bank
Parr’s
Bank
Yokohama
Specie
Bank
(London)
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Table 8.8 Company Foreign Loan (Debenture) Issues. 1905-1913 (contT
Year Company Issue
amount
(¥000)
Interest Issue
rate price
(nominal) (to the
[yield public)
at issue]
<%) W
Kind of Intermediary Loan 
loan issuer
(issue
place)
1908 Industrial 19,526+ 
Bank
5
[5.2]
97 government Industrial 
guaranteed Bank 
debenture 
(13th)
1909Matsui 250
Muslin 
Spinning Co.
1909Keihin 200
Electric 
Railway
1910 Hokkaido 5,000 
Colonial 
Bank
6 1/2 
[6.5]
100
5 1/2 92
(to company)
5
[5.1]
97 7/8
debenture
debenture
debenture
(8th)
Daihyaku
Bank
Koike
Goshi
1911 South 58,578++ 4 1/2 98
Manchurian [4.6]
Railway
government Industrial 
guaranteed Bank 
debenture 
(4th)
1913 Oriental 
Colonial 
Corp.
19,350+* 5
[5.2]
96 3/4 government Industrial 
guaranteed Bank 
debenture 
(1st)
Panmure
Gordon
Hongkong
Bank
Parr’s
Bank
Yokohama
Specie
Bank
(London)
Soci6t6
Gdndrale
(Paris)
A. Gy sin 
(Paris)
Sale & 
Frazer Co. 
(London)
Sale & 
Frazer Co. 
(possibly 
London 
and 
Paris)
Hongkong
Bank
Parr’s
Bank
Yokohama
Specie
Bank
(London)
Banque
Franco-
Japonaise
(Paris)
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Table 8.8 Company Foreign Loan (Debenture! Issues. 1905-1913 (cont.l
Notes: - implies no information;
The issue amounts were based on Japanese records and not converted 
at the fixed rate of exchange (for instance, ¥1 =2 s. l/2d. and ¥1 =Fr2 
11/19);
* the original amount was £1,000,000;
** the original amount was £4,000,000;
+ the original amount was £2,000,000;
+ + the original amount was £6,000,000;
+* the original amount was Fr50,000,000.
Sources: N.K.G.G.S. pp.94-95; The Industrial Bank of Japan, Nippon Gaisai.
op. cit.: The Finance Bureau of the Japanese Ministry of Finance, Kin- 
vu Jik5 Sankosho. op. cit.. pp.27-28; Jitsugyd no Sekai [ed.], Zaikai 
Sanjvunenpu (Thirty-year Chronology of Japanese Business Circles!, 
vol.l (Tokyo, 1938); London Stock Exchange (Guildhall Library), 
Loan and Company Prospectuses.
Table 8.9 Company Debenture Issues. 1902-1913
Year
(1) (2)
Total Total 
number amount 
(¥000)
(3)
Issue
number
abroad
(4)
Amount
abroad
(¥000)
(5)
(4)/(2)
(%)
1902 16 7,695 _ _ _
1903 33 17,151 - - -
1904 4 561 - - -
1905 4 1,565 - - -
1906 16 33,136 2 19,526 58.9
1907 14 50,492 1 39,052 77.3
1908 18 44,985 3 41,052 91.2
1909 31 10,563 1 250 2.3
1910 31 37,125 - - -
1911 22 73,325 1 58,578 79.8
1912 23 15,650 - - -
1913
Notes:
Source:
22 38,504
¥l=2s. l/2d.;
- implies no issue; 
(5)=(4)/(2)xl00. 
N.K.G.G.S.. p.88.
1 19,350 50.2
Table 8.10 First South Manchurian Railway Co. Debenture Issue. 1907
(£)
Underwriting syndicate Underwriting Subscriptions Subscriptions
Loan issue bank amount (PublicXUnderwriters)
Panmure Gordon 2,650,000
Parr’s Bank 600,000 1,333,580 1,566,240
Hongkong Bank 500,000 349,000 236,460
Yokohama Specie Bank 250,000 404,500 110,220
Total 4,000,000 2,087,080 1,912,920
Note: - implies no subscriptions.
Source: H.S.B.A., LOHI/2.
Table 8.11 Third South Manchurian Railway Co. Debenture Issue. 1908
(£)
Underwriting syndicate Underwriting Subscriptions Allotment 
Loan issue bank
Panmure Gordon 1,325,000
Parr’s Bank 300,000 10,993,000 931,700
Hongkong Bank 250,000 6,640,000 584,400
Yokohama Specie Bank 125,000 4,982,000 483,900
Total 2,000,000 22,615,000 2,000,000
Note: - implies no subscription and allotment.
Source: H.S.B.A., LOHI/2 and 34.
Table 8.12 Fourth South Manchurian Railway Co. Debenture Issue. 1911
(£)
Underwriting syndicate Underwriting Subscriptions
Loan issue bank
Panmure Gordon 4,490,000
Parr’s Bank 610,000 5,076,800
Hongkong Bank 500,000 1,038,000
Yokohama Specie Bank 400,000 858,200
Total 6,000,000 6,973,000
Note: - implies no subscription.
Source: H.S.B.A., LOHI/2.
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Table 8.13 Commissions of First and Fourth South Manchurian 
Railway Co. Debenture Issues 
(percent)
Commission First Fourth
Underwriting 2 1 1 / 2
Loan issue bank 1 1
Panmure Gordon (brokerage
- placing underwriting) 1/2 1/2
Industrial Bank (intermediary) 1/2 1/2
Brokerage (application) 1/4 1/4
Expenses 1/4 1/4
Total 4 1/2 4
Source: H.S.B.A., LOHI/2 and 34.
Table 8.14 South Manchurian Railway Co. Debenture Issues. 1907-1911
First Second Third Fourth
19 16 4
July May December January
1907 1908 1908 1911
Loan issue amount £4,000,000 £2,000,000 £2,000,000 £6,000,000
Rate of interest (nominal) (%) 5 5 5 4 1/2
Loan issue prices (%)
to the public 97 98 97 1/2 98
to the company 92 1/2 - 93 94
Yield at issue (%) 5.2 5.1 5.1 4.6
Loan issue commission (%) 4 1/2 - 4 1/2 4
Borrowing period (year) 25 3 24 25
Loan issuer Parr’s Bank - Parr’s Bank Parr’s Bank
Hongkong - Hongkong Hongkong
Bank Bank Bank
Yokohama - Yokohama Yokohama
Specie Specie Specie
Bank Bank Bank
Intermediary Industrial Panmure Industrial Industrial
Bank Gordon Bank Bank
Note: the second issue was placed privately.
Source: M.T.Z.. vol. 12, pp.405-13; H.S.B.A., LOHI/2.
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8.4 Conclusion
It is fair to say that with the strong support of the Japanese government, the Industrial 
Bank had a much firmer footing in many of the municipal and company foreign loan 
issue business than any of the foreign financiers, even though its near monopolistic 
position often received much criticism within Japan and abroad.144 Apart from what the 
government’s policy and guidance effected, did the Industrial Bank have anything of an 
economic advantage in these loan issue transactions?
The Japanese municipal and company foreign loan issues during the period from 
1903 to 1912 can be divided, at the risk of over-simplification, into the two following 
categories.145
First Pattern - Foreign Financiers
Municipality | Agent | Banks in
-* or branch -> | London
Company | in Japan | and Paris
Year Loan Issuer Commission
1902 Yokohama S. Samuel 10
1903 Osaka S. Samuel 8
1905 Hokkaido Chartered Bank 5 3/4
Colliery & Coal
Railway Co.
1905 Kansai S. Samuel 5 1/2
Railway Co.
1907 Yokohama S. Samuel 2
1909 Nagoya Sale & Frazer 5 1/2
1909 Kyoto Union Parisienne 6
1910 Hokkaido Sale & Frazer 6
Colonial Bank
1M. T.K.Z.. no.54-1350, 18 August 1906, pp.283-84.
45. The calculated commissions excluded the British stamp duty. Most of these 
sources have been mentioned in this chapter; otherwise they were extracted from 
S-E.O.I.. M.T.Z.. vol. 12 and H.S.B.A., LOHI/2.
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Second Pattern - Industrial Bank
Municipality
Company
Industrial Bank
London agent 
Paris agent 
Hamburg agent
Banks
in
London, 
Paris and 
Hamburg
Year Loan Issuer Commission i
1906 Tokyo Industrial Bank 3
1907 South Manchurian Industrial Bank 4 1/2
Railway Co.
1908 Industrial Bank Industrial Bank 4
1909 Osaka Industrial Bank 5
Yokohama Industrial Bank 3 1/2
1911 South Manchurian Industrial Bank 4
Railway Co.
1912 Yokohama Industrial Bank 4
1912 Tokyo Industrial Bank 4 1/2
In the first pattern, the relationships between banks in London and Paris and their 
agents in Japan were not always firm, except for branch-head office relations in overseas 
banks. The banks in London and Paris, experts in loan issue business, secured a strong 
position on the loan issue markets but an intermediary commission (1 percent in practice), 
paid to agents in Japan, inevitably raised loan issue costs. The loan issues undertaken by 
overseas banks, not experts in loan issue business, had to be placed into the hands of 
banks in London and Paris, and this also necessarily required additional costs for the loan 
issues.
The Industrial Bank made the agency contracts for placing loans with the financial 
institutions in London, Paris and Hamburg. Through these channels the Industrial Bank 
was able to ensure that foreign loan issue markets worked effectively for arranging loan 
issues. In addition, the intermediary commission of the Industrial Bank (usually between 
1/4 percent and 1/2 percent) was much lower than that of foreign agents in Japan. The 
Industrial Bank was, thus, successful in minimising loan issue costs in many of the
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municipal and company foreign loan issues. In fact, Soyeda (the First Governor of the 
Industrial Bank) admitted that he made great efforts to carry on direct transactions with 
foreign financiers so as to avoid additional intermediary commissions.146
146. M.A., Iko-W-4-689, Stenographic Notes of J. Soyeda’s Speech (20 April 1929).
334
CHAPTER 9
EFFECTS OF JAPANESE GOVERNMENT LOAN ISSUES
Chapters 3 to 8 dealt with the development of Japanese government (including municipal 
and company) borrowing abroad, mainly, but not exclusively, in London. This chapter 
throws light upon two other facets of Japanese foreign loan issues: firstly, the role of the 
loan proceeds of the Japanese government in the working of the gold standard system 
before the First World War; secondly, the repercussion of the loan issues on Japan’s 
trade structure with Britain. Although the perspective of this chapter is limited, it is 
hoped that it will supplement the argument in the previous chapters, especially from the 
viewpoint of Japan’s relations with the world economy of that period.
9.1 Japanese Government’s Foreign Funds1
After the Sino-Japanese War the Japanese government obtained large indemnity money 
(£38,083,000) from China and temporarily held it in London.2 The City feared the
‘. There are several Japanese studies on specie holdings abroad: S. Kitsukawa, Meiji 
Zaisei Keizaishi Kenkvu (Study on the Financial and Economic Histories in the Meiji 
Era') (Tokyo, 1969), chapter 4; H. Kojima, Nippon no Kinhon-isei Jidai. 1897-1917 
(The Gold Standard Era in Japan) (Tokyo, 1981), chapter 2; K. Noji, ‘Nisshin Nichiro 
Sengo Keiei to Taigai Zaisei, 1896-1913 (The Japanese Government’s Administration 
after the Siono-Japanese War and the Russo-Japanese War, and its External Finance, 
1896-1913)’, Tochiseido Shigaku (fJapanesel Journal of Agrarian History1. vol.92, 
(1981); H. Saito, Kinhon-iseika no Zaigai Seika (Specie Holdings abroad under the Gold 
Standard) (Tokyo, 1981); M. Yokouchi, ‘Nijusseiki Shoto ni okeru Zaigai Seika to 
London Kin-yu Shijy5 (Specie Holdings abroad and the London Money Market at the 
Beginning of the Twentieth Century)’, (Niigata University Junior College of Commerce) 
Niigata Daigaku Shogaku Ronshu (Journal of Commerce), no. 19 (Niigata, 1987); T. 
Kamiyama, ‘Nichiro Sengo no Seika Seisaku to Zaisei (Specie Control Policy and 
Finances after the Russo-Japanese War)’, Shigaku Zasshi (fJapanesel Historical Journal), 
vol.98-no. 1 (Tokyo, 1989). These studies, however, do not give sufficient explanations, 
from the viewpoint of the London money market, of the relationships between foreign 
loans and trade balance under the gold standard.
2. M. Matsukata, Report on the Post-Bellum Financial Administration in Japan 
1896-1900 (Tokyo, 1900), pp.218-21.
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sudden withdrawal of the indemnity from London to Japan might seriously diminish 
reserves at the Bank of England and cause sharp fluctuations in the London money 
market,3 although the great Franco-Prussian indemnity loan issues in 1872 passed without 
serious reaction.4
The Court of the Bank of England paid much attention to Japanese government 
deposits in London. B.B. Greene, a Director of the Bank (the Deputy-Govemor from 
1870 to 1871 and the Governor from 1873 to 1875), warned that ‘we must consider the 
Japanese Deposit as quite abnormal’5 and ‘I am concerned to see what is to happen to the 
Japanese Money, no doubt we shall lose control of the greater part of it’.6 In the period 
before the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905), the Japanese government had not yet 
established the practice of leaving funds abroad as zaigai seika (specie holdings abroad 
or specie reserves abroad).7 Until March 1903 most of the deposit was paid out in 
London or transferred to Japan in gold and silver bullion. Only £1,132,864 was retained 
for further payment of various claims on the Japanese government.8
Some countries would hold money in the world’s financial centres - London, 
Paris, Berlin and New York. It was an established practice for British Dominions to keep 
loan proceeds in London and managed them from there.9 Keynes addressed this practice
3. R.S. Sayers, The Bank of England 1891-1944. vol.l (Cambridge, 1976), p.31 
(note 2).
4. Bankers’ Magazine, vol. 32 (1872), p.630.
5. B.E.A., Museum 903, B.B. Greene to M.W. Collet, 20 October 1896.
6. Ibid., 18 November 1895.
7. The term ‘specie’ included gold and gold standard foreign currencies (E. Fukai, 
Shintei Tsuka Chosetsuron fOn Regulation of Currency. Newly Revised! [Tokyo, 1938], 
p.263).
8. M.Z.. vol.2, pp.570-71.
9. J. Viner, Canada’s Balance of International Indebtedness 1900-1913 
(Cambridge[Mass.], 1924), pp. 182-83; J.D. Bailey, ‘Australian Company Borrowing, 
1870-1893: A Study in British Overseas Investment’, Unpublished D. Phil. Thesis, 
Oxford University, 1958, p.212 and appendix iii (xiv-xxiv). Kindleberger understood 
the character of these funds in terms of ‘old-fashioned principles of lending long and 
borrowing short’ (C.P. Kindleberger, International Capital Movements [Cambridge, 
1987], pp.53-54).
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in his famous writing on the Indian currency and finance: a peripheral country’s 
government or central bank kept gold or other resources abroad for regulating the value 
of their domestic currency in terms of the gold exchange standard system.10 Whale gave 
further explanations on how this system worked with reference to borrowing countries’ 
domestic currencies:
There is, however, another way in which these monetary transfers may be brought 
about: that is, by creating additional money in the borrowing country on the basis 
of money held in the lending country. There is evidence, I think, that this was 
commonly done by the banks in many of the countries in which Britain invested 
- the Dominions and British colonies, the South American countries, and Japan. 
The lending country is in this way spared the loss of gold, yet the borrowing 
country gets increased supplies of money. If the banks in the borrowing country 
treat their foreign (or overseas) balances as being exactly equivalent to gold 
reserves, and proceed to make them the basis for a multiple expansion of their 
notes or deposits, 11
Lindert pointed out that before the First World War several central banks, in 
Austria-Hungary, Greece, Japan, Romania, Czarist Russia, Switzerland, the Scandinavian 
countries and Chile, tended to prefer foreign exchange to gold in their official reserves.12 
It was a well-known fact that Czarist Russia held large funds in Paris, Berlin and London 
which was transferred from its loan proceeds, and managed them on the international 
money markets.13 The Chilean government, from 1906, also kept deposits mainly in
10. The Collected Writings of John Maynard Keynes, vol.l (Indian Currency and 
Finance) (1971), pp. 19-20. G.C. Allen regarded Japan’s currency system before 1914 
as ‘a considerable resemblance to the gold exchange standard’ (G.C. Allen, ‘The Recent 
Currency and Exchange Policy of Japan’, Economic Journal, vol.xxxv [1925], p.69). 
Yet, even internally, the gold standard act still provided the metallic basis (conversion 
of gold), although there was no circulation of gold coin.
n. P.B. Whale, ‘The Working of the Pre-War Gold Standard’ in T.S. Ashton & R.S. 
Sayers (eds.), Papers in English Monetary History (Oxford, 1953), pp. 161-62.
12. P.H. Lindert, ‘Key Currencies and the Gold Exchange Standard, 1900-1913’, 
Unpublished Ph. D. Thesis, Cornell University, 1967, chapter 2.
13. A.Z. Arnold, Banks. Credit and Money in Soviet Russia (New York, 1937), p. 16; 
R.G. Hawtrey, The Gold Standard in Theory and Practice (1939), pp.72-73.
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Berlin and London under the name of the ‘Conversion Fund’.14 Lindert further revealed 
that not only British Colonies but also the two foreign countries, Greece and Japan, held 
more reserves in foreign exchange than in gold.15 Obviously these funds (London 
balances) facilitated for borrowing countries the direct settlement of trade balances in 
London, the world’s trade centre, without the trouble of actual gold movements. This 
practice also spared Britain a loss of gold.16
The cumulative issues of the foreign loans during the Russo-Japanese War brought 
large foreign funds to Japan. It was imperative under the gold standard that the Japanese 
government should secure funds abroad for settling the trade balances which were 
substantially in deficit almost every year from 1896 to 1913. Because of the 
extraordinarily increased military imports, in 1903 the Japanese government established 
a new rule for managing foreign loan proceeds: for the convenience of its payments 
abroad the government chose to hold most of these proceeds permanently in the world’s 
financial centres, such as London, Paris, Berlin and New York, instead of transferring 
the proceeds to Japan in bullion.17
Chart 9.1 indicates the distribution of loan proceeds among the Japanese 
government, the Bank of Japan, the Yokohama Specie Bank and foreign exchange banks. 
Japan’s specie holdings rose rapidly from 1905 (Table 9.1) and its main source obviously 
lay in foreign loan proceeds. In the years of 1904, 1905, 1906, 1907 and 1910 the 
Japanese government obtained large loan proceeds, as shown in Chart 9.3. Out of the 
specie holdings abroad, the government paid the principal and interest on the foreign 
loans; after 1906 all the payments connected with the foreign loans amounted to well
14. The Chilean Government Central Statistics Bureau, Statistical Abstract of the 
Republic of Chile (Santiago, 1917), p.65.
15. P.H. Lindert, Key Currencies and Gold. 1900-1913 (New Jersey, 1969), pp. 10-11 
and p. 16.
1<s. A.G. Ford, ‘Notes on the Working of the Gold Standard before 1914’, Oxford 
Economic Papers, new series, vol. 12-no. 1 (1960), pp.60-61; Gold Standard 1880-1914 
(Oxford, 1962), pp. 19-20.
17. Fukai, Shintei Tsuka. op. cit.. pp. 313-14.
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over 30 percent of the government’s total annual payments abroad; the government also 
paid from the specie holdings abroad its various import charges, mainly armaments for 
the Navy. Some of the specie holdings abroad were sold to the Bank of Japan for settling 
trade balances in the form of foreign exchange. The remains were invested in deposits 
with financial institutions in the world’s financial centres or in short-term securities 
(usually Treasury bills).18 The Japanese government’s investments of 31 January 1908 are 
shown in Table 9.3. From the standpoint of liquidity, most of the investments were 
retained in deposits at the Bank of England and London clearing banks. The government 
also kept accounts in New York, Paris and Berlin but London was the nucleus, 55.3 
percent of the total government’s foreign funds (31 January 1908) (Table 9.3), because 
the government transferred funds from New York, Berlin and Paris to London.19
There were transactions in specie holdings abroad between the Japanese 
government, the Bank of Japan, the Yokohama Specie Bank and other foreign exchange 
banks. The Bank of Japan bought loan proceeds from the Japanese government, 
municipalities and companies which issued foreign loans. Payment was made in yen. 
The Bank of Japan re-sold most of its specie holdings abroad to foreign exchange banks 
which needed to make payments abroad, in the form of foreign exchange. Chart 9.4 
shows the Bank of Japan’s receipts and payments of the specie in the period from 1903 
to 1913. The Bank of Japan usually invested the specie holdings abroad in deposits at the 
Bank of England and the Yokohama Specie Bank’s London Branch or in British Treasury 
bills, dividing them into the reserves and non-reserves accounts (Table 9.2).20
In terms of transferring money from one country to another, Japan’s practice of 
holding specie abroad was analogous to India’s, although rupee notes no longer had silver 
convertibility and the value of one rupee was rigidly fixed at Is. 4d. from 1893. The
18. Ibid.. pp.287-88.
19. E. Fukai, Kaiko Shichijunen (Recollection for Seventy Years! (Tokyo, 1941), 
p.83.
* N.G.H.S.. vol.2, pp. 168-71.
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Indian Council in London established the Gold Standard Reserve (sterling) on the 
proceeds of Council Bills and profits of the Indian Mint. From these funds the Indian 
government paid Home Charges and interest on its sterling debts. Council Bills played 
a role in transferring money from Britain to India; those who needed to make payments 
in India, purchased Council Bills (denominated in rupees) for sterling and sent them to 
India; the Indian government and others who needed to make payment in sterling 
purchased these Bills with rupees. Conversely, those who transferred money from India 
to London, bought bills (on London) with rupees in India and sent them to London; the 
Indian Council in London purchased these bills with sterling.21 The close economic 
relations between Britain and India caused the development of such a bilateral money 
payment system. Japan also needed payments in London because its trade balances with 
Britain were always in deficit. For this purpose, the Japanese government and the Bank 
of Japan held large specie reserves there, which were obtained from foreign loan 
proceeds.
With the spread of the gold standard to many countries, however, British bankers 
feared an efflux of gold from the London money market.22 Financial institutions in 
London became more and more nervous about possible ill effects of foreign loan issues 
on the market. From the viewpoint of defending the gold reserves at the Bank of 
England, Japan’s practice of keeping most of the loan proceeds in London was very 
desirable, because these proceeds were still under control of the London money market. 
There was no loss of gold.
Japan’s specie holdings in London (both the government’s and the Bank of 
Japan’s) were of great assistance to the Bank of England in adjusting constant fluctuations 
on the money market. Until the turn of the century, the London balances held by the
21. Keynes, op. cit.. chapter 5-6; B.R. Tomlinson, The Political Economy of the Raj. 
1914-1947 (1979), pp. 17-18.
71. For instance, F. Schuster, ‘Our Gold Reserves’ in J.I.B.. vol. xxviii (1907),
pp. 1-22.
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Council of India had produced a similar effect to the market. As the Council kept large 
sums in London (the Gold Standard Reserve), the Bank of England often borrowed from 
them from the 1890s.23 In the following twenty years, however, the Bank of England 
regarded the Japanese government’s funds, rather than the Council of India’s London 
balances, as a more stable and reliable source for regulating money demand in the market 
and often counted upon them on a large-scale. According to Sayers, there were at least 
five occasions during 1905 that the Bank of England borrowed between £500,000 and 
£1,600,000 from the Bank of Japan.24
After the Russo-Japanese War Japan continued to maintain substantial funds in 
London. But British banks feared that Japan would seek control or influence over the 
London money market more directly.25 The City enquired of the British Foreign Office 
about Japan’s credit balance in London.26 Now British financiers became worried about 
further Japanese foreign loan issues because it already retained large funds in London.
The London Rothschilds considered that it would be easy for Japan to provide 
money for Korea and Manchuria out of its funds abroad, when the Japanese government 
embarked upon the South Manchurian Railway Co. debenture issue in 1908.27 More 
strongly, the British Foreign Office questioned Japan’s practice of maintaining huge 
funds in London, saying that it seemed to be more economical to buy foreign drafts on 
London than to pay interest on foreign bonds when the Japanese government needed to 
pay abroad.28 Although it was difficult for foreign financiers to understand Japan’s
23. Sayers, op. cit.. vol.l, pp.39-40; Keynes, op. cit.. pp.88-91. The Economist 
depicted this operation as ‘it is stated that the India Council has been co-operating in this 
[taking money off the market] by calling in loans and lending the money to the Bank’ (14 
June 1890, p.749).
24. Sayers, op. cit.. vol.l, pp.40-41.
25. B.B.A., COF-05-2-8, Sale & Frazer Co. to Farrer, 26 March 1907.
26. F.O. 371/1667, Currie to Law, 25 March 1913; W.C. Greene to Foreign Office, 
12 April 1913.
27'. R.A.L., XI/130A/3, the London Rothschilds to the Paris Rothschilds, 13 May
1908.
28. F.O. 371/1387, D.C. dated 28 February 1912.
341
strenuous attempts to keep such large funds in London, the Japanese government always 
had misgivings about the constant shortage of gold for making up the trade deficits. 
Therefore, the specie control was always a crucial and inevitable problem for the 
government in the period from 1896 to 1913.
The practice of holding specie abroad provided easily-obtained means for a 
borrowing country to settle its trade balances directly without causing serious fluctuations 
in the rate of foreign exchange.29 In a lending country, like Britain, a Bank Rate policy 
could regulate the outflow and inflow of gold through small interest changes but a 
borrowing country, like Japan, had to follow a more direct policy of regulating the value 
of the domestic currency by selling specie holdings abroad in the form of foreign 
exchange or purchasing foreign exchange.30
There were relationships between specie holdings abroad and the domestic money 
supply.31 Chart 9.2 portrays their relations. Under the gold standard the Bank of Japan 
could influence the volume of the domestic currency through the operation of selling and 
purchasing specie holding abroad, even when the rate of foreign exchange did not reach 
a gold shipment point. The Bank of Japan could regulate the volume of the domestic 
currency by the rate (price) and extent to which it re-sold foreign exchange (specie 
holdings abroad) to exchange banks for yen notes. The Bank of Japan obviously regarded 
this method as one of the policies, as well as the Official Discount Rate policy, for 
regulating the value of the domestic currency. It was revealed that the Bank of Japan 
would re-sell foreign exchange at about the gold shipment point (export) - ¥ l=2s. 
l/4d..32
However, the Japanese government kept large specie holdings abroad which were 
replenished from the foreign loan proceeds and were not linked directly with the domestic
79. Fukai, Shintei Tsuka. op. cit.. p.281.
” , Keynes, op.cit.. pp. 18-19.
31. Fukai, Shintei Tsuka. op. cit.. pp.289-93.
32. Fukai, Kaiko. op. cit.. pp.85-86.
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money supply. In order to meet the financial deficits the Japanese government often sold 
these specie holdings abroad to the Bank of Japan and received yen notes in Japan.33 
These operations necessarily increased the money supply in Japan, but the settlement of 
the trade deficits would soon, through the decrease of specie reserves at the Bank of 
Japan, return the domestic money supply.
While the benefit of the practice of holding specie abroad to the British economy 
has been pointed out, it is also true that the Japanese government, for its part, also 
benefited from this. The practice of holding specie abroad avoided the cost of gold 
movements from the world’s financial centres to Japan when the specie was used for 
settling the trade balances there. In addition, this form of investment earned income for 
Japan.34 The Anglo-Japanese Alliance played a pivotal role in ensuring the safety of these 
funds in London.
Furthermore, as Table 9.5 suggests, the balance of trade did not directly and 
immediately reflect the Bank of Japan’s note issues to such an extent as the classical gold 
standard model implied. Japan’s practice of holding specie abroad played a role in 
softening the immediate influence of large foreign borrowings on the domestic economy 
and in absorbing them indirectly. Keynes once depicted the gold exchange standard 
(including the practice of holding specie abroad) as one of the national systems which 
‘develop devices and maintain large liquid reserves with the express object of having the 
power to maintain internal equilibrium over the short period, without too sensitive a 
regard for external events’.35
33. T.K.Z.. vol.66-1667, 5 October 1912, pp.616-17.
34. Fukai, Shintei Tsuka. op. cit.. pp.280-81.
35. The Collected Writings of John Maynard Keynes, vol.v (A Treatise on Money) 
(1971), p.320.
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9.2 Foreign Loans and Trade Balances
From the end of the nineteenth century there was a serious argument about how 
capital exports influenced the British economy.36 However, these still continuing and 
important debates - the merits and demerits of the capital exports to the British economy 
before 1914 - are beyond the scope of this study.37 Here the consideration is strictly 
limited to the effects of Japan’s foreign borrowings on its trade balances.
Generally the repercussions of foreign borrowings on borrowing countries’ 
economies flowed through two main channels.38 Firstly, direct use of loan proceeds for 
purchasing goods from lending countries, as in the case of tied loans, increased imports 
in the borrowing countries. Secondly, funds transferred from loan proceeds generated 
consumption and related expenditures in the borrowing countries’ economies and, through 
this process, imports were boosted indirectly. In the latter case, however, the lending 
countries could not always increase exports to the borrowing countries, because 
multilateral trade structures39 with the borrowing countries would finally decide whose 
exports were increased.40
36. B.L.P.E.S.A., R(S.R.) 1016, R. Giffen Correspondence, vol.ii, 101, Edgar 
Crammond to R. Giffen, 12 June 1907. [Crammond] was the author of an article entitled 
‘British Investments Abroad’ (Quarterly Review, vol.ccvii-no.412 [1907], pp.245-72) and 
suggested a statistical estimate of British foreign investment to examine Britain’s balance 
of payments.
37. The most important argument on the potential growth of the contemporary British 
economy was addressed by W.P. Kennedy (‘Foreign Investment, Trade, and Growth in 
the United Kingdom, 1870-1913’, Explorations in Economic History, vol. 1 l-no.4 [1974], 
pp.415-44, especially pp.436-39). Also see, S. Pollard, ‘Capital Exports, 1870-1914: 
Harmful or Beneficial?’, Economic History Review, second series, vol.xxxviii-no.4 
(1985), pp.489-514; M. Wilkins, The History of Foreign Investment in the United States 
to 1914 (Cambridge[Mass.], 1989), pp.612-15. Also see introduction of this thesis.
38. S.B. Saul, Studies in British Overseas Trade. 1870-1914 (Liverpool, 1960), p.69.
39. ‘The multilateral settlement of world trade: i.e. payments involving a third party 
or even more, had been for centuries a major feature of world economic relations’ (ibid.. 
p.43).
40. Also there was a time lag between the time of loan issues and the increase of 
imports.
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It is of importance to analyse the repercussions of Japan’s large foreign 
borrowings during 1904 and 1905. This unique experience provides a typical example of 
a relationship between foreign loans and trade balances in a borrowing country. In fact,
S.B. Saul, formulating the patterns of multilateral trade in the world economy, described 
the reaction of Japan’s trade balances to the foreign loans as ‘most interesting’ but 
‘without making any pretence at an exact calculation’.41 It is useful to extend his analysis 
with further calculations.
Japan’s trade balance from 1896 to 1913 was in deficit almost every year with 
a peak in 1905 (Table 9.4). The Japanese government was always forced to obtain gold 
or foreign currency to cover these trade deficits. The main purpose of the Japanese 
government foreign loans, therefore, lay in the settlement of these trade deficits. Table 
9.6 shows Japan’s international payments in the period from 1904 to 1913. In terms of 
the absolute value, the total of long-term capital movements (mostly foreign borrowings) 
is equivalent to the total of the trade and invisible balances (including the large foreign 
loan interest payments and repayments), short-term capital movements, gold (specie) 
movements and changes of specie holdings abroad.42 It is sufficient here to confirm that 
the basic trade structure in the Japanese economy of the time was to obtain the funds 
from foreign loans to meet trade deficits and to pay the principal and interest of these 
loans; the rest of the funds was kept in store in the form of specie holdings abroad. The 
practice of holding specie abroad, however, complicated the relationship between the loan 
proceeds and trade balances to a considerable extent. Demand for imports was created 
indirectly through an expansion of credit and fulfilled itself in a later period, because the 
Bank of Japan purchased specie holdings abroad from the government and used them for
41. Saul, op. cit.. p.87.
42. Short-term capital movements were a residual item, the net balance calculated from 
other items and includes errors and omissions (I. Yamazawa & Y. Yamamoto, Ch5ki 
Keizai Tokei 14. Boeki to Kokusai Shushi TEstimates of Long-term Economic Statistics 
of Japanl. vol. 14 [Foreign Trade and Balance of Payments] [Tokyo, 1979], pp.223- 
224).
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reserves for issuing bank notes.
Japan had trade deficits with Britain, India and Germany; surpluses with the 
United States, China, France and Italy (Table 9.7). Japan exported food and textiles to 
China, and substantial quantities of raw silk to the United States, Italy and France, the 
United States being the largest importer from Japan over all. Japan imported raw cotton 
from India, oil from the United States, and manufactured goods from Britain and 
Germany.
During the Russo-Japanese War Japan’s inherent trade structure: i.e. the constant 
and large deficit in foreign trade financed by foreign loan proceeds, was exaggerated. In 
this period Britain acted as the largest exporter, of both goods and capital, to Japan, and 
its share in Japan’s total annual imports, at almost one-third, was very noticeable. Britain 
increased its exports to Japan to a much higher degree than any of the other countries (the 
United States, Germany and France) which were involved in the simultaneous issues of 
the Japanese government loans. In particular, imports of war-related goods from Britain 
increased greatly,43 and British exporters of iron, steel, coal, steamships, boilers and 
railway equipment occupied the largest shares of the Japanese import markets in this 
period.44 In these cases, British loans increased further the demand for those British 
exports that already enjoyed substantial market penetration. It may also be noted that 
these were Britain’s ‘well-established industries’, which retained competitiveness in 
exports markets.45
The total net (to the government) amount of the foreign loan issues during 1904 
and 1905 amounted to £36,925,000 in Britain, £34,065,000 in the United States, 
£11,535,000 in Germany and £10,560,000 in France (see chapter 5 and chapter 6). 
Japan’s trade balances, loan proceeds, repayments of loan principal, and payments of
43. Report on the Trade of Japan for the Year 1905, no.3675 (1906), pp.8-9.
44. Japanese Bureau of Statistics, Nippon Teikoku 26 Tokei Nenkan (Statistics of the 
Imperial Japan. No.261 (Tokyo, 1907), pp.460-72.
45. Kennedy, op. cit.. p.437 and Industrial Structure. Capital Markets and the Origins 
of British Economic Decline (Cambridge, 1987), p. 154.
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interest need to be tabulated by country, in order to compare the relationship between 
loan issues and trade balances.46 Table 9.8 shows Britain’s trade balances (merchandise 
and bullion) with Japan, Japan’s proceeds from loans floated in London, Japan’s 
repayments of loan principal and payments of interest, and their changes (the base year 
is 1903).47 It is noted that the amounts of the loan issues during 1904 and 1905 were 
extremely large; after 1906 these became much smaller. Except for 1904 and 1905 the 
sum of the trade balance, loan proceeds, repayments of loan principal and payments of 
interest showed a surplus to Britain. The most fundamental character of these trade 
relations was that Britain’s loans, to a considerable degree, unilaterally settled the trade 
balances with Japan. The interlocking settlement structure of trade between Britain and 
Japan of this time was direct, although India slightly increased exports to Japan. Given 
the advantageous trade structure, Britain’s loans significantly contributed to the increase 
of its exports to Japan. Britain’s overall trade balance showed a deficit and was made up 
by invisible trade items, but its trade balance with Japan was still kept in surplus. In this 
respect, Britain’s capital exports to Japan paid returns.
On the other hand, the trade structure of the United States with Japan in this 
period was an extreme contrast. As indicated in Table 9.9, the Japanese government loans 
of 1904 and 1905 issued in New York improved the position of the United States in 
trade with Japan remarkably, being the largest importer from Japan, but after 1906 the 
effects of the loan issues ceased. The United States’ exports to Japan tended to fall, 
increasing Japan’s trade surpluses with the United States. Every year the balance between 
the trade balance, loan proceeds and loan repayments showed a large deficit for the 
United States. The United States’ loans to Japan were settled multilaterally. Indeed, some
46. The Japanese data did not reveal movements of gold and silver by country 
(Yamazawa & Yamamoto, op. cit.). Japan’s capital movements in this period are still 
uncertain.
47. It must also be noted that the amounts of increase and decrease in trade balance 
did not rigidly correspond with calendar years when the amounts of the loan issues and 
the payments of principal and interest were calculated by the direct method.
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of the funds supplied from the United States, Germany and France in 1904 and 1905 
were used to buy British exports. This was perhaps due to the fact that Japan could not 
find any other import channel of military goods than the British one.48 Germany feared, 
in fact, that Japan would not purchase enough manufactured goods from it to cover the 
loan issue amount.49
9.3 Conclusion
Externally, Japan’s practice of holding specie abroad contributed to the working of the 
gold standard. Firstly, it left much of the loan proceeds still under the control of the 
London money market and the Bank of England often utilised these Japan’s funds in 
adjusting fluctuations on the money market. Secondly, it spared Britain a loss of gold 
when foreign loans were issued in London. The practice of holding specie abroad, 
enabled Japan to settle its trade balances directly through its sterling balances in London, 
the world’s trade centre, and firmly linked the Japanese economy with the international 
economic community. Internally, the practice of holding specie abroad played a role of 
reducing the influence of the foreign loan issues on the domestic economy.
Given the multilateral trade settlement system, Britain, the largest lender to Japan, 
significantly increased its exports to Japan because of its overwhelming competitiveness 
in some Japanese import markets, particularly those for military equipment.
Britain’s loans to Japan finally brought surpluses to Britain without a loss of gold.
48. Several British arms firms, such as Armstrong and Vickers, supplied warships and 
guns to the Imperial Japanese Navy. There were strong ties existing between them, and 
in 1907 Armstrong and Vickers agreed to create the Nihon Seik5 Sho, gun-making and 
turret-engineering plant in Japan (C. Trebilcock, ‘British Multinationals in Japan, 1900- 
1941: Vickers, Armstrong, Nobel, and the Defense Sector’ in T. Yuzawa & M. Udagawa 
[eds.], Foreign Business in Japan before World War II [The International Conference on 
Business History 16 Proceedings of the Fuji Conference! [Tokyo, 1990], pp.89-92); In 
1886 Jardine, Matheson & Co. became the agent of Armstrong in Japan (K. Ishii, Kindai 
Nihon to Igirisu Shihon rModem Japan and British Capitall [Tokyo, 1984], p.404).
49. The Economist. 15 July 1905, p. 1162.
Table 9.1 Japan’s Specie Holdings. 1900-1913 
(¥ million; ¥ l=2s. l/2d.)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Year Total [By owners] [By location]
Government Bank of Domestic Abroad 
Japan
1900 68 _ 68 _ _
1901 72 - 72 - -
1902 110 - 110 - -
1903 139 6 133 120 19
1904 97 1 96 26 71
1905 479 363 116 37 442
1906 495 292 203 54 441
1907 445 237 208 44 401
1908 392 166 226 62 330
1909 446 144 302 117 329
1910 472 202 270 135 337
1911 364 113 251 133 231
1912 351 82 269 136 215
1913 376 91 285 130 246
Notes: - implies no information or the amount was less than one million;
End of year;
(l)=(2)+(3)=(4)+(5).
Sources: N.G.K.H.S.. vol. Data, pp.332-33.
Table 9.2 Investments of the Bank of Japan (Specie Holdings Abroad')
. (31 January 19081 
(£000)
Item Amount
Reserves
Bank of England 1,719 
Yokohama Specie Bank (London) 1,000 
Securities 8,252
Total 10,971
Non-reserves
Bank of England 701
Yokohama Specie Bank (London) 2,051
Total 2,752
Grand-total 13,723
Source: J.M.F.A., Mizumachi Papers, 5-26.
Table 9.3 Investments of the Japanese Government (Specie Holdings Abroad)
(31 January 1908)
(1) (2)
Britain (£000) (£000) (Percent)
Deposition
Sub-total
Bank of England 362
362
Investment
Sub-total
Bank of England 
Other London banks 
Securities
5,000
7,525
1,307
13,832
Total 14,194 14,194 (55)
U.S.A. (U.S.S000) (£000)
Deposition
Banks in New York 4,661
Total 4,661 961 (4)
France (FrOOO) (£000)
Deposition
Banks in Paris 148,073
Total 148,073 5,861 (23)
Germany (DM000) (£000)
Deposition
Banks in Germany 
Securities
84,554
9,769
Total 94,323 4,638 (18)
Grand total 25,654 (100)
Notes: U .S.$l=4s. 1 l/2d.; F rl=  9 l/2d.; DM1 = 11 4/5d.;
There was foreign exchange for £1,496, U.S.$110,266, Fr709,278 and 
DM1,253,169;
(2) means sterling conversion of (1);
Deposition means the placing of funds as repositories in short-term. 
Source: J.M.F.A., Mizumachi Papers, 5-26.
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Table 9.4 Japan’s Balance of Trade. 1890-1913 
(¥000; ¥l=2s. l/2d.)
[Trade] [Gold & Silver]
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Year Export Import Balance Export Import Balance Total
balance
1890 56,604 81,729 -25,125 1,687 360 1,327 -23,798
1891 79,527 62,927 16,600 230 283 -53 16,547
1892 91,103 71,326 19,777 8,544 395 8,149 27,926
1893 89,713 88,257 1,456 2,302 496 1,806 3,262
1894 113,246 117,482 -4,236 3,547 555 2,992 -1,244
1895 136,112 129,261 6,851 2,791 1,029 1,762 8,613
1896 117,843 171,674 -53,831 1,996 10,217 -8,221 -62,052
1897 166,859 221,406 -54,547 8,863 64,313 -55,450 -109,997
1898 170,021 281,645 -111,624 46,281 37,083 9,198 -102,426
1899 222,942 224,052 -1,110 8,768 20,216 -11,448 -12,558
1900 212,869 291,664 -78,795 51,761 9,246 42,515 -36,280
1901 261,132 263,163 -2,031 11,477 11,846 -369 -2,400
1902 267,538 279,138 -11,600 453 31,871 -31,418 -43,018
1903 300,697 326,865 -26,168 16,798 26,715 -9,917 -36,085
1904 329,417 381,792 -52,375 107,128 7,241 99,887 47,512
1905 335,018 502,200 -167,182 17,210 22,256 -5,046 -172,228
1906 439,389 437,044 2,345 23,079 38,896 -15,817 -13,472
1907 452,163 512,102 -59,939 19,374 8,591 10,783 -49,156
1908 399,173 460,680 -61,507 3,833 18,290 -14,457 -75,964
1909 437,120 430,509 6,611 6,447 79,818 -73,371 -66,760
1910 501,914 520,483 -18,569 23,577 21,773 1,804 -16,765
1911 522,861 581,116 -58,255 23,713 17,058 6,655 -51,600
1912 618,245 684,104 -65,859 21,399 20,416 983 -64,876
1913 716,494 794,885 -78,391 21,110 11,792 9,318 -69,073
Notes: Excluded special exports and imports (mainly for embassies abroad);
Included import and export from Taiwan and Korea;
(3)=(l)-(2); (6)=(4)-(5); (7)=(3)+(6).
Source: M.H.S.K.T.. pp.278-79 and 298-99.
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Table 9.5 Changes of Trade Balances. Specie and Note Issues in Japan. 1903-1913
(¥ million; ¥1= 2s. l/2d.)
1903 1904 1905 1906 1907 1908 1909 1910 1911 1912 1913
(1)Balance of
Trade -14 -26 -115 165 -62 -2 68 -25 -39 -8 -12
(2)Specie total 29 -42 382 16 -50 -53 54 26 -108 -13 26
(3) Government 6 -5 362 -71 -55 -71 -22 58 -89 -31 9
(4) Bank of
Japan 23 -37 20 87 5 18 76 -32 -19 18 17
(5)Bank of Japan 
Notes
issued 1 54 26 29 28 -17 0 49 32 16 -23
(6) Specie 
Reserve 
issue
(7) Securities 
for Fiduciary 
issue
7 -33 32 31 15 8 48 7 18 -23
-6 87 -6 -2 13 -25 -48 44 25 -2 0
Notes: (2)=(3)+(4); (5)=(6)+(7).
Sources: (1) Table 9.4, column (3);
(2) Table 9.1, column (1);
(3) Table 9.1, column (2);
(4) Table 9.1, column (3);
(5),(6) and (7) M.H.S.K.T.. pp. 170-71.
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Table 9.6 Japan's Balance of Payments. 1904-1913 
(¥ million; ¥1=2 s. l/2d.)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Year Trade Invisible Long-term short-term Total Gold Specie
balance balance capital capital (specie) holdings
movements movements movements abroad
c
1904 -52.4 -77.2 97.2 10.5 -21.9 -73.6 51.7
1905 -167.1 -157.3 591.0 119.7 386.3 14.4 371.9
1906 4.0 -27.9 119.9 -74.4 21.6 23.1 -1.5
1907 -60.1 67.1 25.6 -82.7 -50.1 -9.8 -40.3
1908 -61.6 -1.3 64.2 -57.0 -55.7 15.2 -70.9
1909 6.5 -2.8 128.9 -58.8 73.8 74.3 -0.5
1910 -18.8 -66.5 102.1 -14.2 2.6 -5.0 7.6
1911 -58.4 -45.6 -4.4 -6.5 -114.9 -9.3 -105.6
1912 -66.1 -41.9 34.4 49.4 -24.2 -7.7 -16.5
1913 -78.6 -17.1 95.6 16.8 16.7 -14.8 31.5
Total -552.6 -370.5 1254.5 -97.2 234.2 6.8 227.4
Notes: Invisible balance includes nonmonetary gold, travel, freights, insurance,
investment income (interest and dividends on securities and income on 
undertakings), government receipts and payments, other services and 
transfer (government and private);
Long-term capital movements include portfolio investments and their 
repayments, and direct investments and their collections;
Long-term capital movements show an aggregated item and cannot be 
broken down by portfolio and direct investments;
Short-term capital movements are a residual item, the net balance 
calculated from all other items, and includes errors and omissions; 
Specie (gold) movements mean the movements of gold for monetary use; 
(1)+(2)+(3)+(4)=(5)=(6)+(7).
Sources: Calculated from Yamazawa & Yamamoto, Choki Keizai Tokei 14. Boeki
to Kokusai Shushi (Estimates of Long-term Economic Statistics of Japan), 
op.cit.. table 16 (pp.223-224).
M.S. Gordon, ‘Japan’s Balance of International Payments, 1904-1931’ 
(E.B. Schumpeter [ed.], The Industrialization of Japan and Manchukuo 
[New York, 1940], appendix) calculated the ‘balance of payments of all 
Japan, including Korea and Formosa’ (end table 1) but the invisible items 
which this pioneering work used are incomplete, because the details of 
Japan’s invisible items in the period from 1902-1945 were published in 
1950 (Japanese Ministry of Finance, Zaisei Kin-vu Tokei Geppo fMonthlv 
Report of Financial and Monetary Statisticsl. no.5 [Tokyo, 1950]) 
(Yamazawa & Yamamoto, op. cit.. pp. 125-26).
Table 9.7 Japan’s Exports and Imports. 1900-1910 (By Main Country)
(¥ million; ¥ l=2s. l/2d.)
1900 1901 1902 1903 1904 1905 1906 1907 1908 1909 1910
Export 42.7 59.9 66.9 70.1 72.3 54.1 86.1 94.2 83.9 96.0 108.4 
Britain
Import 126.3 96.7 93.9 96.1 120.4 183.2 170.1 195.0175.8 148.0 163.7
Balance-83.6 -36.8 -27.0 -26.0 -48.1-129.1 -84.0-100.8 -91.9 -52.0 -55.3
Export 19.1 27.2 27.2 34.2 36.3 27.2 40.2 42.5 33.7 41.5 44.9
France
Import 8.0 3.7 4.7 5.1 3.3 5.1 4.9 7.0 5.2 5.5 5.4
Balance 11.1 23.5 22.5 29.1 33.0 22.1 35.3 35.5 28.5 36.0 39.5
Export 3.5 5.2 4.7 5.1 4.1 4.3 8.3 11.2 7.9 7.9 11.1
Germany
Import 29.2 38.3 25.8 26.9 28.6 42.5 42.5 47.6 46.2 40.2 43.9
Balance-25.7 -33.1 -21.1 -21.8 -24.5 -38.2 -34.2 -36.4 -38.3 -32.3 -32.8
Export 7.1 12.5 13.2 11.0 12.0 8.0 11.8 13.7 11.3 12.0 16.8
Italy
Import 0.5 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.7 0.5 0.6 0.9 0.7 0.5 0.6
Balance 6.6 12.3 13.0 10.7 11.3 7.5 11.2 12.8 10.6 11.5 16.2
Export 8.7 9.6 5.0 8.0 9.4 7.9 10.3 13.0 13.6 14.4 18.7
India
Import 23.5 42.7 49.3 69.8 68.0 90.2 60.3 74.5 49.3 65.1 106.3
Balance-14.8 -33.1 -44.3 -61.8 -58.6 -82.3 -50.0 -61.5 -35.7 -50.7 -87.6
Export 31.8 42.9 46.8 64.9 67.9 98.6 117.7 106.0 77.7 89.2 109.1
China
Import 29.9 27.2 40.5 45.4 54.8 52.6 57.3 67.9 63.7 65.0 78.3
Balance 1.9 15.7 6.3 19.5 13.1 46.0 60.4 38.1 14.0 24.2 30.8
Export 52.5 72.3 80.2 82.7 101.2 94.0 125.9 131.1 121.9 131.5 143.7
United States
Import 62.7 42.7 48.6 46.2 58.1 104.2 69.9 80.6 77.6 54.0 54.6
Balance-10.2 29.6 31.6 36.5 43.1 -10.2 56.0 50.5 44.3 77.5 89.1
Notes: Excluding gold and silver movements;
There are serious differences in the figures between these Japanese exports- 
imports data, and the British and the United States’ ones which will be 
used in Table 9.8 and 9.9. The Japanese data neither include re-exports 
nor show the boundaries of Britain and the United States.
Source: M.H.S.K.T.. pp.290-95.
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Table 9.8 Britain’s Trade Balances. Loan Issues and 
Loan Payments with Japan. 1903-1911 
(£ million)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Year Trade Gold & Total Change Loan Change Loan Change Total 
balance silver proceeds payment change
movement
1903 2.4 -2.5 -0.1 0.3 _ 0.9 _ -
1904 2.7 0 2.7 2.8 9.6 9.3 1.6 0.7 -5.8
1905 7.9 0.1 8.0 8.1 28.1 27.8 3.0 2.1 -17.6
1906 10.2 -1.7 8.5 8.6 2.3 2.0 3.2 2.3 8.9
1907 9.0 -0.1 8.9 9.0 *4.0 3.7 4.0 3.1 8.4
1908 7.2 - 7.2 7.3 4.8 4.5 4.7 3.8 6.6
1909 4.4 - 4.4 4.5 4.3 4.0 5.0 4.1 4.6
1910 5.6 0.7 6.3 6.4 *6.7 6.4 5.0 4.1 4.1
1911 8.8 0.6 9.4 9.5 5.3 5.3 5.3 4.4 8.6
Total 55.3 56.2 65.4 63.0 32.7 24.6 17.8
Notes: Included re-exports;
Japan included Formosa;
Base year for changes is 1903;
* The balances, deducting the redemption amounts from the issue amounts, 
were divided according to London’s shares;
Loan proceeds and repayments were calculated from their issue prices (to 
government, municipalities and companies) and nominal interest rates; 
Repayments of principal and payments of interest were assumed to make 
uniformly, starting in the first years of the loan;
(3)=(l)+(2); (9)=(4)+(8)-(6);
The British exports-imports data are used here because the Japanese data 
which have been mentioned in Table 9.7 do not show gold and bullion 
movements by country.
Sources: (1) and (2) Statistical Abstract for the United Kingdom in Each of the
Latest Fifteen Years from 1896 to 1910. pp.72-73, 248-49 and 254-55;
(5) and (7) Table 3.1 and Table 8.1 and Table 8.8.
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Table 9.9 The United States’ Trade Balances. Loan Issues 
and Loan Payments with Japan. 1903-1911 
($ million; $1=4 s. 1 l/2d.)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Year Trade Gold & Total Change Loan Change Loan Change Total
balance silver proceeds payment change
movement
1902 -16.5 -0.6 -17.1 - - _ 3.2 _ _
1903 -23.3 3.0 -20.3 -3.2 - 0 9.3 3.2 0
1904 -21.8 0.5 -21.3 -4.2 46.7 46.7 9.3 6.1 -44.8
1905 -0.6 5.8 5.2 22.3 118.1 118.1 9.3 6.1 -89.7
1906 -14.6 5.3 -9.3 7.8 - 0 9.3 6.1 13.9
1907 -30.4 0 -30.4 -13.3 - 0 9.3 6.1 -7.2
1908 -26.8 0 -26.8 -9.7 - 0 9.3 6.1 -3.6
1908 -43.9 2.8 -41.1 -24.0 - 0 9.3 6.1 -17.9
1910 -44.6 26.6 -18.0 -0.9 - 0 9.3 6.1 5.2
1911 -42.0 -0.3 -41.7 -24.6 - 0 9.3 6.1 -18.5
Total -199.5 -49.8 164.8 164.8 86.9 52.0 -162.6
Notes: Included re-exports;
Base year for changes is 1903;
Japan included Formosa;
Loan proceeds and repayments were calculated from their issue prices (to 
government, municipalities and companies) and nominal interest rates; 
Repayments of principal and payments of interest were assumed to make 
uniformly, starting in the first years of the loan;
(3)=(l)+(2); (9)=(4)+(8)-(6);
The United States’ exports-imports data are used here because the Japanese 
data which have been mentioned in Table 9.7 do not show gold and
bullion movements by country.
Sources: (1) and (2) Statistical Abstract of the United States. 1911 (Washington,
1912), pp.384, 494 and 497;
(5) and (7) Table 3.1; Table 8.1 and Table 8.8.
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Chart 9.1 Distribution of Japanese Loan Proceeds
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Chart 9.3 Japanese Government’s Specie Holdings. 1903-1913
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Chart 9.3 Japanese Government’s Specie Holdings. 1903-1913(cont.l 
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Notes:
Loan - government loan redemption and interest payment;
Sold - specie sold to the Bank of Japan and the Yokohama Specie Bank; 
Government - government import charges;
Others - mainly bullion;
¥l=2s. l/2d..
Source: J.M .F.A., Shoda Papers, 49-1, 14, 16 and 23.
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Chart 9.4 Bank of Japan’s Specie Holdings. 1903-1913
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Chart 9.4 Bank of Japan’s Specie Holdings. 1903-1913 (cont.)
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Gov. bills - specie paid for government payment bills; 
Bills - specie sold in large bills;
Others - mainly bullion;
¥1 =2s. l/2d..
Source: J.M .F.A., Shoda Papers, 49-1, 14, 16 and 23.
02
361
CONCLUSION
This thesis has analysed the Japanese government loan issues on the London capital 
market before the First World War. They were important, reaching over 20 percent of 
all foreign governments’ loan issues in London in the period from 1900 to 1913.
At the outset of this thesis, two questions were addressed: firstly, how foreign 
governments were able to raise funds on the London capital market, and secondly, what 
the role of financial institutions involved in these operations was? Some answers to these 
questions have been discovered in this thesis, with respect to the history of the Japanese 
government foreign loan issues. The conclusion will now summarise the main arguments 
put forward in the thesis.
1 Japanese Foreign Loans 1870-1913: Anatomy of a ‘Successful’ Borrower
Most of this thesis has been concerned with the development of the loan issue markets 
for Japanese government foreign loans. The history of the Japanese government foreign 
loan issues has revealed the explanation for the rapid improvement of Japan’s 
creditworthiness on the London capital market. Their history will be recapitulated first, 
before turning to a discussion on these main reasons.
Unlike Latin American countries, where close ties between governments and City 
financiers had existed since the early-1820s and excess funds in European money markets 
cyclically flowed,1 Japan tended to be neglected by foreign financiers as it had been 
isolated for so long.
'. C. Marichal, A Century of Debt Crises in Latin America (Princeton [N.J.], 1989), 
pp.4 and 95. For the historical perspective of international lending waves and boom 
loans, see C.P. Kindleberger, ‘Debt Situation of the Developing Countries in Historical 
Perspective’ in S.H. Goodman (ed.), Financing and Risk in Developing Countries (New 
York, 1977), pp.3-11.
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In the 1870s London was the sole place of issue for Japanese government loans. 
Because the Japanese government, having no specific knowledge of public loans, was 
dependent upon foreign financiers, it always put its full trust in the bank with Far Eastern 
connections, the Oriental Bank, a leading British overseas bank of that time.
However, after an interval of a quarter-century, in the 1890s, the Japanese 
government aimed to establish close relations with the City for an effective loan flotation. 
The Yokohama Specie Bank, which had been set up in 1879 under the government’s 
official patronage, looked for loan issue banks, rather than intermediaries, which could 
raise government loans on the most favourable terms on the London capital market. The 
Yokohama Specie Bank disregarded the existing influence of banks and merchant houses 
with Far Eastern and Japanese connections, and established business ties with Parr’s 
Bank, a London clearing bank. Yet this link between the Yokohama Specie Bank and 
Parr’s Bank did not successfully carry through the loan issue. The Japanese government, 
as a consequence, turned more of its attention to merchant banks, which were experts in 
loan issue business on the London capital market.
In 1902, Baring Brothers, one of the oldest London merchant banks, became 
involved in the loan issue through their business connections with the Hongkong Bank. 
This combination of the loan issue banks, including banks with Far Eastern and Japanese 
connections and a merchant bank, basically prepared the way for Japan’s further large- 
scale financial operations on the international capital markets.
An expansion of the loan issue market for the Japanese government occurred 
during the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905). The American banks’ participation 
considerably modified the established loan issue pattern. The merchant banks’ widely 
scattered network of correspondents introduced the loan issue to the New York capital 
market, the position of the American banks being subordinate to London. In the next 
stage, the German banks entered the loan issue. The London issue banks thus drew many 
international financiers to the loan issues, retaining their pre-eminence in the loan issue 
negotiations.
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However, in the loan issue of November 1905, London’s primacy in Japanese 
government loan issues, which had prevailed since 1870, was undermined because the 
banks in Paris participated. Loan issue negotiations between them being more 
competitive, the Japanese government could improve loan issue terms.
In 1910, as the result of the division of the issue banks in Paris from those in 
London, the market linkages became relatively diffused, although the markets had close 
relations in simultaneous loan issues. The London and Paris capital markets, the largest 
of the time, were no longer dependent on each other, but competed on equal footing for 
Japanese government loan issues. Thus the Japanese government could negotiate even 
more favourable terms.
Table 3.1, at the beginning of Part II, summarised the overall level of the 
Japanese government foreign loan issues in the period from 1870 to 1913. The total loans 
issued on the London capital market amounted to £82,106,335 (net amount), around 3.8 
percent of the total foreign government loan issues in that period. However, the 
proportion in the period from 1900 to 1913 increased sharply to 20.8 percent because 
Japan’s foreign loan operations took place mainly after 1900. Paris rapidly increased its 
share in Japanese loan business, despite only becoming concerned with it after 1905.
This thesis has suggested a number of reasons for Japan’s growth in 
creditworthiness on the foreign capital markets.
Firstly, the Japanese government, after 1899, learned to avoid over-reliance upon 
one particular foreign financier and market, a practice which tended to impose a high rate 
of commission on borrowers. The Japanese government never allowed itself to fall easy 
prey to aggressive foreign financiers who often urged borrowers to take more loans, 
although in the 1870s it had been a dependent borrower. In order to take the initiative in 
loan issue negotiations with foreign financiers, the Japanese government prepared 
multiple markets and financiers for its foreign loan issues. From this point of view, the
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Paris capital market played a significant role in sharpening competition among financiers 
and effectively improved Japan’s borrowing position on the international capital markets. 
It seems, in the long run, that the geographical expansion of the loan issue markets 
produced a certain market mechanism in the loan issue negotiations. As a consequence, 
the Japanese government could obtain more favourable loan issue terms.
Secondly, considerable emphasis needs to be placed on the role of the leading 
local financial institutions in Japan, notably the Yokohama Specie Bank and the Industrial 
Bank, which took the initiative in negotiating loan issues with foreign financiers after 
1899. By developing a protective economic policy against foreign capital, the Japanese 
government had a definite plan to set up those banks with privileges. Both Banks 
established close business ties with the eminent foreign financiers, through which they 
placed many loans efficiently on the international capital markets at lower costs.
Thirdly, the Japanese government developed a keen appreciation of the structure 
of the London capital market, and knew how to operate a variety of financial institutions 
in the City to maximise their effects in its loan issue operations. The loan issue 
mechanism for Japanese government loans may be described as a harmonious 
combination of various financial institutions.2 At first, the banks with Far Eastern and 
Japanese connections, such as Parr’s Bank, the Hongkong Bank, the Yokohama Specie 
Bank and the Industrial Bank, introduced a loan issue to the London capital market. 
These banks acted as loan issue banks (except for the Industrial Bank), but were not 
really such because they were not experts in loan issue business. Subsequently, their 
business ties drew in merchant banks (Baring Brothers, the London Rothschilds and 
Cassel) and a stockbroker (Panmure Gordon & Co.), whose role was important in 
organising the loan issue on the London capital market. At the final stage, the merchant 
banks, through their correspondent network, linked other major international capital
2. ‘The success of Japanese financial undertakings is owing to intermediaries who 
initiated the world into the value of Japanese bonds’ (R.A.L., IX/130A/1, the London 
Rothschilds to the Paris Rothschilds, 25 February 1907).
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markets, especially New York, Berlin and Paris, for the simultaneous loan issue.
The establishment of the gold standard and the conclusion of the Anglo-Japanese 
Alliance, which formed the background of loan issue negotiations, also helped Japan’s 
rapid improvement of the creditworthiness on the London capital market.
From the macro-economic viewpoint, the adoption of the gold standard in Japan 
in 1897, as in other countries, played a critical role in its borrowing abroad. A standard 
for economic transactions was needed. The gold standard was a prerequisite for Japan to 
build up close effective relations with the City, for without it, it was difficult to make 
favourable and smooth borrowings in London.
Japan’s practice of holding specie abroad, which enhanced the working of the 
international gold standard system, represented its links with the City. The practice of 
holding specie abroad contributed considerably to the adjustment of constant fluctuations 
on the London money market, because the Bank of Japan could often lend the specie 
reserves in London to the Bank of England. For Japan, this practice could reduce the 
influence of large borrowings abroad on the domestic economy by regulating the rate of 
foreign exchange. The holding of specie abroad pegged Japan’s currency through sterling 
balances in London (not directly through gold) to the pound sterling, and Japan could 
absorb large foreign loans without disrupting its foreign trade and commerce.
From the diplomatic viewpoint, it was the Anglo-Japanese Alliance that enabled 
Japan to raise many loans successfully in London during the Russo-Japanese War. 
Diplomatic relations between a lending and a borrowing country formed the most basic 
structure of loan issue negotiations. After the conclusion of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance 
in 1902, it was certain that the London capital market came to favour Japan’s loan issues. 
In the bond re-sale of 1902, the British government provided political assistance to Japan 
by the inscription of the stock at the Bank of England, a method which was employed 
only in diplomatically important foreign government loan issues.
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In wider perspective, it is necessary to state the fundamentals of Japanese 
economic and political development in this era, related to the improvement of its 
creditworthiness.
Political stability fostered the smooth process of industrialisation in Japan, and 
this finally improved Japan’s creditworthiness on the foreign capital markets. After the 
Meiji Restoration in 1863, the newly established government achieved political stability 
in Japan. This government initiated a deliberate programme of modernisation in the 
country by adopting Western culture and techniques.3
The economic development in the Japan of the time was directly connected to the 
military strength of the state. The state pursued policies, such as restricting inward direct 
investment, which maintained Japan’s independence and hastened its development as a 
imperialistic country after the Russo-Japanese War. Often described as ‘armament loans’, 
the character of the Japanese government foreign loans had a military purpose above 
all. At least 75 percent of the total loan issue amount (net amount and excluding the 
conversion loans) was used for military outlay. The increased armaments raised Japan to 
the status of a great military power.
2 Loan Issue Process on the London Capital Market: New Perspectives
A number of general points about the foreign loan issue mechanism on the London capital 
market before the First World War have emerged from this research.
The loan issue mechanism of the London capital market, especially the important 
role of stockbrokers in loan issues, has not been emphasised sufficiently in the previous 
literature and needs to be highlighted here. The fragmented structure of the London
3. A. Gerschenkron, Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective 
(Cambridge[Mass.], 1962), p. 17.
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capital market included a variety of the financial institutions in foreign loan issue 
operations, but the activities of stockbrokers co-ordinated their interests in loan issues and 
enabled various financial institutions, even lacking the necessary expertise, to become 
loan issue banks.
Undoubtedly, the leading figures of the London capital market were merchant 
banks, and they had dealt with most of the large foreign government loan issues since the 
early nineteenth century. Other banks, such as clearing banks, overseas banks and foreign 
banks, encroached gradually on the field of foreign loan issue business in the late 
nineteenth century. But the lack of experience did not easily allow them to effect loan 
issues on the market. They needed to co-operate with merchant banks or stockbrokers, 
who were experts in loan issue business.
Most of the loan issues on the London capital market were carried out by the 
method of public subscription. If the loan issue was underwritten fully, the loan issue 
banks did not run great risks, except for their own underwriting amounts. The loan issue 
banks were not always required to be experts in loan issue business and often were 
simply subscription agents, allowing other financial institutions, such as stockbrokers, 
to make the necessary arrangements for the loan issue. This is why various banks, other 
than merchant banks, could act as loan issue banks in the London capital market when 
they had reasons for business, namely specific linkages with borrowers.
Underwriting could effectively disperse the risks of loan issues to underwriters 
and became the core of loan issue operations on the London capital market. Such 
structure of the loan issue market could free financial intermediaries involved in loan 
issues from the large risks. Stockbrokers played a substantial role in organising the 
underwriters of loan issues, except when the loan issues were arranged by merchant 
banks, most of which would form underwriting syndicates mainly by themselves or 
undertake the loan issues at their own risk. In Germany and France, on the other hand, 
loan issue banks often undertook loan issues at their own risk. In most cases, they took 
the issue and placed them directly with their clients and correspondents by the method
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of direct placement.
For financial institutions, loan issue commissions were important earning sources. 
Normally loan issue commissions were distributed among the following institutions 
involved in the loan issue: loan issue banks (loan issue bank commissions); underwriters 
(underwriting commissions); stockbrokers (brokerage commissions for placing 
underwriting); loan issue banks or stockbrokers (brokerage commissions for application); 
intermediaries which introduced the loan issue to the loan issue banks (intermediary 
commissions).
Both loan issue bank and underwriting commissions fluctuated with borrowers’ 
creditworthiness on the market. Less creditworthy borrowers faced more expensive 
commissions which were imposed by loan issue banks and underwriters in order to 
compensate their risks adequately. Brokerage (placing underwriting and handling 
applications) and intermediary commissions were fixed. Loan issue commissions became 
one of the criteria for borrowers to select loan issue banks and markets, as did costs of 
loan issues. The competitive market structures enabled borrowers to issue loans at lower 
costs.
The expansion of loan issue markets was important in considering loan issues on 
the international capital markets, such as London, Paris, Berlin and New York. The 
mechanism of market linkages has not been satisfactorily analysed so far because of the 
lack of information on loan issue negotiations.
Before the First World War, only specific financial intermediaries, with 
established business connections over a range of national markets, could take up 
international loan issue business. Typically merchant banks, on their extensive 
correspondent networks, frequently linked the markets together for loan issues. At the 
outset, market linkages occurred in simultaneous loan issues under the influence of the 
main market. As a result of the development of the other capital markets, London’s 
unchallenged lead declined and the relationships between the world’s major capital 
markets became relatively decentralised. But each market was not really separate. The
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national capital markets, parts of the international capital markets, would co-operate in 
many simultaneous loan issues. In addition, borrowers improved their borrowing position 
on foreign markets and could have access to any international capital markets directly, 
not through their main market. The patterns of loan issues became more diversified for 
borrowers. Now borrowers could select the most favourable loan issue either on one 
market (a separate loan) or on multiple markets (a simultaneous loan). The market 
linkages reached a new stage.
3 Japan: Debt Rewarded
Most of this thesis has been concerned with the Japanese government loan issue 
operations on the London capital market. It is right to conclude, from this viewpoint, that 
the Japanese government’s foreign loan issues were ‘successful’, because Japan could 
raise itself from the position of a doubtful borrower in the 1870s to a respected one after 
the Russo-Japanese War. However, no straightforward answer to the larger question - 
whether Japan’s foreign borrowings were really ‘successful’ with respect to its domestic 
economy - is possible unless their consequence is closely examined. The import of 
Japan’s foreign borrowings in this sense is beyond the scope of this study, but a few final 
words should be said.
Japan’s early industrialisation before the 1890s was financed mainly by domestic 
sources, not foreign borrowings. From 1897, Japan began to depend upon heavy foreign 
borrowings. The foreign capital in the Japanese economy of this time played a limited 
role mainly in alleviating the strain of the foreign trade deficits incurred to support rapid 
militarisation. The import of foreign capital in the form of government loans in this 
period neither contributed directly to the industrial development of Japan nor positively 
changed the basic structure of its economy.
The Japanese economy, just on the eve of the First World War, was almost 
thrown into a debt crisis which resulted from the large loan issues during the Russo-
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Japanese War. In 1914, the Japanese government, exhausting a huge amount of its specie 
holdings abroad, had to make an urgent agreement with the Bank of Japan and the 
Yokohama Specie Bank that the latter should offer the government its export bills for 
the payment of the government’s charges abroad. Yet the outbreak of war made it 
unnecessary.4 Increased exports, stimulated by war demand, secured Japan sufficient trade 
surpluses. Otherwise it would have suffered considerably from the payment of the 
outstanding debts and trade deficits. Japan was lucky because the exceptional and 
unexpected circumstances of a world war saved it from the most obvious problem of 
large foreign borrowings - the cost of servicing the debt.
4. N.G.H.S.. vol.2, pp.295-96.
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